- Two-Context Probabilism and the Dissolution of the 'Lottery' Problem.Gregor Flock - manuscriptdetails
- Esian Accounts.M. tti & oji nji - manuscriptdetails
- Modal Epistemology.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - manuscriptdetails
- Pragmatic Encroachment and Closure.Charity Anderson & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.details
- Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - forthcoming - Mind.details
- Epistemic Logic and Epistemology.Wesley H. Holliday - forthcoming - In Sven Ove Hansson Vincent F. Hendricks (ed.), Handbook of Formal Philosophy. Springer.details
- New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure.Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (eds.) - forthcoming - London: Routledge.details
- The Hardest Paradox for Closure.Martin Smith - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-26.details
- Underdetermination and Closure: Thoughts on Two Sceptical Arguments.Martin Smith - forthcoming - In Matthew Jope & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.details
- Risky Belief.Martin Smith - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
- A Metalinguistic and Computational Approach to the Problem of Mathematical Omniscience.Zeynep Soysal - forthcoming - Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
- Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.details
- Sobre la distinción entre los principios epistémicos de clausura y de transmisión.Diego Rodríguez Téllez - 2022 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 62:349-381.details
- Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.Bin Zhao - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (1):56-71.details
- A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism.Nevin Climenhaga - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge.details
- On the Alleged Instability of Externalist Anti-Skepticism.Matthew Jope - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (1):43-50.details
- Four Arguments for Denying That Lottery Beliefs Are Justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge:details
- Closure, Deduction and Hinge Commitments.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3533-3551.details
- Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure.Santiago Echeverri - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1361-1378.details
- The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.details
- Rosenkranz’s Logic of Justification and Unprovability.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (6):1243-1256.details
- Williamson, Closure, and KK.Daniel Immerman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3349-3373.details
- The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox.Changsheng Lai - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1269-1288.details
- Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology.Guido Melchior - 2020 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.details
- The Mind as a Sponge, its Cognitive Artifacts, and Being in the 21st Century.Ho Manh Tung - 2020 - OSF Preprints 2020 (10).details
- Against Knowledge Closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2019 - Cambridge University Press.details
- Knowledge Exclusion and the Rationality of Belief.Sean Donahue - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):402-410.details
- Closure, Credence and Rationality: A Problem for Non-Belief Hinge Epistemology.Matt Jope - 2019 - Synthese (Suppl 15):1-11.details
- My Ordinary Anti-Sceptical Beliefs Are Not Insensitive.Changsheng Lai - 2019 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 14 (3):469-489.details
- Epistemic Logic Without Closure.Stephan Leuenberger & Martin Smith - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4751-4774.details
- Mark McBride, Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge, Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2017, 228 Pp., £16.95 , ISBN 978‐1‐78374‐283‐7. [REVIEW]Artūrs Logins - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):280-285.details
- Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation.Guido Melchior - 2019 - New York City, New York, USA: Routledge.details
- No Justificatory Closure Without Truth.Francesco Praolini - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):715-726.details
- Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology.James R. Beebe & Jake Monaghan - 2018 - In Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume Two. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-70.details
- Transparency and the KK Principle.Nilanjan Das & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):3-23.details
- Can Probability Theory Explain Why Closure is Both Intuitive and Prone to Counterexamples?Marcello Di Bello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2145-2168.details
- The Evil Demon Argument as Based on Closure Plus Meta-Coherence.Jean Guillon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4703-4731.details
- How to Formulate Arguments From Easy Knowledge.Alexander Jackson - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):341-356.details
- Enough is Enough: Austin on Knowing.Guy Longworth - 2018 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays. Oxford, UK: pp. 186–205.details
- Ignorance and Knowledge: The Viability of Externalist Neo-Mooreanism as a Resonse to Radical Scepticism.John Asquith - 2017 - Dissertation, King's College Londondetails
- Lotteries and Prefaces.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge. pp. 168-176.details
- Probability, Approximate Truth, and Truthlikeness: More Ways Out of the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani & Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):209-225.details
- On Sharon and Spectre’s Argument Against Closure.Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1039-1046.details
- Question Closure to Solve the Surprise Test.Daniel Immerman - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4583-4596.details
- Epistemic Entitlement and the Leaching Problem.Aidan McGlynn - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):89-102.details
- Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.details
- The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):114-135.details
- Evidence and the Openness of Knowledge.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1001-1037.details
- Risk, Doubt, and Transmission.Rachel Fraser - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2803-2821.details
- Questions, Topics and Restricted Closure.Peter Hawke - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2759-2784.details
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