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  1. added 2018-11-06
    Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Carter and Pritchard (2016) and Pritchard (2010, 2012, 2016) have tried to reconcile the intuition that perceptual knowledge requires only limited discriminatory abilities with the closure principle. To this end, they have introduced two theoretical innovations: a contrast between two ways of introducing error-possibilities and a distinction between discriminating and favoring evidence. I argue that their solution faces the “sufficiency problem”: it is unclear whether the evidence that is normally available to adult humans is sufficient to retain knowledge of the (...)
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  2. added 2018-11-05
    How to Formulate Arguments From Easy Knowledge.Alexander Jackson - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):341-356.
    Arguments from "easy knowledge" are meant to refute a class of epistemological views, including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. I present arguments from easy knowledge in their strongest form, and explain why other formulations in the literature are inferior. I criticize two features of Stewart Cohen's presentation, namely his focus on knowing that one's faculties are reliable, and his use of a Williamson-style closure principle. Rather, the issue around easy knowledge must be understood using a notion of epistemic priority. Roger White's (...)
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  3. added 2018-10-11
    Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation.Guido Melchior - forthcoming - New York City, New York, USA: Routledge.
    This book is primarily about checking and only derivatively about knowing. Checking is a very common concept for describing a subject’s epistemic goals and actions. Surprisingly, there has been no philosophical attention paid to the notion of checking. In Part I, I develop a sensitivity account of checking. To be more explicit, I analyze the internalist and externalist components of the epistemic action of checking which include the intentions of the checking subject and the necessary externalist features of the method (...)
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  4. added 2018-09-26
    Can Probability Theory Explain Why Closure is Both Intuitive and Prone to Counterexamples?Marcello Di Bello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2145-2168.
    Epistemic closure under known implication is the principle that knowledge of \ and knowledge of \, together, imply knowledge of \. This principle is intuitive, yet several putative counterexamples have been formulated against it. This paper addresses the question, why is epistemic closure both intuitive and prone to counterexamples? In particular, the paper examines whether probability theory can offer an answer to this question based on four strategies. The first probability-based strategy rests on the accumulation of risks. The problem with (...)
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  5. added 2018-09-06
    Science Generates Limit Paradoxes.Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (4):409-432.
    The sciences occasionally generate discoveries that undermine their own assumptions. Two such discoveries are characterized here: the discovery of apophenia by cognitive psychology and the discovery that physical systems cannot be locally bounded within quantum theory. It is shown that such discoveries have a common structure and that this common structure is an instance of Priest’s well-known Inclosure Schema. This demonstrates that science itself is dialetheic: it generates limit paradoxes. How science proceeds despite this fact is briefly discussed, as is (...)
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  6. added 2018-09-01
    Pragmatic Encroachment and Closure.Charity Anderson & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
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  7. added 2018-08-19
    Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - forthcoming - Mind.
    We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models (...)
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  8. added 2018-06-27
    Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism.Guy Axtell - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the responses that proponents of virtue epistemology (VE) make to radical skepticism and particularly to two related forms of it, Pyrrhonian skepticism and the “underdetermination-based” argument, both of which have been receiving widening attention in recent debate. Section 1 of the chapter briefly articulates these two skeptical arguments and their interrelationship, while section 2 explains the close connection between a virtue-theoretic and a neo-Moorean response to them. In sections 3 and 4 I advance arguments for improving (...)
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  9. added 2018-04-26
    Four Arguments for Denying That Lottery Beliefs Are Justified.Martin Smith - forthcoming - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge:
    A ‘lottery belief’ is a belief that a particular ticket has lost a large, fair lottery, based on nothing more than the odds against it winning. The lottery paradox brings out a tension between the idea that lottery beliefs are justified and the idea that that one can always justifiably believe the deductive consequences of things that one justifiably believes – what is sometimes called the principle of closure. Many philosophers have treated the lottery paradox as an argument against the (...)
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  10. added 2018-02-26
    Modal Epistemology.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - manuscript
    Some central epistemological notions are expressed by sentential operators O that entail the possibility of knowledge in the sense that 'Op' entails 'It is possible to know that p'. We call these modal-epistemological notions. Using apriority and being in a position to know as case studies, we argue that the logics of modal epistemological notions are extremely weak. In particular, their logics are not normal and do not include any closure principles.
