Related categories

71 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 71
  1. Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
    This anthology of essays on the work of David Kaplan, a leading contemporary philosopher of language, sprang from a conference, "Themes from Kaplan," organized by the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford University.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   506 citations  
  2. What Are You Thinking? Character and Content in the Language of Thought.Louise M. Antony - manuscript
  3. Under Carnap's Lamp: Flat Pre-Semantics.Nuel Belnap - 2005 - Studia Logica 80 (1):1 - 28.
    “Flat pre-semantics” lets each parameter of truth (etc.) be considered sepa-rately and equally, and without worrying about grammatical complications. This allows one to become a little clearer on a variety of philosophical-logical points, such as the use fulness of Carnapian tolerance and the deep relativity of truth. A more definite result of thinking in terms of flat pre-semantics lies in the articulation of some instructive ways of categorizing operations on meanings in purely logical terms in relation to various parame- ters (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4. Demonstratives and Indexicals in Montague Grammar.Michael Bennett - 1978 - Synthese 39 (1):1--80.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  5. Indexicals.David Braun - 2012 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Indexicals are linguistic expressions whose reference shifts from context to context: some paradigm examples are ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘today’,‘he’, ‘she’, and ‘that’. Two speakers who utter a single sentence that contains an indexical may say different things. For instance, Fred and Wilma say different things when they utter the sentence ‘I am female’. Many philosophers (following David Kaplan 1989a) hold that indexicals have two sorts of meaning. The first sort of meaning is often called ‘character’ or ‘linguistic meaning’; the second (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  6. Demonstratives and Their Linguistic Meanings.David Braun - 1996 - Noûs 30 (2):145-173.
    In this paper, I present a new semantics for demonstratives. Now some may think that David Kaplan (1989a,b) has already given a more than satisfactory semantics for demonstratives, and that there is no need for a new one. But I argue below that Kaplan's theory fails to describe the linguistic meanings of 'that' and other true demonstratives. My argument for this conclusion has nothing to do with cognitive value, belief sentences, or other such contentious matters in semantics and the philosophy (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  7. What is Character?David Braun - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (3):241--273.
  8. Putting Things in Contexts.Ben Caplan - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):191-214.
    Thanks to David Kaplan (1989a, 1989b), we all know how to handle indexicals like ‘I’. ‘I’ doesn’t refer to an object simpliciter; rather, it refers to an object only relative to a context. In particular, relative to a context C, ‘I’ refers to the agent of C. Since different contexts can have different agents, ‘I’ can refer to different objects relative to different contexts. For example, relative to a context cwhose agent is Gottlob Frege, ‘I’ refers to Frege; relative to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  9. Pragmemes.Alessandro Capone - 2005 - Journal of Pragmatics 37:1355-1371.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Demonstratives and Belief States.A. J. Chien - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (2):271 - 289.
  11. On the Cognitive Significance of Indexicals.Eros Corazza & Jérôme Dokic - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 66 (2):183 - 196.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Who Is I?Eros Corazza, William Fish & Jonathan Gorvett - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (1):1-21.
    Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom "I" refers, we show that there are occasions when it is not always obvious. In demonstrating this we challenge Kaplan's assumption that the utterer, agent and referent of "I" are always the same person. We begin by presenting what we regard to be the received view about indexical reference popularized by David Kaplan in his influential 1972 "Demonstratives" before going on, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle's answering machine paradox which may (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  13. Context and Communication by Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever (Review). [REVIEW]Alex Davies - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
  14. Communicating by Doing Something Else.Alex Davies - forthcoming - In Tamara Dobler, John Collins & Alun Davies (eds.), Themes from Charles Travis: On Language, Thought, and Perception. Oxford University Press.
    It's sometimes thought that context-invariant linguistic meaning must be a character (a function from context types to contents) i.e. that linguistic meaning must determine how the content of an expression is fixed in context. This is thought because if context-invariant linguistic meaning were not a character then communication would not be possible. In this paper, I explain how communication could proceed even if context-invariant linguistic meaning were not a character.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Occasion-Sensitivity: Selected Essays, by Charles Travis. [REVIEW]Alex Davies - 2011 - Disputatio 4 (31):309-315.
    This is not a critical review of Travis' book. It's an attempt to summarize the key thesis (occasion-sensitivity) in a way that makes the book accessible and distinguishes it from similar looking theses (such as relevance theory and truth-conditional pragmatics).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Binding Into Character.Josh Dever - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):29-80.
    Since Kaplan’s "Demonstratives", it has become a common-place to distinguish between the character and content of an expression, where the content of an expression is what it contributes to "what is said" by sentences containing that expression, and the character gives a rule for determining, in a context, the content of an expression. A tacit assumption of theories of character has been that character is autonomous from content – that semantic evaluation starts with character, adds context, and then derives content. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17. Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective.Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (1):3-31.
