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  1. Credence and Chance in Quantum Theory.John Earman - manuscript
    David Lewis' "Principal Principle" is a purported principle of rationality connecting credence and objective chance. Almost all of the discussion of the Principal Principle in the philosophical literature assumes classical probability theory, which is unfortunate since the theory of modern physics that, arguably, speaks most clearly of objective chance is the quantum theory, and quantum probabilities are not classical probabilities. This paper develops an account of how chance works in quantum theory that reveals a connection between credence and quantum chance (...)
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  2. Two-Dimensional Deference.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscript
    Principles of expert deference say that you should align your credences with those of an expert. This expert could be your doctor, the objective chances, or your future self, after you've learnt something new. These kinds of principles face difficulties in cases in which you are uncertain of the truth-conditions of the thoughts in which you invest credence, as well as cases in which the thoughts have different truth-conditions for you and the expert. For instance, you shouldn't defer to your (...)
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  3. The Principle of Indifference and the Principal Principle Are Incompatible.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscript
    The Principle of Indifference (POI) says that, in the absence of evidence, you should distribute your credences evenly. The Principal Principle (PP) says that, in the absence of evidence, you should align your credences with the chances. Richard Pettigrew (2016) appears to accept both the PP and the POI. However, the POI and the PP are incompatible. Abiding the POI means violating the PP. So Bayesians cannot accept both principles; they must choose which, if either, to endorse.
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  4. Counterfactual Probability.Ginger Schultheis - manuscript
    Stalnaker's Thesis about indicative conditionals is, roughly, that the probability one ought to assign to an indicative conditional equals the probability that one ought to assign to its consequent conditional on its antecedent. The thesis seems right. If you draw a card from a standard 52-card deck, how confident are you that the card is a diamond if it's a red card? To answer this, you calculate the proportion of red cards that are diamonds -- that is, you calculate the (...)
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  5. Quantum Probability and Decision Theory, Revisited [2002 Online-Only Paper].David Wallace - 2002
    An extended analysis is given of the program, originally suggested by Deutsch, of solving the probability problem in the Everett interpretation by means of decision theory. Deutsch's own proof is discussed, and alternatives are presented which are based upon different decision theories and upon Gleason's Theorem. It is argued that decision theory gives Everettians most or all of what they need from `probability'. Contact is made with Lewis's Principal Principle linking subjective credence with objective chance: an Everettian Principal Principle is (...)
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  6. Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily.David Builes, Sophie Horowitz & Miriam Schoenfield - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Standard accuracy-based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational to move between precise and imprecise credences arbitrarily, without gaining any new evidence. Building on the Educated Guessing Framework of Horowitz (2019), we develop an alternative accuracy-based approach to imprecise credences that does not have this shortcoming. We argue that it is always irrational to move from a precise state to an imprecise state arbitrarily, however it can be rational to move from an imprecise state to a (...)
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  7. Solving a Paradox of Evidential Equivalence.Cian Dorr, John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - forthcoming - Mind:fzaa022.
    David Builes presents a paradox concerning how confident you should be that any given member of an infinite collection of fair coins landed heads, conditional on the information that they were all flipped and only finitely many of them landed heads. We argue that if you should have any conditional credence at all, it should be 1/2.
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  8. Justifying Lewis’s Kinematics of Chance.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz009.
    In his ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’, Lewis argued that a particular kinematical model for chances follows from his principal principle. According to this model, any later chance function is equal to an earlier chance function conditional on the complete intervening history of non-modal facts. This article first investigates the conditions that any kinematical model for chance needs to satisfy to count as Lewis’s kinematics of chance. Second, it presents Lewis’s justification for his kinematics of chance and explains why (...)
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  9. A Subjectivist’s Guide to Deterministic Chance.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Synthese.
    I present an account of deterministic chance which builds upon the physico-mathematical approach to theorizing about deterministic chance known as 'the method of arbitrary functions'. This approach promisingly yields deterministic probabilities which align with what we take the chances to be---it tells us that there is approximately a 1/2 probability of a spun roulette wheel stopping on black, and approximately a 1/2 probability of a flipped coin landing heads up---but it requires some probabilistic materials to work with. I contend that (...)
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  10. The Meta-Reversibility Objection.Christopher J. G. Meacham - forthcoming - In Barry Loewer, Brad Weslake & Eric Winsberg (eds.), Time's Arrow and the Probability Structure of the World.