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  11. added 2018-02-17
    Information, Closure, And Knowledge: On Jäger’s Objection To Dretske.P. Baumann - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):403-408.
    Christoph Jäger (2004) argues that Dretske's information theory of knowledge raises a serious problem for his denial of closure of knowledge under known entailment: Information is closed under known entailment (even under entailment simpliciter); given that Dretske explains the concept of knowledge in terms of "information", it is hard to stick with his denial of closure for knowledge. Thus, one of the two basic claims of Dretske would have to go. Since giving up the denial of closure would commit Dretske (...)
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  12. added 2018-02-17
    A Closer Look at Closure Scepticism.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Paperback) 106 (3):381-390.
    The most prominent arguments for scepticism in modern epistemology employ closure principles of some kind. To begin my discussion of such arguments, consider Simple Knowledge Closure (SKC): (SKC) (Kxt[p] ∧ (p → q)) → Kxt[q].1 Assuming its truth for the time being, the sceptic can use (SKC) to reason from the two assumptions that, firstly, we don’t know ¬sh and that, secondly, op entails ¬sh to the conclusion that we don’t know op, where ‘op’ and ‘sh’ are shorthand for ‘ordinary (...)
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  13. added 2018-02-17
    Epistemic Justification and Deductive Closure.Samir Okasha - 1999 - Critica 31 (92):37-51.
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  14. added 2018-02-16
    Shutting Dretske’s Door.Nicholas Shackel - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):393-401.
    Dretske proposes a theory of knowledge in terms of a theory of information, but wishes to deny that empirical knowledge settles the large question of scepticism. This leads him to deny the closure of knowledge under known entailment. In a recent paper Jäger argues that Dretske's theory of information entails closure for knowledge, 'at least for the kind of propositions here at issue'. If Jäger is right, Dretske is seriously embarrassed and must give something up. In this paper I show (...)
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  15. added 2018-01-22
    Ignorance and Knowledge: The Viability of Externalist Neo-Mooreanism as a Resonse to Radical Scepticism.John Asquith - 2017 - Dissertation, King's College London
    Here, I shall be examining the viability of a Moorean response to the Argument from Ignorance; i.e., one that tries to rebut the argument by denying its first premise that we cannot have knowledge that we are not BIVs. After first explicating the Argument from Ignorance in detail, I then go on to try and motivate this approach by critically examining two alternative approaches to dealing with radical scepticism: closure-denial, and attributer contextualism. Finding them wanting, I then turn to a (...)
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  16. added 2018-01-17
    Closure, Deduction and Hinge Commitments.Xiaoxing Zhang - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Duncan Pritchard recently proposed a Wittgensteinian solution to closure-based skepticism. According to Wittgenstein, all epistemic systems assume certain truths. The notions that we are not disembodied brains, that the Earth has existed for a long time and that one’s name is such-and-such all function as “hinge commitments.” Pritchard views a hinge commitment as a positive propositional attitude that is not a belief. Because closure principles concern only knowledge-apt beliefs, they do not apply to hinge commitments. Thus, from the fact that (...)
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  17. added 2017-12-24
    Knowledge and Assumptions.Brett Sherman & Gilbert Harman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):131-140.
    When epistemologists talk about knowledge, the discussions traditionally include only a small class of other epistemic notions: belief, justification, probability, truth. In this paper, we propose that epistemologists should include an additional epistemic notion into the mix, namely the notion of assuming or taking for granted.
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  18. added 2017-12-24
    Knowledge, Assumptions, Lotteries.Gilbert Harman & Brett Sherman - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):492–500.
    John Hawthorne’s marvelous book contains a wealth of arguments and insights based on an impressive knowledge and understanding of contemporary discussion. We can address only a small aspect of the topic. In particular, we will offer our own answers to two questions about knowledge that he discusses.
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  19. added 2017-11-23
    Question Closure to Solve the Surprise Test.Daniel Immerman - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4583-4596.
