Coercion

Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalized persons to educate them about the nature of their oppression. I argue that epistemic exploitation is marked by unrecognized, uncompensated, emotionally taxing, coerced epistemic labor. The coercive and exploitative aspects of the phenomenon are exemplified by the unpaid nature of the educational labor and its associated opportunity costs, the double bind that marginalized persons must navigate when faced with the demand to educate, and the need for additional labor created by the default (...) skepticism of the privileged. I explore the connections between epistemic exploitation and the two varieties of epistemic injustice that Fricker (2007) identifies, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. I situate epistemic exploitation within Dotson’s (2012; 2014) framework of epistemic oppression, and I address the role that epistemic exploitation plays in maintaining active ignorance and upholding dominant epistemic frameworks. (shrink)

Across the health sector there is increased recognition of the ethical significance of interventions that constrain or coerce. Much of the recent interest stems from debates in public health over the use of quarantines and active monitoring in response to epidemics, as well as the manipulation of information in the service of health promotion (or ‘nudges’). But perhaps the area in which these issues remain most pressing is mental health, where the spectre of involuntary treatment has always loomed large. Indeed, (...) there are good reasons to think of psychiatry as ethically exceptional given its broader role as social and legal arbiter. This is compounded by the fact that mental health treatment has other special features that can serve as potential entry points for more subtle forms of pressure and influence. These include the relative cognitive and emotional vulnerability of patients, the highly confidential information involved, and the importance of the therapeutic relationship. Thus the field of mental health needs to grapple with a range of closely related issues concerning the ethics of influence. In this chapter I explore several, with a primary focus on clinical concerns, although implications for research ethics are also touched on. Discussion of treatment pressure has traditionally focused on ‘coercion,’ or, very roughly, the use of threats or force to get someone to do something they otherwise would not. Here I follow suit, beginning with discussion of its conceptual standing alongside other categories of influence, including manipulation and persuasion. As it stands, there is nothing close to a consensus on these matters. But a relatively broad understanding of coercion is available and can be useful for ethical deliberation. Or so I suggest here. Interestingly enough, there is also a growing body of empirical literature on coercion in psychiatry, including research on the use of coercive measures such as hospitalization, physical restraint, and forced medication, as well as the construct of ‘perceived coercion,’ which tracks patients’ experiences of treatment pressure. I briefly describe several key findings and their relation to recent recommendations to reduce coercion. Building on all of this, I then take up the normative questions directly, by way of evaluating a recently proposed framework for the ethical analysis of influence. (shrink)

Up until recently, most legal philosophers have argued that an action is a token of sanctioning if, and only if, (i) its performance brings about unwelcome consequences to the targets, and (ii) it is performed as a response to the breach of a duty. In this paper I take issue with this account. I first add some qualifications to it in order to present it in its most plausible form. After doing this, I advance a series of hypothetical cases which (...) suggests that this account fails. I then propose a new account of sanctioning, whereby an action is a token of sanctioning if, and only if, it is performed in an appropriate context and is apt for punishing wrongdoers. (shrink)

A reprint of a chapter that first appeared in _African Philosophy and the Future of Africa_ (2011).

People commonly believe that any form of deception, no matter how innocuous it is and no matter whether the deceiving person intended it otherwise, is always morally wrong. In this paper, I will argue that deceiving in real-time is morally distinguishable from deceiving on-line because online actions aren’t as fine-grained as actions occurring in real-time. Our failure to detect the fine-grained characteristics of another avatar leads us to believe that that avatar intended to do a moral harm. Openly deceiving someone (...) on Facebook or Twitter is not a way to build wholesome virtual friendships but to destroy them. This paper will show how the traditional understanding of the doing / allowing distinction fails to apply in cyberspace. (shrink)

Abizadeh has argued that because border controls coerce would-be immigrants and invade their autonomy, they are entitled to participate in the democratic institutions that impose those controls. In reply, the author distinguishes between coercion and prevention, shows that prevention need not undermine autonomy, and concludes that although border controls may restrict freedom, they do not give rise to democratic entitlements.

