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  1. Rejecting the Given: Neurath and Carnap on Methodological Solipsism.Thomas Uebel - forthcoming - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science:000-000.
    This paper investigates how the doctrine of the epistemological given—long associated with empiricism and positivism and also informing Carnap’s first major work in 1928—was challenged and overcome by Neurath and Carnap in subsequent years. Particular attention is paid to the controversial issue of how precisely the dialectic between Neurath and Carnap played out: whether Neurath’s argumentation correctly engaged with Carnap’s actual positions, whether Carnap’s change of positions in turn fully engaged with Neurath’s challenge, and what all this may tell us (...)
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  2. A Defence of the Notion of ‘Foundedness’ in Carnap’s Aufbau.Sophie Nagler - 2020 - The New Collection 14:68-87.
    In Der logische Aufbau der Welt, first published in 1928, Carnap aims to rationally reconstruct all objects of cognition by logico-definitional means. As a result, he intends to obtain a fully objective framework in which scientific discourse can take place. This is made possible by the novel method of ‘purely structural definite description’ of all scientifically relevant objects, which is first introduced in the Aufbau. Key to the attainment of this goal is the notion of ‘foundedness’, which Carnap presents as (...)
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  3. Carnap’s Turn to the Thing Language.Ansten Klev - 2018 - Philosophia Scientiæ. Travaux d'Histoire Et de Philosophie des Sciences 22:179-198.
    Les contributions de Carnap au Congrès de 1935 marquent un triple changement dans sa philosophie: son tournant sémantique; ce qui sera appelé plus tard « la libéralisation de l’empirisme»; et son adoption du « langage des choses» comme base du langage de la science. C’est ce troisième changement qui est examiné ici. On s’interroge en particulier sur les motifs qui ont poussé Carnap à adopter le langage des choses comme langage protocolaire de la science unifiée et sur les vertus de (...)
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  4. Carnap on Unified Science.Ansten Klev - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:53-67.
    Unified science is a recurring theme in Carnap's work from the time of the Aufbau until the end of the 1930's. The theme is not constant, but knows several variations. I shall extract three quite precise formulations of the thesis of unified science from Carnap's work during this period: from the Aufbau, from Carnap's so-called syntactic period, and from "Testability and Meaning" and related papers. My main objective is to explain these formulations and to discuss their relation, both to each (...)
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  5. Studies on Paul Feyerabend's Philosophy: From Logical Empiricism to the Historical Turn in Philosophy of Science.Daniel Kuby - 2016 - Dissertation,
    The present article-based dissertation is a contribution to a historical and systematic recon- struction of Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy. Building on previous work on the same subject, this thesis continues a research effort exploring Feyerabend’s early ties to scientific philoso- phy, in particular Logical Empiricism and the Vienna Circle, as well as its continued effects on Feyerabend’s later philosophy. The main claim is that Feyerabend’s formative years in Vienna (1946-1955) happened in the context of scientific philosophy and that his early philosophi- (...)
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  6. A Classic Statement of Logical Empiricism. [REVIEW]Adam Tamas Tuboly - 2015 - The Berlin Review of Books 2015.
    Eino Kaila’s recently translated Human Knowledge: A Classic Statement of Logical Empiricism from 1939 is an important document both in the history of analytic philosophy and the history of logical empiricism in particular. Kaila discusses all the relevant topics that featured in the discussions of the Vienna Circle in the early 1930s and provides a neat summary with his own historical narrative and critical remarks.
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  7. On the Logical Positivists' Philosophy of Psychology: Laying a Legend to Rest.Sean Crawford - 2014 - In Maria Carla Galavotti, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Stephan Hartmann, Thomas Uebel & Marcel Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Vol. 5. Springer. pp. 711-726.
    The received view in the history of the philosophy of psychology is that the logical positivists—Carnap and Hempel in particular—endorsed the position commonly known as “logical” or “analytical” behaviourism, according to which the relations between psychological statements and the physical-behavioural statements intended to give their meaning are analytic and knowable a priori. This chapter argues that this is sheer legend: most, if not all, such relations were viewed by the logical positivists as synthetic and knowable only a posteriori. It then (...)
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  8. Carnap’s Aufbau and Physicalism: What Does the “Mutual Reducibility” of Psychological and Physical Objects Amount To?Thomas Uebel - 2014 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 17:45-56.
    The present paper is part of a larger project of investigating how far puzzling questions about Carnap’s philosophical deflationism – as expressed most prominently in “Empricism, Semantics and Ontology”1 – can be answered by reference to his own preferred position in areas upon which this meta-philosophical position can be expected to have a bearing. For that project the explorations below provide a starting point; on the present occasion they will, I hope, be found to be of independent interest. At issue (...)
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  9. Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and Physicalism: A Reassessment.David G. Stern - 2007 - In Alan Richardson & Thomas Uebel (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 305--31.
    The "standard account" of Wittgenstein’s relations with the Vienna Circle is that the early Wittgenstein was a principal source and inspiration for the Circle’s positivistic and scientific philosophy, while the later Wittgenstein was deeply opposed to the logical empiricist project of articulating a "scientific conception of the world." However, this telegraphic summary is at best only half-true and at worst deeply misleading. For it prevents us appreciating the fluidity and protean character of their philosophical dialogue. In retrospectively attributing clear-cut positions (...)
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  10. Carnap's Philosophy of Mind.Ramon Cirera - 1993 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (3):351-358.
  11. Carnap Und der Physikalismus.Franz Kutschera - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3).
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  12. Wittgenstein and Physicalism.Rudolf Haller - 1989 - Critica 21 (63):17-32.
  13. Physicalism and Relativity.Jules Vuillemin - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 16 (1):313-326.
    Carnap opposes physicalist language to phenomenal language. His elementary physicalist sentences convey descriptions which physicists still regard as phenomenal and subjective. A second order physicalism (principle of special relatively) is required in order to express physical laws. Carnap makes the phenomenal language a proper part of the physicalist language. This relation is compared to the relation that general relativity establishes between geometry and physiscs.
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  14. Review: A Physicalist Account of Psychology. [REVIEW]J. J. C. Smart - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):403 - 410.
  15. Carnap's Treatment of the Problem of Other Minds.A. J. Ayer - 1963 - In ¸ Iteschilpp:Prc. pp. 269--81.
  16. Psychology in Physical Language.R. Carnap - 1959 - In A. J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism. Free Press.
  17. The New Dualism: Psychological and Physical Terms.Israel Scheffler - 1950 - Journal of Philosophy 47 (December):737-751.
  18. Empiricism and Physicalism.B. V. Juhos - 1935 - Analysis 2 (6):81-92.
  19. Carnap and the Psychophysical Problem.Pierre Wagner - unknown
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  20. Wittgenstein Versus Carnap on Physicalism: A Reassessment.David Stern - unknown
    The "standard account" of Wittgenstein’s relations with the Vienna Circle is that the early Wittgenstein was a principal source and inspiration for the Circle’s positivistic and scientific philosophy, while the later Wittgenstein was deeply opposed to the logical empiricist project of articulating a "scientific conception of the world." However, this telegraphic summary is at best only half-true and at worst deeply misleading. For it prevents us appreciating the fluidity and protean character of their philosophical dialogue. In retrospectively attributing clear-cut positions (...)
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