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1 — 50 / 146
  1. added 2019-01-03
    The Dutch Book Arguments.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    (This is for the series Elements of Decision Theory published by Cambridge University Press and edited by Martin Peterson) -/- Our beliefs come in degrees. I believe some things more strongly than I believe others. I believe very strongly that global temperatures will continue to rise during the coming century; I believe slightly less strongly that the European Union will still exist in 2029; and I believe much less strongly that Cardiff is east of Edinburgh. My credence in something is (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-18
    Admissibility Troubles for Bayesian Direct Inference Principles.Christian Wallmann & James Hawthorne - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-37.
    Direct inferences identify certain probabilistic credences or confirmation-function-likelihoods with values of objective chances or relative frequencies. The best known version of a direct inference principle is David Lewis’s Principal Principle. Certain kinds of statements undermine direct inferences. Lewis calls such statements inadmissible. We show that on any Bayesian account of direct inference several kinds of intuitively innocent statements turn out to be inadmissible. This may pose a significant challenge to Bayesian accounts of direct inference. We suggest some ways in which (...)
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  3. added 2018-12-18
    Correcting Credences with Chances.Ilho Park - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    Lewis’s Principal Principle is widely recognized as a rationality constraint that our credences should satisfy throughout our epistemic life. In practice, however, our credences often fail to satisfy this principle because of our various epistemic limitations. Facing such violations, we should correct our credences in accordance with this principle. In this paper, I will formulate a way of correcting our credences, which will be called the Adams Correcting Rules and then show that such a rule yields non-commutativity between conditionalizing and (...)
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  4. added 2018-12-06
    Accuracy and Credal Imprecision.Dominik Berger & Nilanjan Das - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (i.e. credal states representable only by sets of credence functions) rather than precise ones (i.e. credal states representable by single credence functions). Some writers have recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing solely to the overall accuracy of the doxastic states they recommend. But these arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we prove some (...)
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  5. added 2018-11-15
    Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.
    The foundations of probability are viewed through the lens of the subjectivist interpretation. This article surveys conditional probability, arguments for probabilism, probability dynamics, and the evidential and subjective interpretations of probability.
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  6. added 2018-10-31
    Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
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  7. added 2018-07-30
    A Subjectivist's Guide to Deterministic Chance.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscript
    I present an account of deterministic chance which takes, as its jumping-off point, the physico-mathematical approach to theorizing about deterministic chance known as 'the method of arbitrary functions'. This approach promisingly yields deterministic probabilities which align with what we take the chances to be---it tells us that there is approximately a 1/2 probability of a spun roulette wheel stopping on black, and approximately a 1/2 probability of a flipped coin landing heads up---but it requires some probabilistic materials to work with. (...)
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  8. added 2018-07-30
    Is It the Principal Principle That Implies the Principle of Indifference?Balazs Gyenis & Leszek Wronski - 2017 - In Gábor Hofer-Szabó & Leszek Wroński (eds.), Making it Formally Explicit: Probability, Causality and Indeterminism. Springer International Publishing.
    Hawthorne, Landes, Wallmann and Williamson argue that the Principal Principle implies a version of the Principle of Indifference. We show that what the Authors take to be the Principle of Indifference can be obtained without invoking anything which would seem to be related to the Principal Principle. In the Appendix we also discuss several Conditions proposed in the same paper.
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  9. added 2018-07-30
    The Relation Between Credence and Chance: Lewis' "Principal Principle" Is a Theorem of Quantum Probability Theory.John Earman - unknown
    David Lewis' "Principal Principle" is a purported principle of rationality connecting credence and objective chance. Almost all of the discussion of the Principal Principle in the philosophical literature assumes classical probability theory, which is unfortunate since the theory of modern physics that, arguably, speaks most clearly of objective chance is the quantum theory, and quantum probabilities are not classical probabilities. Given the generally accepted updating rule for quantum probabilities, there is a straight forward sense in which the Principal Principle is (...)
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  10. added 2018-06-18
    No Crystal Balls.Jack Spencer - forthcoming - Noûs.
    The world is said to contain crystal balls whenever the present carries news of the as-yet-undetermined parts of the future. Many philosophers believe that crystal balls are metaphysically possible. In this essay, I argue that they are not. Whether crystal balls are possible matters, for at least two reasons. The first is epistemological. According to a simple, user-friendly chance norm for credence, which I call the Present Principle, agents are rationally required to conform their credences to their expectations of the (...)
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  11. added 2018-06-05
    Probability.Antony Eagle - 2016 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science,. USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 417-439.
