Carvaka Philosophy

भारतीय समाज मूल्यप्रधान समाज है. भारतीय संस्कृति में मूल्यों को मनुष्य के सामाजिक, राजनैतिक और धार्मिक जीवन में विशेष स्थान दिया गया है क्योंकि मूल्यों के वास्तवीकरण का नाम ही संस्कृति है. वर्तमान समय में विज्ञान ने जहाँ मनुष्य को भौतिक सुविधाएँ उपलब्ध करने के लिए प्रत्येक क्षेत्र में अविष्कारों के ढेर लगा दिए हैं ,वहां उसके जीवन में एक खोखलापन भी उत्त्पन्न कर दिया है. ऐसे में समाज, देश और अपने स्वयं के जीवन में उसने मानव मूल्यों को तिलांजली (...) दे दी है. मानव जीवन की सार्थकता तभी है जब वह श्रेष्ठ भावनाएं रखे. हम एक लोकतान्त्रिक समाज का हिस्सा हैं जहाँ पर हम आपसी भाई-चारे, न्याय, समान अधिकार और स्वतन्त्रता का हिमायती बनने का नाटक करते हैं. संविधान में दिए गये मूल्यों की प्राप्ति से पहले हमें व्यक्ति के जीवन और समाज का भी मुआयना करना होगा तभी हम श्रेष्ठ मूल्यों को समाज में स्थापित कर सकते हैं. मूल्य, व्यक्ति की सामाजिक विरासत का एक अंग होता है इसलिए मूल्यों की व्यवस्था मानव आस्तित्व के विभिन्न स्तरों या आयामों में व्यक्ति के अनुकूलन की प्रक्रिया का मार्गदर्शन करती है. नैतिक मूल्य व्यक्ति के जीवन के साथ साथ समाज को भी उत्कृष्टता की तरफ अग्रसर करते हैं. इस शोध-पत्र का मुख्य उद्देश्य नैतिक मूल्यों के व्यक्ति के जीवन और वर्तमान भारतीय समाज में उपयोगिता का अध्ययन करना है. (shrink)

The article discusses Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpavṛtti and Avalokitavrata’s Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā commentaries on the “not without a cause” (nāpy ahetutaḥ) alternative of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1.1ab, from which it emerges that at least two distinct theories of causality can be attributed to the Lokāyata school. The first one is a physicalist theory that confines all causal relations within the sphere of material elements and is assimilated to accidentalism. The second one is a naturalist theory that attributes causal power to inner nature (svabhāva). The paper (...) discusses the theoretical differences between these two approaches, considers Bhāviveka’s and Avalokitavrata’s counter-arguments and concludes that some of the conjectures that modern scholars have put forward on the relation between svabhāvavāda, accidentalism and Lokāyata should be revised. (shrink)

A long-lived and lively tradition of materialist philosophers flourished in classical India and in classical Greece. Due to the condition of their texts, however, they do not often receive close study. This essay compares the views of the classical Indian materialists, the Cārvākas, and the classical Greek materialists, the Epicureans. The first section introduces their philosophies. The second outlines their doctrines of empiricism and materialism. The third and fourth turn to two comparative topics in Cārvāka and Epicurean ethics: their views (...) on eliminating irrational fears caused by superstition and their understanding of pleasure as the goal of human action and life. (shrink)

The classical Indian Cārvāka (“Materialist”) tradition contains three branches with regard to the means of knowledge (pramāṇas). First, the standard Cārvākas accept a single means of knowledge, perception, supporting this view with a critique of the reliability and coherence of inference (anumāna). Second, the “more educated” Cārvākas as well as Purandara endorse a form of inference limited to empirical matters. Third, radical skeptical Cārvākas like Jayarāśi attempt to undermine all accounts or technical definitions of the means of knowledge (even perception) (...) in order to enjoy a life free from philosophical and religious speculation. These branches respectively present something akin to David Hume’s problem of induction, endorse a fallibilistic, mitigated skepticism, and embody a thoroughgoing skepticism about philosophy itself. While all three branches are skeptics about religious matters, each branch exemplifies a different variety of epistemological skepticism. (shrink)

This is the third and final part of a study focused on the Madhyamaka accounts of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata so-called “wolf’s footprint” stanza and tale, and “beautiful lady” stanza. In particular, this paper discusses Jayānanda’s short account of the tale and the stanzas contained in his Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā on Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya. The Tibetan edition and English translation of Jayānanda’s relevant passages are also provided.

