Causation

In this paper I argue that there is a significant but often overlooked metaphysical distinction to be made between contextualism and contrastivism. The orthodox view is that contrastivism is merely a form of contextualism. This is a mistake. The contextualist view is incompatible with certain naturalist claims about the metaphysical nature of concepts within whichever domain is being investigated, while the contrastivist view is compatible with these claims. So, choosing one view over the other will involve choosing to affirm or (...) deny a significant metaphysical claim. As such, a demarcation ought to be put in place between contextualism and contrastivism. (shrink)

Currently, the dominant answer for the origin of the universe is the Big Bang Theory. This theory attempts to explain the origin of the universe by the origin of continuous causal paths. The theory relies heavily on physics, which interchanges time with incremental change. I argue that this leaves explanations either speculating too many or too few entities for the origin of continuous causal paths. Accordingly, I provide an alternative explanation that forces one not speculate too many or too few (...) entities for the origin of continuous causal paths, and argue that the Big Bang Theory is not an adequate explanation for the origin of the universe. (shrink)

Merab Konstantinovich [Mamardashvili] met with me immediately, as soon as I requested it, although he forewarned me that he could only dimly remember much of that distant past in which I was most interested. But evidently that past still perturbed him as well, since he agreed to speak with me even though he had not yet completely recovered from his illness, and hence his voice was feeble, at times subsiding to a whisper; he would pronounce his words indistinctly, constantly sticking (...) one onto another; on top of that, for technical reasons the dictaphone was situated a bit away from him. It was therefore very difficult to transcribe the text, and I raised many questions with the idea of asking Merab Konstantinovich about them at our next meeting and clearing up some things. But alas, there was no next meeting … Hence I am permitting myself now to publish only some of the most clearly enunciated fragments of my conversation with him, one of the four "forefathers" of the Moscow Methodological Circle, whose name for us, today's participants (and hence neophytes) in the methodological movement, is enveloped by legends handed down by word of mouth. I kept my questions to a minimum. Mamardashvili's reminiscences, arguments, and reflections will seem contentious to many. But no matter, one can dispute points of substance even with those who have passed on. (shrink)

I think that our concepts of past and future are so basic and so all-pervasive that I find it difficult to believe that anyone could even begin to make it appear plausible that one could dislodge them from their accustomed habitats. But Michael Dummett, in his paper Bringing about the past, while leaving no doubt about the fact that we are well-advised to leave the past where it belongs, arrives at the conclusion that under very special circumstances one might consider (...) it not completely impossible to regard a situation as one in which the past has been brought about. In spite of Dummett’s very sophisticated arguments I continue to have doubts about this. But before going into these doubts, I shall try to remind you of the substance of Dummett’s paper. (shrink)

We aim to devise a Ramsey test analysis of actual causation. Our method is to define a strengthened Ramsey test for causal models. Unlike the accounts of Halpern and Pearl ([2005]) and Halpern ([2015]), the resulting analysis deals satisfactorily with both over- determination and conjunctive scenarios.

This paper examines the role of reason in Shepherd's account of acquiring knowledge of the external world via first principles. Reason is important, but does not have a foundational role. Certain principles enable us to draw the required inferences for acquiring knowledge of the external world. These principles are basic, foundational and, more importantly, self‐evident and thus justified in other ways than by demonstration. Justificatory demonstrations of these principles are neither required, nor possible. By drawing on textual and contextual evidence, (...) I will show that Shepherd should have said that we know the first principles of any science, in general, and that “everything which begins to exist must have a cause”, in particular, via intuition, not via reason. Reasoning about such principles can help their self‐evidence shine through in certain cases; their justification, and our being justified in believing them, does not come from this reasoning, however. (shrink)

