Classical Daoism

The orange hand is waving frantically broh. Ought we to jump into the river or not? Stay tuned for a collection of thoughts riddled with noetic contradictions and repurposed political anxiety. Resist in whatever way presents itself to you broh. Then abide.

本书把无为归纳为互相联系的两种含义:或是没有做什么, 表示一种存在状态;或是不要做什么, 表示一种行为禁忌.

Nothingness is inconceivable, yet at the same time it is not inconceivable because it is actually referred to. I propose several accessibility relations to illustrate that nothingness is not an object at all. The fictional object that Sherlock Holmes is belongs to the domain of some semantic context, but the fictionally fictional object that nothingness is does not. Based on this idea, I will also discuss the semantics of “Nothingness does not exist”. How is it that it is not an (...) object, unlike Sherlock Holmes, but we attribute to it nonexistence? (shrink)

An intentional fallacy is committed when one sets the goal of getting to the author’s intention. In this paper, I restore authorial authority, through proposing a situational hermeneutic. It obligates, when engaging with a text, stepping into the author’s shoes. Instead of focusing only on the ideas of the author, I emphasise the importance of knowing how the text relates to the author’s world through identifying the referents. This priority of reference over meaning resonates with Chad Hansen’s black-box analogy in (...) contravention of Eurocentrism, which focuses on the mentality of the author. I develop an externalism from his apparent linguistic behaviourism, by bringing out the mental element, referential intention, in my pragmatic theory. I will argue for the importance of knowledge of situation of the author in doing hermeneutics, with the Daodejing as an example. (shrink)

In the digital age, redefining and aesthetically appraising the spiritual substance of non-human entities is crucial, as traditional folklore’s immaterial beings like ghosts are not fully integrated into digital information products. But the enduring popularity of ghost monsters in global media culture, especially mononoke or yōkai in Japan, makes us rethink their immaterial presence alongside advancements in human technology and AI. A notable case is the TV series Mononoke (2006-07), which has spawned adaptations across various media in Japan and recently (...) begun a film trilogy (2024-). Here, we explore the philosophical underpinnings of the series, focusing on the exorcism performed by the protagonist (‘medicine seller’) via three keywords: ‘form’, ‘truth’, and ‘reason’. By doing so, we link the mononoke nature to two philosophical traditions: historical Daoism and modern pragmatism. The first analysis draws on Laozi’s concept of ‘container’ (qi), or the form of Dao. Secondly, we deploy the pragmatist C.S. Peirce’s three normative steps of logic, ethics, and aesthetics. Overall, we argue that the mononoke’s immaterial nature and the haunting of humans are rooted in an elaborately aesthetic interplay of form, truth, and reason. (shrink)

This short essay, originally written for the periodical mare, reflects on the motif of water in the book Laozi as as opposed to the cult of the strong. Water is one of the conspicuous material symbols of the transvaluation of all values that distinguishes early Daoism.

The paper discusses five conceptions of knowledge present in texts traditionally associated with the thought of such thinkers as Kongzi, Mozi, Mengzi, Xunzi, Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Hanfeizi. The first three maps onto conceptions of knowledge familiar to contemporary ears: skill knowledge (knowing-how), propositional knowledge (knowing-that) and objectual knowledge (knowing by acquaintance); while the next two map onto less commonly discussed conceptions of knowledge: motivational knowledge (knowing-to) and applied knowledge (knowing-how-to). The discussion aims to complement existing projects in the literature that (...) look at related issues more explicitly from the standpoint of the ‘native’ concepts. The paper concludes with some comments on the early Chinese philosophical concerns with knowledge and its relation to broader conceptions of ‘philosophical’ projects. (shrink)

This paper offers an original interpretation of the Daodejing 道德經 as containing a distinctive account of creation. In my reading, the Daodejing envisions the creation of the cosmos by Dao (1) as a movement from the absence of phenomenal forms to phenomenal forms and (2) as a movement from nothingness to existence. I interpret creation as a unique metaphysical operation that explains how (1) and (2) are possible. The paper is organized into two sections. First, I introduce the distinctions between (...) the lack and presence of phenomenal forms (§1.1) and between nothingness and existence (§1.2), using them to map the distinction between Dao and the created world. Then, I propose my account of the Daodejing’s metaphysics of creation (§2.1) and elaborate on its connection with the previously drawn distinctions while answering a potential objection (§2.2). I conclude with some considerations about the connections between the Daodejing’s view of creation and its soteriology. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the emerging field of comparative metaethics by offering a reconstruction of the metaethical views implicit to the Daoist classic, the Laozi 老子 or Daodejing 道德經. It offers two novel views developed out of the Laozi: one-all value monism and moral trivialism. The paper proceeds by discussing Brook Ziporyn’s reading of the Laozi in terms of omnipresence and irony, and then applies his reading to moral properties like values and names (ming 名). The paper emboldens Ziporyn’s monistic (...) tendencies in order to claim that the Laozi not only treats the Dao as an omnipresent value, but also as the one value that is all values. I call this view one-all value monism. I then argue that, in terms of moral epistemology, one-all value monism entails moral trivialism, the view that all moral judgments are true. I conclude by emphasizing the therapeutic motivation for holding such apparently outrageous metaethical views. The paper thus defends the basic claim that there is a point at which Ziporyn’s omnipresence and irony become monism and true contradiction, and that further exploring the consequences of these inevitable transitions leads to the discovery of novel metaethical views. (shrink)

