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  1. Has Dretske Really Refuted Skepticism?Charles J. Abate - unknown
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  2. Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):1-35.
    As teorias epistemológicas do rastreamento sustentam que o conhecimento é uma relação real entre o agente cognitivo e seu ambiente. Os estados cognitivos de um agente epistêmico fazem o rastreamento da verdade das proposições que são objeto de conhecimento ao embasarem a crença em indicadores confiáveis da verdade (evidência, razões, ou métodos de formação de crença). A novidade nessa abordagem é que se dá pouca ênfase no tipo de justificação epistêmica voltada ao fornecimento de procedimentos de decisão doxástica ou regras (...)
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  3. Towards Closure on Closure.Fred Adams, John A. Barker & Julia Figurelli - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):179-196.
    Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial for tracking theories (...)
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  4. The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection.Patrick Allo - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.
    In this paper I present a more refined analysis of the principles of deductive closure and positive introspection. This analysis uses the expressive resources of logics for different types of group knowledge, and discriminates between aspects of closure and computation that are often conflated. The resulting model also yields a more fine-grained distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and places Hintikka’s original argument for positive introspection in a new perspective.
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  5. Epistemic Closure, Skepticism and Defeasibility.Claudio Almeida - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):197-215.
    Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske's lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure maneuvering useless. But there is a (...)
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  6. Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons.Claudio Almeida - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):301-319.
    It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or epistemic rationality ) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.
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  7. Why Safety Doesn't Save Closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):127-142.
    Knowledge closure is, roughly, the following claim: For every agent S and propositions P and Q, if S knows P, knows that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is so implied, then S knows Q. Almost every epistemologist believes that closure is true. Indeed, they often believe that it so obviously true that any theory implying its denial is thereby refuted. Some prominent epistemologists have nevertheless denied it, most famously Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick. There are closure advocates (...)
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  8. Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure.Marc Alspector‐Kelly - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):570-611.
    Fred Dretske notoriously claimed that knowledge closure sometimes fails. Crispin Wright agrees that warrant does not transmit in the relevant cases, but only because the agent must already be warranted in believing the conclusion in order to acquire her warrant for the premise. So the agent ends up being warranted in believing, and so knowing, the conclusion in those cases too: closure is preserved. Wright's argument requires that the conclusion's having to be warranted beforehand explains transmission failure. I argue that (...)
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  9. A Problem for the Closure Argument.Philip Atkins & Ian Nance - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):36-49.
    Contemporary discussions of skepticism often frame the skeptic's argument around an instance of the closure principle. Roughly, the closure principle states that if a subject knows p, and knows that p entails q, then the subject knows q. The main contention of this paper is that the closure argument for skepticism is defective. We explore several possible classifications of the defect. The closure argument might plausibly be classified as begging the question, as exhibiting transmission failure, or as structurally inefficient.
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  10. Deductive Closure, Defeasibility and Scepticism: A Reply to Feldman.Robert Audi - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):494-499.
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  11. Justification, Deductive Closure and Reasons to Believe.Robert Audi - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1-2):77-.
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  12. Closure Reconsidered.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.
    Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume closure for justification, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the three best objections to it. The general upshot for theories of justification is that (...)
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  13. Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):552-568.
    Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, incidental, and knowledge is achieved despite falsehood. We also show that the (...)
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  14. Epistemic Closure and Skepticism.J. A. Barker & F. Adams - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):221-246.
    Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if S infers that Q, S knows that Q. Fred Dretske acknowledges that closure is plausible but contends that it should be rejected because it conflicts with the plausible thesis: Conclusive reasons : S knows that P only if S believes P on the basis of conclusive reasons, i.e., reasons S wouldn‘t have if it weren‘t the case that P. Dretske develops an (...)
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  15. What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
    If the reliability of a source of testimony is open to question, it seems epistemically illegitimate to verify the source’s reliability by appealing to that source’s own testimony. Is this because it is illegitimate to trust a questionable source’s testimony on any matter whatsoever? Or is there a distinctive problem with appealing to the source’s testimony on the matter of that source’s own reliability? After distinguishing between two kinds of epistemically illegitimate circularity—bootstrapping and self-verification—I argue for a qualified version of (...)
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  16. Information, Closure, and Knowledge: On Jäger's Objection to Dretske.P. Baumann - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):403 - 408.
    Christoph Jäger (2004) argues that Dretske’s information theory of knowledge raises a serious problem for his denial of closure of knowledge under known entailment: Information is closed under known entailment (even under entailment simpliciter); given that Dretske explains the concept of knowledge in terms of “information”, it is hard to stick with his denial of closure for knowledge. Thus, one of the two basic claims of Dretske would have to go. Since giving up the denial of closure would commit Dretske (...)
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  17. Nozick's Defense of Closure.Peter Baumann - 2012 - In Kelly Becker & Tim Black (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 11--27.
