This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

56 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 56
  1. From Wittgenstein's Prison to the Boundless Ocean : Carnap's Dream of Logical Syntax.Steve Awodey & A. W. Carus - 2009 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  2. Identity, Semantics and Ontology in Carnap.Gilead Bar-Elli - 1986 - Philosophia 16 (3-4):315-331.
  3. Semantic Information.Yehoshua Bar-Hillel & Rudolf Carnap - 1953 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4 (14):147-157.
  4. Nuel Belnap Under Carnap's Lamp: Flat Pre-Semantics.N. Belnap - unknown
    “Flat pre-semantics” lets each parameter of truth be considered separately and equally, and without worrying about grammatical complications. This allows one to become a little clearer on a variety of philosophical-logical points, such as the usefulness of Carnapian tolerance and the deep relativity of truth. A more definite result of thinking in terms of flat pre-semantics lies in the articulation of some instructive ways of categorizing operations on meanings in purely logical terms in relation to various parameters of truth ; (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Carnap, the Necessary a Priori, and Metaphysical Anti-Realism.Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson - 2016 - In Stephen Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap. Oxford: pp. 81-104.
    In Meaning and Necessity (1947/1950), Carnap advances an intensional semantic framework on which modal claims are true in virtue of semantical rules alone, and so are a priori. In 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (1950), Carnap advances an epistemic-ontological framework on which metaphysical claims are either trivial or meaningless, since lacking any means of substantive confirmation. Carnap carried out these projects two decades before Kripke influentially argued, in Naming and Necessity (1972/1980), that some modal claims are true a posteriori. How should (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. The Problem of Other Minds: A Debate Between Schrödinger and Carnap. [REVIEW]Michel Bitbol - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):115-123.
    This paper reviews the debate between Carnap and Schrödinger about Hypothesis P (It is not only I who have perceptions and thoughts; other human beings have them too)–a hypothesis that underlies the possibility of doing science. For Schrödinger this hypothesis is not scientifically testable; for Carnap it is. But Schrödinger and Carnap concede too much to each other and miss an alternative understanding: science does not depend on an explicit hypothesis concerning what other human beings see and think; it is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Carnap's Semantics.Max Black - 1949 - Philosophical Review 58 (3):257-264.
  8. Language, Truth, and Knowledge: Contributions to the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap.Thomas Bonk (ed.) - 2003 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This collection, with essays by Graham H. Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Jan Wolenski, will interest graduate students of the philosophy of language and logic, as well as professional philosophers, historians of analytic philosophy, and philosophically inclined logicians. Language, Truth and Knowledge brings together 11 new essays that offer a wealth of insights on a number of Carnap's concerns and ideas. The volume arose out of a symposium on Carnap's work at an international conference held in Vienna in 2001. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Language, Truth and Knowledge.Thomas Bonk (ed.) - 2003 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This collection, with essays by Graham H. Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Jan Wolenski, will interest graduate students of the philosophy of language ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Carnap’s Epistemological Critique of Metaphysics.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2247-2265.
    Many who take a dismissive attitude towards metaphysics trace their view back to Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. But the reason Carnap takes a dismissive attitude to metaphysics is a matter of controversy. I will argue that no reason is given in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, and this is because his reason for rejecting metaphysical debates was given in ‘Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy’. The argument there assumes verificationism, but I will argue that his argument survives the rejection of verificationism. The root (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics.John P. Burgess - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
    Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  12. Carnap on Meaning and Analyticity.Richard Butrick - 1970 - The Hague: Mouton.
  13. Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (11):20--40.
  14. On Protocol Sentences.Rudolf Carnap, Richard Creath & Richard Nollan - 1987 - Noûs 21 (4):457-470.
  15. Revisability and Conceptual Change in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism".David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (8):387-415.