    One popular approach to statistical mechanics understands statistical mechanical probabilities as measures of rational indifference. Naive formulations of this ``indifference approach'' face reversibility worries - while they yield the right prescriptions regarding future events, they yield the wrong prescriptions regarding past events. This paper begins by showing how the indifference approach can overcome the standard reversibility worries by appealing to the Past Hypothesis. But, the paper argues, positing a Past Hypothesis doesn't free the indifference approach from all reversibility worries. For (...)
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  11. Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, Additivity, and Strict Propriety. In this paper, I show how to strengthen the arguments based on these conditions by showing that the central mathematical theorem on which each depends goes through without assuming Additivity.
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  12. No Crystal Balls.Jack Spencer - forthcoming - Noûs.
    The world is said to contain crystal balls whenever the present carries news of the as-yet-undetermined parts of the future. Many philosophers believe that crystal balls are metaphysically possible. In this essay, I argue that they are not. Whether crystal balls are possible matters, for at least two reasons. The first is epistemological. According to a simple, user-friendly chance norm for credence, which I call the Present Principle, agents are rationally required to conform their credences to their expectations of the (...)
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  13. Everettian Theory as Pure Wave Mechanics Plus a No-Collapse Probability Postulate.Paul Tappenden - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    Proposed derivations of the Born rule for Everettian theory are controversial. I argue that they are unnecessary but may provide justification for a simplified version of the Principal Principle. It’s also unnecessary to replace Everett’s idea that a subject splits in measurement contexts with the idea that subjects have linear histories which partition Many worlds? Everett, quantum theory, and reality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 181–205, 2010; Wallace in The emergent multiverse, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, Chapter 7; Wilson in (...)
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  14. The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable.Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-15.
    This paper highlights the role of Lewis’ Principal Principle and certain auxiliary conditions on admissibility as serving to explicate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. These considerations motivate the presuppositions of the argument that the Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference, put forward by Hawthorne et al.. They also suggest a line of response to recent criticisms of that argument, due to Pettigrew and Titelbaum and Hart, 621–632, 2020). The paper also shows that related concerns of Hart and (...)
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  15. Centering the Principal Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1897-1915.
    I show that centered propositions—also called de se propositions, and usually modeled as sets of centered worlds—pose a serious problem for various versions of Lewis's Principal Principle. The problem, put roughly, is that in scenarios like Elga's `Sleeping Beauty' case, those principles imply that rational agents ought to have obviously irrational credences. To solve the problem, I propose a centered version of the Principal Principle. My version allows centered propositions to be objectively chancy.
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  16. Accuracy and Credal Imprecision.Dominik Berger & Nilanjan Das - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):666-703.
    Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (i.e. credal states representable only by sets of credence functions) rather than precise ones (i.e. credal states representable by single credence functions). Some writers have recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing solely to the overall accuracy of the doxastic states they recommend. But these arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we prove some (...)
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  17. A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence.David Builes - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):113-127.
    Our evidence can be about different subject matters. In fact, necessarily equivalent pieces of evidence can be about different subject matters. Does the hyperintensionality of ‘aboutness’ engender any hyperintensionality at the level of rational credence? In this paper, I present a case which seems to suggest that the answer is ‘yes’. In particular, I argue that our intuitive notions of independent evidence and inadmissible evidence are sensitive to aboutness in a hyperintensional way. We are thus left with a paradox. While (...)
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  18. Inductive Logic From the Viewpoint of Quantum Information.Vasil Penchev - 2020 - Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 12 (13):1-2.
    The resolving of the main problem of quantum mechanics about how a quantum leap and a smooth motion can be uniformly described resolves also the problem of how a distribution of reliable data and a sequence of deductive conclusions can be uniformly described by means of a relevant wave function “Ψdata”.
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  19. The Dutch Book Arguments.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    (This is for the series Elements of Decision Theory published by Cambridge University Press and edited by Martin Peterson) -/- Our beliefs come in degrees. I believe some things more strongly than I believe others. I believe very strongly that global temperatures will continue to rise during the coming century; I believe slightly less strongly that the European Union will still exist in 2029; and I believe much less strongly that Cardiff is east of Edinburgh. My credence in something is (...)
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  20. The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):605-619.