The problem of indeterminism in quantum mechanics usually being considered as a generalization determinism of classical mechanics and physics for the case of discrete (quantum) changes is interpreted as an only mathematical problem referring to the relation of a set of independent choices to a well-ordered series therefore regulated by the equivalence of the axiom of choice and the well-ordering “theorem”. The former corresponds to quantum indeterminism, and the latter, to classical determinism. No other premises (besides the above only mathematical (...) equivalence) are necessary to explain how the probabilistic causation of quantum mechanics refers to the unambiguous determinism of classical physics. The same equivalence underlies the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics. It merged the well-ordered components of the vectors of Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics and the non-ordered members of the wave functions of Schrödinger’s undulatory mechanics. The mathematical condition of that merging is just the equivalence of the axiom of choice and the well-ordering theorem implying in turn Max Born’s probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. Particularly, energy conservation is justified differently than classical physics. It is due to the equivalence at issue rather than to the principle of least action. One may involve two forms of energy conservation corresponding whether to the smooth changes of classical physics or to the discrete changes of quantum mechanics. Further both kinds of changes can be equated to each other under the unified energy conservation as well as the conditions for the violation of energy conservation to be investigated therefore directing to a certain generalization of energy conservation. (shrink)

What distinguishes causation from grounding? One suggestion is that causation, but not grounding, occurs over time. Recently, however, counterexamples to this simple temporal criterion have been offered. In this paper, we situate the temporal criterion within a broader framework that focuses on two aspects: locational overlapping in space and time and the presence of intermediaries in space and time. We consider, and reject, the idea that the difference between grounding and causation is that grounding can occur without intermediaries. We go (...) on to use the fact that grounding and causation both involve intermediaries to develop a better temporal criterion for distinguishing causation from grounding. The criterion is this: when a cause and effect are spatially disjoint, there is always a chain of causal intermediaries between the cause and the effect that are extended in time. By contrast, when the grounds and the grounded are spatially disjoint, there is always a chain of grounding intermediaries, but the chain need not be extended in time, it can be purely spatial. The difference between grounding and causation, then, is that causation requires time for chaining in a way that grounding does not. (shrink)

The well-known empiricist apories of the lawfulness of nature prevent an adequate philosophical interpretation of empirical science until this day. Clarification can only be expected through an immanent refutation of the empiricist point of view. My argument is that Hume’s claim, paradigmatic for modern empiricism, is not just inconsequent, but simply contradictory: Empiricism denies that a lawlike character of nature can be substantiated. But, as is shown, anyone who claimes experience to be the basis of knowledge (as the empiricist naturally (...) does), has, in fact, always already presupposed the lawfullness of nature, i.e. has assumed the ontology of a nature lawful in itself. If lawfulness is, more closely, understood as dependency on conditions, then the functional character of the laws of nature is involved with the consequence that verification is not to be taken as a mere repetition of measurements but as clarification of the conditional structure of the physical process. Furthermore the functionality of the laws of nature also includes a statement on their invariance (relative to certain transformations) and so their lawlikeness. This throws a new light on the problem of induction. Seen in this way it is hardly surprising that the notorious neglect of the functional aspect in empiricism has led to fundamental problems with the concept of the law of nature. (shrink)

In his article on the foundations of Ficino’s ideas on magic, James Hankins observes that, where Ficino justifies non-material causation in the universe, he is heavily indebted to Avicenna. As Hankins also points out, this Avicennan idea clearly violates the Aristotelian maxim that ‘physical causation requires contact’. Because Avicenna holds the view that the soul is neither a physical entity nor simply the form of body, Avicenna’s consent to the soul to manipulate material objects means assignment of the soul to (...) perform actions upon physical nature. According to Hankins, this consent resorts to a vertical connectivity between physical objects and the human soul. However, we do not see in Hankins’s argument how this connection can occur according to Avicenna and on what grounds Avicenna lets the soul cause changes on material objects. How does this non-material causation take place? (shrink)

The theistic doctrine of creation highlights the significance of the world's dependence on God. For this doctrine, a variety of justifications have been offered based on the ontological and epistemological commitments of a philosopher or theologian. In this dissertation, I defend the thesis that the theistic doctrine of creation is strongly justified when on the one hand the integrity of nature is established by affirming causal necessity while on the other hand the sovereignty of God is maintained by affirming divine (...) simplicity, eternity, and immutability. To construct my argument, in the first chapter, I examine the Aristotelian roots of causal necessity and its development by Avicenna. I also consider objections to causal necessity raised by Hume and al-Ghazālī and some contemporary objections by David Lewis. In the second chapter, I identify three competing theses to explain the integrity of nature, namely, the regularism, the extrinsic necessitarianism, and the intrinsic necessitarianism. I conclude that the intrinsic necessitarianism is the strongest among them. In the third chapter, I make a case for the sovereignty of God by exploring the limits of the concept of the theistic God and claim that sovereignty is conditional on immutability, simplicity, and eternity, which qualify the divine attributes of knowledge, power, and goodness. In the last chapter, after analyzing strengths and weaknesses of theistic accounts of creation, I propose an account of ontological dependence by extending Avicenna's account of creation, which consists in God's conferral of existence, to His sustaining activity at all times during which an object endures. (shrink)