A realist Daoism is best illustrated through contrasting with something less robust. Chad Hansen’s Daoism may be understood as a linguistic constructivism and is thus a good candidate. I challenge his interpretation of the Zhuang-Zi and respond with a realist understanding of daos. The resultant realist Daoism is to be understood given a Daoist realism from Lao Zi’s Dao-De-Jing, whose realist flavour is constituted by some dao sometimes, if not always, outrunning us. The present paper thus situates Zhuang Zi better (...) as inheriting Daoism from Lao Zi, contributing to classical Daoism with a relativity that is realist. I submit a sinological hypothesis about wu-wei, from a theory of wei that grapples with the two senses of the Chinese word: one about doing, another fictitiousness. I venture further a philosophical hypothesis that in a realist Daoism, an artificiality that is bad, such as hypocrisy, differs from some other artificiality that though involves pretence is of real Daoist value. The present Daoist realism comes with a Dao externalism, illustrated with a wanderer wandering in nature, when their paths outrun them. Even with a dao, instead of the Dao, the externalism enables an artist’s performance in their own style having a success condition that also outruns them, such that one always could have done better. A humanism that entails the possibility of an aesthetic competence embodying the Dao is explored. (shrink)

Current approaches to contemporary political philosophy are disproportionately western, and the need for more diverse and global perspectives is urgent. To address this imbalance Colin J. Lewis and Jennifer Kling take up a series of contemporary topics in political philosophy and consider how the application of classical Chinese thought can engender new insights and enable progress on some of the thorniest sociopolitical issues. They argue that classical Chinese political theories and views have much to say that is relevant to our (...) contemporary life, and buttress their argument with case studies. Each chapter takes up a particular contemporary sociopolitical issue, describes standard Western approaches to it, and then applies classical Chinese thought to the task of either re-framing it, or suggesting a novel solution. -/- The book engages with and makes progress on several current sociopolitical issues, including the construction and deconstruction of political narratives, the legal standing of robots, the relationships between people, communities, and the environment, the funding (or defunding) of police, the status of private militias, and the question of justified revolution in liberal democracies, among others. While classical Chinese philosophy has been previously dismissed in some circles as inaccessible or banal, Lewis and Kling argue that, to the contrary, it is a powerful lens through which to view and dissect today's challenges. (shrink)

This volume explores East Asian intellectual traditions and their influence on contemporary discussions of the ethics of war and peace. Through cross-cultural comparison and dialogue between East and West, this work charts a new trajectory in the development of applied ethics. A sequel to the volume Chinese Just War Ethics, it expands the range of the earlier work and includes attention to Japan and other Eastern and Western traditions for contrastive reflection and engages with the full range of Chinese intellectual (...) traditions for comparative analysis. The book scrutinizes pioneering works such as the Mengzi, the Han Feizi, and the Seven Military Classics, investigating their influence in subsequent times. It also engages with new texts and thinkers such as the Four Books of the Yellow Emperor, Zeng Guofan, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Zedong, along with examining recent writings of the scholars of the People's Liberation Army. The final section of the book identifies and discusses some emerging issues in the comparative study of military ethics, just war and peace that derive from the preceding sections. The volume editors then offer some concluding remarks at the end of the book. This book will be of much interest to students of the ethics of war and peace, just war theory, military ethics, Asian studies and International Relations in general. (shrink)

An accessible introduction to Daoist moral philosophy.

A survey of particularist, anti-theoretical, and other approaches to morality across traditions.

Being a widely translated piece of work, the Daodejing becomes vulnerable to 'translation errors', which fail to bring across the nuances in certain parts of the text. This thus leads to the existing argument that the Daodejing seems to portray some form of linguistic skepticism, through the presence of differing interpretations of the Dao and the moral truth of wuwei (无为) (non-action). Furthermore, given that the text is widely used as a moral guide, there is a problem. It now seems (...) that the text perpetuates moral skepticism as well. In this paper, I analyse the question of whether linguistic skepticism in the Daodejing does bring about moral skepticism, and argue that it is the case; that moral skepticism does indeed follow from linguistic skepticism. The hope through this discussion is to call for a universal address of the presence of linguistic skepticism in the Daodejing and how it perpetuates moral skepticism, for this topic is still rather novel in the community, and open up further discussion. (shrink)