  18. Indexicals as Token-Reflexives.Manuel Garc'ıa-Carpintero - 1998 - Mind 107 (427):529-564.
    Reichenbachian approaches to indexicality contend that indexicals are "token-reflexives": semantic rules associated with any given indexical-type determine the truth-conditional import of properly produced tokens of that type relative to certain relational properties of those tokens. Such a view may be understood as sharing the main tenets of Kaplan's well-known theory regarding content, or truth-conditions, but differs from it regarding the nature of the linguistic meaning of indexicals and also regarding the bearers of truth-conditional import and truth-conditions. Kaplan has criticized these (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  19. The Real Distinction Between Descriptions and Indexicals.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2005 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):49-74.
    Some contemporary semantic views defend an asymmetry thesis concerning defi-nite descriptions and indexicals. Semantically, indexicals are devices of singular refer-ence; they contribute objects to the contents of the speech acts made with utterances including them. Definite descriptions, on the other hand, are generalized quantifiers, behaving roughly the way Russell envisaged in “On Denoting”. The asymmetry thesis depends on the existence of a sufficiently clear-cut distinction between semantics and pragmatics, because indexicals and descriptions are often used in ways that apparently contradict (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Vague Terms, Indexicals, and Vague Indexicals.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):437 - 445.
    Jason Stanley has criticized a contextualist solution to the sorites paradox that treats vagueness as a kind of indexicality. His objection rests on a feature of indexicals that seems plausible: that their reference remains fixed in verb phrase ellipsis. But the force of Stanley’s criticism depends on the undefended assumption that vague terms, if they are a special sort of indexical, must function in the same way that more paradigmatic indexicals do. This paper argues that there can be more than (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21. Relativized Metaphysical Modality.Benj Hellie, Adam Russell Murray & Jessica Wilson - forthcoming - In Otávio Bueno & Scott Shalkowski (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Modality. New York: Routledge.
    Relativized Metaphysical Modality (RMM: Murray and Wilson, 'Relativized metaphysical modality', Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2012; Murray, Perspectives on Modal Metaphysics, 2017) exploits 'two-dimensionalist' resources to metaphysical, rather than epistemological, ends: the second dimension offers perspective-dependence without contingency, diverting attacks on 'Classical' analyses of modals (in effect, analyses validating S5 and the Barcan Formulae). Here, we extend the RMM program in two directions. First, we harvest resources for RMM from Lewis's 1980 'Context--Index' (CI) framework: (a) the ban in CI on binding (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. A Plea for Radical Contextualism.Minyao Huang - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):963-988.
    Extant contextualist theories have relied on the mechanism of pragmatically driven modulation to explain the way non-indexical expressions take on different interpretations in different contexts. In this paper I argue that a modulation-based contextualist semantics is untenable with respect to non-ambiguous expressions whose invariant meaning fails to determine a unique literal interpretation, such as ‘lawyer’ ‘musician’ ‘book’ and ‘game’. The invariant meaning of such an expression corresponds to a range of closely related and equally basic interpretations, none of which can (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Where Monsters Dwell.David Israel & John Perry - 1996 - In Jerry Seligman & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, Language and Computation. Csli Publications, Stanford. pp. 1--303.
    Kaplan says that monsters violate Principle 2 of his theory. Principle 2 is that indexicals, pure and demonstrative alike, are directly referential. In providing this explanation of there being no monsters, Kaplan feels his theory has an advantage over double-indexing theories like Kamp’s or Segerberg’s (or Stalnaker’s), which either embrace monsters or avoid them only by ad hoc stipulation, in the sharp conceptual distinction it draws between circumstances of evaluation and contexts of utterance. We shall argue that Kaplan’s prohibition is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Afterthoughts.David Kaplan - 1989 - In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 565-614.
  25. Demonstratives.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
  26. On the Logic of Demonstratives.David Kaplan - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):81 - 98.
  27. Wahrheitsrelativismus.Dirk Kindermann - 2015 - In Nikola Kompa (ed.), Handbuch Sprachphilosophie. Metzler. pp. 106-13.
    The paper gives a short introduction to and overview of truth relativism in recent philosophy of language.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. The Purpose of the Essential Indexical.Catherine Legg - 2015 - The Commens Working Papers.
    This paper takes indexicality as a case-study for critical examination of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics as currently conceived in mainstream philosophy of language. Both a ‘pre-indexical’ and ‘post-indexical’ analytic formal semantics are examined and found wanting, and instead an argument is mounted for a ‘properly pragmatist pragmatics’, according to which we do not work out what signs mean in some abstract overall sense and then work out to what use they are being put; rather, we must understand to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. A Plea Against Monsters.Emar Maier - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (3):363-395.