Most philosophers of physics are eliminativists about causation. Following Bertrand Russell’s lead, they think that causation is a folk concept that cannot be rationally reconstructed within a worldview informed by contemporary physics. Against this thesis, I argue that physics contributes to shaping the concept of causation, in two ways. 1. Special Relativity is a physical theory that expresses causal constraints. 2. The physical concept of a conserved quantity can be used in the functional reduction of the notion of causation. The (...) empirical part of this reduction makes the hypothesis that the transference of an amount of a conserved quantity is a necessary and sufficient condition for causation. This hypothesis is defended against several objections from physics: that amounts of energy do not possess the appropriate identity conditions required for being able to be transmitted, that there is no universal principle of the conservation of energy in General Relativity, and that there are at least two types of physical systems in which causation does not involve any transference: entangled systems in quantum mechanics and the Aharanov-Bohm effect. In order to show that physics provides means to elaborate the concept of causation it is important to avoid certain misunderstandings. In particular, the claim that there is causation in a physical world does not mean that causation is an additional ingredient of the "furniture" of the world, over and above the ingredients identified by physics. (shrink)

Our approach aims at accounting for causal claims in terms of how the physical states of the underlying dynamical system evolve with time. Causal claims assert connections between two sets of physicals states—their truth depends on whether the two sets in question are genuinely connected by time evolution such that physical states from one set evolve with time into the states of the other set. We demonstrate the virtues of our approach by showing how it is able to account for (...) typical causes, causally relevant factors, being ‘the’ cause, and cases of overdetermination and causation by absences. (shrink)

Many researchers consider cancer to have molecular causes, namely mutated genes that result in abnormal cell proliferation (e.g. Weinberg 1998); yet for others, the causes of cancer are to be found not at the molecular level but at the tissue level and carcinogenesis would consist in a disrupted tissue organization with downward causation effects on cells and cellular components (e.g. Sonnenschein & Soto 2008). In this contribution, I ponder how to make sense of such downward causation claims. Adopting a manipulationist (...) account of causation (Woodward 2003), I propose a formal definition of downward causation, and discuss further requirements (in light of Baumgartner 2009). I then show that such an account cannot be mobilized in support of non-reductive physicalism (contrary to Raatikainen 2010). However, I also argue that such downward causation claims might point at particularly interesting dynamic properties of causal relationships that might prove salient in characterizing causal relationships (following Woodward 2010). (shrink)

The received view in physicalist philosophy of mind assumes that causation can only take place at the physical domain and that the physical domain is causally closed. It is often thought that this leaves no room for mental states qua mental to have a causal influence upon the physical domain, leading to epiphenomenalism and the problem of mental causation. However, in recent philosophy of causation there has been growing interest in a line of thought that can be called causal antifundamentalism: (...) causal notions cannot play a role in physics, because the fundamental laws of physics are radically different from causal laws. Causal anti-fundamentalism seems to challenge the received view in physicalist philosophy of mind and thus raises the possibility of there being genuine mental causation after all. This paper argues that while causal anti-fundamentalism provides a possible route to mental causation, we have reasons to think that it is incorrect. Does this mean that we have to accept the received view and give up the hope of genuine mental causation? I will suggest that the ontological interpretation of quantum theory provides us both with a view about the nature of causality in fundamental physics, as well as a view how genuine mental causation can be compatible with our fundamental (quantum) physical ontology. (shrink)

I argue that the debate between proponents of substance causation and proponents of causation by powers, as to whether substances or their powers are causes, hinges on whether or not powers are self-exemplifying or non-self-exemplifying properties. Substance causation is committed to powers being non-self-exemplifying properties while causation by powers is committed to powers being self-exemplifying properties. I then argue that powers are non-self-exemplifying properties, in support of substance causation.