The cross-cultural philosopher B.K. Matilal is one of many who have argued that some Indian philosophers are skeptics. Inspired by Matilal, in Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India, Ethan Mills argues that Nāgārjuna (150–200 CE), Jayarāśi (770–830 CE), and Śrī Harṣa (1125–1180 CE) are skeptics in a specific sense: as part of a textually inspired tradition of “skepticism about philosophy,” they share overlapping methods. Mills’ arguments about method are more successful than those about tradition, although the book’s engaging exposition (...) of these three thinkers will hopefully spark new interest in their work. (shrink)

Epicurus was a Greek philosopher interested in pleasure or pursuit of it more than other ideals. He said, "No pleasure in itself is a bad thing, but the things that produce certain pleasures involve disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves." Epicurus tells us that the knowledge of which pleasures are good for us is wisdom. While this sometimes led to a negative view of his philosophy, in many regions of the world today the reality is that his thinking (...) has been very advanced and developed, leading to his ideas becoming highly influential in modern thought. His simple philosophies of avoiding pain, living a simple life, and learning has made much of his philosophy appealing and influential. An important Indian philosophy called "Charvaka" is that this world is the only reality. Out of the four human values — Dharma, Artha, Kama, and Moksha — they advocate the pursuit of karma only, and Artha merely as a means of facilitating the purpose. For Charvaka, the goal of human life is to achieve the maximum amount of pleasure in this life and to avoid as much pain as possible. Good life is the most enjoyable life. Good action is one that leads to a balance of pleasure, and bad action is one that causes more pain than pleasure. Today, consumerism is pervasive, the real spirit for any developing economy is to develop consumerism-driven products and marketing practices, and it is inevitable that the interests of consumers in general will be safeguarded. Consumerism believes that personal well-being and happiness depends to a very large extent on the level of personal consumption, in particular on the purchase of material goods. The idea is not simply that well-being depends on a standard of living above a certain threshold, but that consumption and material possessions are at the center of happiness. It is an attempt of this paper to see the relationship between these philosophies and to try to find common characteristics that lead man to live a happy and satisfying life. (shrink)

This is the second part of a three-part study dealing with the Madhyamaka accounts of, and commentaries on, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata so-called “wolf’s footprint” stanza and tale, and “beautiful lady” stanza. Here Avalokitavrata’s discussion of the tale and the stanzas is dealt with, together with the Tibetan edition and English translation of the corresponding passage from his Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā.

The cross-cultural philosopher B.K. Matilal is one of many who have argued that some Indian philosophers are skeptics. Inspired by Matilal, in Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India, Ethan Mills argues that Nāgārjuna (150–200 CE), Jayarāśi (770–830 CE), and Śrī Harṣa (1125–1180 CE) are skeptics in a specific sense: as part of a textually inspired tradition of “skepticism about philosophy,” they share overlapping methods. Mills’ arguments about method are more successful than those about tradition, although the book’s engaging exposition (...) of these three thinkers will hopefully spark new interest in their work. (shrink)

With the present study an analysis in three parts is provided of the Buddhist reception of two Cārvāka/Lokāyata stanzas, abbreviated as "wolf's footprint" and the "beautiful lady". These stanzas seem to be conceptually related to each other, having the common aim to emphasize the idea that one should rely only upon what is or can be perceived. Consequently, from here it is concluded that any perspective concerning the existence of an afterlife or of a moral retribution of our actions, since (...) these things cannot be directly perceived, should be abandoned. The first part of the article is a study of the occurrences of the two stanzas in the Buddhist sources, taking into account also new material, recently discovered, together with a comparison with the Jain sources. The second and third parts discuss respectively Avalokitavrata's and Jayānanda's interpretations of the stanzas, offering also for the first time to the reader a translation and analysis of their versions of the "wolf's footprint" tale, so far studied only from Jain sources. (shrink)

