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  1. Heterogeneous Inferences with Maps.Mariela Aguilera - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    Since Tolman’s paper in 1948, psychologists and neuroscientists have argued that cartographic representations play an important role in cognition. These empirical findings align with some theoretical works developed by philosophers who promote a pluralist view of representational vehicles, stating that cognitive processes involve representations with different formats. However, the inferential relations between maps and representations with different formats have not been sufficiently explored. Thus, this paper is focused on the inferential relations between cartographic and linguistic representations. To that effect, we (...)
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  2. Working Memory is Not a Natural Kind and Cannot Explain Central Cognition.Javier Gomez-Lavin - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-27.
    Working memory is a foundational construct of cognitive psychology, where it is thought to be a capacity that enables us to keep information in mind and to use that information to support goal directed behavior. Philosophers have recently employed working memory to explain central cognitive processes, from consciousness to reasoning. In this paper, I show that working memory cannot meet even a minimal account of natural kindhood, as the functions of maintenance and manipulation of information that tie working memory models (...)
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  3. How to Think About the Debate Over the Reality of Beliefs.Krzysztof Poslajko - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a new conceptualization of the distinction between realism and anti-realism about beliefs that is based on the division between natural and non-natural properties, as defined by Lewis. It will be argued that although the traditional form of anti-realism about beliefs, namely eliminative materialism, has failed, there is a possibility to reformulate the division in question. The background assumption of the proposal is the framework of deflationism about truth and existence: it will be (...)
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  4. Experiential Pluralism and Mental Kinds.Maja Spener - forthcoming - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception.
    This paper offers a new argument in favour of experiential pluralism about visual experience – the view that the nature of successful visual experience is different from the nature of unsuccessful visual experience. The argument appeals to the role of experience in explaining possession of ordinary abilities. In addition, the paper makes a methodological point about philosophical debates concerning the nature of perceptual experience: whether a given view about the nature of experience amounts to an interesting and substantive thesis about (...)
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  5. How Colour Qualia Became a Problem.Z. Adams & J. Browning - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):14-25.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have problem intuitions about consciousness, why we intuitively think that conscious experience cannot be scientifically explained. In his discussion of this problem, David Chalmers briefly considers the possibility of giving a 'genealogical' solution, according to which problem intuitions are 'accidents of cultural history' (2018, p. 33). Chalmers' response to this solution is largely dismissive. In this paper, we defend the viability of a genealogical solution. Our strategy is to focus (...)
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  6. „Die Ontologie von Geist: Das Sein von Wahrnehmung, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität Und Handeln“.Wolfgang Barz - 2020 - In J. Urbich & J. Zimmer (eds.), Handbuch Ontologie. Stuttgart: Metzler. pp. 436-442.
  7. Empiricist Intuitions Arise from an Ontological Dissonance: Reply to Carruthers.I. Berent - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):220-229.
    People are systematically biased against the possibility that ideas are innate. Berent (2020) traces these attitudes to an ontological dissonance, arising from the collision of two fundamental principles of human cognition -- dualism and essentialism. Carruthers (this issue) challenges this hypothesis and attributes our empiricist bias primarily to mindreading intuitions. Here, I counter Carruthers' concerns and show that mindreading cannot be the sole source of the empiricist bias. Specifically, mindreading fails to explain why our empiricist intuitions depend on the perceived (...)
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  8. Explaining the Empiricist Bias: Reply to Berent.P. Carruthers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):230-235.
    Berent (this issue) critiques one of the three main proposals put forward by Carruthers (this issue), who suggests that cognitive scientists are biased against innateness-claims by the tacit assumptions of the mentalizing faculty. Berent proposes, instead, that the bias results from dissonance produced by a conflict between our innate dualism and our innate essentialism. The present response raises a number of difficulties for her argument.
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  9. Does Your Brain Exist When Unperceived? Review of The Case Against Reality: Why Evolution Hid the Truth From Our Eyes by Donald Hoffman.Alex Gomez-Marin - 2020 - Constructivist Foundations 16 (1):124-128.
    Not only does Hoffman claim that we do not see reality as it is, but that unperceived brains, trees and moons do not exist. His “interface theory of perception” is a peculiar blend of metaphorical ontology (objects are icons, space-time is a desktop) and mathematical modelling (the game-theoretical argument that fitness trumps truth. Conflating abstractions with concrete experience, evolution is used to refute everything (including evolution itself. Hoffman’s sweeping iconoclasm then lands where it took off: addressing the problem of consciousness. (...)
