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  1. What Quine (and Carnap) Might Say About Contemporary Metaphysics of Time.Natalja Deng - forthcoming - In Frederique Janssen-Lauret (ed.), Quine, Structure, and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter explores some of the relations between Quine’s and Carnap’s metaontological stances on the one hand, and contemporary work in the metaphysics of time, on the other. Contemporary metaphysics of time, like analytic metaphysics in general, grew out of the revival of the discipline that Quine’s critique of the logical empiricists (such as Carnap) made possible. At the same time, the metaphysics of time has, in some respects, strayed far from its Quinean roots. This chapter examines some likely Quinean (...)
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  2. The Significance of Quasizerlegung for Carnap's Aufbau and Scientific Philosophy in General.Caterina del Sordo & Thomas Mormann - 2022 - PHILINQ 10 (1):234 - 253.
  3. Ontological Expressivism.Vera Flocke - 2021 - In J. T. M. Miller (ed.), The Language of Ontology. Oxford, UK:
    Ontological expressivism is the view that ontological existence claims express non-cognitive mental states. I develop a version of ontological expressivism that is modeled after Gibbard’s (2003) norm-expressivism. I argue that, when speakers assess whether, say, composite objects exist, they rely on assumptions with regard to what is required for composition to occur. These assumptions guide their assessment, similar to how norms may guide the assessment of normative propositions. Against this backdrop, I argue that “some objects have parts”, uttered in the (...)
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  4. Scientific Realism and Anti-Realism in Quine’s Philosophy.Amir Hajizadeh - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 15 (37):974-996.
    In this essay, we try to address a fundamental issue in the philosophy of science, namely the conflict between realism and antirealism in Quine's philosophy. There seems to be an inner tension in his views on the question of the reality of unobservable entities or reference of theoretical terms. In order to refute his seemingly inconsistent position, we first begin with the concept of ontological commitment, which he formulated in contrast to the position of his teacher, Carnap. In the following, (...)
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  5. A Problem for Easy Ontology.Sybren Heyndels - 2021 - Disputatio 10 (16).
    Thomasson’s easy ontology approach (2015) aims at deflating existence questions through a revival of Carnap’s (1950) distinction between internal and external questions. Importantly, her account depends on an analysis of the ordinary meaning of ‘exist(s)’ as a second-order predicate. I do two things in this paper. First, I show that Thomasson’s analysis fails to do justice to the complexity of the English predicate ‘exist(s)’. Against Thomasson, I argue that there are cases in which ‘exist(s)’ functions as a first-order predicate. Because (...)
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  6. Unresolvable Disagreements in Carnap’s Metametaphysics.Andreas Vrahimis - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (2):1-21.
    Carnap’s 1931 attack against metaphysics notoriously utilises Heidegger’s work to exemplify the meaninglessness of metaphysical pseudo‐statements. This paper interprets Carnap’s metametaphysics as concerned with delimiting theoretical dialogue in such a manner as to exclude unresolvable disagreements. It puts forth a revised version of Carnap’s argument against the viability of metaphysics, by setting aside his stronger claims that rely on verificationism and focusing instead on his account of metaphysical claims as mere expressions of what he calls “Lebensgefühl,” or a general attitude (...)
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  7. Carnap on Analyticity and Existence: A Clarification, Defense, and Development of Quine’s Reading of Carnap’s Views on Ontology.Gary Ebbs - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (5):1-31.
    Does Carnap’s treatment of philosophical questions about existence, such as “Are there numbers?” and “Are there physical objects?”, depend on his analytic–synthetic distinction? If so, in what way? I answer these questions by clarifying, defending, and developing the reading of Carnap’s paper “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” that W. V. Quine proposes, with little justification or explanation, in his paper “On Carnap’s Views on Ontology”. The primary methodological value of studying Quine’s reading of “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” is that it prompts (...)
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  8. Eliminativism: The Problem of Representation and Carnapian Metametaphysics.Krzysztof Poslajko - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):181-195.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a new reading of eliminative materialism concerning propositional attitudes, along the lines of broadly understood Carnapian metametaphysics. According to the proposed reading, eliminativism should be seen as a normative metalinguistic claim that we should dispose of terms like “beliefs” and associated linguistic rules. It will be argued that such reading allows a significant philosophical problem which besets eliminativism to be solved: the problem of representation. The general idea of the problem of representation, (...)
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  9. Carnap’s Epistemological Critique of Metaphysics.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2247-2265.
