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  1. Choosing the Analytic Component of Theories.Sebastian Lutz - 2013
    I provide a compact reformulation of Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for the analytic and the synthetic component of a theory and show that, contrary to arguments by Winnie and Demopoulos, Carnap’s conditions of adequacy need not be supplemented by another condition. This has immediate implications for the analytic component of reduction sentences.
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  2. The Limits and Basis of Logical Tolerance: Carnap’s Combination of Russell and Wittgenstein.Adam Tamas Tuboly - forthcoming - In Peter Stone (ed.), Bertrand Russell’s Life and Legacy. Vernon Press.
  3. A Defence of the Notion of ‘Foundedness’ in Carnap’s Aufbau.Sophie Nagler - 2020 - The New Collection 14:68-87.
    In Der logische Aufbau der Welt, first published in 1928, Carnap aims to rationally reconstruct all objects of cognition by logico-definitional means. As a result, he intends to obtain a fully objective framework in which scientific discourse can take place. This is made possible by the novel method of ‘purely structural definite description’ of all scientifically relevant objects, which is first introduced in the Aufbau. Key to the attainment of this goal is the notion of ‘foundedness’, which Carnap presents as (...)
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  4. A Note on Carnap’s Result and the Connectives.Tristan Haze - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (3):285-288.
    Carnap’s result about classical proof-theories not ruling out non-normal valuations of propositional logic formulae has seen renewed philosophical interest in recent years. In this note I contribute some considerations which may be helpful in its philosophical assessment. I suggest a vantage point from which to see the way in which classical proof-theories do, at least to a considerable extent, encode the meanings of the connectives (not by determining a range of admissible valuations, but in their own way), and I demonstrate (...)
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  5. A New Interpretation of Carnap’s Logical Pluralism.Teresa Kouri - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):305-314.
    Rudolf Carnap’s logical pluralism is often held to be one in which corresponding connectives in different logics have different meanings. This paper presents an alternative view of Carnap’s position, in which connectives can and do share their meaning in some contexts. This re-interpretation depends crucially on extending Carnap’s linguistic framework system to include meta-linguistic frameworks, those frameworks which we use to talk about linguistic frameworks. I provide an example that shows how this is possible, and give some textual evidence that (...)
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  6. Pluralizm logiczny a relatywizm w logice.Bożena Czernecka-Rej - 2018 - Diametros 56:51-68.
    The aim of the article is to analyze the situation of contemporary logic with reference to the issue concerning connections between the pluralism of logical systems and relativism in logic. Accordingly, I seek answers to the following questions: Can the plurality of logic, more specifically, a large number and variety of systems constructed by logicians, be justified in a rational way? Does pluralism in logic imply the thesis of relativism? Is logical relativism in the contemporary philosophy of logic just a (...)
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  7. Carnap* Replies.Geoffrey Hellman - 2018 - The Monist 101 (4):388-393.
    In an imagined dialogue between two figures called “Carnap*” and “Quine*” that appeared in the Library of Living Philosophers volume in 1986, certain proposals and clarifications of the linguistic doctrine were offered by Carnap* answering Quinean objections, but these were brushed aside rather breezily in a reply to this dialogue in the same volume by Quine himself. After a brief summary of the questions at issue in that earlier dialogue, Carnap* is here allowed a final reply, introducing yet another variant (...)
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  8. Rudolf Carnap.Logan Paul Gage - 2017 - In Paul Copan, I. I. I. Tremper Longman, Christopher L. Reese & Michael G. Strauss (eds.), Dictionary of Christianity and Science: The Definitive Reference for the Intersection of Christian Faith and Contemporary Science. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic. pp. 79-80.
    A brief introduction to the life and key work of Rudolf Carnap with special attention to his work on inductive logic.
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  9. How May the Propositional Calculus Represent?Tristan Haze - 2017 - South American Journal of Logic 3 (1):173-184.