    In a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this article, I argue that it does not. Lewis’s version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one proposition is admissible for another: Conditions 1 and 2. There are two ways of reading their (...)
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  21. Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):319-335.
    Why are conditional degrees of belief in an observation E, given a statistical hypothesis H, aligned with the objective probabilities expressed by H? After showing that standard replies are not satisfactory, I develop a suppositional analysis of conditional degree of belief, transferring Ramsey’s classical proposal to statistical inference. The analysis saves the alignment, explains the role of chance-credence coordination, and rebuts the charge of arbitrary assessment of evidence in Bayesian inference. Finally, I explore the implications of this analysis for Bayesian (...)
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  22. The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference, Because Conditioning on Biconditionals Is Counterintuitive.Michael G. Titelbaum & Casey Hart - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):621-632.
    Roger White argued for a principle of indifference. Hart and Titelbaum showed that White’s argument relied on an intuition about conditioning on biconditionals that, while widely shared, is incorrect. Hawthorne, Landes, Wallmann, and Williamson argue for a principle of indifference. Remarkably, their argument relies on the same faulty intuition. We explain their intuition, explain why it’s faulty, and show how it generates their principle of indifference. 1Introduction 2El Caminos and Indifference 2.1Overview 2.2Fins and antennas 2.3HLWW in the example 2.4The restrictiveness (...)
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  23. Admissibility Troubles for Bayesian Direct Inference Principles.Christian Wallmann & James Hawthorne - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):957-993.
    Direct inferences identify certain probabilistic credences or confirmation-function-likelihoods with values of objective chances or relative frequencies. The best known version of a direct inference principle is David Lewis’s Principal Principle. Certain kinds of statements undermine direct inferences. Lewis calls such statements inadmissible. We show that on any Bayesian account of direct inference several kinds of intuitively innocent statements turn out to be inadmissible. This may pose a significant challenge to Bayesian accounts of direct inference. We suggest some ways in which (...)
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  24. The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.
    This paper poses a problem for Lewis’ Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian framework: we show that, where chances inform degrees of belief, subjective Bayesianism fails to validate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. This problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. However, one version of objective Bayesianism has a straightforward resolution to this problem, because it avoids this latter claim. The problem, then, offers some support (...)
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  25. The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.
    This paper poses a problem for Lewis’ Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian framework: we show that, where chances inform degrees of belief, subjective Bayesianism fails to validate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. This problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. However, one version of objective Bayesianism has a straightforward resolution to this problem, because it avoids this latter claim. The problem, then, offers some support (...)
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  26. Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    What if your peers tell you that you should disregard your perceptions? Worse, what if your peers tell you to disregard the testimony of your peers? How should we respond if we get evidence that seems to undermine our epistemic rules? Several philosophers have argued that some epistemic rules are indefeasible. I will argue that all epistemic rules are defeasible. The result is a kind of epistemic particularism, according to which there are no simple rules connecting descriptive and normative facts. (...)
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  27. Exploring a New Argument for Synchronic Chance.Katrina Elliott - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    A synchronic probability is the probability at a time that an outcome occurs at that very time. Common sense invokes synchronic probabilities with values between 0 and 1, as do scientific theories such as classical statistical mechanics. Recently, philosophers have argued about whether any synchronic probabilities are best interpreted as objective chances. I add to this debate an underappreciated reason we might have to believe in synchronic chance; it might turn out that the best interpretation of our common sense and (...)
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  28. Taking a Chance on KK.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):183-196.
    Dorr et al. present a case that poses a challenge for a number of plausible principles about knowledge and objective chance. Implicit in their discussion is an interesting new argument against KK, the principle that anyone who knows p is in a position to know that they know p. We bring out this argument, and investigate possible responses for defenders of KK, establishing new connections between KK and various knowledge-chance principles.
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  29. On the Inadmissibility of Some Historical Information.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):479-493.
    I argue—from a Humean perspective—for the falsity of what I call the “Admissibility of Historical Information Thesis”. According to the AHIT, propositions that describe past events are always admissible with respect to propositions that describe future events. I first demonstrate that this thesis has some counter-intuitive implications and argue that a Humean can explain the intuitive attractiveness of the AHIT by arguing that it results from a wrong understanding of the concept of chance. I then demonstrate how a Humean “best (...)