    Inspired by Schlenker's (2003) seminal 'Plea for Monsters', linguists have been analyzing every occurrence of a shifted indexical by postulating a monstrous operator. My aim in this paper is to show that Kaplan's (1989) original strategy of explaining apparent shifting in terms of a quotational use/mention distinction offers a much more intuitive, parsimonious and empirically superior analysis of many of these phenomena, including direct--indirect switches in Ancient Greek, role shift in signed languages, free indirect discourse in literary narratives, and mixed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Quotation Marks as Monsters, or the Other Way Around?Emar Maier - 2007 - In Dekker Aloni (ed.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Amsterdam Colloquium. pp. 145-150.
    Mixed quotation exhibits characteristics of both mention and use. Some even go so far as to claim it can be described wholly in terms of the pragmatics of language use. Thus, it may be argued that the observed shifting of indexicals under all quotation shows that a monstrous operator is involved. I will argue the opposite: a proper semantic account of quotation can be used to exorcize Schlenker's monsters from semantic theory.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Shifty Characters.Eliot Michaelson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):519-540.
    In “Demonstratives”, David Kaplan introduced a simple and remarkably robust semantics for indexicals. Unfortunately, Kaplan’s semantics is open to a number of apparent counterexamples, many of which involve recording devices. The classic case is the sentence “I am not here now” as recorded and played back on an answering machine. In this essay, I argue that the best way to accommodate these data is to conceive of recording technologies as introducing special, non-basic sorts of contexts, accompanied by non-basic conventions governing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  32. Pragmatics and Intensional Logic.Richard Montague - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):68--94.
  33. Pragmatics.Richard Montague - 1968 - In R. Klibansky (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy: A Survey, Volume 1. La Nuova Italia Editrice. pp. 102--22.
  34. Indexicals as Demonstratives: On the Debate Between Kripke and Künne.Carlo Penco - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):55-71.
    This paper is a comparison of Kripke’s and Künne’s interpretations of Frege’s theory of indexicals, especially concerning Frege’s remarks on time as “part of the expression of thought”. I analyze the most contrasting features of Kripke’s and Künne’s interpretations of Frege’s remarks on indexicals. Subsequently, I try to identify a common ground between Kripke’s and Künne’s interpretations, and hint at a possible convergence between those two views, stressing the importance given by Frege to nonverbal signs in defining the content of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Sense and Linguistic Meaning: A Solution to the Kirkpe-Burge Conflict.Carlo Penco - 2013 - Paradigmi 23 (3).
    In this paper I apply a well known tension between cognitive and semantic aspects in Frege’s notion of sense to his treatment of indexicals. I first discusses Burge’s attack against the identification of sense and meaning, and Kripke’s answer supporting such identification. After showing different problems for both interpreters, the author claims that the tension in Frege’s conception of sense (semantic and cognitive) accounts for some shortcomings of both views, and that considering the tension helps in understanding apparently contradictory Fregean (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Essentially Incomplete Descriptions.Carlo Penco - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (2):47 - 66.
    In this paper I offer a defence of a Russellian analysis of the referential uses of incomplete (mis)descriptions, in a contextual setting. With regard to the debate between a unificationist and an ambiguity approach to the formal treatment of definite descriptions (introduction), I will support the former against the latter. In 1. I explain what I mean by "essentially" incomplete descriptions: incomplete descriptions are context dependent descriptions. In 2. I examine one of the best versions of the unificationist “explicit” approach (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37. The Problem of the Essential Indexical.John Perry - 1979 - Noûs 13 (1):3-21.
    This collection deals with various problems related to "self-locating beliefs": the sorts of beliefs one expresses with indexicals and demonstratives, like "I" and "this." He includes such well-known essays as "Frege on Demonstratives," "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," and "The Prince and the Phone Booth.".
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   212 citations  
  38. Rigidification and Attitudes.Bryan Pickel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):43-58.
    Scott Soames has argued that Rigidified Descriptivism wrongly predicts that one cannot believe, say, that Joe Strummer was born in 1952 without having a belief about the actual world. Soames suggests that agents in other possible worlds may have this belief, but may lack any beliefs about the actual world, a world that they do not occupy and have no contact with. I respond that this argument extends to other popular actuality-involving analyses. In order for Soames to hold on to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39. Reviving the Parameter Revolution in Semantics.Bryan Pickel, Brian Rabern & Josh Dever - forthcoming - In Derek Ball & Brian Rabern (eds.), The Science of Meaning. Oxford University Press.