    This paper is a conceptual study in the philosophy of logic. The question considered is 'How may formulae of the propositional calculus be brought into a representational relation to the world?'. Four approaches are distinguished: (1) the denotational approach, (2) the abbreviational approach, (3) the truth-conditional approach, and (4) the modelling approach. (2) and (3) are very familiar, so I do not discuss them. (1), which is now largely obsolete, led to some interesting twists and turns in early analytic philosophy (...)
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  10. Husserl and Carnap on Regions and Formal Categories.Ansten Klev - 2017 - In Stefania Centrone (ed.), Essays on Husserl’s Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag. pp. 409-429.
    Husserl, in his doctrine of categories, distinguishes what he calls regions from what he calls formal categories. The former are most general domains, while the latter are topic-neutral concepts that apply across all domains. Husserl’s understanding of these notions of category is here discussed in detail. It is, moreover, argued that similar notions of category may be recognized in Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt.
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  11. Carnap’s Early Metatheory: Scope and Limits.Georg Schiemer, Richard Zach & Erich Reck - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):33-65.
    In Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik and Abriss der Logistik, Carnap attempted to formulate the metatheory of axiomatic theories within a single, fully interpreted type-theoretic framework and to investigate a number of meta-logical notions in it, such as those of model, consequence, consistency, completeness, and decidability. These attempts were largely unsuccessful, also in his own considered judgment. A detailed assessment of Carnap’s attempt shows, nevertheless, that his approach is much less confused and hopeless than it has often been made out to (...)
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  12. Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):143-162.
    In this paper I examine the question of logic’s normative status in the light of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance. I begin by contrasting Carnap’s conception of the normativity of logic with that of his teacher, Frege. I identify two core features of Frege’s position: first, the normative force of the logical laws is grounded in their descriptive adequacy; second, norms implied by logic are constitutive for thinking as such. While Carnap breaks with Frege’s absolutism about logic and hence with the (...)
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  13. The Context of the Development of Carnap’s Views on Logic Up to the Aufbau.Clinton Tolley - 2016 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 18:187-212.
  14. Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science.Gary Ebbs - 2015 - History and Philosophy of Logic 36 (2):181-188.
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  15. A Classic Statement of Logical Empiricism. [REVIEW]Adam Tamas Tuboly - 2015 - The Berlin Review of Books 2015.
    Eino Kaila’s recently translated Human Knowledge: A Classic Statement of Logical Empiricism from 1939 is an important document both in the history of analytic philosophy and the history of logical empiricism in particular. Kaila discusses all the relevant topics that featured in the discussions of the Vienna Circle in the early 1930s and provides a neat summary with his own historical narrative and critical remarks.
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  16. Review of Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard. [REVIEW]Sam Hillier - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (3):476-480,.
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  17. Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2013 - Open Court Press.
    During the academic year 1940-1941, several giants of analytic philosophy congregated at Harvard, holding regular private meetings, with Carnap, Tarski, and Quine. Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard allows the reader to act as a fly on the wall for their conversations. Carnap took detailed notes during his year at Harvard. This book includes both a German transcription of these shorthand notes and an English translation in the appendix section. Carnap’s notes cover a wide range of topics, but surprisingly, the (...)
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  18. Frege, Carnap, and Explication: ‘Our Concern Here Is to Arrive at a Concept of Number Usable for the Purpose of Science’.Gregory Lavers - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):225-41.
    This paper argues that Carnap both did not view and should not have viewed Frege's project in the foundations of mathematics as misguided metaphysics. The reason for this is that Frege's project was to give an explication of number in a very Carnapian sense — something that was not lost on Carnap. Furthermore, Frege gives pragmatic justification for the basic features of his system, especially where there are ontological considerations. It will be argued that even on the question of the (...)
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  19. An Observation on Carnapʼs Continuum and Stochastic Independencies.J. B. Paris - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):421-429.
