About this topic
Summary Traditionally emotions have been considered to be non-cognitive by nature, perhaps movements of the body or feelings or such-like. However, many emotion theorists have thought this traditional view to be mistaken. Thus it is often argued that emotions have intentional properties and can be assessed for their rationality - features that seem distinctive of belief and thought. Moreover some emotions seem clearly to involve cognitive content - for instance, it is difficult to see how one can be indignant and not have thoughts regarding injustices. However, cognitive theories of emotion are often criticized as well. One early critic, William James, claimed that such theories seem unsound for phenomenological reasons and more recently a number of emotion theorists have pointed out that it seems possible for people to have an emotion while failing to have the cognitive state that cognitive theorists typically think identify the emotion (say, thoughts of danger in the case of fear). This category is devoted to cognitive theories of emotion, detailing works that defend and develop such theories as well as works that are more critical of cognitive approaches to understanding emotion.      
Key works Key texts defending a cognitive theory of emotion include amongst others works by Robert Solomon (e.g. Solomon 2003), Jerome Neu (Neu 2000), and Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2001). Critics of cognitive theories of emotion include amongst others William James (James 1884), Jesse Prinz (Prinz 2004), and John Deigh (Deigh 1994)
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162 found
1 — 50 / 162
  1. added 2019-03-08
    A Paper On Recalcitrant Emotions.Alex Grzankowski - manuscript
    In discussions of the metaphysics and normativity of the emotions, it is commonplace to wheel out examples of (for instance) people who know that rollercoasters aren’t dangerous but who fear them anyway. Such cases are well known to have been troubling for Cognitivists who hold the emotions are (at least in part) judgements or beliefs. But more recently, the very theories that emerged from the failure of Cognitivism (Perceptual theories and other Neo-Cognitivist approaches) have been argued to face trouble as (...)
  2. added 2019-02-08
    Emotions and Formal Objects.Fabrice Teroni - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.
    It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that (...)
  3. added 2019-01-30
    Knowing Emotions: Truthfulness and Recognition in Affective Experience.Cecilea Mun - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Review of Knowing Emotions: Truthfulness and Recognition in Affective Experience by Rick A. Furtak.
  4. added 2019-01-01
    Hume's Science of Emotions: Feeling Theory Without Tears.Mark Collier - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (1):3-18.
    We must rethink the status of Hume’s science of emotions. Contemporary philosophers typically dismiss Hume’s account on the grounds that he mistakenly identifies emotions with feelings. But the traditional objections to Hume’s feeling theory are not as strong as commonly thought. Hume makes several important contributions, moreover, to our understanding of the operations of the emotions. His claims about the causal antecedents of the indirect passions receive support from studies in appraisal theory, for example, and his suggestions concerning the social (...)
  5. added 2018-09-13
    Creative Resentments: The Role of Emotions in Moral Change.Matthew Congdon - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):739-757.
    This paper develops two related theses concerning resentment. The first, which I label the ‘prior norm requirement’, holds that feelings of resentment are grounded in the resenter’s conviction that some portion of their existing normative expectations has been violated. The second holds that resentments can make a rational contribution to the development of new normative expectations, transforming the resenter’s existing normative outlook. Certain expressions of the prior norm requirement in recent theory clash with the notion of norm-creative resentments, portraying resentment (...)
  6. added 2018-08-15
    Can Emotional Feelings Represent Significant Relations?Larry A. Herzberg - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-20.
    Jesse Prinz (2004) argues that emotional feelings (“state emotions”) can by themselves perceptually represent significant organism-environment relations. I object to this view mainly on the grounds that (1) it does not rule out the at least equally plausible view that emotional feelings are non-representational sensory registrations rather than perceptions, as Tyler Burge (2010) draws the distinction, and (2) perception of a relation requires perception of at least one of the relation’s relata, but an emotional feeling by itself perceives neither the (...)
  7. added 2018-06-22
    The Emergence of Emotions.Richard Sieb - 2013 - Activitas Nervosa Superior 55 (4):115-145.
    Emotion is conscious experience. It is the affective aspect of consciousness. Emotion arises from sensory stimulation and is typically accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body. Hence an emotion is a complex reaction pattern consisting of three components: a physiological component, a behavioral component, and an experiential (conscious) component. The reactions making up an emotion determine what the emotion will be recognized as. Three processes are involved in generating an emotion: (1) identification of the emotional significance of a (...)
  8. added 2018-06-08
    The Emergence of Emotion.Richard Sieb - 2013 - Activitas Nervosa Superior 55 (4):115-145.
    Emotion is conscious experience. It is the affective aspect of consciousness. Emotion arises from sensory stimulation and is typically accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body. Hence an emotion is a complex reaction pattern consisting of three components: a physiological component, a behavioral component, and an experiential (conscious) component. The reactions making up an emotion determine what the emotion will be recognized as. Three processes are involved in generating an emotion: (1) identification of the emotional significance of a (...)
  9. added 2018-06-06
    What Kind of Evaluative States Are Emotions? The Attitudinal Theory Vs. The Perceptual Theory of Emotions.Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
    This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...)
  10. added 2018-06-05
    Review: The Emotions. [REVIEW]Bennett W. Helm - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):132-135.