    W.V. Quine’s article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is one of the most influential works in 20thcentury philosophy. The article is cast most explicitly as an argument against logical empiricists such as Carnap, arguing against the analytic/synthetic distinction that they appeal to along with their verificationism. But the article has been read much more broadly as an attack on the notion..
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  16. The Semantic Tradition From Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station.Alberto Coffa - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    This major publication is a history of the semantic tradition in philosophy from the early nineteenth century through its incarnation in the work of the Vienna Circle, the group of logical positivists that emerged in the years 1925-1935 in Vienna who were characterised by a strong commitment to empiricism, a high regard for science, and a conviction that modern logic is the primary tool of analytic philosophy. In the first part of the book, Alberto Coffa traces the roots of logical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   33 citations  
  17. Every Dogma has its Day.Richard Creath - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347-389.
    This paper is a reexamination of Two Dogmas in the light of Quine's ongoing debate with Carnap over analyticity. It shows, first, that analytic is a technical term within Carnap's epistemology. As such it is intelligible, and Carnap's position can meet Quine's objections. Second, it shows that the core of Quine's objection is that he has an alternative epistemology to advance, one which appears to make no room for analyticity. Finally, the paper shows that Quine's alternative epistemology is itself open (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  18. Some Remarks on "Protocol Sentences".Richard Creath - 1987 - Noûs 21 (4):471-475.
  19. Carnap's Early Conventionalism. An Inquiry Into the Historical Background of the Vienna Circle.Richard Creath - 1986 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (3):430-431.
  20. Cambridge Companion to Rudolf Carnap.Richard Creath & Michael Friedman (eds.) - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
  21. Reason's Nearest Kin: Philosophies of Arithmetic From Kant to Carnap Michael Potter.William Demopoulos - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):599-612.
  22. Carnap on Theoretical Terms: Structuralism Without Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Michael Friedman - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):249 - 263.
    Both realists and instrumentalists have found it difficult to understand (much less accept) Carnap's developed view on theoretical terms, which attempts to stake out a neutral position between realism and instrumentalism. I argue that Carnap's mature conception of a scientific theory as the conjunction of its Ramsey sentence and Carnap sentence can indeed achieve this neutral position. To see this, however, we need to see why the Newman problem raised in the context of recent work on structural realism is no (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  23. Rudolf Carnap.Logan Paul Gage - 2017 - In Paul Copan, I. I. I. Tremper Longman, Christopher L. Reese & Michael G. Strauss (eds.), Dictionary of Christianity and Science: The Definitive Reference for the Intersection of Christian Faith and Contemporary Science. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic. pp. 79-80.
  24. Les Termes Théoriques, de Carnap À Lewis.Henri Galinon - 2009 - Philonsorbonne 4:1-12.
    This is a short introductory paper to the Ramsey-Carnap method, as introduced by Carnap in his "Philosophical foundations of Physics" (1966) to explain the meaning of theoretical terms.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Semantics in Carnap.Warren Goldfarb - 1997 - Philosophical Topics 25 (2):51-66.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  26. Two Dogmas'–All Bark and No Bite? Carnap and Quine on Analyticity.Paul A. Gregory - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633–648.
    Recently O’Grady argued that Quine’s “Two Dogmas” misses its mark when Carnap’s use of the analyticity distinction is understood in the light of his deflationism. While in substantial agreement with the stress on Carnap’s deflationism, I argue that O’Grady is not sufficiently sensitive to the difference between using the analyticity distinction to support deflationism, and taking a deflationary attitude towards the distinction itself; the latter being much more controversial. Being sensitive to this difference, and viewing Quine as having reason to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Carnap, the Principle of Tolerance, and Empiricism.Robert Hudson - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (3):341-358.