Given that the concept of coercion remains a central concern for bioethics, Quigley's (Monash Bioethics Rev 32:141–158, 2014) recent article provides a helpful analysis of its frequent misapplication in debates over the use of ‘nudges’. In this commentary I present a generally sympathetic response to Quigley’s argument while also raising several issues that are important for the larger debates about nudges and coercion. I focus on several closely related topics, including the definition of coercion, the role of empirical research, and (...) the normative concerns at the core of these disputes. I suggest that while a degree of precision is certainly required when deploying the relevant concepts, perhaps informed by empirical data, we need to continue to push these debates towards more pressing normative considerations. (shrink)

Blackmail raises a pair of parallel legal and moral problems, sometimes referred to as the "paradox of blackmail". It is sometimes legal and morally permissible to ask someone for money, or to threaten to release harmful information about them, while it is illegal and morally impermissible to do these actions jointly. I address the moral version of this paradox by bringing instances of blackmail under a general account of wrongful coercion. According to this account, and contrary to the appearances which (...) give rise to the paradox, threatening the release of harmful information to constrain another's actions is almost never morally impermissible unless it is likewise impermissible to carry out one's threat. To defend this claim I identify a special wrong that arises in the paradoxical cases of threatened information release. The account also resolves a number of other puzzles about blackmail—for example, why profiting from a threat in blackmail can sometimes be impermissible, even though accepting identical payment from an independent offer to retain the same information can be permissible. (shrink)

In this essay, I raise the question of whether some degree of noncoercive state support for religious conceptions (broadly understood) should be left to the majoritarian branch ofgovernment. I argue that the reason not to do so is that such state support would alienate many citizens. However to take this as a sufficient reason to constrain the majoritarian branch is to accept the thesis that not being alienated from one's polity is a significant part of the human good. Those who (...) would prohibit even a small amount of noncoercive support of religious conceptions must appeal either to pragmatic considerations (the worry that noncoercive will lead to coercive support, i.e., to tyranny) or to a conception of the good that puts great value on the agent's sense of connectedness to the polity. And the latter is something that reasonable citizens in a modern democracy could reasonably reject. (shrink)

I am grateful to Donald Ainslie, Lisa Austin, Michael Blake, Abraham Drassinower, David Dyzenhaus, George Fletcher, Robert Gibbs, Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Sari Kisilevsky, Dennis Klimchuk, Christopher Morris, Scott Shapiro, Horacio Spector, Sergio Tenenbaum, Malcolm Thorburn, Ernest Weinrib, Karen Weisman, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for comments, and audiences in the UCLA Philosophy Department and Columbia Law School for their questions.

The traditional understanding of coercion as exemplified by the use of force and violence to constrain the actions of agents has been challenged by theories that describe coercion instead in terms of the pressure it puts on some agents to act or refrain from acting. Building on earlier work defending the traditional understanding and rejecting the ‘pressure’ accounts of coercion, I argue in this paper that the traditional understanding of coercion, which I dub ‘coercion as enforcement’, provides a helpful analytic (...) tool for identifying coercion in peripheral cases, and thereby supporting the theoretical implications that are supposed to follow from the claim that someone has been coerced. In particular I analyze the coerciveness of the practices of credit-card issuers and institutions of higher education, and the demands by Greece’s creditors that the Greek government institute fiscal austerity, or else leave the European Monetary Union. (shrink)

What is coercion? Not only is an answer to this question interesting in itself but it can also help us to better understand the nature of freedom of action. I start with a critical discussion of Harry Frankfurt’s conception of coercion and voluntary action. Despite several objections, it turns out that some of Frankfurt’s ideas and arguments can also be used in a different way and prove to be crucial for a more plausible conception of coercion and free action.

The practices of using hostages to obtain concessions and using human shields to deter aggression share an important characteristic which warrants a univocal reference to both sorts of conduct: they both involve manipulating our commitment to morality, as a means to achieving wrongful ends. I call this type of conduct “moral coercion”. In this paper I (a) present an account of moral coercion by linking it to coercion more generally, (b) determine whether and to what degree the coerced agent is (...) liable for the harms resulting from acceding to moral coercion, and (c) investigate factors relevant to determining whether we ought to accede to moral coercion. In so doing, I provide grounds for the intuition that we “allow evil to succeed” when we accede to moral coercion. (shrink)