    This paper argues against common views that at least in many cases Robert Nozick is not forced to deny common closure principles. More importantly, Nozick does not – despite first (and second) appearances and despite his own words – deny closure. On the contrary, he is defending a more sophisticated and complex principle of closure. This principle does remarkably well though it is not without problems. It is surprising how rarely Nozick’s principle of closure has been discussed. He should be (...)
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  18. Epistemic closure.Peter Baumann - 2011 - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 597--608.
    This article gives an overview over different principles of epistemic closure, their attractions and their problems.
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  19. Lotteries And Contexts.Peter Baumann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):415-428.
    There are many ordinary propositions we think we know. Almost every ordinary proposition entails some "lottery proposition" which we think we do not know but to which we assign a high probability of being true (for instance: “I will never be a multi-millionaire” entails “I will not win this lottery”). How is this possible - given that some closure principle is true? This problem, also known as “the Lottery puzzle”, has recently provoked a lot of discussion. In this paper I (...)
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  20. New Essays on Sensitivity and Knowledge.Kelly Becker (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  21. Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology.James R. Beebe & Jake Monaghan - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosopohy.
    We report the results of four empirical studies designed to investigate the extent to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested that our shared epistemic practices may only include a source-relative closure principle—one that applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. We argue that the results of our studies provide reason for thinking that individuals are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials conflict with (...)
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  22. The Relevance of Skepticism.James Markham Ambler Bell - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    It is undeniable that the skeptic's argument can grip you. How can you claim to know that you are not right now dreaming? And if you can't, how can you claim that you know anything about the external world? Some philosophers have argued that we may insist that the skeptic's inference from "You do not know that you are not now dreaming" to "You do not know you have hands" is illegitimate, because it relies on the false principle that knowledge (...)
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  23. Lotteries and Prefaces.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge. pp. 168-176.
    The lottery and preface paradoxes pose puzzles in epistemology concerning how to think about the norms of reasonable or permissible belief. Contextualists in epistemology have focused on knowledge ascriptions, attempting to capture a set of judgments about knowledge ascriptions and denials in a variety of contexts (including those involving lottery beliefs and the principles of closure). This article surveys some contextualist approaches to handling issues raised by the lottery and preface, while also considering some of the difficulties encountered by those (...)
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  24. Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.
    It is widely thought that if knowledge requires sensitivity, knowledge is not closed because sensitivity is not closed. This paper argues that there is no valid argument from sensitivity failure to non-closure of knowledge. Sensitivity does not imply non-closure of knowledge. Closure considerations cannot be used to adjudicate between safety and sensitivity accounts of knowledge.
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  25. Skepticism, Externalism, and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 2008 - In The Metaphysics of Memory. Springer. pp. 105--133.
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  26. Self-Knowledge and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 1998 - In Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. CSLI Publications. pp. 333-349.
    Paul Boghossian has famously argued that semantic externalism is incompatible with authoritative self-knowledge. Boghossian also draws incompatibilist consequences from the slow switching thought experiment introduced by Tyler Burge. This paper develops three objections to Boghossian's incompatibilist argument.
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  27. What We Can Learn From the Skeptical Puzzle.Tim Black - 2009 - Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 1 (2):439-447.
    There is reason to think that a familiar and frequently used epistemic closure principle is false. Given this, the relevant instance of that principle should be removed from a familiar skeptical argument, and replaced with an instance of a more plausible epistemic closure principle. Once this has been done, however, we see that even if the resulting skeptical argument is unsound, we need deny neither closure nor the claim that we know the things we ordinarily take ourselves to know. Nothing (...)
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  28. Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Tim Black - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.
    Stewart Cohen argues that several epistemological theories fall victim to the problem of easy knowledge: they allow us to know far too easily that certain sceptical hypotheses are false and that how things seem is a reliable indicator of how they are. This problem is a result of the theories' interaction with an epistemic closure principle. Cohen suggests that the theories should be modified. I argue that attempts to solve the problem should focus on closure instead; a new and plausible (...)
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  29. RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES AND THE SHIFTING STANDARDS OF KNOWLEDGE.Tim Black - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):23-32.
    So, C. I don’t know that T. Premises 1 and 2 are both plausible. However, C seems false—I do seem to know that there is a tree before me. AI presents a puzzle because its two plausible premises yield a conclusion whose negation is plausible. And no matter whether we accept or reject AI, we find that we must give up something plausible—either premise 1, premise 2, or the negation of C. But which of these should we give up? I (...)
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  30. In Defense of Sensitivity.Tim Black & Peter Murphy - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):53-71.
    The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose’s revised condition. Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale which suggests a (...)
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  31. A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):381–390.
