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  1. Rejecting the Given: Neurath and Carnap on Methodological Solipsism.Thomas Uebel - forthcoming - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science:000-000.
    This paper investigates how the doctrine of the epistemological given—long associated with empiricism and positivism and also informing Carnap’s first major work in 1928—was challenged and overcome by Neurath and Carnap in subsequent years. Particular attention is paid to the controversial issue of how precisely the dialectic between Neurath and Carnap played out: whether Neurath’s argumentation correctly engaged with Carnap’s actual positions, whether Carnap’s change of positions in turn fully engaged with Neurath’s challenge, and what all this may tell us (...)
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  2. A Defence of the Notion of ‘Foundedness’ in Carnap’s Aufbau.Sophie Nagler - 2020 - The New Collection 14:68-87.
    In Der logische Aufbau der Welt, first published in 1928, Carnap aims to rationally reconstruct all objects of cognition by logico-definitional means. As a result, he intends to obtain a fully objective framework in which scientific discourse can take place. This is made possible by the novel method of ‘purely structural definite description’ of all scientifically relevant objects, which is first introduced in the Aufbau. Key to the attainment of this goal is the notion of ‘foundedness’, which Carnap presents as (...)
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  3. Empiricist and Neo-Kantian Elements in the Aufbau.Saniye Vatansever - 2020 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):451-468.
    According to W. V. O. Quine's received view, Rudolf Carnap's Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (henceforth Aufbau) is a radical empiricist project that attempts at reducing scientific knowledge to a phenomenalistic basis. In Quine's reading, having a phenomenalistic basis is an essential part of the thesis of the Aufbau. According to Michael Friedman, on the other hand, Aufbau is a neo-Kantian project that is primarily concerned with showing the possibility of objective and unified scientific knowledge. Thus, for Friedman, Carnap's choice (...)
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  4. Stance Empiricism and Epistemic Reason.Jonathan Surovell - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):709-733.
    Some versions of empiricism have been accused of being neither empirically confirmable nor analytically true and therefore meaningless or unknowable by their own lights. Carnap, and more recently van Fraassen, have responded to this objection by construing empiricism as a stance containing non-cognitive attitudes. The resulting stance empiricism is not subject to the norms of knowledge, and so does not self-defeat as per the objection. In response to this proposal, several philosophers have argued that if empiricism is a stance, then (...)
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  5. Carnap’s Epistemological Critique of Metaphysics.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2247-2265.
    Many who take a dismissive attitude towards metaphysics trace their view back to Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. But the reason Carnap takes a dismissive attitude to metaphysics is a matter of controversy. I will argue that no reason is given in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, and this is because his reason for rejecting metaphysical debates was given in ‘Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy’. The argument there assumes verificationism, but I will argue that his argument survives the rejection of verificationism. The root (...)
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  6. Carnap’s Turn to the Thing Language.Ansten Klev - 2018 - Philosophia Scientiae 22:179-198.
    Les contributions de Carnap au Congrès de 1935 marquent un triple changement dans sa philosophie: son tournant sémantique; ce qui sera appelé plus tard « la libéralisation de l’empirisme»; et son adoption du « langage des choses» comme base du langage de la science. C’est ce troisième changement qui est examiné ici. On s’interroge en particulier sur les motifs qui ont poussé Carnap à adopter le langage des choses comme langage protocolaire de la science unifiée et sur les vertus de (...)
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  7. Rudolf Carnap.Logan Paul Gage - 2017 - In Paul Copan, I. I. I. Tremper Longman, Christopher L. Reese & Michael G. Strauss (eds.), Dictionary of Christianity and Science: The Definitive Reference for the Intersection of Christian Faith and Contemporary Science. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic. pp. 79-80.
    A brief introduction to the life and key work of Rudolf Carnap with special attention to his work on inductive logic.
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  8. Carnap, the Necessary a Priori, and Metaphysical Anti-Realism.Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson - 2016 - In Stephen Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap. Oxford: pp. 81-104.
    In Meaning and Necessity (1947/1950), Carnap advances an intensional semantic framework on which modal claims are true in virtue of semantical rules alone, and so are a priori. In 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (1950), Carnap advances an epistemic-ontological framework on which metaphysical claims are either trivial or meaningless, since lacking any means of substantive confirmation. Carnap carried out these projects two decades before Kripke influentially argued, in Naming and Necessity (1972/1980), that some modal claims are true a posteriori. How should (...)
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  9. X - Phi and Carnapian Explication.Joshua Shepherd & James Justus - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):381-402.
    The rise of experimental philosophy has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and (...)
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  10. Objectivity and Understanding: A New Reading of Carnap’s Aufbau.Iulian D. Toader - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1543-1557.