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  10. Editorial Introduction: More Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.F. Kammerer - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):8-13.
  11. Two Caveats to the Meta-Problem Challenge.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):74-81.
    I present two caveats to the meta-problem challenge to theories of consciousness. Chalmers suggests that a theory of consciousness that solves the hard problem should also inform us about the meta-problem, and vice versa. The first caveat is the view that mechanism M, the mechanism through which content becomes conscious, may be neutral with respect to the content it renders conscious. This means that there can be no systematic connection between M and conscious content. The second caveat concerns how we (...)
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  12. First-Person Interventions and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.C. Klein & A. B. Barron - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):82-90.
    Chalmers' (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground between otherwise incompatible positions. We argue that the materialist should welcome discussion of the meta-problem. We suggest that the core of the metaproblem is the seeming arbitrariness of subjective experience. This has an unexpected resolution when one moves to an interventionist account of scientific explanation: the same interventions that resolve the hard problem should also resolve the meta-problem.
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  13. Technical Artefact Theories: A Comparative Study and a New Empirical Approach.Claudio Masolo & Emilio M. Sanfilippo - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):831-858.
    Embracing an inter-disciplinary approach grounded on Gärdenfors’ theory of conceptual spaces, we introduce a formal framework to analyse and compare selected theories about technical artefacts present in the literature. Our focus is on design-oriented approaches where both designing and manufacturing activities play a crucial role. Intentional theories, like Kroes’ dual nature thesis, are able to solve disparate problems concerning artefacts but they face both the philosophical challenge of clarifying the ontological nature of intentional properties, and the empirical challenge of testing (...)
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  14. Ignorance and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.T. McClelland - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):108-119.
    Chalmers (2018) considers a wide range of possible responses to the meta-problem of consciousness. Among them is the ignorance hypothesis -- the view that there only appears to be a hard problem because of our inadequate conception of the physical. Although Chalmers quickly dismisses this view, I argue that it has much greater promise than he recognizes. The plausibility of the ignorance hypothesis depends on how exactly one frames the 'problem intuitions' that a solution to the meta-problem must explain. I (...)
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  15. Appearance, Reality, and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Giovanni Merlo - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):120-130.
    Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. The first consists in clarifying how the concept of consciousness precludes the possibility of any distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'. The second consists in spelling out our reasons for recognizing the existence of something that satisfies that concept.
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  16. The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):131-142.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal powers view and my main arguments for it and—drawing in part on a similar view developed by (...)
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  17. Two Problems for Non-Inferentialist Views of the Meta-Problem.Graham Peebles - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):156-165.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is to explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. On Chalmers' view of the meta-problem, our judgments about the hard problem of consciousness arise non-inferentially as a result of introspection. I raise two problems for such a non-inferentialist view of the metaproblem. It does not seem to match the psychological facts about how we come to the realization of the hard problem, and it is unclear how the view can bridge the (...)
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  18. Illusionism Helps Realism Confront the Meta-Problem.R. C. Schriner - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):166-173.
    Chalmers (2018) maintains that even if we understood every physical process in the brain we could still wonder why these processes give rise to conscious experience. The meta-problem is the challenge of explaining why we think this 'hard problem' exists. This response to the target paper endorses illusionist accounts of three 'problem intuitions' about consciousness: duality, presentation, and revelation. Subject–object duality is explained in terms of a clash between two compelling but contradictory convictions about consciousness. Phenomenal presence is understood in (...)
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  19. How to Count Biological Minds: Symbiosis, the Free Energy Principle, and Reciprocal Multiscale Integration.Matthew Sims - 2020 - Synthese 8:1-1.
    The notion of a physiological individuals has been developed and applied in the phi- losophy of biology to understand symbiosis, an understanding of which is key to theorising about the major transition in evolution from multi-organismality to multi- cellularity. The paper begins by asking what such symbiotic individuals can help to reveal about a possible transition in the evolution of cognition. Such a transition marks the movement from cooperating individual biological cognizers to a function- ally integrated cognizing unit. Somewhere along (...)
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  20. Modeling Artificial Agents’ Actions in Context – a Deontic Cognitive Event Ontology.Miroslav Vacura - 2020 - Applied Ontology 15 (4):493-527.