भारतीय चिन्तन परम्परा में पंच-महाभूत का बहुत महत्वपूर्ण स्थान है. भारतीय प्राचीन ग्रन्थों से लेकर अब तक विश्व की सरंचना सम्बन्धी सिद्धांतों में पंच-महाभूत सबसे स्वीकार्य सिद्धांत माना जाता रहा है. ये पांच तत्व हैं: पृथ्वी, जल, वायु, अग्नि और आकाश. परन्तु चार्वाक जैसे दार्शनिक और आर्यभट्ट (पांचवीं शताब्दी) जैसे विज्ञानी यह कहते आ रहे हैं की तत्व पांच नहीं, चार हैं. इन लोगों ने आकाश को स्वतंत्र तत्व के रूप में स्वीकर नहीं किया. चार्वाक का यह भी विचार रहा (...) है की सारा भौतिक व प्राक्रतिक परिदृश्य न किसी ने रचा है, न इसका कोई उद्देश्य है, प्रक्रति में परिवर्तन, विकास, रुपनान्तरण आदि इसकी अपनी प्रकिया है जो तब भी लाखों करोड़ों वर्षों से हो रहा था और आज भी विभिन्न रूपों में हो रहा है. पंच-तत्व के सिद्धांत को मानने वालों का विचार है की इन पांच तत्वों से जब शारीर बनता है तब आत्मा बाहर से प्रविष्ट होती है जबकि चार तत्व को मानने वाले चार्वाक का कथन है की इन चरों तत्वों के विशेष रूप में परस्पर मेल से ही चैतन्य (चेतना ) की उत्पत्ति होती है, आत्मा कहीं बाहर से नहीं आती- भूतेभ्य: चैतन्यम.आज विज्ञानं बहुत आगे बढ़ गया है और चार्वाक उसके अनुसार नये तत्वों की बात करते हैं. वास्तविकता तो यह है की जिन्हें हम तत्व कह रहे हैं वे तत्व न होकर यौगिक या मिश्रण हैं. तत्व वह होता है जिसमें एक तरह कर परमाणु रहते हैं और जिसे सरलतम पदार्थ के रूप में विभाजित नहीं किया जा सकता. चार्वाक प्रकृति के जड़ रूप से ही, भौतिक तत्वों से चैतन्य की उत्पत्ति को मानता है. जैसे किनव, मधु और शर्करा आदि के मिलने से मादकता उत्पन्न होती है उसी प्रकार शरीर में चैतन्य की उत्त्पति होती है. जब भौतिक तत्वों का तालमेल बिगड़ जाता है तो चैतन्य भी खत्म हो जाता है- सदा के लिए, सर्वदा के लिए – भस्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमन कुत:.चार्वाक का कहना है की चैतन्य आत्मा काआकस्मिक गुण नहीं बल्कि मौलिक गुण है और चैतन्ययुक्त शरीर ही आत्मा है . यद्यपि आज चार्वाक के चार तत्व भी आदर्शवादियों के पांच तत्वों की तरह ही रद्द हो चुके हैं तथापि उनकी स्थिति दूसरी है. उन्होंने चार तत्वों को प्रकृति के प्रतिनिधि कह कर इन से चेतना की उत्पत्ति मानी है, प्रकृति एकतत्ववाद का उनका सिद्धांत आज विज्ञानसम्मत सिद्धांत है, भले ही उन की तत्वों की बात तकनीकी रूप में सही न हो. उनके लिए चार तत्वों को मानना न अनिवार्य है और न ही उसे मानने के लिए कोई ईश्वरीय आदेश है क्योंकि तत्व उनके लिए प्रकृति के प्रतिनिधि मात्र हैं, जो तब यदि चार थे तो आज 118 हैं. इससे उन्हें कोई फर्क नहीं पड़ता जबकि अन्य दर्शनों के लिए के लिए स्वीकार करना दुरूह है. अत: हम कह सकते हैं की चार्वाक का दर्शन अनात्मवादी, प्रत्यक्षवादी और भौतिकवादी है. अत: इस शोध-पत्र का मुख्य विष्ण पंच-महाभूतों की अवधारणा की चार्वाक के सन्दर्भ में समीक्षा करना है और चार्वाक दर्शन की आज की प्रासंगिकता को देखना है. (shrink)