    This paper argues that Carnap's project in the Aufbau is best considered as an attempt to determine the conditions for both objectivity and understanding, thus aiming at refuting the skeptical contention that objectivity and understanding are incompossible ideals of science.
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  11. Carnap’s Conventionalism in Geometry.Stefan Lukits - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):123-138.
    Against Thomas Mormann's argument that differential topology does not support Carnap's conventionalism in geometry we show their compatibility. However, Mormann's emphasis on the entanglement that characterizes topology and its associated metrics is not misplaced. It poses questions about limits of empirical inquiry. For Carnap, to pose a question is to give a statement with the task of deciding its truth. Mormann's point forces us to introduce more clarity to what it means to specify the task that decides between competing hypotheses (...)
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  12. Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Stefanie Rocknak - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of Quine's understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction, especially as it is conveyed in his paper, "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism.".
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  13. Revising Carnap’s Semantic Conception of Modality.Toby Meadows - 2012 - Studia Logica 100 (3):497-515.
    I provide a tableau system and completeness proof for a revised version of Carnap's semantics for quantified modal logic. For Carnap, a sentence is possible if it is true in some first order model. However, in a similar fashion to second order logic, no sound and complete proof theory can be provided for this semantics. This factor contributed to the ultimate disappearance of Carnapian modal logic from contemporary philosophical discussion. The proof theory I discuss comes close to Carnap's semantic vision (...)
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  14. De-Synthesizing the Relative a Priori.Thomas Uebel - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):7-17.
    This paper considers the question whether the notion of the relative apriori, central to Michael Friedman’s transcendentalist programme for philosophy of science, is available also to philosophers who reject appeals to a synthetic a priori. After tracing the rediscovery of the relative a priori and delineating its potential, the question is considered whether Friedman’s arguments against Quinean naturalism and Carnap’s attenuated logicism tell against a conception of philosophy as scientific metatheory that combines logical and empirical inquiries. Finding an opening here (...)
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  15. Revisability and Conceptual Change in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism".David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (8):387-415.
    W.V. Quine’s article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is one of the most influential works in 20thcentury philosophy. The article is cast most explicitly as an argument against logical empiricists such as Carnap, arguing against the analytic/synthetic distinction that they appeal to along with their verificationism. But the article has been read much more broadly as an attack on the notion..
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  16. Carnap on Theoretical Terms: Structuralism Without Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Michael Friedman - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):249 - 263.
    Both realists and instrumentalists have found it difficult to understand (much less accept) Carnap's developed view on theoretical terms, which attempts to stake out a neutral position between realism and instrumentalism. I argue that Carnap's mature conception of a scientific theory as the conjunction of its Ramsey sentence and Carnap sentence can indeed achieve this neutral position. To see this, however, we need to see why the Newman problem raised in the context of recent work on structural realism is no (...)
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  17. Carnap, the Principle of Tolerance, and Empiricism.Robert Hudson - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (3):341-358.
    Kurt Gödel criticizes Rudolf Carnap's conventionalism on the grounds that it relies on an empiricist admissibility condition, which, if applied, runs afoul of his second incompleteness theorem. Thomas Ricketts and Michael Friedman respond to Gödel's critique by denying that Carnap is committed to Gödel's admissibility criterion; in effect, they are denying that Carnap is committed to any empirical constraint in the application of his principle of tolerance. I argue in response that Carnap is indeed committed to an empirical requirement vis‐à‐vis (...)
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  18. Understanding Quine in Terms of the Aufbau: Another Look at Naturalized Epistemology.Stefanie Rocknak - 2010 - In Marcin Milkowski Konrad Talmud-Kaminski (ed.), Beyond Description: Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications.
    I argue that Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s “radical” (FLPV; TDE 39) and “phenomenalistic” (FSS 15-16) reductionism—as it is manifest in the Aufbau—may be understood in terms of a broader historical context. In particular, it may be understood as a rejection of a contemporary variant of the second horn of Meno’s Paradox. As a result, Quine’s motivation to adopt naturalism may be understood independently of his pragmatic concerns. According to Quine, it was simply unreasonable (i.e. paradoxical) to adopt a Carnapian phenomenalistic/mentalistic (...)
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  19. From Wittgenstein's Prison to the Boundless Ocean : Carnap's Dream of Logical Syntax.Steve Awodey & A. W. Carus - 2009 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  20. Les Termes Théoriques, de Carnap À Lewis.Henri Galinon - 2009 - Philonsorbonne 4:1-12.
    This is a short introductory paper to the Ramsey-Carnap method, as introduced by Carnap in his "Philosophical foundations of Physics" (1966) to explain the meaning of theoretical terms.
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  21. Review of Richard Creath, Michael Friedman (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Carnap[REVIEW]Gregory Lavers - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (9).