In debating the ethics of immigration, philosophers have focused much of their attention on determining whether a political community ought to have the discretionary right to control immigration. They have not, however, given the same amount of consideration to determining whether there are any ethical limits on how a political community enforces its immigration policy. This article, therefore, offers a different approach to immigration justice. It presents a case against legitimate states having discretionary control over immigration by showing both how (...) ethical limits on enforcement circumscribe the options legitimate states have in determining their immigration policy and how all immigrants (including undocumented immigrants) are entitled to certain protections against a state’s enforcement apparatus. (shrink)

This paper considers three modes of captivity with an eye to examining the effects of captivity on free agency and whether these modes depend on or constitute coercion. These modes are: physical captivity, psychological captivity, and social/legal captivity. All these modes of captivity may severely impact capacities a person relies on for free agency in different ways. They may also undermine or destroy a person’s identity-constituting cares and values. On a Nozick-style view of coercion, coercion amounts to conditional threats and (...) so many of the processes creating captivity are not coercive. However, this view overlooks the role that barriers to action play in making threats effective. Thus, an enforcement view of coercion is better to understand the coercion that takes place in captivity but the effects of the use of power on a captive’s psychology remains an important area of investigation. (shrink)

I first characterize a moral mistake in coercion. The principle of independence with which I criticize coercion seems also to condemn exchange. I propose an account of exchange from which it follows that exchange upholds independence after all. In support of that account I argue that, of the accounts of exchange that occur to me, only this one has the consequence that, on general assumptions, a person can take part in exchange while acting, intending, and believing with sufficient reason. I (...) argue that the hiring of very poor people by very rich people for labor from which the rich draw a substantial surplus does not give rise to an exchange of this kind. These instances of the wage labor relation resemble coercion insofar as they violate independence. (shrink)

Two classes of arguments are often deployed by the anti-global egalitarians against attempts to universalize the demands of distributive equality. One are arguments attempting to show that global egalitarians have misconstrued the reasons for why equality matters domestically, and hence have wrongly extended these reasons to the global arena. These arguments hold that the boundary of distributive justice is effectively coextensive with the boundaries of state. The other are arguments that attempt to show that membership in political societies generates special (...) duties among members that may outweigh the demands of global egalitarianism. These arguments appeal to the ethical significance of state boundaries and membership. In my defense of global egalitarianism, I reject both the attempts to limit the boundary of justice and the attempts to give state boundaries special moral significance and priority. In particular, I will argue that the boundary of justice cannot coincide with the boundaries of states when the justice of the boundaries is at issue. (shrink)

The central contention of this article is that contemporary liberal theory is without an account of what legitimates coercing those who reject liberalism that is consistent with its own stipulations of the conditions of political legitimacy. After exploring the nature of the liberal principle of legitimacy, and in particular how it is intended to function as a way of protecting individuals from domination and oppression by reconciling freedom and public law, the article considers four different possible accounts of what might (...) legitimate coercing non-liberals. While some of them have independent plausibility, the article argues that none of them meets the requirements of liberal legitimacy. The final section of the article considers the implications of this theoretical gap for liberal theory more widely. The argument is made that liberalism must accept that even liberal politics will necessitate the oppressive use of coercive power, i.e. compelling people to live according to wills other than their own, and that insofar as this is a position central to the recent burgeoning literature on political realism, liberalism ought therefore to be more realist. (shrink)

In this article I spell out a conception of dignity grounded in African moral thinking that provides a plausible philosophical foundation for human rights, focusing on the particular human right not to be executed by the state. I first demonstrate that the South African Constitutional Court’s sub-Saharan explanations of why the death penalty is degrading all counterintuitively entail that using deadly force against aggressors is degrading as well. Then, I draw on one major strand of Afro-communitarian thought to develop a (...) novel conception of dignity as the view that what is special and inviolable about human nature is our capacity for harmonious relationships. I argue that a principle of respect for the dignity of such a capacity entails that the death penalty is an indignity but that deadly force in self- or other-defense need not be, and I contend that this African- inspired principle promises to do no worse than the more Western, Kantian principle of respect for autonomy at accounting for a broad range of human rights. (shrink)