    Rather than entailing that a particular outcome will occur, many scientific theories only entail that an outcome will occur with a certain probability. Because scientific evidence inevitably falls short of conclusive proof, when choosing between different theories it is standard to make reference to how probable the various options are in light of the evidence. A full understanding of probability in science needs to address both the role of probabilities in theories, or chances, as well as the role of probabilistic (...)
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  12. added 2018-03-30
    Mischaracterizing Uncertainty in Environmental-Health Sciences.Kristin Shrader-Frechette - 2017 - Diametros 53:96-124.
    Researchers doing welfare-related science frequently mischaracterize either situations of decision-theoretic mathematical/scientific uncertainty as situations of risk, or situations of risk as those of uncertainty. The paper outlines this epistemic/ethical problem ; surveys its often-deadly, welfare-related consequences in environmental-health sciences; and uses recent research on diesel particulate matter to reveal 7 specific methodological ways that scientists may mischaracterize lethal risks instead as situations of uncertainty, mainly by using methods and assumptions with false-negative biases. The article closes by outlining two normative strategies (...)
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  13. added 2018-02-20
    The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference, Because Conditioning on Biconditionals is Counterintuitive.Michael G. Titelbaum & Casey Hart - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy011.
    In his, Roger White argued for a principle of indifference. Hart and Titelbaum showed that White’s argument relied on an intuition about conditioning on biconditionals which, while widely shared, is incorrect. In their, Hawthorne, Landes,Wallmann, and Williamson argue for a principle of indifference. Remarkably, their argument relies on the same faulty intuition. We explain their intuition, explain why it’s faulty, and show how it generates their principle of indifference.
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  14. added 2018-02-20
    Exploring a New Argument for Synchronic Chance.Katrina Elliott - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    A synchronic probability is the probability at a time that an outcome occurs at that very time. Common sense invokes synchronic probabilities with values between 0 and 1, as do scientific theories such as classical statistical mechanics. Recently, philosophers have argued about whether any synchronic probabilities are best interpreted as objective chances. I add to this debate an underappreciated reason we might have to believe in synchronic chance; it might turn out that the best interpretation of our common sense and (...)
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  15. added 2018-02-17
    Probability in GRW Theory.Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):371-389.
    GRW Theory postulates a stochastic mechanism assuring that every so often the wave function of a quantum system is `hit', which leaves it in a localised state. How are we to interpret the probabilities built into this mechanism? GRW theory is a firmly realist proposal and it is therefore clear that these probabilities are objective probabilities (i.e. chances). A discussion of the major theories of chance leads us to the conclusion that GRW probabilities can be understood only as either single (...)
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  16. added 2017-12-06
    The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx060.
    In a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this paper, I argue that it does not. Lewis’s version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one proposition is admissible for another: Conditions 1 and 2. There are two ways of reading their (...)
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  17. added 2017-10-30
    Is Kantian Projectivism the Only Hope for Grounding the Principal Principle?Lange Marc - 2017 - The Monist 100 (3):422-436.
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  18. added 2017-10-30
    Is Kantian Projectivism the Only Hope for Grounding the Principal Principle?Lange Marc - 2017 - The Monist 100 (3):422-436.
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  19. added 2017-10-16
    Explaining the Principal Principle Without Metaphysics.Katrina Elliott - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (4):480-499.
    According to David Lewis’s Principal Principle, our beliefs about the objective chances of outcomes determine our rational credences in those outcomes. Lewis influentially argues that any adequate metaphysics of objective chance must explain why the Principal Principle holds. Since no theory of chance is widely agreed to have met this burden, I suggest we change tack. On the view I develop, a central aspect of the Principal Principle holds not because of what objective chances are but rather because of the (...)
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  20. added 2017-10-08
    The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    In a recent paper in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson (henceforth HLWW) argue that the Principal Principle entails the Principle of Indifference. In this paper, I argue that it does not. Lewis’ version of the Principal Principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW do not give a precise account either, but they do appeal to two principles concerning admissibility, which (...)
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  21. added 2017-10-07
    Credence and Chance in Quantum Theory.John Earman - manuscript
    David Lewis' "Principal Principle" is a purported principle of rationality connecting credence and objective chance. Almost all of the discussion of the Principal Principle in the philosophical literature assumes classical probability theory, which is unfortunate since the theory of modern physics that, arguably, speaks most clearly of objective chance is the quantum theory, and quantum probabilities are not classical probabilities. This paper develops an account of how chance works in quantum theory that reveals a connection between credence and quantum chance (...)
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  22. added 2017-09-06
    Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty.A. Wilson - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):573-598.
