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  1. A Defence of the Notion of ‘Foundedness’ in Carnap’s Aufbau.Sophie Nagler - 2020 - The New Collection 14:68-87.
    In Der logische Aufbau der Welt, first published in 1928, Carnap aims to rationally reconstruct all objects of cognition by logico-definitional means. As a result, he intends to obtain a fully objective framework in which scientific discourse can take place. This is made possible by the novel method of ‘purely structural definite description’ of all scientifically relevant objects, which is first introduced in the Aufbau. Key to the attainment of this goal is the notion of ‘foundedness’, which Carnap presents as (...)
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  2. Carnap’s Epistemological Critique of Metaphysics.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2247-2265.
    Many who take a dismissive attitude towards metaphysics trace their view back to Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. But the reason Carnap takes a dismissive attitude to metaphysics is a matter of controversy. I will argue that no reason is given in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, and this is because his reason for rejecting metaphysical debates was given in ‘Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy’. The argument there assumes verificationism, but I will argue that his argument survives the rejection of verificationism. The root (...)
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  3. Why “is At”? —On Quine’s Objection to Carnap’s Aufbau in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.Ka Ho Lam - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (4).
    In “Two Dogmas”, Quine indicates that Carnap’s Aufbau fails “in principle” to reduce our knowledge of the external world to sense data. This is because in projecting the sensory material to reconstruct the physical world, Carnap gives up the use of operating rules and switches to a procedure informed by general principles. This procedure falls short of providing an eliminative translation for the connective “is at”, which is necessary for the reduction. In dissecting Quine’s objection, I argue that Quine has (...)
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  4. Rudolf Carnap.Logan Paul Gage - 2017 - In Paul Copan, I. I. I. Tremper Longman, Christopher L. Reese & Michael G. Strauss (eds.), Dictionary of Christianity and Science: The Definitive Reference for the Intersection of Christian Faith and Contemporary Science. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic. pp. 79-80.
    A brief introduction to the life and key work of Rudolf Carnap with special attention to his work on inductive logic.
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  5. Stroud’s Carnap.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):276-302.
    In “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” Carnap drew his famous distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap’s aim and method. Carnap was responding to critics who suggested that his willingness to quantify over abstract entities in his work in semantics violated his (...)
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  6. Naturalism, Normativity, and Explanation: Some Scientistic Biases of Contemporary Naturalism.Guy Axtell - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (3):253-274.
    The critical focus of this paper is on a claim made explicitly by Gilbert Harman and accepted implicitly by numerous others, the claim that naturalism supports concurrent defense of scientific objectivism and moral relativism. I challenge the assumptions of Harman's ‘argument from naturalism' used to support this combination of positions, utilizing. Hilary Putnam’s ‘companions in guilt’ argument in order to counter it. The paper concludes that while domain-specific anti-realism is often warranted, Harman’s own views about the objectivity of facts and (...)
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  7. The Concept of Confirming Evidence.Rudolf Carnap - 1983 - In Peter Achinstein (ed.), The Concept of Evidence. Oxford University Press.
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  8. Immodest Inductive Methods.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.
    Inductive methods can be used to estimate the accuracies of inductive methods. Call a method immodest if it estimates that it is at least as accurate as any of its rivals. It would be unreasonable to adopt any but an immodest method. Under certain assumptions, exactly one of Carnap's lambda-methods is immodest. This may seem to solve the problem of choosing among the lambda-methods; but sometimes the immodest lambda-method is λ =0, which it would not be reasonable to adopt. We (...)
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  9. Estimated Utility and Corroboration.Alex C. Michalos - 1965 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (64):327-331.
  10. Corroboration and Rules of Acceptance.Isaac Levi - 1962 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (52):307-313.
  11. Remarks on Popper's Note on Content and Degree of Confirmation.Rudolf Carmap - 1956 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):243-244.
  12. Carnap on Defining "Degree of Confirmation".John W. Lenz - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (3):230-236.
  13. On the Comparative Concept of Confirmation.Rudolf Carnap - 1952 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (12):311-318.
  14. Truth and Confirmation.Rudolf Carnap - 1949 - In Harry Fiegl & Wilfred Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts. pp. 119--127.
  15. Carnap, Revisionism and "Truth and Confirmation".J. C. P. Oliveira - unknown
    In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed. One aspect of this revisionism -defended by authors like Michael Friedman, John Earman and George Reisch - is the thesis that Carnap’s later thought is compatible with that of Kuhn and even that Carnap anticipates some relevant points of Kuhn’s theory of science. In this paper I discuss one of Carnap’s texts most frequently cited by revisionists in favor of their thesis -"Truth and Confirmation" - trying to (...)
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  16. Carnap-Confirmation, Content-Cutting, & Real Confirmation.Ken Gemes - 1989
    The attempt to explicate the intuitive notions of confirmation and inductive support through use of the formal calculus of probability received its canonical formulation in Carnap's The Logical Foundations of Probability. It is a central part of modern Bayesianism as developed recently, for instance, by Paul Horwich and John Earman. Carnap places much emphasis on the identification of confirmation with the notion of probabilistic favorable relevance. Notoriously, the notion of confirmation as probabilistic favorable relevance violates the intuitive transmittability condition that (...)
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