About this topic
Summary This category is devoted to works exploring different emotions (e.g. fear, anger, love, jealousy) and different emotion-types (e.g. aesthetic and moral emotions, 'basic' and 'non-basic' emotions). 
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76 found
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1 — 50 / 76
  1. added 2019-02-08
    Émotions et moi, et moi, et moi.Fabrice Teroni - 2016 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141 (2):161.
    Les émotions possèdent-elles un rapport privilégié au moi ? Je montre en premier lieu qu’une thèse ambitieuse à ce propos se doit de situer ce rapport au niveau de l’intentionnalité des émotions. Ce rapport intentionnel peut prendre différentes formes dans la mesure où l’intentionnalité des émotions est complexe : une émotion porte toujours sur un objet donné qu’elle évalue. J’examine ensuite trois thèses à ce propos. La première considère que le moi constitue l’objet intentionnel de toute émotion. La deuxième fait (...)
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  2. added 2018-09-17
    Are Emotions Psychological Constructions?Charlie Kurth - 2018 - Philosophy of Science.
    According to psychological constructivism, emotions result from projecting folk emotion concepts onto felt affective episodes (e.g., Barrett 2017, LeDoux 2015, Russell 2004). Moreover, while constructivists acknowledge there’s a biological dimension to emotion, they deny that emotions are (or involve) affect programs. So they also deny that emotions are natural kinds. However, the essential role constructivism gives to felt experience and folk concepts leads to an account that’s extensionally inadequate and functionally inaccurate. Moreover, biologically-oriented proposals that reject these commitments are not (...)
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  3. added 2018-05-16
    Happiness, Pleasures, and Emotions.Mauro Rossi - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):898-919.
    In The Pursuit of Unhappiness, Daniel Haybron has defended an emotional state theory of happiness, according to which happiness consists in a broadly positive balance of emotions, moods, and mood propensities. In this paper, I argue that Haybron’s theory should be modified in two ways. First, contra Haybron, I argue that sensory pleasures should be regarded as constituents of happiness, alongside emotions and moods. I do this by showing that sensory pleasures are sufficiently similar to emotions for them to be (...)
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  4. added 2017-10-24
    Modeling Semantic Emotion Space Using a 3D Hypercube-Projection: An Innovative Analytical Approach for the Psychology of Emotions.Radek Trnka, Alek Lačev, Karel Balcar, Martin Kuška & Peter Tavel - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    The widely accepted two-dimensional circumplex model of emotions posits that most instances of human emotional experience can be understood within the two general dimensions of valence and activation. Currently, this model is facing some criticism, because complex emotions in particular are hard to define within only these two general dimensions. The present theory-driven study introduces an innovative analytical approach working in a way other than the conventional, two-dimensional paradigm. The main goal was to map and project semantic emotion space in (...)
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  5. added 2017-09-03
    Walton's Quasi-Emotions Do Not Go Away.Miguel F. Dos Santos - 2017 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 75 (3):265-274.
    The debate about how to solve the paradox of fiction has largely been a debate between Kendall Walton and the so-called thought theorists. In recent years, however, Jenefer Robinson has argued, based on her affective appraisal theory of emotion, for a noncognitivist solution to the paradox as an alternative to the thought theorists’ solution and especially to Walton's controversial solution. In this article, I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Robinson's affective appraisal theory is compatible with Walton's solution, at (...)
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  6. added 2017-03-08
    Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions: Shadows of the Soul.Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelman Ziv - 2018 - Routledge.
    Negative emotions are familiar enough, but they have rarely been a topic of study in their own right. This volume brings together fourteen chapters on negative emotions, written in a highly accessible style for non-specialists and specialists alike. It starts with chapters on general issues raised by negative emotions, such as the nature of valence, the theoretical implications of nasty emotions, the role of negative emotions in fiction, as well as the puzzles raised by ambivalent and mixed emotions. The second (...)
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  7. added 2016-12-12
    Philosophy and the Emotions.Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    This major volume of original essays maps the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the relation between consciousness and body; by analysing the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by emotions; and by exploring questions of value in making sense of emotions at a political, ethical and personal level. Leading researchers in the field reflect on the nature of human feelings, (...)