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  30. Correcting Credences with Chances.Ilho Park - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):509-536.
    Lewis’s Principal Principle is widely recognized as a rationality constraint that our credences should satisfy throughout our epistemic life. In practice, however, our credences often fail to satisfy this principle because of our various epistemic limitations. Facing such violations, we should correct our credences in accordance with this principle. In this paper, I will formulate a way of correcting our credences, which will be called the Adams Correcting Rules and then show that such a rule yields non-commutativity between conditionalizing and (...)
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  31. Chance, Credence and Circles.Fabrizio Cariani - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):49-58.
    This is a discussion of Richard Pettigrew's book "Accuracy and the Laws of Credence". I target Pettigrew's application of the accuracy framework to derive chance-credence principles. My principal contention is that Pettigrew's preferred version of the argument might in one sense be circular and, moreover, that Pettigrew's premises have content that go beyond that of standard chance-credence principles.
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  32. Is It the Principal Principle That Implies the Principle of Indifference?Balazs Gyenis & Leszek Wronski - 2017 - In Gábor Hofer-Szabó & Leszek Wroński (eds.), Making it Formally Explicit: Probability, Causality and Indeterminism. Springer International Publishing.
    Hawthorne, Landes, Wallmann and Williamson argue that the Principal Principle implies a version of the Principle of Indifference. We show that what the Authors take to be the Principle of Indifference can be obtained without invoking anything which would seem to be related to the Principal Principle. In the Appendix we also discuss several Conditions proposed in the same paper.
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  33. The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference.James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):axv030.
    We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument2 Some Objections Met.
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  34. Is Kantian Projectivism the Only Hope for Grounding the Principal Principle?Lange Marc - 2017 - The Monist 100 (3):422-436.
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  35. The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx060.
    In a recent paper in this journal, James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson argue that the principal principle entails the principle of indifference. In this paper, I argue that it does not. Lewis’s version of the principal principle notoriously depends on a notion of admissibility, which Lewis uses to restrict its application. HLWW base their argument on certain intuitions concerning when one proposition is admissible for another: Conditions 1 and 2. There are two ways of reading their (...)
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  36. Mischaracterizing Uncertainty in Environmental-Health Sciences.Kristin Shrader-Frechette - 2017 - Diametros 53:96-124.
    Researchers doing welfare-related science frequently mischaracterize either situations of decision-theoretic mathematical/scientific uncertainty as situations of risk, or situations of risk as those of uncertainty. The paper outlines this epistemic/ethical problem ; surveys its often-deadly, welfare-related consequences in environmental-health sciences; and uses recent research on diesel particulate matter to reveal 7 specific methodological ways that scientists may mischaracterize lethal risks instead as situations of uncertainty, mainly by using methods and assumptions with false-negative biases. The article closes by outlining two normative strategies (...)
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  37. On the Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle.Gergei Bana - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):988-1001.
    Rédei and Gyenis suggest that Lewis’s Principal Principle is meaningful only if it satisfies certain consistency conditions: starting from any assignment of subjective probabilities to some algebra of events, we should always be able to extend our algebra with events of the form “the value of the objective probability of event E is p” and assign subjective probabilities to such events in a consistent manner. We show that this extension is indeed possible in most cases. However, we also argue that (...)
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  38. The Universe Had One Chance.Heather Demarest - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (2):248-264.
    In a deterministically evolving world, the usefulness of nontrivial probabilities can seem mysterious. I use the ‘Mentaculus’ machinery developed by David Albert and Barry Loewer to show how all probabilities in such a world can be derived from a single, initial chance event. I go on to argue that this is the only genuine chance event. Perhaps surprisingly, we have good evidence of its existence and nature. I argue that the existence of this chance event justifies our epistemic reliance on (...)
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  39. Probability.Antony Eagle - 2016 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science. USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 417-439.
    Rather than entailing that a particular outcome will occur, many scientific theories only entail that an outcome will occur with a certain probability. Because scientific evidence inevitably falls short of conclusive proof, when choosing between different theories it is standard to make reference to how probable the various options are in light of the evidence. A full understanding of probability in science needs to address both the role of probabilities in theories, or chances, as well as the role of probabilistic (...)
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  40. Explaining (One Aspect of) the Principal Principle Without (Much) Metaphysics.Katrina Elliott - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (4):480-499.