[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian] Armstrong’s theory of laws and causation may be articulated as something like the following, which we may refer to as the received view: “Laws are intrinsic higher-order relations of ensuring between properties. The instantiation of laws is identical with singular causation. This identity is a posteriori.” Opponents and advocates of this view, believe that it may fairly and correctly be attributed to Armstrong. I do not deny it; instead I seek to reconsider (...) the received view, specifically by treating it as a part of Armstrong’s metaphysics. The main features that should concern us are truthmaker theory and the formal account of the constitutive parts of states of affairs. I also discuss Bird’s ultimate argument against Armstrong and show how its impact is weakened by this proper reading. (shrink)

Experimental design is one aspect of a scientific method. A well-designed, properly conducted experiment aims to control variables in order to isolate and manipulate causal effects and thereby maximize internal validity, support causal inferences, and guarantee reliable results. Traditionally employed in the natural sciences, experimental design has become an important part of research in the social and behavioral sciences. Experimental methods are also endorsed as the most reliable guides to policy effectiveness. Through a discussion of some of the central concepts (...) associated with experimental design, including controlled variation and randomization, this chapter will provide a summary of key ethical issues that tend to arise in experimental contexts. In addition, by exploring assumptions about the nature of causation and by analyzing features of causal relationships, systems, and inferences in social contexts, this chapter will summarize the ways in which experimental design can undermine the integrity of not only social and behavioral research but policies implemented on the basis of such research. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se concentra en el debate acerca de los alcances de la providencia que tuvo lugar entre las escuelas estoica, platónica y peripatética entre las siglos I y III de nuestra era. En ese contexto, analiza el problema del status ontológico de los singulares en Orígenes de Alejandría y Nemesio de Émesa. Influidos primariamente por la síntesis filoniana entre las distintas teorías griegas de providencia y la de las Escrituras, estos autores fundan la consistencia de los singulares en (...) la tesis de una acción directa del principio divino sobre cada uno de ellos. Frente a una cierta tendencia universalista y necesitarista del pensamiento clásico, los Padres griegos intentaron rescatar el valor metafísico del individuo en cuanto tal. -/- The present paper focuses on the debate over the scope of Providence that took place among the Stoic, Platonic and Peripatetic schools between the first and the third centuries AD. In that context, it deals with the problem of the ontological status of the singulars in the thought of Origen of Alexandria and Nemesius of Emesa. Influenced primarily by the Philonian synthesis of the different Greek theories of Providence with that of the Scriptures, Origen and Nemesius ground the consistency of individual beings on the thesis of a direct divine action intended for each of them. Faced with the universalistic and necessitarian tendencies of classical thought, the Greek Fathers tried to rescue the metaphysical value of individuals as such. (shrink)

The peculiar emphases of Gregory of Nyssa’s thought earned him all kinds of charges, in his own lifetime and onwards: among others, that he falls into Tritheism, Modalism, Synergism, Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism. The purpose of this paper is to interpret one of these theoretical audacities. It can be found in a passage from his late treatise De vita Moysis (II 86), where he refers to the evils suffered by the Egyptians in the book of Exodus, and he attributes their cause (...) to human decision (proaíresis). He affirms there that Divine Justice itself ‘is consequent’ or ‘follows’ (epakolouthoûsa) human decisions according to their merit. Although at this point Gregory follows closely Origen’s exegesis – which tried to rebut the determinism of certain Gnostic schools by affirming the true self-government of the soul, even regarding salvation or damnation, he goes beyond his Alexandrian predecessor and his Greek sources concerning the real autonomy of human actions, in interpersonal correspondence between the human and the divine. (shrink)

After a brief historical survey the book discusses major recently discussed theories of causation (regularity theories, process theories, counterfactual theories as well as interventionist theories). Towards the end the author's own account of a disposition based process theory of causation is developed.

On the recently suggested loophole view of causal closure, nothing in a universe has its cause coming from another universe. It is allowed, though, that something, especially a first thing, can have its cause situated in an interface between universes. However, the possibility of such an interface does not mean that there is any actual interface. In fact, there are several major obstacles to be managed before an interface should be hoped for. One such obstacle, the need for an account (...) of how objects in one universe relate to objects in another universe, is addressed in this paper. The outcome is positive and suggests that objects of different ontological status relate as the kind ‘object’. Some positive and negative properties of such higher-order objects are noted. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that, if there are substances, substance causation (i.e., causation by substances) is the only sort of causation in the universe – or the only fundamental sort. Subsequently, I develop an account of substance causation that is partly grounded on a peculiar interpretation of absolute change (i.e., of entities' coming and ceasing to be) and qualitative change, on some ontological assumptions about modes (i.e., individual properties that ontologically depend on their bearers) and powers. Finally, I reply to (...) some objections against substance causation in general (e.g., C. D. Broad's objection against causes' being non-essentially-dated entities) and to some possible objections against my own account and I briefly explore three advantages given by the acceptance of the latter. (shrink)