The base texts of most of the philosophical systems of ancient India are in the form of a collection of aphorisms (sūtra-s). The aphorisms are so brief and tersely worded that their significance can seldom be understood without the help of a commentary or commentaries. Sometimes, the literal meaning of an aphorism needs to be qualified or modified by an explanation found in the commentary. If a reader relies exclusively on the literal meaning of the aphorisms in the base text (...) without having recourse to any commentary or disregards all commentaries, he or she may miss the point. Contrariwise, if a reader relies exclusively on a commentary and disregards the literal meaning of an aphorism, he or she will commit another kind of blunder. Ideally, equal attention should be paid to the base text as well as the commentary or commentaries. Even then, all problems are not automatically solved, for it is an uphill task to decide when to go by the literal meaning of the aphorisms and when to follow the commentary. In their polemics against the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, Jayantabhaṭṭa (c. ninth century C.E.) and Hemacandra (eleventh century C.E.) erred because they did not follow the golden rule stated above and consequently misunderstood and misrepresented their opponents’ contentions. (shrink)

In questo saggio sono espresse alcune riflessioni concernenti l’orizzonte etico-morale proprio della scuola di materialismo indiana nota con il nome di Cārvāka/Lokāyata. La discussione si sviluppa secondo i seguenti punti: 1. Gli assunti ontologico-psicologici; 2. Gli assunti epistemologici; 3. L’etica e la morale; 4. Conclusioni.

Ciò che qui chiamo Materialismo indiano non deve intendersi come scuola filosofica unica ed univocamente impostata, bensì come insieme di correnti di pensiero, propugnanti differenti punti di vista, ma tutte collocate entro l’orizzonte concettuale che nega ciò che in Occidente si usa chiamare Trascendente. Inoltre, com’è ovvio, bisogna distinguere tra un Materialismo filosofico – che prenderò in considerazione qui – ed un Materialismo, per così dire, popolare – al quale mi riferirò solo se necessario. Due sono le impostazioni materialiste che (...) intendo trattare: l’una riguarda i sostenitori dell’esistenza di cinque elementi materiali (bhūtapañcakavādin) che chiamerò, seguendo Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, proto-Materialisti, l’altra concerne i sostenitori dell’esistenza di quattro elementi materiali (bhūtacatuṣṭayavādin), tra cui i Cārvāka. (shrink)

Reconsidering Classical Indian Thoughts neither claims, nor attempts to be a definitive study of all the characteristics as concept(s) of classical Indian thoughts. It is a modest attempt of the editor to familiarise the common, but philosophy reader with the fundamental conceptions of ancient Indian culture. I hope, by studying this book the reader will understand the relevance of Indian classical thoughts. -/- Here we have collected 17 papers both in English and Hindi languages written on Indian epistemology, metaphysics, logic, (...) ethics and social philosophy. To study the nature of philosophy in India and its implementation in all spheres of human life is one of the most important objectives of our Centre. In this regard we have published two online books entitled Philosophy, Education and Indian Value System and Positive Philosophy for Contemporary Indian Society, respectively. ISBN: 978-81-922377-2-5 Second Edition, 2012 Publisher: Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS), Milestone Education Society (Regd.), Balmiki Dharmashala, Ward No.06, Pehowa (Kurukshetra)-136128 (Haryana) Emails: [email protected], dr.si[email protected] Price: Rs.300/- (Three Hundred Rs. Only) -/- . (shrink)

An interview with Ramkrishna Bhattacharya on Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophy.

In this article an attempt is made to detect what could have been the dialectical reasons that impelled the Cār-vāka thinker Udbhatabhatta to revise and reformulate the classical materialistic concept of cognition. If indeed according to ancient Cārvākas cognition is an attribute entirely dependent on the physical body, for Udbhatabhatta cognition is an independent principle that, of course, needs the presence of a human body to manifest itself and for this very reason it is said to be a peculiarity of (...) the body. Therefore, Udbhatabhatta seems to de-scribe the cognizing faculty according to a double ontology: it is both a principle and a characteristic, both inde-pendent and dependent. Two philosophical contexts—Vaisesika and Nyāya schools—are here taken into account as possible anti-Cārvāka fault-finding points of view that spured Udbhatabhatta to reconsider the Cārvāka per-spective. Although we do not have so much textual material on this particular aspect of the ancient and medieval philosophical debate in India, it nonetheless can be supposed that Udbhatabhatta’s reformulation of the concept of cognition was a tentative response to the Vaisesika idea that cognition is not an attribute of the body, rather of the mind (which is here supposed to be eternal), and to the Naiyāyika perspective according to which cognition would be an attribute of an everlasting self. In the case of the Nyāya school, fortunately we have at our disposal the criticism put forward by Vātsyāyana against the materialistic conception of cognition during this time. By examining some Vātsyāyana’s objections, it will emerge that Udbhatabhatta’s idea of cognition really seems to have the aspect of a consistent answer to them, from a renewed materialistic point of view. (shrink)