    Kurt Gödel criticizes Rudolf Carnap's conventionalism on the grounds that it relies on an empiricist admissibility condition, which, if applied, runs afoul of his second incompleteness theorem. Thomas Ricketts and Michael Friedman respond to Gödel's critique by denying that Carnap is committed to Gödel's admissibility criterion; in effect, they are denying that Carnap is committed to any empirical constraint in the application of his principle of tolerance. I argue in response that Carnap is indeed committed to an empirical requirement vis‐à‐vis (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. “Carnap” and “the Polish Logician”.Peter Inwagen - 2002 - Acta Analytica 17 (1):7-17.
    InThe Many Faces of Realism and elsewhere, Hilary Putnam has presented an argument for the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter as to how many objects there are. In brief: Carnap says that a certain imaginary world contains three objects, ×1, ×2, and ×3. The Polish logician says that this same world must contain four other objects (×1 + ×2, ×1 + ×2 + ×3, etc.). Putnam maintains that there can be no fact of the matter as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Review of Richard Creath, Michael Friedman (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Carnap[REVIEW]Gregory Lavers - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (9).
  30. Carnap, Formalism, and Informal Rigour.Gregory Lavers - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):4-24.
    Carnap's position on mathematical truth in The Logical Syntax of Language has been attacked from two sides: Kreisel argues that it is formalistic but should not be, and Friedman argues that it is not formalistic but needs to be. In this paper I argue that the Carnap of Syntax does not eliminate our ordinary notion of mathematical truth in favour of a formal analogue; so Carnap's notion of mathematical truth is not formalistic. I further argue that there is no conflict (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  31. Carnap, Semantics and Ontology.Gregory Lavers - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):295-316.
    This paper will deal with three questions regarding Carnap's transition from the position he held at the time of writing Syntax to the doctrines he held during his semantic phase: (1) What was Carnap's attitude towards truth at the time of writing Syntax? (2) What was Carnap's position regarding questions of reference and ontology at the time of writing Syntax? (3) Was Carnap's acceptance of Tarski's analysis of truth and reference detrimental to his philosophical project? Section 1 of this paper (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  32. Empirical Equivalence in the Quine-Carnap Debate.Eric J. Loomis - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508.
    Alexander George has put forward a novel interpretation of the Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity. George argues that Carnap's claim that there exists an analytic-synthetic distinction was held by Carnap to be empty of empirical consequences. As a result, Carnap understood his position to be empirically indistinguishable from Quine's. Although George defends his interpretation only briefly, I show that it withstands further examination and ought to be accepted. The consequences of accepting it undermine a common understanding of Quine's criticism of Carnap, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  33. Carnap's Conventionalism in Geometry.Stefan Lukits - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):123-138.
    Against Thomas Mormann's argument that differential topology does not support Carnap's conventionalism in geometry we show their compatibility. However, Mormann's emphasis on the entanglement that characterizes topology and its associated metrics is not misplaced. It poses questions about limits of empirical inquiry. For Carnap, to pose a question is to give a statement with the task of deciding its truth. Mormann's point forces us to introduce more clarity to what it means to specify the task that decides between competing hypotheses (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Revising Carnap's Semantic Conception of Modality.Toby Meadows - 2012 - Studia Logica 100 (3):497-515.
    I provide a tableau system and completeness proof for a revised version of Carnap's semantics for quantified modal logic. For Carnap, a sentence is possible if it is true in some first order model. However, in a similar fashion to second order logic, no sound and complete proof theory can be provided for this semantics. This factor contributed to the ultimate disappearance of Carnapian modal logic from contemporary philosophical discussion. The proof theory I discuss comes close to Carnap's semantic vision (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Mathematical Aspects of Similarity and Quasi-Analysis - Order, Topology, and Sheaves.Thomas Mormann - manuscript
    The concept of similarity has had a rather mixed reputation in philosophy and the sciences. On the one hand, philosophers such as Goodman and Quine emphasized the „logically repugnant“ and „insidious“ character of the concept of similarity that allegedly renders it inaccessible for a proper logical analysis. On the other hand, a philosopher such as Carnap assigned a central role to similarity in his constitutional theory. Moreover, the importance and perhaps even indispensibility of the concept of similarity for many empirical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Rudolf Carnap.Thomas Mormann - 2000 - C.H. Beck.