    According to David Lewis’s Principal Principle, our beliefs about the objective chances of outcomes determine our rational credences in those outcomes. Lewis influentially argues that any adequate metaphysics of objective chance must explain why the Principal Principle holds. Since no theory of chance is widely agreed to have met this burden, I suggest we change tack. On the view I develop, a central aspect of the Principal Principle holds not because of what objective chances are but rather because of the (...)
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  41. Chance Regained: David Albert’s Oeuvre Revisited: David Z. Albert: After Physics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 192pp, $35 HB. [REVIEW]Kerry McKenzie - 2016 - Metascience 25 (1):51-55.
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  42. Chance and Necessity.Daniel Nolan - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):294-308.
    A principle endorsed by many theories of objective chance, and practically forced on us by the standard interpretation of the Kolmogorov semantics for chance, is the principle that when a proposition P has a chance, any proposition Q that is necessarily equivalent to P will have the same chance as P. Call this principle SUB (for the substitution of necessary equivalents into chance ascriptions). I will present some problems for a theory of chance, and will argue that the best way (...)
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  43. Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences. The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Pettigrew looks to decision theory in order to ground his argument. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets (...)
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  44. Measure Theoretic Analysis of Consistency of the Principal Principle.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):972-987.
    Weak and strong consistency of thePrincipal Principle are defined in terms of classical probability measure spaces. It is proved that the Abstract Principal Principle is both weakly and strongly consistent. The Abstract Principal Principle is strengthened by adding a stability requirement to it. Weak and strong consistency of the resulting Stable Abstract Principal Principle are defined. It is shown that the Stable Abstract Principal Principle is weakly consistent. Strong consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal principle remains an open question.
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  45. Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs.Sherrilyn Roush - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):45-69.
    There is a widespread view that in order to be rational we must mostly know what we believe. In the probabilistic tradition this is defended by arguments that a person who failed to have this knowledge would be vulnerable to sure loss, or probabilistically incoherent. I argue that even gross failure to know one's own beliefs need not expose one to sure loss, and does not if we follow a generalization of the standard bridge principle between first-order and second-order beliefs. (...)
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  46. Finite Frequentism in a Big World.Nick Tosh - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):169-213.
    The view that chances are relative frequencies of occurrence within actual, finite reference classes has long been written off. I argue that it ought to be reconsidered. Focusing on non-deterministic chance, I defend a version of finite frequentism in which reference classmates are required to have qualitatively identical pasts. While my analysis can evade or resist several standard objections, it has a counterintuitive consequence: non-trivial chances entail the existence of past light cones that are perfect intrinsic duplicates. In mitigation, I (...)
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  47. Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.
    The foundations of probability are viewed through the lens of the subjectivist interpretation. This article surveys conditional probability, arguments for probabilism, probability dynamics, and the evidential and subjective interpretations of probability.
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  48. Credence in the Image of Chance.Michael Caie - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):626-648.
    In this article, I consider what sorts of chance credence norms can be justified by appeal to the idea that ideal credences should line up with the chances. I argue that the Principal Principle cannot be so justified but that an alternative norm, the Temporal Principle—which maintains that an agent’s credence in a proposition ϕ, conditional on the temporal proposition that says that the chance of ϕ is x, should be x—can be so justified.
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  49. Re-Thinking Local Causality.Simon Friederich - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):221-240.
    There is widespread belief in a tension between quantum theory and special relativity, motivated by the idea that quantum theory violates J. S. Bell’s criterion of local causality, which is meant to implement the causal structure of relativistic space-time. This paper argues that if one takes the essential intuitive idea behind local causality to be that probabilities in a locally causal theory depend only on what occurs in the backward light cone and if one regards objective probability as what imposes (...)
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  50. Beyond the Magical Thinking Behind the Principal Principle.Edward James - 2015 - Philosophy 90 (3):479-503.
    David Lewis's Principal Principle states that our credence in a single case follows from the general probability of all such cases. Against this stands the Challenge Argument – to show that the inference is justified. Recent law-to-chance, Bayesian, and propensity theories of probability take up the challenge – but, I argue, fall short. Rather, we should understand propensity via Aristotle's analysis of spontaneity and probabilistic reasoning via the Anti-PP and the practice of bundling one offs, where forced bad-odds one offs (...)
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