    The most prominent arguments for scepticism in modern epistemology employ closure principles of some kind. To begin my discussion of such arguments, consider Simple Knowledge Closure (SKC): (SKC) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Kxt[q].1 Assuming its truth for the time being, the sceptic can use (SKC) to reason from the two assumptions that, firstly, we don’t know ¬sh and that, secondly, op entails ¬sh to the conclusion that we don’t know op, where ‘op’ and ‘sh’ are shorthand for ‘ordinary (...)
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  32. Cognition and Epistemic Closure.Radu Bogdan - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1):55 - 63.
    JUSTIFICATION and knowledge are thought to be closed under known implication..1 This widely shared assumption is embodied in the following principles of epistemic closure.
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  33. ``Cognition and Epistemic Closure".Radu J. Bogdan - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1):55--63.
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  34. A Note on the Rational Closure of Knowledge Bases with Both Positive and Negative Knowledge.R. Booth & J. B. Paris - 1998 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (2):165-190.
    The notion of the rational closure of a positive knowledge base K of conditional assertions | (standing for if then normally ) was first introduced by Lehmann (1989) and developed by Lehmann and Magidor (1992). Following those authors we would also argue that the rational closure is, in a strong sense, the minimal information, or simplest, rational consequence relation satisfying K. In practice, however, one might expect a knowledge base to consist not just of positive conditional assertions, | , but (...)
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  35. On Synchronic Dogmatism.Rodrigo Borges - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3677-3693.
    Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.
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  36. Deductive Closure and Epistemic Context.Yves Bouchard - 2011 - Logique Et Analyse 54 (216):439-451.
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  37. Epistemic Closure in Context.Yves Bouchard - unknown
    The general principle of epistemic closure stipulates that epistemic properties are transmissible through logical means. According to this principle, an epistemic operator, say ε, should satisfy any valid scheme of inference, such as: if ε(p entails q), then ε(p) entails ε(q). The principle of epistemic closure under known entailment (ECKE), a particular instance of epistemic closure, has received a good deal of attention since the last thirty years or so. ECKE states that: if one knows that p entails q, and (...)
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  38. Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination.Cameron Boult - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1125-1133.
    Anthony Brueckner has argued that claims about underdetermination of evidence are suppressed in closure-based scepticism (“The Structure of the Skeptical Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:4, 1994). He also argues that these claims about underdetermination themselves lead to a paradoxical sceptical argument—the underdetermination argument—which is more fundamental than the closure argument. If Brueckner is right, the status quo focus of some predominant anti-sceptical strategies may be misguided. In this paper I focus specifically on the relationship between these two arguments. I (...)
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  39. Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism.Jochen Briesen - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):221-234.
    Anthony Brueckner argues for a strong connection between the closure and the underdetermination argument for scepticism. Moreover, he claims that both arguments rest on infallibilism: In order to motivate the premises of the arguments, the sceptic has to refer to an infallibility principle. If this were true, fallibilists would be right in not taking the problems posed by these sceptical arguments seriously. As many epistemologists are sympathetic to fallibilism, this would be a very interesting result. However, in this paper I (...)
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  40. Review: Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]A. Brueckner - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):160-165.
  41. Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge.A. Brueckner - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):333-335.
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  42. Klein on Closure and Skepticism.A. L. Brueckner - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (2):139-151.
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  43. Reply to Coffman on Closure and Skepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):167–171.
    E. J. Coffman defends Peter Klein’s work on epistemic closure against various objections that I raised in an earlier paper. In this paper, I respond to Coffman.
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  44. Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge.Anthony Brueckner - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):333–335.
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  45. Closure and Context.Anthony Brueckner - 1998 - Ratio 11 (1):78–82.
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  46. Skepticism and Epistemic Closure.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.
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  47. Contextualism, Closure, and the Knowledge Account of Assertion.Christopher Buford - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:111-121.
    This paper argues that Epistemic Contextualism, Knowledge Closure, and the Knowledge Account of Assertion are inconsistent. The argument is developed by considering an objection to Contextualism that is unsuccessful. Some Contextualist responses are canvassed and rejected. Finally, it is argued that an analogue of the inconsistency arises for those who accept that justification is closed under known entailment.
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  48. DeRose and the Comparative Account of Epistemic Closure.Christopher Buford - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (2):255-259.
  49. On an Argument Against Closure.James Cargile - 1999 - Noûs 33 (2):239-246.
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  50. Radical Skepticism, Closure, and Robust Knowledge.J. Adam Carter - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:115-133.
    The Neo-Moorean response to the radical skeptical challenge boldly maintains that we can know we’re not the victims of radical skeptical hypotheses; accordingly, our everyday knowledge that would otherwise be threatened by our inability to rule out such hypotheses stands unthreatened. Given the leverage such an approach has against the skeptic from the very start, the Neo-Moorean line is an especially popular one; as we shall see, though, it faces several commonly overlooked problems. An initial problem is that this particular (...)
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