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  8. added 2016-12-08
    Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions.Robert C. Solomon (ed.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Philosophers since Aristotle have explored emotion, and the study of emotion has always been essential to the love of wisdom. In recent years Anglo-American philosophers have rediscovered and placed new emphasis on this very old discipline. The view that emotions are ripe for philosophical analysis has been supported by a considerable number of excellent publications. In this volume, Robert Solomon brings together some of the best Anglo-American philosophers now writing on the philosophy of emotion, with chapters from philosophers who have (...)
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  9. added 2016-12-08
    Kant's Taxonomy of the Emotions.Kelly D. Sorensen - 2002 - Kantian Review 6:109-128.
    If there is to be any progress in the debate about what sort of positive moral status Kant can give the emotions, we need a taxonomy of the terms Kant uses for these concepts. It used to be thought that Kant had little room for emotions in his ethics. In the past three decades, Marcia Baron, Paul Guyer, Barbara Herman, Nancy Sherman, Allen Wood and others have argued otherwise. Contrary to what a cursory reading of the Groundwork may indicate, Kant (...)
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  10. added 2016-12-05
    Metaemotional Intentionality.Scott Alexander Howard - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
    This article argues against two theories that obscure our understanding of emotions whose objects are other emotions. The tripartite model of emotional intentionality holds that an emotion's relation to its object is necessarily mediated by an additional representational state; I argue that metaemotions are an exception to this claim. The hierarchical model positions metaemotions as stable, epistemically privileged higher-order appraisals of lower-level emotions; I argue that this clashes with various features of complex metaemotional experiences. The article therefore serves dual purposes, (...)
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  11. added 2016-12-05
    Emotion.Carolyn Price - 2015 - Polity.
    Emotion is at the centre of our personal and social lives. To love or to hate, to be frightened or grateful is not just a matter of how we feel on the inside: our emotional responses direct our thoughts and actions, unleash our imaginations, and structure our relationships with others. Yet the role of emotion in human life has long been disputed. Is emotion reason?s friend or its foe? From where do the emotions really arise? Why do we need them (...)
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  12. added 2016-12-05
    Justice and Desert-Based Emotions.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):53-68.
    A number of contemporary philosophers have pointed out that justice is not primarily an intellectual virtue, grounded in abstract, detached beliefs, but rather an emotional virtue, grounded in certain beliefs and desires that are compelling and deeply embedded in human nature. As a complex emotional virtue, justice seems to encompass, amongst other things, certain desert-based emotions that are developmentally and morally important for an understanding of justice. This article explores the philosophical reasons for the rising interest in desert-based emotions and (...)
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  13. added 2016-12-05
    A Tear is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion.Jerome Neu - 2000 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Is jealousy eliminable? If so, at what cost? What are the connections between pride the sin and the pride insisted on by identity politics? How can one question an individual's understanding of their own happiness or override a society's account of its own rituals? What makes a sexual desire "perverse," or particular sexual relations undesirable or even unthinkable? These and other questions about what sustains and threatens our identity are pursued using the resources of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and other disciplines. The (...)
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  14. added 2016-11-07
    Mikko Salmela and Christian von Scheve , Collective Emotions: Perspectives From Psychology, Philosophy, and Sociology. [REVIEW]Tom Cochrane - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):467-473.
    Review of OUP volume on collective emotions which provides a taxonomy of the different theories, raising potential objections for each.
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  15. added 2016-10-27
    Analyzing Love.Robert Brown - 1987 - Cambridge University Press.
    Analyzing Love is concerned with four basic and neglected problems concerning love. The first is identifying its relevant features: distinguishing it from liking and benevolence and from sexual desire; describing the objects that can be loved and the judgements and aims required by love. The second question is how we recognize the presence of love and what grounds we may have for thinking it present in any particular case. The third is that of relating it to other emotions such as (...)