In Āryadevapāda’s Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi we find a problematic passage in which some Cārvāka theories are expounded. The problem here lies in the fact that, according to Āryadevapāda, the Cārvākas—who did not admit rebirth—would have upheld that happiness in this life can be gained by worshipping gods and defeating demons. As the Cārvākas were materialists, the reference to gods and demons does not fit so much with their philosophical perspective. In this paper, by taking into account several passages from Pāli and Sanskrit (...) Buddhist sources, I have tried to demonstrate that Āryadevapāda is here probably following the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, where mention is made of some Lokāyatikas who are said to have been able to infatuate gods and demons. In both the Pāli Canon and the Mahāyāna sūtras, however, the term lokāyata does not refer to “materialism”. It rather conveys the meaning of “art of disputation”, and is generally used in the description of brāhmaṇas well versed in the Vedas, in the recitation of mantras and in dialectic methods in general. It is the Laṅkāvatārasūtra that introduces the idea—corroborated also by a passage from the Mahābhārata—that these brāhmaṇas, skilled in lokāyata, would have indulged in some materialistic tenet. When the two terms, Cārvāka and Lokāyata, came both to mean “materialism”, around the IV century CE, it is highly probable that non-Cārvāka thinkers and commentators—as could be the case of Āryadevapāda—had in some occasion assimilated and integrated certain points of view, originally belonging to the ancient lokāyata perspective (for instance, the references to gods and demons), into what they believed Cārvāka philosophy had to be. (shrink)

This is a free paper written by Prof. Ramkrishna Bhattacharya on Carvaka/Lokayata materialism. Here he pinpoints in a popularizing but thorough way the basic tenets of this philosophical school, dealing also with the historical development, the principal exponents, the new perspectives, etc.

In this paper I have tried to present the philosophy of the Cārvāka school of thought. I have covered their basic beliefs, Epistemology, Metaphyics and the way of life. I have also presented the contribution of the Cārvāka thought to the Indian society. Finally I have drawn parallels between the Eastern and Western thought processes and how the Cārvāka philosophy is actually the first philosophy which propagated freedom of thought and dissent by questioning the then prevalent social and religious structures (...) in India. (shrink)

Epicurus was a Greek philosopher and more interested in pleasure or its pursuit than other ideals. He said, “No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.” Epicurus tells us that wisdom is the knowledge of which pleasures are good for us. While at times this led to a negative view of his philosophy, the reality is his thinking was very advanced and developed, leading to (...) his ideas becoming highly influential in modern thought in many regions of the world today. His simple philosophies of avoiding pain, leading a simple life, and attaining knowledge have made his philosophy both attractive and influential to many. One important Indian Philosophy “Charvaka” take this world to be the only reality. Out of the four human values - Dharma, artha, kama, and moksha - they advocate pursuit of kama only and artha merely as a facilitating means for the purpose. For Charvaka, the goal of human life to attain the maximum amount of pleasure in this life, avoiding pain as far as possible. A good life is a life of maximum enjoyment. A good action is one which leads to a balance of pleasure and a bad action is one which brings about more pain than pleasure. In present times, consumerism is all pervading, the real spirit for any developing economy is to develop products and marketing practices advocating consumerism and it is inevitable to safeguard the interest of consumers at large. Consumerism is the belief that personal wellbeing and happiness depends to a very large extent on the level of personal consumption, particularly on the purchase of material goods. The idea is not simply that wellbeing depends upon a standard of living above some threshold, but that at the center of happiness is consumption and material possessions. It is an attempt of this paper to see the relation between these philosophies and try to find common characteristics which lead man to lead a happy and satisfactorily life. (shrink)