    Einführung in die Philosophie Rudolf Carnaps.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  37. Carnap, Rudolf.Mauro Murzi - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  38. The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Edited by P. A. Schilpp. (Open Court and Cambridge University Press. 1964. Pp. Xvi and 1,088. £9.). [REVIEW]D. J. O'Connor - 1967 - Philosophy 42 (161):291-.
  39. Carnap and Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Paul O'Grady - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1015-1027.
    There is a general consensus that Quine’s assault on analyticity and verificationism in ‘Two Dogma of Empiricism’ has been successful and that Carnap’s philosophical position has been vanquished. This paper so characterises Carnap’s position that it escapes Quine’s criticisms. It shows that the disagreement is not a first order dispute about analyticity or verificationism, but rather a deeper dispute about philosophical method.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  40. How Carnap Should Bite Goodman's Bullet.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 1994 - Philosophia 24 (1-2):149-156.
  41. Carnap e o Positivismo Logico.Alberto Pasquinelli - 1983 - Edicoes 70.
  42. Hans Hahn & Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, La concezione scientifica del mondo - Il circolo di Vienna, 1929.Alberto Pasquinelli (ed.) - 1979 - Laterza.
  43. Introduzione a Carnap.Alberto Pasquinelli - 1972 - Laterza.
  44. Il Neoempirismo.Alberto Pasquinelli (ed.) - 1969 - Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese.
  45. Metodologia, epistemologia e filosofia della scienza. Appunti dal corso.Alberto Pasquinelli - 1969 - Clueb.
  46. La Teoría de Los Invariantes y El Espacio Intuitivo En Der Raum de Rudolf Carnap.Álvaro J. Peláez Cedrés - 2008 - Análisis Filosófico 28 (2):175-203.
    La consecuencia más difundida de la revolución en la geometría del siglo XIX es aquella que afirma que después de dichos cambios ya nada quedaría de la vieja noción de espacio como "forma de la intuición sensible", ni de la geometría como "condición trascendental" de la posibilidad de la experiencia. Este artículo se ocupa del intento de Rudolf Carnap por articular una concepción del espacio intuitivo que, al tiempo que se mantiene dentro del paradigma kantiano se hace eco de algunos (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Review: Coffa, The Semantic Tradition From Carnap to Kant: To the Vienna Station. [REVIEW]C. Pigden - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (4):522-525.
  48. Rudolf Carnap's 'Theoretical Concepts in Science'.Stathos Psillos - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (1):151-172.
    Rudolf Carnap delivered the hitherto unpublished lecture ‘Theoretical Concepts in Science’ at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, at Santa Barbara, California, on 29 December 1959. It was part of a symposium on ‘Carnap’s views on Theoretical Concepts in Science’. In the bibliography that appears in the end of the volume, ‘The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap’, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, a revised version of this address appears to be among Carnap’s forthcoming papers. But although Carnap started (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  49. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition From Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station. [REVIEW]Alan Richardson - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (1):142-.
  50. Understanding Quine in Terms of the Aufbau: Another Look at Naturalized Epistemology.Stefanie Rocknak - 2010 - In Marcin Milkowski Konrad Talmud-Kaminski (ed.), Beyond Description: Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications.
    I argue that Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s “radical” (FLPV; TDE 39) and “phenomenalistic” (FSS 15-16) reductionism—as it is manifest in the Aufbau—may be understood in terms of a broader historical context. In particular, it may be understood as a rejection of a contemporary variant of the second horn of Meno’s Paradox. As a result, Quine’s motivation to adopt naturalism may be understood independently of his pragmatic concerns. According to Quine, it was simply unreasonable (i.e. paradoxical) to adopt a Carnapian phenomenalistic/mentalistic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 56