    Many who take a dismissive attitude towards metaphysics trace their view back to Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. But the reason Carnap takes a dismissive attitude to metaphysics is a matter of controversy. I will argue that no reason is given in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, and this is because his reason for rejecting metaphysical debates was given in ‘Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy’. The argument there assumes verificationism, but I will argue that his argument survives the rejection of verificationism. The root (...)
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  10. Sellars and Carnap: Science and/or Metaphysics.Carlo Gabbani - 2018 - In Luca Corti & Antonio Nunziante (eds.), Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 197-215.
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  11. Husserl and Carnap on Regions and Formal Categories.Ansten Klev - 2017 - In Stefania Centrone (ed.), Essays on Husserl’s Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag. pp. 409-429.
    Husserl, in his doctrine of categories, distinguishes what he calls regions from what he calls formal categories. The former are most general domains, while the latter are topic-neutral concepts that apply across all domains. Husserl’s understanding of these notions of category is here discussed in detail. It is, moreover, argued that similar notions of category may be recognized in Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt.
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  12. Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External Distinction.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):873-890.
    Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former’s internal–external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine’s metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on metaphysics (...)
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  13. Carnap, the Necessary a Priori, and Metaphysical Anti-Realism.Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson - 2016 - In Stephen Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap. Oxford: pp. 81-104.
    In Meaning and Necessity (1947/1950), Carnap advances an intensional semantic framework on which modal claims are true in virtue of semantical rules alone, and so are a priori. In 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (1950), Carnap advances an epistemic-ontological framework on which metaphysical claims are either trivial or meaningless, since lacking any means of substantive confirmation. Carnap carried out these projects two decades before Kripke influentially argued, in Naming and Necessity (1972/1980), that some modal claims are true a posteriori. How should (...)
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  14. Ontology After Carnap.Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
    Analytic philosophy is once again in a methodological frame of mind. Nowhere is this more evident than in metaphysics, whose practitioners and historians are actively reflecting on the nature of ontological questions, the status of their answers, and the relevance of contributions both from other areas within philosophy and beyond. Such reflections are hardly new: the debate between Willard van Orman Quine and Rudolf Carnap about how to understand and resolve ontological questions is widely seen as a turning point in (...)
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  15. Carnap's Legacy for the Contemporary Metaontological Debate.Matti Eklund - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology After Carnap.
  16. Make Ontology Easy Again: Amie Thomasson: Ontology Made Easy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, Xiii+345pp, $53.00 HB. [REVIEW]Greg Frost-Arnold - 2016 - Metascience 25 (3):497-500.
    A book review of Amie Thomasson's defense of Neo-Carnapianism in her "Ontology Made Easy" (2015, Oxford UP).
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  17. Frameworks and Deflation in “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” and Recent Metametaphysics.Alan Sidelle - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Ontology after Carnap. pp. 59-80.
    ABSTRACT: Rudolf Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (ESO) has received a good deal of sympathetic interest over the years from philosophers who are not particularly sympathetic to verificationism, or suspicious of metaphysics in general. Recent work has favorably cited ESO in connection with doubts about the genuine content of debates in the metaphysics of material objects. But, when we look at how Carnap introduces his central notion of a ‘framework’, and the questions he wants to use it to deflate, there (...)
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  18. The Context of the Development of Carnap’s Views on Logic Up to the Aufbau.Clinton Tolley - 2016 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 18:187-212.
  19. Internal and External Questions Revisited.Jared Warren - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (4):177-209.
    Rudolf Carnap famously distinguished between the external meanings that existence questions have when asked by philosophers and the internal meanings they have when asked by non-philosophers. Carnap’s overall position involved various controversial commitments, but relatively uncontroversial interpretative principles also lead to a Carnap-style distinction between internal and external questions. In section 1 of this paper I offer arguments for such a distinction in several particular cases; in section 2 I defend my arguments from numerous objections and motivate them by using (...)
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  20. Metaontological Deflationism in the Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Debate.Jonathan Egeland - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):33-52.
    With metaphysical philosophy gaining prominence in the aftermath of the Quine-Carnap debate, not only has it become assumed that the Quinean critique leaves ontological pluralism behind as an untenable approach, but also that the same is true of deflationism more generally. Building on Quine’s criticisms against the analytic-synthetic distinction and the notion of quantifier variance, contemporary metaphysicians like van Inwagen and Sider continue to argue for the untenability of deflationary approaches to metaontology. In this paper I will argue that Quine’s (...)