How many notions of cause are there? The causality literature is witnessing a flourishing of pluralist positions. Here I focus on a recent debate on whether interpreting causality in terms of inferential relations commits one to _semantic_ pluralism or not. I argue that inferentialism is compatible with a `weak' form of monism, where causality is envisaged as _one_, _vague_ cluster concept. I offer two arguments for this, one for vagueness, one for uniqueness. Finally, I qualify in what sense the resulting (...) form of monism is `weak'. (shrink)

This work addresses and resolved Kant's first antinomy, and brings metaphysics in line with advances in he science of big bang cosmology, introduces a new philosophical argument for the existence of a Supreme Being, and is presented in three versions, with the first version quoting Kant's most relevant remarks with regard to what he calls a science of metaphysics, and an abbreviated version without any quotes, as well as a one page abstract diagram of the argument.

The transference theory reduces causation to the transmission of physical conserved quantities, like energy or momenta. Although this theory aims at applying to all felds of physics, we claim that it fails to account for a quantum electrodynamic effect, viz. the Aharonov-Bohm effect. After having argued that the Aharonov-Bohm effect is a genuine counter-example for the transference theory, we offer a new physicalist approach of causation, ontic and modal, in which this effect is embedded.

In their article 'Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes', Joseph Halpern and Judea Pearl draw upon structural equation models to develop an attractive analysis of 'actual cause'. Their analysis is designed for the case of deterministic causation. I show that their account can be naturally extended to provide an elegant treatment of probabilistic causation.

Lack of clarity about underlying philosophical commitments leads to lack of clarity at other levels of analysis. Here I show that the literature on so-called “causal mechanisms” is rife with conceptual problems, stemming from insufficient rigor with respect to the metaphysics of causation.

Machamer, Darden, and Craver argue that causal explanations explain effects by describing the operations of the mechanisms which produce them. One of this paper’s aims is to take advantage of neglected resources of Mechanism to rethink the traditional idea that actual or counterfactual natural regularities are essential to the distinction between causal and non-causal co-occurrences, and that generalizations describing natural regularities are essential components of causal explanations. I think that causal productivity and regularity are by no means the same thing, (...) and that the Regularists are mistaken about the roles generalizations play in causal explanation. Humean, logical empiricist, and other Regularist accounts of causal explanation have had the unfortunate effect of distracting philosophers’ from important non-explanatory scientific uses of laws and lesser generalizations which purport to describe natural regularities. My second aim is to characterize some of these uses, illustrating them with examples from neuroscientific research. (shrink)

Salmón ha afirmado que su teoría de la explicación causal no es enteramente adecuada para el dominio cuántico debido a ciertas anomalías causales como el dualismo onda/partícula y, especialmente, a las correlaciones estadísticas que surgen de experimentos tipo EPR. En este escrito se analizan las nociones causales de Salmón, en las cuales se basa su teoría probabilista de la explicación, con el fin de delimitar su alcance en ese dominio mostrando que sólo abarca procesos de transición pero no procesos de (...) transmutación. Además, se propone, a muy grandes rasgos, una noción alternativa de causalidad indeterminista que pretende ser adecuada para ciertos procesos cuánticos como procesos estocásticos. Por último se arguye que si bien la explicación de las correlaciones cuánticas es un problema abierto, sería erróneo considerar que una teoría de la explicación causal, como la de Salmón, concebida y elaborada primordialmente para procesos físicos individuales, pueda y deba dar cuenta de tales correlaciones. /// Salmon has said that his theory of causal explanation is not fully adequate for the quantum domain because of certain causal anomalies such as the wave/particle dualism and, in particular, the statistical correlations which arise from EPR-type experiments. This paper analyzes Salmon's causal notions, on which his probabilistic theory of explanation is based, in order to delimit its scope within that domain by showing that it covers only transition processes but not processes of transmutation. Beside, I propose, very roughly, an alternative notion of indeterministic causality, intended to be adequate for certain quantum processes as stochastic processes. Finally, I also argue that, while the explanation of the quantum correlations is an open problem, is would be a mistake to think that a theory of causal explanation, like Salmon's, conceived and worked out primarily for individual physical processes, could and should account for such correlations. (shrink)