    We characterize those identities and independencies which hold for all probability functions on a unary language satisfying the Principle of Atom Exchangeability. We then show that if this is strengthen to the requirement that Johnson's Sufficientness Principle holds, thus giving Carnap's Continuum of inductive methods for languages with at least two predicates, then new and somewhat inexplicable identities and independencies emerge, the latter even in the case of Carnap's Continuum for the language with just a single predicate.
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  20. Carnap, Turing and Wittgenstein : Contrasting Notions of Analysis.Juliet Floyd - 2012 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Ideal of Explication and Naturalism. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  21. ""Quine's" Two Dogmas" as a Criticism of Logical Empiricism.Artur Koterski - 2012 - Filozofia Nauki 20 (1):45 - +.
    Dans les « Deux dogmes», Quine voulait démontrer que le positivisme logique n’était possible qu’en raison d’hypothèses injustifiées. L’intention de Quine était de montrer qu’il n’est possible de sauver l’empirisme que si l’on accepte une autre approche, holistique. Toutefois, l’article de Quine était anachronique dès le moment de sa publication. Le but de cet article est double. Tout d’abord, on esquissera l’argument de Quine et on le confrontera aux positions de Carnap et Dubislav. On montrera que la critique de Quine (...)
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  22. Carnap and the Tractatus' Philosophy of Logic.Oskari Kuusela - 2012 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.
    This article discusses the relation between the early Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s philosophies of logic, arguing that Carnap’s position in The Logical Syntax of Language is in certain respects much closer to the Tractatus than has been recognized. In Carnapian terms, the Tractatus’ goal is to introduce, by means of quasi-syntactical sentences, syntactical principles and concepts to be used in philosophical clarification in the formal mode. A distinction between the material and formal mode is therefore already part of the Tractatus’ view, (...)
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  23. On the Quinean-Analyticity of Mathematical Propositions.Gregory Lavers - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):299-319.
    This paper investigates the relation between Carnap and Quine’s views on analyticity on the one hand, and their views on philosophical analysis or explication on the other. I argue that the stance each takes on what constitutes a successful explication largely dictates the view they take on analyticity. I show that although acknowledged by neither party (in fact Quine frequently expressed his agreement with Carnap on this subject) their views on explication are substantially different. I argue that this difference not (...)
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  24. Revising Carnap’s Semantic Conception of Modality.Toby Meadows - 2012 - Studia Logica 100 (3):497-515.
    I provide a tableau system and completeness proof for a revised version of Carnap's semantics for quantified modal logic. For Carnap, a sentence is possible if it is true in some first order model. However, in a similar fashion to second order logic, no sound and complete proof theory can be provided for this semantics. This factor contributed to the ultimate disappearance of Carnapian modal logic from contemporary philosophical discussion. The proof theory I discuss comes close to Carnap's semantic vision (...)
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  25. Some Modifications of Carnap’s Modal Logic.Vít Punčochář - 2012 - Studia Logica 100 (3):517-543.
    In this paper, Carnap's modal logic C is reconstructed. It is shown that the Carnapian approach enables us to create some epistemic logics in a relatively straightforward way. These epistemic modifications of C are axiomatized and one of them is compared with intuitionistic logic. At the end of the paper, some connections between this epistemic logic and Medvedev's logic of finite problems and inquisitive semantics are shortly discussed.
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  26. Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention.Gary Ebbs - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):193-237.
    According to the standard story W. V. Quine ’s criticisms of the idea that logic is true by convention are directed against, and completely undermine, Rudolf Carnap’s idea that the logical truths of a language L are the sentences of L that are true-in- L solely in virtue of the linguistic conventions for L, and Quine himself had no interest in or use for any notion of truth by convention. This paper argues that and are both false. Carnap did not (...)
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  27. On Carnap Sentences.P. Raatikainen - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):245-246.
    The influential proposal that the analytical component of a theory is captured by its ‘Carnap sentence’ is critically scrutinized. A counterexample which makes the suggestion problematic is presented.
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  28. Carnap’s Ramseyfications Defended.Thomas Uebel - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):71-87.