The question of Who am I?” is the end of philosophy. The famous ancient Greek philosopher Socrates raised three ultimate questions in philosophy when he looked up at the starry sky: “Who am I?” “Where do I come from?” “Where am I going？”. For thousands of years, humans have explored and answered questions about them, including various disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, biology, and neurology etc., but none of them have been recognized. This article starts with the cosmology and worldview (...) of “Who am I?” and elaborates on the origin of “Who am I?” and the concept of “center”. (shrink)

Our home, planet Earth, is under threat from a host of environmental problems: global climate change, loss of biodiversity, and pollution of the air and waterways from industries. I posit that this global crisis arises from the loss of our sense of place in the world. Drawing upon insights on sense of place from the Daoist text, the Daodejing, I make the case for an ecological ethics of weiziran (為自然), that exhorts us to recover our sense of place in the (...) world by dwelling rightly in our relation with the natural environment. (shrink)

Názory na historickou identitu Laoziho a na vznik a výklad Dao De Jingu se v průběhu dvacátého století silně rozrůznily. V tomto článku nejprve stručně představuji tradiční a modifikovaně-tradiční náhled na Laoziho a Dao De Jing. Poté se obšírněji věnuji genesi taoismu podle Russella Kirklanda. Tento americký badatel ve své knize Taoism: The Enduring Tradition (2004) syntetickým způsobem předkládá výsledky mnoha specializovaných studií, vedených historicko-kritickou metodou známou např. z biblické hermeneutiky. Kirkland hájí mj. následující čtyři teze: (1) Laozi je fiktivní (...) osoba, (2) Dao De Jing je výsledkem komplexního redakčního procesu, (3) Dao De Jing je hromada přísloví, nikoli dílo jednotné vize, (4) taoismus jakožto identifikovatelné hnutí vznikl až v 5. stol. n.l. Přes výhrady, které vůči Kirklandovým tezím vyjádřuji v tomto svém článku, je třeba jeho knihu považovat za zásadně přínosnou výzvu pro všechny taoistické badatele. (shrink)

本文通过对德国著名汉学家、翻译家卫礼贤的最后一部哲学论著《中国哲学导 论》(1929)的翻译和研究,整理归纳了卫礼贤对中国哲学的核心词“道”的五种不同译法, 深入剖析了他如何用“一词多译”的方法,对中国哲学史上不同文本、不同哲学家、不同时代 及不同思想维度中的“道”进行诠释。同时,本文以术语学(Terminologie)为研究方法,聚焦 于卫礼贤用来翻译“道”的几个德语哲学术语,并对这些词汇进行溯源。以此为切入点, 本文 分析了卫礼贤作为对中国哲学与德国哲学均有深刻理解的汉学家,有意识地从跨文化比较哲学 的角度出发,将“道”转换为德国哲学中与之相匹配的哲学概念,并将其介绍给德国思想界的 路径。重新审视卫礼贤对“道”的“一词多译”,在加强当今中外文化互鉴和中文著作外译方面 具有积极且重要的作用。[This contribution is based on the translation and study of the book Chinesische Philosophie: Eine Einführung (Chinese Philosophy: An Introduction, 1929). It is the last philosophy-related work by the famous German sinologist and translator Richard Wilhelm. The article provides a compilation, summary, and in-depth analysis concerning Wilhelm's handling of the translation of "Dao", the "Urwort" (Heidegger) of Chinese philosophy. The study provides insight into how Wilhelm has used a poly-perspective method to (...) interpret the word “Dao" by using five different translation terms in relation to divergent texts, various philosophers, and different periods in the history of Chinese philosophy. Some of the German philosophical terms that were applied in these translations are investigated by tracing their etymological origins and general semantics. Richard Wilhelm was a sinologist with a deep understanding of both Chinese and German philosophical traditions. He deliberately imparted the different philosophical meanings of "Dao" in a way that was compatible with the context of the contemporary German intellectual community. In parts, he presented this semantic field from the perspective of transcultural philosophy. We believe that a re-examination of Richard Wilhelm's variational approaches to translate the term "Dao" can provide important methodological inspirations for the translation of complex Chinese texts as well as concerning the improvement of mutual cultural understanding between Chinese and other cultures.]. (shrink)

This article departs from a mereological conceptualization of the Daoist metaphysi- cal system in the Daodejing 道德經. I discuss what parthood status applies to dao 道. Whereas it is quite intuitive that you 有—the region of concrete objects—has parthood relationships and compositions (entities made from parts), the other, undif- ferentiated region, dao, poses a considerable problem. This problem can be charac- terized in the following way: (a) dao cannot be characterized as a particular com- position, which entails that it does (...) not include parts. However, (b) dao underpins compositions in you, which entails that it contains compositions or at least parts that make compositions in you. This generates a problem of how compositions are possi- ble with an undifferentiated ontological foundation. I focus on one possible approach to this problem––mereological nihilism, according to which no composition is pos- sible. Assuming nihilism entails dao composed of mereological simples––funda- mental entities, which are not parts. (shrink)