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  16. added 2016-10-06
    Epistemic Emotions: A Natural Kind?Anne Meylan - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries 2 (1).
    The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phe-nomena – feelings like the feeling of knowing, of familiarity, of certainty, etc., but also phenomena like curiosity, interest, surprise and trust – which have been labelled “epis-temic emotions” in fact constitute a unified kind, i.e., the kind of the so-called “epistemic emotions”. Obviously, for an affective phenomenon to belong to the kind of the epistemic emotions, it has to meet two conditions: it has to qualify, first, as (...)
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  17. added 2016-08-08
    Stereotypes, Prejudice, and the Taxonomy of the Implicit Social Mind.Alex Madva & Michael Brownstein - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):611-644.
    How do cognition and affect interact to produce action? Research in intergroup psychology illuminates this question by investigating the relationship between stereotypes and prejudices about social groups. Yet it is now clear that many social attitudes are implicit. This raises the question: how does the distinction between cognition and affect apply to implicit mental states? An influential view—roughly analogous to a Humean theory of action—is that “implicit stereotypes” and “implicit prejudices” constitute two separate constructs, reflecting different mental processes and neural (...)
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  18. added 2016-06-26
    On the Definition of Jealousy and Other Emotions in Anarchy, State and Utopia.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2017 - Philosophical Pathways (209):1-3.
    This paper responds to an ingenious footnote from Robert Nozick’s book Anarchy, State and Utopia. Using a table of four possible situations, Nozick defines what it is to be jealous, envious, begrudging, spiteful and competitive. I deny a claim that Nozick makes for his table, a claim needed for these definitions. I also point out that Nozick fails to capture what he has in mind by jealousy.
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  19. added 2015-08-21
    Going Through the Emotions: Passion, Violence, and “Other‐Control” Among the Dou Donggo.Peter Just - 1991 - Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 19 (3):288-312.
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  20. added 2015-04-28
    The Difference Between Emotion and Affect.Tom Cochrane - forthcoming - Physics of Life Reviews.
    In this brief comment on a target article by Koelsch et al., I argue that emotions are more sensitive to context than other affective states.
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  21. added 2014-06-09
    Passions and Affections.Amy Schmitter - 2013 - In Peter R. Anstey (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century. Oxford University Press. pp. 442-471.
    This chapter examines the views of seventeenth-century British philosophers on passions and affections. It explains that about 8,000 books published during this period mentioned passion and that it started with Thomas Wright's Passions of the Mind in General. The chapter also explores the intellectual basis of the writers who wrote about passion – which includes Augustinianism, Aristotelianism, stoicism, Epicureanism, and medicine – and furthermore, analyzes the relevant works of Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, Henry More, and Lord Shaftesbury.
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  22. added 2014-06-09
    17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions.Amy Morgan Schmitter - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    1. Introduction: 1.1 Difficulties of Approach; 1.2 Philosophical Background. 2. The Context of Early Modern Theories of the Passions: 2.1 Changing Vocabulary; 2.2 Taxonomies; 2.3 Philosophical Issues in Theories of the Emotions. SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS: Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Theories of the Emotions; Descartes; Hobbes; Malebranche; Spinoza; Shaftsbury; Hutcheson; Hume.
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  23. added 2014-03-30
    The Political Sources of Emotions: Greed and Anger.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3):21-33.
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  24. added 2014-03-28
    Love as a Moral Emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
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  25. added 2014-03-26
    Happiness and Pleasure.Daniel M. Haybron - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):501-528.
    This paper argues against hedonistic theories of happiness. First, hedonism is too inclusive: many pleasures cannot plausibly be construed as constitutive of happiness. Second, any credible theory must count either attitudes of life satisfaction, affective states such as mood, or both as constituents of happiness; yet neither sort of state reduces to pleasure. Hedonism errs in its attempt to reduce happiness, which is at least partly dispositional, to purely episodic experiential states. The dispositionality of happiness also undermines weakened nonreductive forms (...)
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  26. added 2014-03-26
    The Emotions of Courage.Daniel Putman - 2001 - Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):463–470.