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  21. Ontology Made Easy.Amie L. Thomasson - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    Existence questions have been topics for heated debates in metaphysics, but this book argues that they can often be answered easily, by trivial inferences from uncontroversial premises. This 'easy' approach to ontology leads to realism about disputed entities, and to the view that metaphysical disputes about existence questions are misguided.
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  22. Carnap's Metaontology.Matti Eklund - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):229-249.
  23. Frege, Carnap, and Explication: ‘Our Concern Here Is to Arrive at a Concept of Number Usable for the Purpose of Science’.Gregory Lavers - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):225-41.
    This paper argues that Carnap both did not view and should not have viewed Frege's project in the foundations of mathematics as misguided metaphysics. The reason for this is that Frege's project was to give an explication of number in a very Carnapian sense — something that was not lost on Carnap. Furthermore, Frege gives pragmatic justification for the basic features of his system, especially where there are ontological considerations. It will be argued that even on the question of the (...)
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  24. Heidegger and Carnap: Disagreeing About Nothing?Eric S. Nelson - 2013 - In Francois Raffoul & Eric S. Nelson (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 2--151.
  25. Carnap and Kuhn on linguistic frameworks and scientific revolutions.Gilson Olegario - 2013 - Manuscrito 36 (1):190.
    Several recent works in history and philosophy of science have re-evaluated the alleged opposition between the theses put forth by logical empiricists such as Carnap and the so-called "post-positivists", such as Kuhn. Although the latter came to be viewed as having seriously challenged the logical positivist views of science, recent authors (e.g., Friedman, Reisch, Earman, Irzik and Grünberg) maintain that some of the most notable theses of the Kuhnian view of science have striking similarities with some aspects of Carnap's philosophy. (...)
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  26. Questions About 'Internal and External Questions About God'.Natalja Deng - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (2):257-268.
    This article is an evaluation of Le Poidevin’s use of Carnap ’s stance on ontology within the philosophy of religion. Le Poidevin claims that 1) theists need to take God to be a putative entity within space-time in order for their claim that God exists to be meaningful, and that 2) instrumentalism about theology is viable. I argue that although Le Poidevin’s response to Carnap ’s argument is no less problematic than that argument itself, his position is in fact thoroughly (...)
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  27. Multitude, Tolerance and Language-Transcendence.Matti Eklund - 2012 - Synthese 187 (3):833-847.
    Rudolf Carnap's 1930s philosophy of logic, including his adherence to the principle of tolerance, is discussed. What theses did Carnap commit himself to, exactly? I argue that while Carnap did commit himself to a certain multitude thesis—there are different logics of different languages, and the choice between these languages is merely a matter of expediency—there is no evidence that he rejected a language-transcendent notion of fact, contrary to what Warren Goldfarb and Thomas Ricketts have prominently argued. (In fact, it is (...)
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  28. Carnap, Pseudo-Problems, and Ontological Questions.Gottfried Gabriel - 2012 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Ideal of Explication and Naturalism. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  29. Dilthey and Carnap: Empiricism, Life-Philosophy, and Overcoming Metaphysics.Eric S. Nelson - 2012 - Pli 23:20–49.
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  30. Carnap, Goguen, and the Hyperontologies: Logical Pluralism and Heterogeneous Structuring in Ontology Design. [REVIEW]Dominik Lücke - 2010 - Logica Universalis 4 (2):255-333.
    This paper addresses questions of universality related to ontological engineering, namely aims at substantiating (negative) answers to the following three basic questions: (i) Is there a ‘universal ontology’?, (ii) Is there a ‘universal formal ontology language’?, and (iii) Is there a universally applicable ‘mode of reasoning’ for formal ontologies? To support our answers in a principled way, we present a general framework for the design of formal ontologies resting on two main principles: firstly, we endorse Rudolf Carnap’s principle of logical (...)
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  31. Carnap and Ontological Pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 130--56.
    My focus here will be Rudolf Carnap’s views on ontology, as these are presented in the seminal “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950). I will first describe how I think Carnap’s distinction between external and internal questions is best understood. Then I will turn to broader issues regarding Carnap’s views on ontology. With certain reservations, I will ascribe to Carnap an ontological pluralist position roughly similar to the positions of Eli Hirsch and the later Hilary Putnam. Then I turn to some (...)
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  32. Metaphysics After Carnap : The Ghost Who Walks?Huw Price - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 320--46.
  33. Review of Richard Creath, Michael Friedman (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Carnap[REVIEW]Gregory Lavers - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (9).