    Although there have been efforts to integrate Semantic Web technologies and artificial agents related AI research approaches, they remain relatively isolated from each other. Herein, we introduce a new ontology framework designed to support the knowledge representation of artificial agents’ actions within the context of the actions of other autonomous agents and inspired by standard cognitive architectures. The framework consists of four parts: 1) an event ontology for information pertaining to actions and events; 2) an epistemic ontology containing facts about (...)
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  21. What It Is Like to Be a Pickpocket.Witold M. Wachowski - 2020 - Culture and Psychology 26 (4):907–918.
    This study aims to show the socio-cognitive engineering of the pickpocket craft from the point of view of cognitive ecology. Being a pickpocket has a wider, existential status; studying it goes beyond the field of cognitive sciences. My ambitions are more modest: I try to show that the question about what it is like to be someone like a pickpocket is also a question about the cognitive structure of his or her activity space. In this light, I analyze some aspects (...)
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  22. Headlessness without Illusions: Phenomenological Undecidability and Materialism.K. Williford - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):190-200.
    I argue that there is a version of (quasi-Armstrongian) weak illusionism that intelligibly relates phenomenal concepts and introspective opacity, accounts for the (hard) problem intuitions Chalmers highlights (modal, epistemic, explanatory, and metaphysical), and undermines the most important arguments Chalmers deploys against type-B and type-C materialisms. If this is successful, we can satisfactorily account for the meta-problem of consciousness, mollify our hard problem intuitions, and remain genuine realists about phenomenal experience.
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  23. Comfortably Numb.Ilexa Yardley - 2020 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory/.
  24. O debate causalismo versus simulacionismo em filosofia da memória como negociação metalinguística.César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2019 - Perspectiva Filosófica 46 (2):143-188.
    Às vezes, o debate entre causalistas e simulacionistas em filosofia da memória é apresentado de tal modo que parece que apenas o simulacionismo é compatível com a psicologia da memória contemporânea. Contudo, ambas teorias são compatíveis com os fatos descobertos pela ciência. Mas se o debate não é sobre a adequação aos fatos, sobre o que é? Nós propomos que este debate é um caso de negociação metalinguística. Caulistas e simulacionistas aceitam o mesmo conjunto de fatos, mas disputam sobre como (...)
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  25. Недовольство языком: культурная диверсификация или диверсия?Vitalii Shymko - 2019 - Pro|Stranstvo.
    Публикация (#9) из научно-популярного цикла: "Структурная онтология познания с доктором Шимко".
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  26. Natural Classes in Brentano's Psychology.Arnaud Dewalque - 2018 - Brentano‐Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 16:111-142.
    This article argues that Brentano’s classification of mental phenomena is best understood against the background of the theories of natural classification held by Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. Section 1 offers a reconstruction of Brentano’s two-premise argument for his tripartite classification. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the reception and historical background of the classification project. Section 3 addresses the question as to why a classification of mental phenomena is needed at all and traces the answer back to (...)
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  27. The Functional Character of Memory.Jordi Fernandez - 2018 - In Dorothea Debus Kourken Michaelian (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. London: pp. 52-72.
    The purpose of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering, or having a memory of, something? The main issue to be addressed is therefore a metaphysical one. It is the issue of determining which features those mental states which qualify as memories typically enjoy, and those states which do not qualify as such typically lack. In (...)
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  28. Intentional Objects of Memory.Jordi Fernandez - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. London, UK: pp. 88-100.
    Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental (...)
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  29. Innateness as a Natural Cognitive Kind.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):319-333.
    Innate cognitive capacities are widely posited in cognitive science, yet both philosophers and scientists have criticized the concept of innateness as being hopelessly confused. Despite a number of recent attempts to define or characterize innateness, critics have charged that it is associated with a diverse set of properties and encourages unwarranted inferences among properties that are frequently unrelated. This criticism can be countered by showing that the properties associated with innateness cluster together in reliable ways, at least in the context (...)
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  30. The Co-Essential Self.J. J. McGraw - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (1-2):283-301.
    Mesoamerican cosmologies have developed ideas about self using change-in-time as the principal orientation. These approaches conceive existence to be a phenomenon of temporal organization, which is radically different in assumptions and consequences than a metaphysics based on substances. The chief consequence of this is a continuity between human beings-in-time and other living and non- living entities.One 's character and destiny are of a kind with specific animals, meteorological phenomena, places, and objects. The qualities of the timed world and the qualities (...)
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  31. Leaky Levels and the Case for Proper Embodiment.Mog Stapleton - 2016 - In G. Etzelmüller & C. Tewes (eds.), Embodiment in Evolution and Culture. Tübingen, Germany: pp. 17-30.