    Darren Bradley has recently appealed to observation selection effects to argue that conditionalization presents no special problem for Everettian quantum mechanics, and to defend the ‘halfer’ answer to the puzzle of Sleeping Beauty. I assess Bradley’s arguments and conclude that while he is right about confirmation in Everettian quantum mechanics, he is wrong about Sleeping Beauty. This result is doubly good news for Everettians: they can endorse Bayesian confirmation theory without qualification, but they are not thereby compelled to adopt the (...)
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  23. added 2017-06-16
    On the Inadmissibility of Some Historical Information.Ittay Nissan‐Rozen - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):479-493.
    I argue—from a Humean perspective—for the falsity of what I call the “Admissibility of Historical Information Thesis”. According to the AHIT, propositions that describe past events are always admissible with respect to propositions that describe future events. I first demonstrate that this thesis has some counter-intuitive implications and argue that a Humean can explain the intuitive attractiveness of the AHIT by arguing that it results from a wrong understanding of the concept of chance. I then demonstrate how a Humean “best (...)
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  24. added 2017-02-21
    Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle.Meacham Cjg - unknown
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  25. added 2017-02-21
    Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2007 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):93-108.
    Reichenbach's use of 'posits' to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach's second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach's alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey conditionalization. We conclude that, under (...)
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  26. added 2017-02-21
    Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):368-382.
    David Lewis proposed the Principal Principle and a “reformulation” which later on he called ‘OP’. Reacting to his belief that these principles run into trouble, Lewis concluded that they should be replaced with the New Principle. This conclusion left Lewis uneasy, because he thought that an inverse form of NP is “quite messy”, whereas an inverse form of OP, namely the simple and intuitive PP, is “the key to our concept of chance”. I argue that, even if OP should be (...)
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  27. added 2017-02-21
    Undermining Undermined: Why Humean Supervenience Never Needed to Be Debugged.John T. Roberts - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (S3):S98-S108.
    The existence of "undermining futures" appears to show that a contradiction can be deduced from the conjunction of Humean supervenience about chance and the Principal Principle. A number of strategies for rescuing HS from this problem have been proposed recently. In this paper, a novel way of defending HS from the threat is presented, and it is argued that this defense has advantages not shared by others. In particular, it requires no revisionism about chance, and it is equally available to (...)
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  28. added 2017-01-31
    Taking a Chance on KK.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):183-196.
    Dorr et al. present a case that poses a challenge for a number of plausible principles about knowledge and objective chance. Implicit in their discussion is an interesting new argument against KK, the principle that anyone who knows p is in a position to know that they know p. We bring out this argument, and investigate possible responses for defenders of KK, establishing new connections between KK and various knowledge-chance principles.
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  29. added 2017-01-29
    David Z. Albert: Time And Chance. [REVIEW]R. Kastner - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):400-404.
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  30. added 2017-01-28
    "Chance and Order in Science" Via "the Extended Mach Principle".Joe Rosen - 1984 - Epistemologia 7 (2):309.
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  31. added 2017-01-17
    The Universe Had One Chance.Demarest Heather - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (2):248-264.
    In a deterministically evolving world, the usefulness of nontrivial probabilities can seem mysterious. I use the ‘Mentaculus’ machinery developed by David Albert and Barry Loewer to show how all probabilities in such a world can be derived from a single, initial chance event. I go on to argue that this is the only genuine chance event. Perhaps surprisingly, we have good evidence of its existence and nature. I argue that the existence of this chance event justifies our epistemic reliance on (...)
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  32. added 2017-01-16
    The Principal Point and Principal Distance in Photogrammetry.H. G. Fourcade - 1928 - Transactions of the Royal Society of South Africa 16 (1):13-22.
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  33. added 2017-01-15
    Chance Regained: David Albert’s Oeuvre Revisited.Kerry McKenzie - 2016 - Metascience 25 (1):51-55.
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  34. added 2017-01-14
    Chance, Repetition, and Error in the Development of Normal Nervous Systems.Peter G. H. Clarke - 1981 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 25 (1):2-19.
  35. added 2016-12-08
    On Background: Using Two-Argument Chance.Kevin Nelson - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):165-186.
    I follow Hájek (Synthese 137:273–323, 2003c) by taking objective probability to be a function of two propositional arguments—that is, I take conditional probability as primitive. Writing the objective probability of q given r as P(q, r), I argue that r may be chosen to provide less than a complete and exact description of the world’s history or of its state at any time. It follows that nontrivial objective probabilities are possible in deterministic worlds and about the past. A very simple (...)
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  36. added 2016-12-08
    Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Open Court.
  37. added 2016-10-27
    Chance, Credence and Circles.Fabrizio Cariani - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):49-58.