  34. Cambridge Companion to Rudolf Carnap.Richard Creath & Michael Friedman (eds.) - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
  35. Untersuchungen Zur Ontologie.Guido Imagire & Christine Schneider (eds.) - 2006
  36. Carnap, Semantics and Ontology.Gregory Lavers - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):295-316.
    This paper will deal with three questions regarding Carnap's transition from the position he held at the time of writing Syntax to the doctrines he held during his semantic phase: (1) What was Carnap's attitude towards truth at the time of writing Syntax? (2) What was Carnap's position regarding questions of reference and ontology at the time of writing Syntax? (3) Was Carnap's acceptance of Tarski's analysis of truth and reference detrimental to his philosophical project? Section 1 of this paper (...)
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  37. Herbert HOCHBERG: The Positivist and the Ontologist. Bergmann, Carnap and Logical Realism , Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam—Atlanta, 2001, 400 Pp., ISBN 90-420-1434-2, € 73. [REVIEW]Jan Woleński - 2004 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):251-252.
  38. Language, Truth and Knowledge: Contributions to the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap.Thomas Bonk (ed.) - 2003 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This collection, with essays by Graham H. Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Jan Wolenski, will interest graduate students of the philosophy of language and logic, as well as professional philosophers, historians of analytic philosophy, and philosophically inclined logicians. Language, Truth and Knowledge brings together 11 new essays that offer a wealth of insights on a number of Carnap's concerns and ideas. The volume arose out of a symposium on Carnap's work at an international conference held in Vienna in 2001. The (...)
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  39. Language, Truth and Knowledge: Contributions to the Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap.Thomas Bonk (ed.) - 2003 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This collection, with essays by Graham H. Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Jan Wolenski, will interest graduate students of the philosophy of language ...
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  40. The Positivist and the Ontologist: Bergmann, Carnap and Logical Realism.Eugenio S. G. Lombardo - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):724-728.
  41. The Scope of Deflationism: Reply to Gregory.Paul O’Grady - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):649-653.
    Paul Gregory’s careful and insightful response to “Camap and Two Dogmas of Empiricism” highlights a number of points which were underdeveloped in that paper. I think that he has brought into relief a central issue between Camap and Quine by supplying a crucial distinction. However I still maintain that Quine’s assault is less than successful and that Gregory’s further analysis of the debate sheds light on why this is so.
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  42. On Quine on Carnap on Ontology.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (1):93 - 122.
    W. V. Quine assumed that in _Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology Rudolf Carnap was attempting to dodge commitment to abstract entities--without either renouncing quantification over them or demonstrating their dispensability--by wielding the analytic/synthetic distinction against ontological issues. Quine's interpretation of Carnap's intent--and his criticism of it--is widely endorsed. But Carnap objected, I argue, not to abstract entities, but to his critics' suggestion that empiricism implies nominalism. Quine's and Carnap's views are therefore more akin than Quine ever suspected. Unfortunately, Quine's misinterpretation of (...)
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  43. Carnap, Rudolf.Mauro Murzi - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  44. Carnap’s Construction of the World: The _Aufbau_ and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism[REVIEW]Andy Hamilton - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):402-405.
  45. Rudolf Carnap.Thomas Mormann - 2000 - C.H. Beck.
    Einführung in die Philosophie Rudolf Carnaps.
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  46. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL: A QUIZZICAL RESPONSE.Andre Gallois - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):263-283.
  47. Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?Stephen Yablo - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):229 - 283.
    [Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces of (...)
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  48. Carnap’s Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism.Alan W. Richardson - 1997 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a major contribution to the history of analytic philosophy in general and of logical positivism in particular. It provides the first detailed and comprehensive study of Rudolf Carnap, one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century philosophy. The focus of the book is Carnap's first major work: Der logische Aufbau der Welt. It reveals tensions within the context of German epistemology and philosophy of science in the early twentieth century. Alan Richardson argues that Carnap's move to philosophy (...)
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  49. The Semantic Tradition From Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station.Alberto Coffa - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    This major publication is a history of the semantic tradition in philosophy from the early nineteenth century through its incarnation in the work of the Vienna Circle, the group of logical positivists that emerged in the years 1925-1935 in Vienna who were characterised by a strong commitment to empiricism, a high regard for science, and a conviction that modern logic is the primary tool of analytic philosophy. In the first part of the book, Alberto Coffa traces the roots of logical (...)
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  50. Science, Metaphysics and Meaningful Philosophical Principles.Gino Tarozzi - 1988 - Epistemologia 11:97.
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