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  1. Breve introducción al pensamiento de Carnap. [REVIEW]M. C. Caamaño Alegre - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (3).
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  2. Measurement in Carnap's Late Philosophy of Science.Vadim Batitsky - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (2):87–108.
  3. Carnap's Internal and External Questions: Part I: Quine's Criticisms.Graham Bird - 2003 - In Thomas Bonk (ed.), Language, Truth and Knowledge. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 97--131.
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  4. Carnap and Quine: Internal and External Questions. [REVIEW]Graham H. Bird - 1995 - Erkenntnis 42 (1):41 - 64.
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  5. Kant's Explication and Carnap's Explication.Giovanni Boniolo - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):289-298.
    In this paper I will compare the concept of explication à la Carnap and the concept of explication à la Kant. This essay should primarily be seen as a comparison of two different philosophical styles, but it is also intended as a vindication of what Kant wrote and what Carnap forgot to read.
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  6. Rawls and Carnap on Doing Philosophy Without Metaphysics.Idil Boran - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):459–479.
    Some philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen, view Rawls's rejection of metaphysical claims, encapsulated in his method of avoidance, as being compatible with the "anti-philosophical" stance, the view that metaphysical debates are sterile and should be abandoned to be replaced by practically viable forms of thinking. This paper shows that this reading of the method of avoidance is incorrect and argues that the method of avoidance is in fact comparable to Carnap's higher-order standpoint of neutrality with regards to different frameworks. This (...)
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  7. Carnap and the Rationality of Theory Choice.Mátyás Brendel - unknown
    In this paper, one aspect of Carnap's philosophy is examined, namely the relations of Carnap's various views and the rationality of theory acceptance in science. Irzik, Friedman and others have shown already that the so called “standard account” – presenting Carnap as an “arch rationalist”- is over-simplified. Friedman’s earlier view was criticized by Irzik to be too relativistic. I agree with these critiques; however I attempt to show that even Irzik’s and Friedman’s later view – which converge to each other (...)
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  8. Carnap, Popper, Gödel: Can Unity Be Refuted by Incompleteness?Mátyás Brendel - unknown
    In this paper all the “acting” philosophers play their classical role: Gödel is present with his incompleteness theorems. Carnap is present with the positivist view of unity of science, and specifically with the thesis about a universal language. Finally, Popper tries to refute Carnap’s thesis with the help of Gödel’s. Unfortunately this debate did not take place in real, only one claim and reponse was made in Shilpp’s volume. I attempt to clarify this question in the present paper. The main (...)
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  9. Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-Engineering.Georg Brun - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1211-1241.
    Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for (...)
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  10. Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics.John P. Burgess - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
    Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's (...)
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  11. Carnap's Explication of 'Analytic' and 'Meaning-Of'.Richard Porter Butrick - 1966 - Dissertation, Columbia University
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  12. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.Rudolf Carnap - 1974 - Dover Publications.
    Stimulating, thought-provoking text by one of the 20th century’s most creative philosophers clearly and discerningly makes accessible such topics as probability, measurement and quantitative language, structure of space, causality and determinism, theoretical laws and concepts and much more. "...the best book available for the intelligent reader who wants to gain some insight into the nature of contemporary philosophy of science."—Choice.
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  13. Philosophical Foundations of Physics;.Rudolf Carnap - 1966 - New York: Basic Books.
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  14. On Protocol Sentences.Rudolf Carnap, Richard Creath & Richard Nollan - 1987 - Noûs 21 (4):457-470.
  15. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.Michael T. Casey - 1955 - Philosophical Studies 5:161-161.
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  16. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science: Vol. I, No. 9. Foundations of Biology. [REVIEW]Michael T. Casey - 1955 - Philosophical Studies 5:161-161.
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  17. Revisability and Conceptual Change in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism".David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (8):387-415.
    W.V. Quine’s article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is one of the most influential works in 20thcentury philosophy. The article is cast most explicitly as an argument against logical empiricists such as Carnap, arguing against the analytic/synthetic distinction that they appeal to along with their verificationism. But the article has been read much more broadly as an attack on the notion..
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  18. The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory.Sean Crawford - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The identity theory’s rise to prominence in analytic philosophy of mind during the late 1950s and early 1960s is widely seen as a watershed in the development of physicalism, in the sense that whereas logical behaviourism proposed analytic and a priori ascertainable identities between the meanings of mental and physical-behavioural concepts, the identity theory proposed synthetic and a posteriori knowable identities between mental and physical properties. While this watershed does exist, the standard account of it is misleading, as it is (...)
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  19. Rudolf Carnap and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism.R. Creath (ed.) - 2012 - Springer Verlag.
    This book discusses Rudolf Carnap, a member of the Vienna Circle and one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century.
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  20. Before Explication.Richard Creath - 2012 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Ideal of Explication and Naturalism. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  21. Carnap's Conventionalism.Richard Creath - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):141 - 165.