    This paper seeks to evaluate the potential of the Newman objection to function as an immanent critique of Carnap's use of the Ramsey method of regimenting scientific theories. Stress is laid on the distinctive way in which ramseyfications are used by Carnap to formulate the analytic/synthetic distinction for the theoretical language and on the difference between the ontological and the epistemic readings of the Newman objection. While the former reading of the Newman objection is rejected as trading on an assumption (...)
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  29. The Role of the Foundations of Mathematics in the Development of Carnap's Theory of Theories.William Demopoulos - 2010 - In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
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  30. Carnap, Goguen, and the Hyperontologies: Logical Pluralism and Heterogeneous Structuring in Ontology Design. [REVIEW]Dominik Lücke - 2010 - Logica Universalis 4 (2):255-333.
    This paper addresses questions of universality related to ontological engineering, namely aims at substantiating (negative) answers to the following three basic questions: (i) Is there a ‘universal ontology’?, (ii) Is there a ‘universal formal ontology language’?, and (iii) Is there a universally applicable ‘mode of reasoning’ for formal ontologies? To support our answers in a principled way, we present a general framework for the design of formal ontologies resting on two main principles: firstly, we endorse Rudolf Carnap’s principle of logical (...)
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  31. Carnap's Criterion of Logicality.Denis Bonnay - 2009 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Providing a principled characterization of the distinction between logical and non-logical expressions is a longstanding issue in the philosophy of logic. In the Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap proposes a syntactic solution to this problem, which aims at grounding the claim that logic and mathematics are analytic. Roughly speaking, his idea is that logic and mathematics correspond to the largest part of science for which it is possible to completely specify by "syntactic" means which sentences are valid and which are (...)
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  32. Carnap on Logical Consequence for Languages I and II.Philippe de Rouilhan - 2009 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  33. Carnap's Syntax Programme and the Philosophy of Mathematics.Warren Goldfarb - 2009 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  34. The Development of Carnap’s Semantics.Igor Hanzel - 2009 - American Journal of Semiotics 25 (1/2):123-151.
    The paper reconstructs the three main stages in the development of Carnap’s semantics in the years 1935–1947. It starts with Carnap’s approach to metalogic in his Zirkelprotokolle and his Logische Syntax der Sprache from the point of view of one-level approach to the relation between metalanguage and its object-language. It then analyzes Tarski’s turn to semantics in his paper presented at the Paris conference in September 1935, as well as the implications of his view for Carnap’s approach to semantics from (...)
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  35. The Cambridge Companion to Carnap.James Justus - 2009 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 15 (4):428-431.
    Rudolf Carnap is increasingly regarded as one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. He was one of the leading figures of the logical empiricist movement associated with the Vienna Circle and a central figure in the analytic tradition more generally. He made major contributions to philosophy of science and philosophy of logic, and, perhaps most importantly, to our understanding of the nature of philosophy as a discipline. In this volume a team of contributors explores the major themes (...)
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  36. REVIEWS-M. Friedman and R. Creath (Editors), The Cambridge Companion to Carnap.James Justus - 2009 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 15 (4).
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  37. The Analysis of Philosophy in Logical Syntax : Carnap's Critique and His Attempt at a Reconstruction.Pierre Wagner - 2009 - In Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 184--202.
  38. Review of Richard Creath, Michael Friedman (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Carnap[REVIEW]Gregory Lavers - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (9).
  39. Carnap, Gödel, and the Analyticity of Arithmetic.Neil Tennant - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):100-112.
    Michael Friedman maintains that Carnap did not fully appreciate the impact of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem on the prospect for a purely syntactic definition of analyticity that would render arithmetic analytically true. This paper argues against this claim. It also challenges a common presumption on the part of defenders of Carnap, in their diagnosis of the force of Gödel's own critique of Carnap in his Gibbs Lecture. The author is grateful to Michael Friedman for valuable comments. Part of the research (...)
