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  1. added 2019-02-09
    Basic Action and Practical Knowledge.Will Small - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    It is a commonplace in philosophy of action that there is and must be teleologically basic action: something done on an occasion without doing it by means of doing anything else. It is widely believed that basic actions are exercises of skill. As the source of the need for basic action is the structure of practical reasoning, this yields a conception of skill and practical reasoning as complementary but disjoint. On this view, practical reasoning and complex intentional action depend on (...)
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  2. added 2018-10-09
    Philosophy of Action From Suarez to Davidson.Constantine Sandis (ed.) - forthcoming
  3. added 2018-09-21
    Neuropsychology and the Criminal Responsibility of Psychopaths: Reconsidering the Evidence.Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):1003-1025.
    Recently it has been argued that certain neuropsychological findings on the decision-making, instrumental learning, and moral understanding in psychopathic offenders offer reasons to consider them not criminally responsible, due to certain epistemic and volitional impairments. We reply to this family of arguments, that collectively we call the irresponsibility of the psychopath argument. This type of argument has a premise that describes or prescribes the deficiencies that grant or should grant partial or complete criminal exculpation. The other premise contends that neuropsychological (...)
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  4. added 2018-09-11
    Unable to Do the Impossible.Anthony Nguyen - 2018 - Mind 1.
    Jack Spencer has recently argued for the striking thesis that, possibly, an agent is able to do the impossible—that is, perform an action that is metaphysically impossible for that person to perform. Spencer bases his argument on (Simple G), a case in which it is impossible for an agent G to perform some action but, according to Spencer, G is still intuitively able to perform that action. I reply that we would have to give up at least four action-theoretical principles (...)
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  5. added 2018-05-14
    Blameworthiness and Unwitting Omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - In Dana Kay Nelkin and Samuel C. Rickless (ed.), The Ethics and Law of Omissions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 63-83.
    This paper argues that agents can be directly blameworthy for unwitting omissions. The view developed focuses on the capacities and abilities of agents.
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  6. added 2018-03-22
    Legal Agreements and the Capacities of Agents.Andrei Buckareff - 2014 - In Law and the Philosophy of Action. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill. pp. 195-219.
    Most work at the intersection of law and the philosophy of action focuses on criminal responsibility. Unfortunately, this focus has been at the expense of reflecting on how the philosophy of action might help illuminate our understanding of issues in civil law. In this essay, focusing on Anglo-American jurisprudence, we examine the conditions under which a party to a legal agreement is deemed to have the capacity required to be bound by that agreement. We refer to this condition as the (...)
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  7. added 2018-03-07
    Agency and Practical Abilities.Will Small - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:235-264.
    Though everyday life accords a great deal of significance to practical abilities—such as the ability to walk, to speak French, to play the piano—philosophers of action pay surprisingly little attention to them. By contrast, abilities are discussed in various other philosophical projects. From these discussions, a partial theory of abilities emerges. If the partial theory—which is at best adequate only to a few examples of practical abilities—were correct, then philosophers of action would be right to ignore practical abilities, because they (...)
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  8. added 2018-02-02
    On the Ability to Inhibit Thought and Action: General and Special Theories of an Act of Control.Gordon D. Logan, Trisha Van Zandt, Frederick Verbruggen & Eric-Jan Wagenmakers - 2014 - Psychological Review 121 (1):66-95.
  9. added 2018-01-06
    Changing Things: Aristotle on Action and the Capacity for Action in Metaphysics IX, 5.R. King - unknown
  10. added 2017-05-24
    Action, Knowledge, & Will.John Hyman - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Human agency has four irreducibly different dimensions -- psychological, ethical, intellectual, and physical -- which the traditional idea of a will tended to conflate. Twentieth-century philosophers criticized the idea that acts are caused by 'willing' or 'volition', but the study of human action continued to be governed by a tendency to equate these dimensions of agency, or to reduce one to another. Cutting across the branches of philosophy, from logic and epistemology to ethics and jurisprudence, Action, Knowledge, and Will defends (...)
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  11. added 2015-05-04
    Hart and Punishment for Negligence.Larry Alexander - 2014 - In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility.
  12. added 2015-03-28
    A Neurophysiological Dissociation Between Monitoring One’s Own and Others’ Actions in Psychopathy.Inti A. Brazil, Rogier B. Mars, Berend H. Bulten, Jan K. Buitelaar, Robbert J. Verkes & Ellen R. A. De Bruijn - 2011 - Biological Psychiatry 69:693–699.
    Monitoring of own behavior is not affected in psychopathy, whereas processing of the outcome of others’ actions is disturbed. Specifically, although psychopathic individuals do not have a problem with initial processing of the actions of others, they have problems with deeper analyses of the consequences of the observed action, possibility related to the reward value of the action. These results suggest that aspects of action monitoring in psychopathy are disturbed in social contexts and possibly play a central role in the (...)
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  13. added 2014-07-17
    Rational Capacities, Or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 17-38.
    We ordinarily suppose that there is a difference between having and failing to exercise a rational capacity on the one hand, and lacking a rational capacity altogether on the other. This is crucial for our allocations of responsibility. Someone who has but fails to exercise a capacity is responsible for their failure to exercise their capacity, whereas someone who lacks a capacity altogether is not. However, as Gary Watson pointed out in his seminal essay ’Skepticism about Weakness of Will’, the (...)
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