  27. added 2014-03-26
    Something It Takes to Be an Emotion: The Interesting Case of Disgust.Edward B. Royzman & John Sabini - 2001 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 31 (1):29–59.
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  28. added 2014-03-25
    Kinds of Emotion.Teresa Chandler - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):109-115.
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  29. added 2014-03-25
    Moral Emotions.Ronald de Sousa - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109-126.
    Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...)
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  30. added 2014-03-25
    On the Emotional Character of Trust.Bernd Lahno - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):171-189.
    Trustful interaction serves the interests of those involved. Thus, one could reason that trust itself may be analyzed as part of rational, goaloriented action. In contrast, common sense tells us that trust is an emotion and is, therefore, independent of rational deliberation to some extent. I will argue that we are right in trusting our common sense. My argument is conceptual in nature, referring to the common distinction between trust and pure reliance. An emotional attitude may be understood as some (...)
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  31. added 2014-03-24
    Back to Basics: On the Very Idea of "Basic Emotions".Robert C. Solomon - 2002 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 32 (2):115–144.
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  32. added 2014-03-24
    Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions?Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.
    The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.
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  33. added 2014-03-23
    Biological Universals and the Nature of Fear.Mohan Matthen - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):105-132.
    Cognitive definitions cannot accommodate fear as it occurs in species incapable of sophisticated cognition. Some think that fear must, therefore, be noncognitive. This paper explores another option, arguably more in line with evolutionary theory: that like other "biological universals" fear admits of variation across and within species. A paradigm case of such universals is species: it is argued that they can be defined by ostension in the manner of Putnam and Kripke without implying that they must have an invariable essence. (...)
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  34. added 2014-03-20
    The Emotional Life of the Wise.John M. Cooper - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (S1):176-218.
    The ancient Stoics notoriously argued, with thoroughness and force, that all ordinary “emotions” (passions, mental affections: in Greek, pãyh) are thoroughly bad states of mind, not to be indulged in by anyone, under any circumstances: anger, resentment, gloating; pity, sympathy, grief; delight, glee, pleasure; impassioned love (i.e. ¶rvw), agitated desires of any kind, fear; disappointment, regret, all sorts of sorrow; hatred, contempt, schadenfreude. Early on in the history of Stoicism, however, apparently in order to avoid the objection that human nature (...)
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  35. added 2014-03-18
    Respect as a Moral Emotion: A Phenomenological Approach.John J. Drummond - 2006 - Husserl Studies 22 (1):1-27.
  36. added 2014-03-15
    The Structure of Empathy.Julien Deonna - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):99-116.
    If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Maria's emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call the transparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that these two conditions are collectively necessary and sufficient for empathy. I first clarify the ‘awareness’ and ‘feeling in tune’ conditions, and go on to examine different candidate models that explain the manner in which these two conditions might (...)
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  37. added 2014-03-15
    Justice and Desert-Based Emotions. By Kristjan Kristjansson.Hugo Meynell - 2007 - Heythrop Journal 48 (4):664–666.
  38. added 2014-03-14
    A Woman's Scorn: Toward a Feminist Defense of Contempt as a Moral Emotion.Macalester Bell - 2005 - Hypatia 20 (4):80-93.
    In an effort to reclaim women's moral psychology, feminist philosophers have reevaluated several seemingly negative emotions such as anger, resentment, and bitterness. However, one negative emotion has yet to receive adequate attention from feminist philosophers: contempt. I argue that feminists should reconsider what role feelings of contempt for male oppressors and male-dominated institutions and practices should play in our lives. I begin by surveying four feminist defenses of the negative emotions. I then offer a brief sketch of the nature and (...)
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  39. added 2014-03-12
    Self-Referential Emotions.Alexandra Zinck - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):496-505.
    The aim of this paper is to examine a special subgroup of emotion: self-referential emo- tions such as shame, pride and guilt. Self-referential emotions are usually conceptualized as (i) essentially involving the subject herself and as (ii) having complex conditions such as the capacity to represent others’ thoughts. I will show that rather than depending on a fully fledged ‘theory of mind’ and an explicit language-based self-representation, (i) pre-forms of self-referential emotions appear at early developmental stages already exhib- iting their (...)