  22. Every Dogma has its Day.Richard Creath - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347-389.
    This paper is a reexamination of Two Dogmas in the light of Quine's ongoing debate with Carnap over analyticity. It shows, first, that analytic is a technical term within Carnap's epistemology. As such it is intelligible, and Carnap's position can meet Quine's objections. Second, it shows that the core of Quine's objection is that he has an alternative epistemology to advance, one which appears to make no room for analyticity. Finally, the paper shows that Quine's alternative epistemology is itself open (...)
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  23. Some Remarks on "Protocol Sentences".Richard Creath - 1987 - Noûs 21 (4):471-475.
  24. Carnap's Early Conventionalism. An Inquiry Into the Historical Background of the Vienna Circle.Richard Creath - 1986 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (3):430-431.
  25. On Kaplan on Carnap on Significance.Richard Creath - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (6):393 - 400.
    In 'the methodological character of theoretical concepts' carnap offered a sophisticated criterion of empirical significance. Unfortunately, Shortly thereafter david kaplan devised a pair of devastating counter-Examples which appeared to show that carnap's criterion was simultaneously too wide and too narrow. In this note I show that kaplan's first counter-Example misses its mark and that his second counter-Example can be avoided by a natural generalization of carnap's method.
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  26. Gödel, Carnap and the Fregean Heritage.Gabriella Crocco - 2003 - Synthese 137 (1-2):21 - 41.
    Thorough a detailed analysis of version III of Gödel's Is mathematics syntax of language?, we propose a new interpretation of Gödel's criticism against the conventionalist point of view in mathematics. When one reads carefully Gödel's text, it brings out that, contrary to the opinion of some commentators, Gödel did not overlook the novelty of Carnap's solution, and did not criticise him from an old-fashioned conception of science. The general aim of our analysis is to restate the Carnap/Gödel debate in the (...)
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  27. Carnap, Kuhn, and Revisionism: On the Publication of Structure in Encyclopedia. [REVIEW]J. C. Pinto de Oliveira - 2007 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (1):147-157.
    In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly regarding Carnap’s work. In this paper, I argue against the interpretation that Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the revisionist idea that Carnap “would have found Structure philosophically congenial”. I claim that Kuhn’s book, from Carnap’s point of view, is not in philosophy of science but rather in history of science (...)
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  28. Geometric Conventionalism and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance.David De Vidi & Graham Solomon - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (5):773-783.
    We discuss in this paper the question of the scope of the principle of tolerance about languages promoted in Carnap's The Logical Syntax of Language and the nature of the analogy between it and the rudimentary conventionalism purportedly exhibited in the work of Poincaré and Hilbert. We take it more or less for granted that Poincaré and Hilbert do argue for conventionalism. We begin by sketching Coffa's historical account, which suggests that tolerance be interpreted as a conventionalism that allows us (...)
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  29. Carnap and Quine on Some Analytic-Synthetic Distinctions.Lieven Decock - unknown
    I want to analyse the Quine-Carnap discussion on analyticity with regard to logical, mathematical and set-theoretical statements. In recent years, the renewed interest in Carnap’s work has shed a new light on the analytic-synthetic debate. If one fully appreciates Carnap’s conventionalism, one sees that there was not a metaphysical debate on whether there is an analytic-synthetic distinction, but rather a controversy on the expedience of drawing such a distinction. However, on this view, there can be no longer a single analytic-synthetic (...)
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  30. The Role of the Foundations of Mathematics in the Development of Carnap's Theory of Theories.William Demopoulos - 2010 - In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
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  31. Reason's Nearest Kin: Philosophies of Arithmetic From Kant to Carnap Michael Potter.William Demopoulos - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):599-612.
  32. Carnap's Definition of 'Analytic Truth' for Scientific Theories. Derden - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (4):506-522.
    In this paper Rudolf Carnap's definition of 'analytic truth' based upon a meaning postulate At, for theoretical predicates of a given scientific theory is subjected to critique. It is argued that this definition is both too exclusive and too inclusive. Assuming that the preceding is correct, At is subjected to further scrutiny to determine how to interpret it and whether, and under what conditions, it need even be true. It is argued that a given At need not be true as (...)
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  33. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Volumes I and II: Foundations of the Unity of Science. [REVIEW]N. E. - 1938 - Journal of Philosophy 35 (25):689-693.
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  34. Jornadas sobre 'EI Programa Filosófico de Carnap: Significado y Consecuencias' (San Sebastiän, 10-12 de abril de 1991).X. Eizagirre - 1991 - Theoria 6 (1/2):336-338.
  35. Une Explication de Texte.Maña Angélica Berho Esteves - 1969 - Humanitas 21:57.
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  36. Carnap on Theoretical Terms: Structuralism Without Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Michael Friedman - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):249 - 263.