    In this chapter I present the thesis of Proper Embodiment: the claim that (at least some of) the details of our physiology matter to cognition and consciousness in a fundamental way. This thesis is composed of two sub-claims: (1) if we are to design, build, or evolve artificial systems that are cognitive in the way that we are, these systems will have to be internally embodied, and (2) the exploitation of the particular internal embodiment that allows systems to evolve solutions (...)
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  32. The Inherent Bias in Positing an Inherence Heuristic.Muhammad Ali Khalidi & Joshua Mugg - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (5):493-494.
    There are two problems with Cimpian & Salomon’s (C&S’s) claim that an innate inherence heuristic is part of our cognitive makeup. First, some of their examples of inherent features do not seem to accord with the authors’ own definition of inherence. Second, rather than posit an inherence heuristic to explain why humans rely more heavily on inherent features, it may be more parsimonious to do so on the basis of aspects of the world itself and our relationship to it.
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  33. The Role of the Brain During Conscious Experience: In Search of a New Metaphor.U. W. Weger & F. Edelhauser - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (11-12):111-129.
    Many scholars interpret the close correlation between neuronal and mental phenomena as causal in nature --with physiological events producing psychological states and processes. This interpretation is suggestive but by no means the most parsimonious or logically sound account and there is an increasing number of challenges to this view. The current article discusses these, briefly reviews alternative accounts and elaborates on one such alternative account in particular. Proposed already a century ago, we take it up here because we consider it (...)
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  34. Dispositions and Processes in the Emotion Ontology.Janna Hastings, Werner Ceusters, Barry Smith & Kevin Mulligan - 2011 - In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Biomedical Ontology. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. pp. 71-78.
    Affective science conducts interdisciplinary research into the emotions and other affective phenomena. Currently, such research is hampered by the lack of common definitions of te rms used to describe, categorise and report both individual emotional experiences and the results of scientific investigations of such experiences. High quality ontologies provide formal definitions for types of entities in reality and for the relationships between such entities, definitions which can be used to disambiguate and unify data across different disciplines. Heretofore, there has been (...)
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  35. The Emotion Ontology: Enabling Interdisciplinary Research in the Affective Sciences.Janna Hastings, Werner Ceusters, Barry Smith & Kevin Mulligan - 2011 - In M. Beigl, H. Christiansen, T. Roth-Berghofer, A. Kofod-Petersen, K. R. Coventry & H. R. Schmidtke (eds.), CONTEXT, The Seventh International and Interdisciplinary Conference on Modeling and Using Context. Springer. pp. 119--123.
    Affective science conducts interdisciplinary research into the emotions and other affective phenomena. Currently, such research is hampered by the lack of common definitions of terms used to describe, categorise and report both individual emotional experiences and the results of scientific investigations of such experiences. High quality ontologies provide formal definitions for types of entities in reality and for the relationships between such entities, definitions which can be used to disambiguate and unify data across different disciplines. Heretofore, there has been little (...)
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  36. Nature and Nurture in Cognition.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):251-272.
    This paper advocates a dispositional account of innate cognitive capacities, which has an illustrious history from Plato to Chomsky. The "triggering model" of innateness, first made explicit by Stich ([1975]), explicates the notion in terms of the relative informational content of the stimulus (input) and the competence (output). The advantage of this model of innateness is that it does not make a problematic reference to normal conditions and avoids relativizing innate traits to specific populations, as biological models of innateness are (...)
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  37. Innateness and Domain Specificity.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):191-210.
    There is a widespread assumption in cognitive science that there is anintrinsic link between the phenomena of innateness and domain specificity. Many authors seem to hold that given the properties of these two phenomena, it follows that innate mental states are domain-specific, or that domain-specific states are innate. My aim in this paper is to argue that there are no convincing grounds for asserting either claim. After introducing the notions of innateness and domain specificity, I consider some possible arguments for (...)
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  38. Two Concepts of Concept.Muhammad ali KhAlidi - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):402-22.
    Two main theories of concepts have emerged in the recent psychological literature: the Prototype Theory (which considers concepts to be self-contained lists of features) and the Theory Theory (which conceives of them as being embedded within larger theoretical networks). Experiments supporting the first theory usually differ substantially from those supporting the second, which suggests that these the· ories may be operating at different levels of explanation and dealing with different entities. A convergence is proposed between the Theory Theory and the (...)
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