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  40. added 2014-03-12
    Meta-Emotions.Christoph Jäger & Anne Bartsch - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):179-204.
    This paper explores the phenomenon of meta-emotions. Meta-emotions are emotions people have about their own emotions. We analyze the intentional structure of meta-emotions and show how psychological findings support our account. Acknowledgement of meta-emotions can elucidate a number of important issues in the philosophy of mind and, more specifically, the philosophy and psychology of emotions. Among them are (allegedly) ambivalent or paradoxical emotions, emotional communication, emotional self-regulation, privileged access failure for repressed emotions, and survivor guilt.
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  41. added 2014-03-07
    Relations of Homology Between Higher Cognitive Emotions and Basic Emotions.Jason A. Clark - 2010 - Biology and Philosophy 25 (1):75-94.
    In the last 10 years, several authors including Griffiths and Matthen have employed classificatory principles from biology to argue for a radical revision in the way that we individuate psychological traits. Arguing that the fundamental basis for classification of traits in biology is that of ‘homology’ (similarity due to common descent) rather than ‘analogy’, or ‘shared function’, and that psychological traits are a special case of biological traits, they maintain that psychological categories should be individuated primarily by relations of homology (...)
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  42. added 2014-03-06
    Classifying Emotion: A Developmental Account.Alexandra Zinck & Albert Newen - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):1 - 25.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for (...)
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  43. added 2014-02-10
    Unconscious Emotions: A Reply to Professor Mullane's Unconscious and Disguised Emotions.Michael Fox - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):412-414.
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  44. added 2014-02-10
    Unconscious and Disguised Emotions.Michael Fox - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (3):403-414.
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  45. added 2013-12-21
    Review of Elena Pulcini, Invidia. La passione triste. [REVIEW]Marco Solinas - 2012 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica (65):200-201.
  46. added 2013-02-19
    Review of 'Emotion and Psyche' by Marc Jackson. [REVIEW]María G. Navarro - 2011 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (34).
    motion and Psyche is a really exciting book. In just 47 pages, Marc Jackson gets to define what is an emotion, what emotion categories can be established, when an action represents an emotional conflict, why some people tend to keep memories of certain events while others forget them, and so on. Emotion and Psyche is a reflection on the nature of emotions. But it is much more. The author does not only question the meaning of emotions in our affective life, (...)
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  47. added 2012-01-26
    Basic Empathy and Complex Empathy.Dan Zahavi - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (1):81-82.
    In my short commentary, I dwell on the distinction between basic and complex empathy, and suggest that a basic perception-based form of empathy might point to the existence of a type of social understanding that is more direct and more fundamental than the types of social cognition normally addressed by simulation theory and theory theory.
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  48. added 2011-12-23
    What is Meant by Calling Emotions Basic.Paul Ekamn & Daniel Cordaro - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (4): Emotion Review October 2364-370.
    Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events. The emotion terms, such as anger, fear, etcetera, denote a family of related states sharing at least 12 characteristics, which distinguish one emotion family from another, as well as from other affective states. These affective responses are preprogrammed and involuntary, but are also shaped by life experiences.
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  49. added 2011-07-11
    Do Discrete Emotions Exist?Yang-Ming Huang, Maria Gendron & Lisa Feldman Barrett - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):427-437.
    In various guises (usually referred to as the “basic emotion” or “discrete emotion” approach), scientists and philosophers have long argued that certain categories of emotion are natural kinds. In a recent paper, Colombetti (2009) proposed yet another natural kind account, and in so doing, characterized and critiqued psychological constructionist approaches to emotion, including our own Conceptual Act Model. In this commentary, we briefly address three topics raised by Columbetti. First, we correct several common misperceptions about the discrete emotion approach to (...)
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  50. added 2011-05-05
    Emotion Labelling and Cognition.Robert M. Gordon - 1978 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 8 (2):125–135.
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