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  40. Carnap’s Dream: Gödel, Wittgenstein, and Logical, Syntax.S. Awodey & A. W. Carus - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):23-45.
    In Carnap’s autobiography, he tells the story how one night in January 1931, “the whole theory of language structure” in all its ramifications “came to [him] like a vision”. The shorthand manuscript he produced immediately thereafter, he says, “was the first version” of Logical Syntax of Language. This document, which has never been examined since Carnap’s death, turns out not to resemble Logical Syntax at all, at least on the surface. Wherein, then, did the momentous insight of 21 January 1931 (...)
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  41. Frege, the Identity of Sinn and Carnap's Intension.I. Hanzel - 2006 - History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (3):229-247.
    The paper analyses Frege's approach to the identity conditions for the entity labelled by him as Sinn. It starts with a brief characterization of the main principles of Frege's semantics and lists his remarks on the identity conditions for Sinn. They are subject to a detailed scrutiny, and it is shown that, with the exception of the criterion of intersubstitutability in oratio obliqua, all other criteria have to be discarded. Finally, by comparing Frege's views on Sinn with Carnap's method of (...)
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  42. Carnap Brought Home: The View From Jena. [REVIEW]Christopher Pincock - 2006 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 12:213-218.
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  43. On Gödel's Way In: The Influence of Rudolf Carnap.Warren Goldfarb - 2005 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (2):185-193.
  44. Harvard 1940–1941: Tarski, Carnap and Quine on a Finitistic Language of Mathematics for Science.Paolo Mancosu - 2005 - History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (4):327-357.
    Tarski, Carnap and Quine spent the academic year 1940?1941 together at Harvard. In their autobiographies, both Carnap and Quine highlight the importance of the conversations that took place among them during the year. These conversations centred around semantical issues related to the analytic/synthetic distinction and on the project of a finitist/nominalist construction of mathematics and science. Carnap's Nachlaß in Pittsburgh contains a set of detailed notes, amounting to more than 80 typescripted pages, taken by Carnap while these discussions were taking (...)
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  45. Critical Study of Michael Potter’s Reason’s Nearest Kin. [REVIEW]Richard Zach - 2005 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 46 (4):503-513.
    Critical study of Michael Potter, Reason's Nearest Kin. Philosophies of Arithmetic from Kant to Carnap. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. x + 305 pages.
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  46. Carnap, Semantics and Ontology.Gregory Lavers - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):295-316.
    This paper will deal with three questions regarding Carnap's transition from the position he held at the time of writing Syntax to the doctrines he held during his semantic phase: (1) What was Carnap's attitude towards truth at the time of writing Syntax? (2) What was Carnap's position regarding questions of reference and ontology at the time of writing Syntax? (3) Was Carnap's acceptance of Tarski's analysis of truth and reference detrimental to his philosophical project? Section 1 of this paper (...)
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  47. Carnap and the Logic of Inductive Inference.S. L. Zabell - 2004 - In Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods & Akihiro Kanamori (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic. Elsevier. pp. 10--265.
  48. ‘Two Dogmas’ -- All Bark and No Bite?Paul A. Gregory - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633 - 648.
    Recently O'Grady argued that Quine's "Two Dogmas" misses its mark when Carnap's use of the analyticity distinction is understood in the light of his deflationism. While in substantial agreement with the stress on Carnap's deflationism, I argue that O'Grady is not sufficiently sensitive to the difference between using the analyticity distinction to support deflationism, and taking a deflationary attitude towards the distinction itself; the latter being much more controversial. Being sensitive to this difference, and viewing Quine as having reason to (...)
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  49. The Positivist and the Ontologist: Bergmann, Carnap and Logical Realism.Eugenio S. G. Lombardo - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):724-728.
  50. Much Ado About the Nothing : Carnap and Heidegger on Logic and Metaphysics.Edward Witherspoon - 2003 - In C. G. Prado (ed.), A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy. Humanity Books.
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