    Both realists and instrumentalists have found it difficult to understand (much less accept) Carnap's developed view on theoretical terms, which attempts to stake out a neutral position between realism and instrumentalism. I argue that Carnap's mature conception of a scientific theory as the conjunction of its Ramsey sentence and Carnap sentence can indeed achieve this neutral position. To see this, however, we need to see why the Newman problem raised in the context of recent work on structural realism is no (...)
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  37. Carnap and Weyl on the Foundations of Geometry and Relativity Theory.Michael Friedman - 1995 - Erkenntnis 42 (2):247-260.
  38. The Large Scale Structure of Logical Empiricism: Unity of Science and the Elimination of Metaphysics.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):826-838.
    Two central and well-known philosophical goals of the logical empiricists are the unification of science and the elimination of metaphysics. I argue, via textual analysis, that these two apparently distinct planks of the logical empiricist party platform are actually intimately related. From the 1920’s through 1950, one abiding criterion for judging whether an apparently declarative assertion or descriptive term is metaphysical is that that assertion or term cannot be incorporated into a language of unified science. I explore various versions of (...)
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  39. The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science. [REVIEW]Stephen Gaukroger - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Science 42 (2):294-296.
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  40. What Are the Grounds of Explication?Eugene T. Gendlin - 1965 - The Monist 49 (1):137-164.
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  41. Carnap's Syntax Programme and the Philosophy of Mathematics.Warren Goldfarb - 2009 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  42. Two Dogmas'–All Bark and No Bite? Carnap and Quine on Analyticity.Paul A. Gregory - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633–648.
    Recently O’Grady argued that Quine’s “Two Dogmas” misses its mark when Carnap’s use of the analyticity distinction is understood in the light of his deflationism. While in substantial agreement with the stress on Carnap’s deflationism, I argue that O’Grady is not sufficiently sensitive to the difference between using the analyticity distinction to support deflationism, and taking a deflationary attitude towards the distinction itself; the latter being much more controversial. Being sensitive to this difference, and viewing Quine as having reason to (...)
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  43. Carnap's Work in the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics in a Historical Perspective.Jaakko Hintikka - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):167 - 189.
    Carnap's philosophy is examined from new viewpoints, including three important distinctions: (i) language as calculus vs language as universal medium; (ii) different senses of completeness: (iii) standard vs nonstandard interpretations of (higher-order) logic. (i) Carnap favored in 1930-34 the "formal mode of speech," a corollary to the universality assumption. He later gave it up partially but retained some of its ingredients, e.g., the one-domain assumption. (ii) Carnap's project of creating a universal self-referential language is encouraged by (ii) and by the (...)
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  44. Carnap and Essler Versus Inductive Generalization.Jaakko Hintikka - 1975 - Erkenntnis 9 (2):235 - 244.
  45. Holistic Reductionism. The Case Against the Case Against Carnap.Herbert Hrachovec - unknown
    Consider statements like ``Machines will never be able to think'' or ``You cannot turn a cat into a dog''. Many people will find such propositions evident, but we have learned to be cautious. 100 years from now things might look very different; it seems unduly dogmatic to insist on todays opinions as unrevisable points of reference, disallowing future breakthroughs in computer science or biology. The scientific outlook presupposes and enhances a high degree of curiosity and it seems a good idea (...)
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  46. Carnap, the Principle of Tolerance, and Empiricism.Robert Hudson - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (3):341-358.
    Kurt Gödel criticizes Rudolf Carnap's conventionalism on the grounds that it relies on an empiricist admissibility condition, which, if applied, runs afoul of his second incompleteness theorem. Thomas Ricketts and Michael Friedman respond to Gödel's critique by denying that Carnap is committed to Gödel's admissibility criterion; in effect, they are denying that Carnap is committed to any empirical constraint in the application of his principle of tolerance. I argue in response that Carnap is indeed committed to an empirical requirement vis‐à‐vis (...)
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  47. Carnap and Kuhn: Arch Enemies or Close Allies?Gürol Irzik & Teo Grünberg - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):285-307.
    We compare Carnap's and Kuhn's views on science. Although there are important differences between them, the similarities are striking. The basis for the latter is a pragmatically oriented semantic conventionalist picture of science, which suggests that the view that post-positivist philosophy of science constitutes a radical revolution which has no interesting affinities with logical positivism must be seriously mistaken.
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  48. AW Carus: Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought. Explication as Enlightenment.Jelena Issajeva - 2012 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 5 (1).
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  49. Carnap's Empiricism.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6.
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  50. Carnap on Concept Determination: Methodology for Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW]James Justus - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):161-179.
    Abstract Recent criticisms of intuition from experimental philosophy and elsewhere have helped undermine the authority of traditional conceptual analysis. As the product of more empirically informed philosophical methodology, this result is compelling and philosophically salutary. But the negative critiques rarely suggest a positive alternative. In particular, a normative account of concept determination—how concepts should be characterized—is strikingly absent from such work. Carnap's underappreciated theory of explication provides such a theory. Analyses of complex concepts in empirical sciences illustrates and supports this (...)
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