    This is a discussion of Richard Pettigrew's book "Accuracy and the Laws of Credence". I target Pettigrew's application of the accuracy framework to derive chance-credence principles. My principal contention is that Pettigrew's preferred version of the argument might in one sense be circular and, moreover, that Pettigrew's premises have content that go beyond that of standard chance-credence principles.
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  38. added 2016-10-06
    Chance and Necessity.Daniel Nolan - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):294-308.
    A principle endorsed by many theories of objective chance, and practically forced on us by the standard interpretation of the Kolmogorov semantics for chance, is the principle that when a proposition P has a chance, any proposition Q that is necessarily equivalent to P will have the same chance as P. Call this principle SUB (for the substitution of necessary equivalents into chance ascriptions). I will present some problems for a theory of chance, and will argue that the best way (...)
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  39. added 2016-09-05
    The Doomsday Argument Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe.Nick Bostrom - 2001 - Synthese 127 (3):359-387.
    The Doomsday argument purports to show that the risk of the human species going extinct soon has been systematically underestimated. This argument has something in common with controversial forms of reasoning in other areas, including: game theoretic problems with imperfect recall, the methodology of cosmology, the epistomology of indexical belief, and the debate over so-called fine-tuning arguments for the design hypothesis. The common denominator is a certain premiss: the Self-Sampling Assumption. We present two strands of argument in favor of this (...)
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  40. added 2016-05-24
    Measure Theoretic Analysis of Consistency of the Principal Principle.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):972-987.
    Weak and strong consistency of thePrincipal Principle are defined in terms of classical probability measure spaces. It is proved that the Abstract Principal Principle is both weakly and strongly consistent. The Abstract Principal Principle is strengthened by adding a stability requirement to it. Weak and strong consistency of the resulting Stable Abstract Principal Principle are defined. It is shown that the Stable Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent. Strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal principle remains an open question.
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  41. added 2016-03-07
    On the Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle.Gergei Bana - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):988-1001.
    Rédei and Gyenis suggest that Lewis’s Principal Principle is meaningful only if it satisfies certain consistency conditions: starting from any assignment of subjective probabilities to some algebra of events, we should always be able to extend our algebra with events of the form “the value of the objective probability of event E is p” and assign subjective probabilities to such events in a consistent manner. We show that this extension is indeed possible in most cases. However, we also argue that (...)
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  42. added 2016-02-16
    Sleeping Beauty and Direct Inference.Joel Pust - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):290-293.
    One argument for the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem rests on direct inference from objective probabilities. In this paper, I consider a particularly clear version of this argument by John Pollock and his colleagues (The Oscar Seminar 2008). I argue that such a direct inference is defeated by the fact that Beauty has an equally good reason to conclude on the basis of direct inference that the probability of heads is 1/2. Hence, neither thirders nor halfers can find (...)
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  43. added 2016-02-01
    Conditional Degree of Belief.Jan Sprenger - unknown
    It is a commonplace in epistemology that credences should equal known chances. It is less clear, however, that conditional credences should do so, too. Following Ramsey, this paper proposes a counterfactual interpretation of conditional probability which provides a justification for this equality without relying on the Principal Principle. As a result, we obtain a refined view of Bayesian inference where both learning and supposing have a place.
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  44. added 2016-02-01
    Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings.Antony Eagle (ed.) - 2010 - Routledge.
    _Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings_ is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
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  45. added 2016-01-26
    Interpretations of Probability.Weimin Sun - 2003 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    In this dissertation I aim to clarify the concept of probability. There are three kinds of interpretation of probability: the objective interpretation, the logical interpretation, and the subjective interpretation. The objective interpretation understands probability as a natural property that exists independently of our minds. I will clarify and defend one version of objective probability---the propensity interpretation of probability. I reject the logical interpretation of probability that treats probability as a logical relation between evidence and hypothesis, and maintain that probability is (...)
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  46. added 2016-01-18
    Discussion of Bruno de Finetti's Paper 'Initial Probabilities: A Prerequisite for Any Valid Induction'.I. J. Good - 1969 - Synthese 20 (1):17 - 24.
  47. added 2015-12-07
    Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences. The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Pettigrew looks to decision theory in order to ground his argument. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets (...)
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  48. added 2015-12-07
    Probability in the Sciences.Evandro Agazzi - 1988
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  49. added 2015-12-07
    Kyburg and Fiducial Inference.Stephen Leeds - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):78-91.
  50. added 2015-12-07
    On the Epistemological Foundations of Probability.Salvatore Cannavo - 1956 - Dissertation, New York University
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1 — 50 / 146