    Montague and Kaplan began a revolution in semantics, which promised to explain how a univocal expression could make distinct truth-conditional contributions in its various occurrences. The idea was to treat context as a parameter at which a sentence is semantically evaluated. But the revolution has stalled. One salient problem comes from recurring demonstratives: "He is tall and he is not tall". For the sentence to be true at a context, each occurrence of the demonstrative must make a different truth-conditional contribution. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Kaplan's Three Monsters.S. Predelli - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):389-393.
    This paper distinguishes three non-equivalent senses of 'monster' in Kaplan's Demonstratives: context-shifters, global-shifters, and character-shifters.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Modal Monsters and Talk About Fiction.Stefano Predelli - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):277-297.
    This paper argues in favor of a treatment of discourse about fiction in terms of operators on character, that is, Kaplanesque ‘monsters’. The first three sections criticize the traditional analysis of ‘according to the fiction’ as an intensional operator, and the approach to fictional discourse grounded on the notion of contextual shifts. The final sections explain how an analysis in terms of monsters yields the correct readings for a variety of examples involving modal and temporal indexicals.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42. I Am Not Here Now.Stefano Predelli - 1998 - Analysis 58 (2):107–115.
  43. Utterance, Interpretation and the Logic of Indexicals.Stefano Predelli - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):400–414.
  44. Index, Context, and the Content of Knowledge.Brian Rabern - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 465-479.
    The verb 'knows' is often taken to be context-sensitive in an interesting way. What 'knows' means seems to be sensitive to the epistemic features of the context, e.g. the epistemic standard in play, the set of relevant alternatives, etc. There are standard model-theoretic semantic frameworks which deal with both intensional operators and context-sensitive expressions. In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the various moving parts of these frameworks, the roles of context and index, the need for double indexing, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Monsters in Kaplan's Logic of Demonstratives.Brian Rabern - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):393-404.
    Kaplan (1989a) insists that natural languages do not contain displacing devices that operate on character—such displacing devices are called monsters. This thesis has recently faced various empirical challenges (e.g., Schlenker 2003; Anand and Nevins 2004). In this note, the thesis is challenged on grounds of a more theoretical nature. It is argued that the standard compositional semantics of variable binding employs monstrous operations. As a dramatic first example, Kaplan’s formal language, the Logic of Demonstratives, is shown to contain monsters. For (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  46. Monsters and Communication: The Semantics of Contextual Shifting and Sensitivity.Brian Rabern - 2012 - Dissertation, The Australian National University
    This thesis argues for two main points concerning the philosophy of natural language semantics. Firstly, that the objects of assertion are distinct from the entities appealed to in the compositional rules of natural language semantics. Secondly, natural languages contain context-shifting operators known as "monsters". In fact, it will be shown that these theses are simply two sides of the same coin.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47. Against the Identification of Assertoric Content with Compositional Value.Brian Rabern - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):75-96.
    This essay investigates whether or not we should think that the things we say are identical to the things our sentences mean. It is argued that these theoretical notions should be distinguished, since assertoric content does not respect the compositionality principle. As a paradigmatic example, Kaplan's formal language LD is shown to exemplify a failure of compositionality. It is demonstrated that by respecting the theoretical distinction between the objects of assertion and compositional values certain conflicts between compositionality and contextualism are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  48. Monsters and the Theoretical Role of Context.Brian Rabern & Derek Ball - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Kaplan (1989) famously claimed that monsters--operators that shift the context--do not exist in English and "could not be added to it". Several recent theorists have pointed out a range of data that seem to refute Kaplan's claim, but others (most explicitly Stalnaker 2014) have offered a principled argument that monsters are impossible. This paper interprets and resolves the dispute. Contra appearances, this is no dry, technical matter: it cuts to the heart of a deep disagreement about the fundamental structure of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Nonindexical Context-Dependence and the Interpretation as Abduction Approach.Erich Rast - 2011 - Lodz Journal of Pragmatics 7 (2):259-279.
    Abstract -/- Inclusive nonindexical context-dependence occurs when the preferred interpretation of an utterance implies its lexically-derived meaning. It is argued that the corresponding processes of free or lexically mandated enrichment can be modeled as abductive inference. A form of abduction is implemented in Simple Type Theory on the basis of a notion of plausibility, which is in turn regarded a preference relation over possible worlds. Since a preordering of doxastic alternatives taken for itself only amounts to a relatively vacuous ad (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Context as Assumptions.Erich Rast - 2010 - Msh Lorraine Preprints 2010 of the Proceedings of the Epiconfor Workshop on Epistemology, Nancy 2009.
    In the tradition of Stalnaker there is a number of well-known problems that need to be addressed, because revision of iterated belief modalities is required in this case. These problems have already been investigated in detail in recent works on DDL Leitgeb/Segerberg 2007)and DEL see e.g. Ditmarsch et. Another strategy would be to maintain and revise assumptions independently of the beliefs of an agent.I will briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each of these views. In both views, assumptions constitute (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 71