    This paper offers a new solution to the Surprise Test Paradox. The paradox arises thanks to an ingenious argument that seems to show that surprise tests are impossible. My solution to the paradox states that it relies on a questionable closure principle. This closure principle says that if one knows something and competently deduces something else, one knows the further thing. This principle has been endorsed by John Hawthorne and Timothy Williamson, among others, and I trace its motivation back to (...)
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  20. added 2017-10-12
    Replies to Klein, Hawthorne, Prades.Stewart Cohen - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):132 - 139.
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  21. added 2017-08-27
    Reply to Professor Cross.Jarrett Leplin - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):99-101.
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  22. added 2017-06-17
    Closure Failures for Safety.Peter Murphy - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):331-334.
    Ernest Sosa and others have proposed a safety condition on knowledge: If S knows p, then in the nearest (non-actual) worlds in which S believes p, p is true.1 Colloquially, this is the idea that knowing requires not being easily mistaken. Here, I will argue that like another condition requiring a counterfactual relation between a subject’s belief and the world, viz. Robert Nozick’s sensitivity condition, safety leads, in certain cases, to the unacceptable result that knowledge is not closed under known (...)
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  23. added 2017-05-31
    Lotteries, Possibility and Skepticism.Daniel Immerman - 2015 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 12:51-67.
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  24. added 2017-05-28
    Précis of Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):476–481.
  25. added 2017-05-28
    Lewis, the Lottery and the Preface.John Hawthorne - 2002 - Analysis 62 (3):242–251.
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  26. added 2017-05-15
    Two-Context Probabilism and the Dissolution of the 'Lottery' Problem.Gregor Flock - manuscript
    In this paper it will be attempted to dissolve the lottery problem based on fallibilism, probabilism and the introduction of a so far widely neglected second context of knowledge. First, it will be argued that the lottery problem is actually an exemplification of the much wider Humean "future knowledge problem" (ch. 1). Two types of inferences and arguments will be examined, compared and evaluated in respect to their ability to fittingly describe the thought processes behind lottery/future knowledge propositions (ch. 2). (...)
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  27. added 2017-05-15
    Confusion About Concessive Knowledge Attributions.Dylan Dodd - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):381 - 396.
    Concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs) are knowledge attributions of the form ‘S knows p, but it’s possible that q’, where q obviously entails not-p (Rysiew, Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 35:477–514, 2001). The significance of CKAs has been widely discussed recently. It’s agreed by all that CKAs are infelicitous, at least typically. But the agreement ends there. Different writers have invoked them in their defenses of all sorts of philosophical theses; to name just a few: contextualism, invariantism, fallibilism, infallibilism, and that the knowledge (...)
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  28. added 2017-05-15
    Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]Richard Feldman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):211–226.
  29. added 2017-05-15
    The Challenge of Concessive Knowledge Attributions.Dylan Dodd - 2006 - Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):221-227.
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  30. added 2017-05-15
    Review: Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]A. Brueckner - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):160-165.
  31. added 2017-05-15
    Lewis on Fallible Knowledge.Igor Douven - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):573 – 580.
    Lewis has offered a contextualist epistemology that he claims is non-fallibilist. The present note aims to show that, while there seems to be a simple argument for Lewis's claim, the argument is fallacious, and Lewis's epistemology is fallibilist after all.
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  32. added 2017-05-15
    A Noncontextualist Account of Contextualist Linguistic Data.Mylan Engel Jr - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (2):56-79.
    The paper takes as its starting point the observation that people can be led to retract knowledge claims when presented with previously ignored error possibilities, but offers a noncontextualist explanation of the data. Fallibilist epistemologies are committed to the existence of two kinds of Kp -falsifying contingencies: (i) Non-Ignorable contingencies [NI-contingencies] and (ii) Properly-Ignorable contingencies [PI-contingencies]. For S to know that p, S must be in an epistemic position to rule out all NI-contingencies, but she need not be able to (...)
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  33. added 2017-05-15
    Lotteries And Contexts.Peter Baumann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):415-428.
    There are many ordinary propositions we think we know. Almost every ordinary proposition entails some "lottery proposition" which we think we do not know but to which we assign a high probability of being true (for instance: “I will never be a multi-millionaire” entails “I will not win this lottery”). How is this possible - given that some closure principle is true? This problem, also known as “the Lottery puzzle”, has recently provoked a lot of discussion. In this paper I (...)