The paper attempts to reconcile two very different approaches to the concept of causation. In the original form, it is the opposition found in Laplace between his doctrine of constant and variable causes on the one hand and his mechanistic determinism on the other. This tension was described clearly only by Maxwell who stressed the contrast between the statistical and the dynamical method (calling the latter also the historical or strictly kinetic method). A similar dichotomy surfaces in the work of (...) Wesley Salmon who distinguished statistical from aleatory causation. Acknowledging that we seem to have conflicting intuitions about causality and explanation, I argue that assigning probabilistic laws a fundamental role in scientific explanation does not conflict with the assumption of Laplacian determinism. This is due to the fact that in most systems of interest, we confront a complex interaction of multiple causal factors and an extreme sensitivity to small variations of initial conditions. (shrink)

This volume claims to offer first a correct interpretation of Hume's theory of causation, and second, a philosophical defense of it against many recent criticisms. The first two chapters try to reconcile Hume's two definitions of "cause," and to prove that Hume was not a skeptic about induction. The authors contend that Hume's views on causation can be rationally reconstructed as a unified theory that is, they believe, faithful to his intentions, namely that causation involves regularities or constant conjunctions, and (...) some kind of necessity. (shrink)

Kenneth Clatterbaugh has written a valuable exposition and discussion of a century of upheaval in metaphysics and natural philosophy, tracing the gutting and reworking of Aristotelian causality from its uncomfortable scholastic context into a leaner and meaner instrument of secularized scientific explanation. The book examines key figures directly, evaluates prominent interpretations from the recent literature, and also puts Clatterbaugh’s own useful and definite stamp on the story. This includes the usual philosophical suspects—Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume—and their weighty philosophical interlocutors (...) and followers like Hobbes, Gassendi, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Anthony Legrand. Then, on the more narrowly scientific side, there are Boyle, Rohault, and Newton. (shrink)

Recently, certain philosophers have argued that an explanatory relation is a causal relation that is fundamentally about the invariance of a relation betweenvariables of interest under intervention-i.e., about a manipulable invariant relation. This manipulative theory tends to reduce a causal relation to a manipulable invariant relation. By explicating a case from contemporary econometrics, this paper argues that a manipulable invariant relation can be obtained only when the causal chain or causal structure of the targeted relation is free from disturbing influences. (...) In other words, a manipulable invariant relation can be regarded only as a special kind of causal relation, and so the notion of invariance can never replace the idea of causation. This paper also shows that the distinction between causation and invariance has methodological import concerning the philosophical discussion of economic theorizing and of economic theory development.1. Introduction2. Manipulation, Invariance, Superexogeneity, and Causal Structure2.1 The Manipulability Theory of Causation2.2 The Idea ofWeak Exogeneity2.3 The Idea of Invariance and Its Relation to the Idea of Superexogeneity2.4 Can We Equate a Causal Relation with an Invariant Relation?3. The Methodological Import of the Distinction between Causation and Invariance4. A Causal Structuralist Account of Economic Theorizing and Economic Theory Development5. Conclusion. (shrink)

This book explores the artificial by examining transformations in the Aristotelian metaphysical understanding of the relationship between nature and techne, which leads to the “operative imperative” in early modernity. With this a reversal takes place, whereby instead of nature being model for techne as it is for Aristotle and Aquinas, techne becomes the model for nature.

Phyllis Illari & Federica Russo: Causality: Philosophical Theory Meets Scientific Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 310pp, £29.99 HB.

Recent literature on causation invokes a distinction between deviant and default behavior to account for token causation. Critical examination of two prominent attempts to employ a distinction between deviants and defaults reveals that the distinction is far from clear. I clarify and develop the distinction by appeal to the notion of a modally robust process, and show how the distinction can be employed by causal process theorists to respond to cases of causation by omission. This shows that the default/deviant distinction (...) is not so much a tool for counterfactual accounts of causation, but rather for causal process theory. (shrink)