According to an often repeated definition, economics is the science of individual choices and their consequences. The emphasis on choice is often used – implicitly or explicitly – to mark a contrast between markets and the state: While the price mechanism in well-functioning markets preserves freedom of choice and still efficiently coordinates individual actions, the state has to rely to some degree on coercion to coordinate individual actions. Since coercion should not be used arbitrarily, coordination by the state needs to (...) be legitimized by the consent of its citizens. The emphasis in economic theory on freedom of choice in the market sphere suggests that legitimization in the market sphere is “automatic” and that markets can thus avoid the typical legitimization problem of the state. In this paper, I shall question the alleged dichotomy between legitimization in the market and in the state. I shall argue that it is the result of a conflation of choice and consent in economics and show how an independent concept of consent makes the need for legitimization of market transactions visible. Footnotes1 For helpful comments and suggestions I am most grateful to Marc Fleurbaey, Alain Marciano, Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Thomas Pogge, Hans Bernhard Schmid, to seminar or conference participants in Aix-Marseille, Tutzing, Paris, and Amsterdam, and to two anonymous referees. (shrink)

Some political philosophers believe that equality emerges as a moral concern where and because people coerce each other. I shall argue that they are wrong. The idea of coercion as a trigger of equality is neither as plausible nor as powerful as it may initially appear. Those who rely on the idea that coercion is among the conditions that give rise to equality as a moral demand face a threefold challenge. They will have to succeed in jointly (a) offering a (...) convincing account of the wrongness of coercion, (b) rendering cogent the idea that the demand of equality arises in response to the moral problem of coercion, and (c) identifying some types of interaction as relevantly coercive. This challenge, I believe, cannot be met. More precisely, I argue that two important accounts of coercion fail to meet it. (shrink)

Liberalism faces a tension between its commitment to minimal interference with individual liberty and the urgent need for strong collective action on global climate change. This paper attempts to resolve that tension. It does so on the one hand by defending an expanded model of collective moral responsibility, according to which a set of individuals can be responsible, qua ?putative group?, for harm resulting from the predictable aggregation of their individual acts. On the other, it defends a collectivized version of (...) the harm principle. The claim is that the collectivized principle pushes the burden of argument, against coercively enforced measures to curtail climate change and compensate its victims, onto the global elite collectively responsible for environmental harms. Some such potential arguments are briefly considered and rejected. (shrink)

Warren Samuels maintains that every society has a constant amount of coercion and order, which vary only in terms of who gains and who loses, because every society has a government that establishes property rights. In making these arguments, Samuels exaggerates the extent to which governmental decisions predetermine the workings of a market society, and he fails to recognize that, with regard to the attainment of specific socioeconomic outcomes, governmental stipulation of private property rights differs fundamentally from governmental command and (...) control. (shrink)

The problem I am concerned with is very general: Why do we need a coercive institution in our society to control our behavior? This question is a little different from "Why do we need a government?" in two ways: First, because "coercive institution" is a broader term than "government"; probably not every coercive institution that controlled people's behavior would be called a government, though every government is a coercive institution (that is, an institution exercising coercion as one of its main (...) functions). Second, controlling the behavior of the members of the society in which it exists is perhaps not the only important function of government (it may be, for example, that we need a government to fight people from other societies); I will not consider other possible things we might need a coercive institution to do. I will only consider whether we as a society need such an institution to control our own behavior. (shrink)

Hate groups are often thought to reveal a paradox in liberal thinking. On the one hand, such groups challenge the very foundations of liberal thought, including core values of equality and freedom. On the other hand, these same values underlie the rights such as freedom of expression and association that protect hate groups. Thus a liberal democratic state that extends those protections to such groups in the name of value neutrality and freedom of expression may be thought to be undermining (...) the values on which its legitimacy rests. In this paper, I suggest how this apparent paradox might be resolved. I argue that the state should protect the expression of illiberal beliefs, but that the state (along with its citizens) is also obligated to criticize publicly those beliefs. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action—coercive and expressive—I contend that such criticism should be pursued through the state’s expressive capacities in its roles as speaker, educator, and spender. Here I extend the familiar idea that law, to be legitimate, must be widely publicized; I contend that a proper theory of the freedom of expression obligates the legitimate state to publicize the reasons that underlie rights, in particular reasons that appeal to the entitlement of each citizen subject to coercion to be treated as free and equal. My theory of freedom of expression is thus “expressive” in two senses: it protects the entitlement of citizens to express any political viewpoint, and it emphasizes a role for the state in explaining these free-speech protections and persuading its citizens of the value of the entitlements that underlie them. (shrink)

The article defines the boundaries of social and institutional power clearly; it argues that all institutional power rests finally on the acceptance of sanctioning authority and thus on mutual recognition.