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  34. added 2017-05-15
    RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES AND THE SHIFTING STANDARDS OF KNOWLEDGE.Tim Black - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):23-32.
    So, C. I don’t know that T. Premises 1 and 2 are both plausible. However, C seems false—I do seem to know that there is a tree before me. AI presents a puzzle because its two plausible premises yield a conclusion whose negation is plausible. And no matter whether we accept or reject AI, we find that we must give up something plausible—either premise 1, premise 2, or the negation of C. But which of these should we give up? I (...)
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  35. added 2017-02-14
    Near Triviality of Conclusive Reasons.Tetsuji Iseda - 2005 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 14 (1):1-20.
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  36. added 2017-02-13
    Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.
    This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition (...)
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  37. added 2017-02-12
    The Place of Nonconceptual Information in University Education with Special Reference to Teaching Literature.Reuven Tsur - 2009 - Pragmatics and Cognition 17 (2):309-330.
    This paper assumes that crucial mental activities involved in scientific discovery and literary reponse are nonconceptual. Some of the greatest scientific discoveries were made in states of extreme mental passivity induced in “the Bus, the Bath, or the Bed“. Universities usually teach techniques and conceptual systems required for scientific research, but have no courses in achieving moments of extreme mental passivity, that is, taking a hot bath or dozing off on a rocking bus. I have adopted from the psychology of (...)
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  38. added 2017-02-09
    What Is It to Be a Human Knower?Jan Derry - 2007 - Philosophy Now 63:10-11.
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  39. added 2017-02-08
    Knowledge From Non-Knowledge.Branden Fitelson - unknown
    The Naive View (TNV) of Inferential Knowledge (slogan): (TNV) Inferential knowledge requires known relevant premises. One key aspect of (TNV) is “counter-closure” [9, 10].
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  40. added 2017-02-08
    A Knower's Evidence.Douglas Odegard - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (2):123 - 128.
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  41. added 2017-02-07
    Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
  42. added 2017-01-29
    Probability and Danger.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Amherst Lecture in Philosophy.
    What is the epistemological structure of situations where many small risks amount to a large one? Lottery and preface paradoxes and puzzles about quantum-mechanical blips threaten the idea that competent deduction is a way of extending our knowledge . Seemingly, everyday knowledge involves small risks, and competently deducing the conjunction of many such truths from them yields a conclusion too risky to constitute knowledge. But the dilemma between scepticism and abandoning MPC is false. In extreme cases, objectively improbable truths are (...)
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  43. added 2017-01-29
    The Development of the Closure.Raymond Murphy - 1983 - Theory and Society 12 (5):631.
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  44. added 2017-01-28
    Epistemic Closure - Left and Right.Wendy Kaminer - 2010 - Free Inquiry 30:14-14.
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  45. added 2017-01-27
    Has Dretske Really Refuted Skepticism?Charles J. Abate - unknown
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  46. added 2017-01-26
    Closure and “Colored People's Time”.John Streamas - 2010 - In Jo Alyson Parker, Paul Harris & Christian Steineck (eds.), Time: Limits and Constraints. Brill. pp. 13--219.
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  47. added 2017-01-26
    Experimental Existentialism and the Concept of Closure.M. Dechesne & A. Kruglanski - 2004 - In Jeff Greenberg, Sander L. Koole & Tom Pyszczynski (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Existential Psychology. Guilford Press. pp. 247--262.
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  48. added 2017-01-26
    Lexical Shadowing and Argument Closure.James Pustejovsky - 2000 - In Yael Ravin & Claudia Leacock (eds.), Polysemy: Theoretical and Computational Approaches. Oxford University Press. pp. 68--90.
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  49. added 2017-01-26
    A One-Sided Boundary: On the Limits of Knowing Organisational Closure.Arno Goudsmit - 1992 - In G. van der Vijve (ed.), New Perspectives on Cybernetics. pp. 175--205.
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  50. added 2017-01-25
    The End is Near!: The Phenomenon of the Declaration of Closure in a Discipline.Arthur M. Silverstein - 1999 - History of Science 37 (118):407-425.
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