  22. Carnap, Formalism, and Informal Rigour.Gregory Lavers - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):4-24.
    Carnap's position on mathematical truth in The Logical Syntax of Language has been attacked from two sides: Kreisel argues that it is formalistic but should not be, and Friedman argues that it is not formalistic but needs to be. In this paper I argue that the Carnap of Syntax does not eliminate our ordinary notion of mathematical truth in favour of a formal analogue; so Carnap's notion of mathematical truth is not formalistic. I further argue that there is no conflict (...)
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  23. La Teoría de Los Invariantes y El Espacio Intuitivo En Der Raum de Rudolf Carnap.Álvaro J. Peláez Cedrés - 2008 - Análisis Filosófico 28 (2):175-203.
    La consecuencia más difundida de la revolución en la geometría del siglo XIX es aquella que afirma que después de dichos cambios ya nada quedaría de la vieja noción de espacio como "forma de la intuición sensible", ni de la geometría como "condición trascendental" de la posibilidad de la experiencia. Este artículo se ocupa del intento de Rudolf Carnap por articular una concepción del espacio intuitivo que, al tiempo que se mantiene dentro del paradigma kantiano se hace eco de algunos (...)
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  24. Teaching & Learning Guide For: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Gillian Russell - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):273-276.
    Readings, topics, and suggestions for a course on the analytic/synthetic distinction.
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  25. Verificationist Theory of Meaning.Markus Schrenk - 2008 - In U. Windhorst, M. Binder & N. Hirowaka (eds.), Encyclopaedic Reference of Neuroscience. Springer.
    The verification theory of meaning aims to characterise what it is for a sentence to be meaningful and also what kind of abstract object the meaning of a sentence is. A brief outline is given by Rudolph Carnap, one of the theory's most prominent defenders: If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. [...] thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical (...)
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  26. Cambridge Companion to Rudolf Carnap.Richard Creath & Michael Friedman (eds.) - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
  27. Empirical Equivalence in the Quine-Carnap Debate.Eric J. Loomis - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508.
    Alexander George has put forward a novel interpretation of the Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity. George argues that Carnap's claim that there exists an analytic-synthetic distinction was held by Carnap to be empty of empirical consequences. As a result, Carnap understood his position to be empirically indistinguishable from Quine's. Although George defends his interpretation only briefly, I show that it withstands further examination and ought to be accepted. The consequences of accepting it undermine a common understanding of Quine's criticism of Carnap, (...)
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  28. The Problem of Other Minds: A Debate Between Schrödinger and Carnap. [REVIEW]Michel Bitbol - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):115-123.
    This paper reviews the debate between Carnap and Schrödinger about Hypothesis P (It is not only I who have perceptions and thoughts; other human beings have them too)–a hypothesis that underlies the possibility of doing science. For Schrödinger this hypothesis is not scientifically testable; for Carnap it is. But Schrödinger and Carnap concede too much to each other and miss an alternative understanding: science does not depend on an explicit hypothesis concerning what other human beings see and think; it is (...)
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  29. Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics.John P. Burgess - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
    Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's (...)
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  30. Carnap, Semantics and Ontology.Gregory Lavers - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):295-316.
    This paper will deal with three questions regarding Carnap's transition from the position he held at the time of writing Syntax to the doctrines he held during his semantic phase: (1) What was Carnap's attitude towards truth at the time of writing Syntax? (2) What was Carnap's position regarding questions of reference and ontology at the time of writing Syntax? (3) Was Carnap's acceptance of Tarski's analysis of truth and reference detrimental to his philosophical project? Section 1 of this paper (...)
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  31. Language, Truth, and Knowledge: Contributions to the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap.Thomas Bonk (ed.) - 2003 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This collection, with essays by Graham H. Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Jan Wolenski, will interest graduate students of the philosophy of language and logic, as well as professional philosophers, historians of analytic philosophy, and philosophically inclined logicians. Language, Truth and Knowledge brings together 11 new essays that offer a wealth of insights on a number of Carnap's concerns and ideas. The volume arose out of a symposium on Carnap's work at an international conference held in Vienna in 2001. The (...)
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  32. Language, Truth and Knowledge.Thomas Bonk (ed.) - 2003 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This collection, with essays by Graham H. Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Jan Wolenski, will interest graduate students of the philosophy of language ...
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  33. ‘Two Dogmas’ -- All Bark and No Bite?Paul A. Gregory - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633–648.
    Recently O’Grady argued that Quine’s “Two Dogmas” misses its mark when Carnap’s use of the analyticity distinction is understood in the light of his deflationism. While in substantial agreement with the stress on Carnap’s deflationism, I argue that O’Grady is not sufficiently sensitive to the difference between using the analyticity distinction to support deflationism, and taking a deflationary attitude towards the distinction itself; the latter being much more controversial. Being sensitive to this difference, and viewing Quine as having reason to (...)
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  34. “Carnap” and “the Polish Logician”.Peter Inwagen - 2002 - Acta Analytica 17 (1):7-17.
    InThe Many Faces of Realism and elsewhere, Hilary Putnam has presented an argument for the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter as to how many objects there are. In brief: Carnap says that a certain imaginary world contains three objects, ×1, ×2, and ×3. The Polish logician says that this same world must contain four other objects (×1 + ×2, ×1 + ×2 + ×3, etc.). Putnam maintains that there can be no fact of the matter as (...)
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  35. Reason's Nearest Kin: Philosophies of Arithmetic From Kant to Carnap Michael Potter.William Demopoulos - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):599-612.
  36. Carnap, Rudolf.Mauro Murzi - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  37. Rudolf Carnap.Thomas Mormann - 2000 - C.H. Beck.
    Einführung in die Philosophie Rudolf Carnaps.
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  38. Rudolf Carnap's ‘Theoretical Concepts In Science'.Stathis Psillos - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (4):151-172.
    Rudolf Carnap delivered the hitherto unpublished lecture ‘Theoretical Concepts in Science’ at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, at Santa Barbara, California, on 29 December 1959. It was part of a symposium on ‘Carnap’s views on Theoretical Concepts in Science’. In the bibliography that appears in the end of the volume, ‘The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap’, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, a revised version of this address appears to be among Carnap’s forthcoming papers. But although Carnap started (...)
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  39. Carnap and Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Paul O’Grady - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1015-1027.
    There is a general consensus that Quine's assault on analyticity and verificationism in `Two Dogma of Empiricism' has been successful and that Carnap's philosophical position has been vanquished. This paper so characterises Carnap's position that it escapes Quine's criticisms. It shows that the disagreement is not a first order dispute about analyticity or verificationism, but rather a deeper dispute about philosophical method.
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  40. The Construction of Relations in Hume and Quine, Directed by Jaakko Hintikka (Introduction).Stefanie A. Rocknak - 1999 - Dissertation, Boston University
    Hume and Quine argue that human beings do not have access to general knowledge, that is, to general truths . The arguments of these two philosophers are premised on what Jaakko Hintikka has called the atomistic postulate. In the present work, it is shown that Hume and Quine in fact sanction an extreme version of this postulate, according to which even items of particular knowledge are not directly accessible in so far as they are relational. For according to their fully (...)
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  41. Semantics in Carnap.Warren Goldfarb - 1997 - Philosophical Topics 25 (2):51-66.
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  42. How Carnap Should Bite Goodman's Bullet.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 1994 - Philosophia 24 (1-2):149-156.
  43. Review: Coffa, The Semantic Tradition From Carnap to Kant: To the Vienna Station. [REVIEW]Charles Pigden - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (4):522-525.
  44. Review of The Semantic Tradition From Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station by Alberto Coffa. [REVIEW]Alan Richardson - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (1):142-144.
  45. Carnap's Principle of Tolerance.Alan Richardson & Dan Isaacson - 1994 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 (1):67 - 83.
    I see the perspective of Tolerance as enshrining an attitude toward philosophical work that stresses its continuity with the procedures of conceptual clarification through mathematisation found in the sciences. What I have tried to show is that Carnap's understanding of the philosophical foundations of mathematics is inseparable from his understanding of the business of philosophy of empirical science.
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  46. Rational Reconstruction as Elucidation? Carnap in the Early Protocol Sentence Debate.Thomas E. Uebel - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):107 - 140.
  47. The Semantic Tradition From Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station.Alberto Coffa - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    This major publication is a history of the semantic tradition in philosophy from the early nineteenth century through its incarnation in the work of the Vienna Circle, the group of logical positivists that emerged in the years 1925-1935 in Vienna who were characterised by a strong commitment to empiricism, a high regard for science, and a conviction that modern logic is the primary tool of analytic philosophy. In the first part of the book, Alberto Coffa traces the roots of logical (...)
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  48. Every Dogma has its Day.Richard Creath - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347-389.
    This paper is a reexamination of Two Dogmas in the light of Quine's ongoing debate with Carnap over analyticity. It shows, first, that analytic is a technical term within Carnap's epistemology. As such it is intelligible, and Carnap's position can meet Quine's objections. Second, it shows that the core of Quine's objection is that he has an alternative epistemology to advance, one which appears to make no room for analyticity. Finally, the paper shows that Quine's alternative epistemology is itself open (...)
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  49. Wittgenstein and Physicalism.Rudolf Haller - 1989 - Critica 21 (63):17-32.
  50. On Protocol Sentences.Rudolf Carnap, Richard Creath & Richard Nollan - 1987 - Noûs 21 (4):457-470.
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