  11. added 2018-05-16
    What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories Paul E. Griffiths Science and Its Conceptual Foundations Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1997, Xi + 286 Pp., $27.50. [REVIEW]Ronald de Sousa - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (4):908-.
  12. added 2018-05-12
    Dietrich von Hildebrand.Jean Moritz Müller - forthcoming - In Thomas Szanto & Hilge Landweer (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. London, UK: Routledge.
    It is sometimes alleged that the study of emotion and the study of value are currently pursued as relatively autonomous disciplines. As Kevin Mulligan notes, “the philosophy and psychology of emotions pays little attention to the philosophy of value and the latter pays only a little more attention to the former.” (2010b, 475). Arguably, the last decade has seen more of a rapprochement between these two domains than used to be the norm (cf. e.g. Roeser & Todd 2014). But there (...)
  13. added 2017-11-24
    On Emotions: Philosophical Essays Ed. John Deigh 2013. Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]John M. Monteleone - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):307-312.
    This review begins with Solomon's philosophical orientation on emotions, which is summed up in the claim that emotions are value-laden. That is, emotions are about values, and in consequence, are valuable for their own sake. This review discusses aspects of this thesis in the context of essays by Laurence Thomas, Kathleen Higgins, Nancy Sherman, and Jerome Neu. Subsequently, the review discusses the essays by Robert C. Roberts and John Deigh to consider whether Solomon's own explanation of the value-laden aspect of (...)
  14. added 2017-11-08
    How to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.
    It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...)
  15. added 2017-11-05
    Emotion as Position-Taking.Jean Mueller - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):525-540.
    It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...)
  16. added 2017-09-07
    The Double Intentionality of Emotional Experience.Tom Cochrane - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1454-1475.
    I argue that while the feeling of bodily responses is not necessary to emotion, these feelings contribute significant meaningful content to everyday emotional experience. Emotional bodily feelings represent a ‘state of self’, analysed as a sense of one's body affording certain patterns of interaction with the environment. Recognising that there are two sources of intentional content in everyday emotional experience allows us to reconcile the diverging intuitions that people have about emotional states, and to understand better the long-standing debate between (...)
  17. added 2017-07-05
    The Real Trouble with Recalcitrant Emotions.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Erkenntnis (3):1-11.
    Cognitivists about the emotions minimally hold that it is a necessary condition for being in an emotional state that one make a certain judgement or have a certain belief. For example, if I am angry with Sam, then I must believe that Sam has wronged me. Perhaps I must also elicit a certainly bodily response or undergo some relevant experience, but crucial to the view is the belief or judgement. In the face of ‘recalcitrant emotions’, this once very popular view (...)
  18. added 2017-06-16
    Gefühle und Gedanken. Entwurf einer adverbialen Emotionstheorie.Anja Berninger - 2017 - Münster: Mentis.
  19. added 2017-05-10
    Self-Deception as Affective Coping. An Empirical Perspective on Philosophical Issues.Federico Lauria, Delphine Preissmann & Fabrice Clément - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 41:119-134.
    In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the (...)
  20. added 2017-03-29
    Why Emotion Recognition is Not Simulational.Ali Yousefi Heris - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6).
    According to a dominant interpretation of the simulation hypothesis, in recognizing an emotion we use the same neural processes used in experiencing that emotion. This paper argues that the view is fundamentally misguided. I will examine the simulational arguments for the three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger and argue that the simulational account relies strongly on a narrow sense of emotion processing which hardly squares with evidence on how, in fact, emotion recognition is processed. I contend that the (...)
  21. added 2017-03-23
    Ambivalence for Cognitivists: A Lesson From Chrysippus?Bill Wringe - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):147-156.
    Ambivalence—where we experience two conflicting emotional responses to the same object, person or state of affairs—is sometimes thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. Drawing on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus, I argue that a cognitivist can account for ambivalence without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully-fledged evaluative judgments. It is central to the account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one about the subject's (...)
  22. added 2017-03-08
    The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2011 - Routledge.
    The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? (...)
  23. added 2017-02-13
    A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness.Richard Brown & Joseph LeDoux - 2017 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
    Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. On this view, what differs in emotional and non-emotional states is the kind of inputs that are processed by a (...)
  24. added 2016-12-23
    Thinking Sadly: In Favor of an Adverbial Theory of Emotions.Anja Berninger - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):799-812.
    Introspective as well as empirical evidence indicates that emotions shape our thinking in numerous ways. Yet, this modificatory aspect of emotions has received relatively little interest in the philosophy of emotion. I give a detailed account of this aspect. Drawing both on the work of William James and adverbialist conceptions of perception, I sketch a theory of emotions that takes these aspects into consideration and suggest that we should understand emotions as manners of thinking.
  25. added 2016-12-23
    Horror, Fear, and the Sartrean Account of Emotions.Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):209-225.
    Phenomenological approaches to affectivity have long recognized the vital role that emotions occupy in our lives. In this paper, I engage with Jean-Paul Sartre's well-known and highly influential theory of the emotions as it is advanced in his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. I examine whether Sartre's account offers two inconsistent explications of the nature of emotions. I argue that despite appearances there is a reading of Sartre's theory that is free of inconsistencies. Ultimately, I highlight a novel (...)
  26. added 2016-12-23
    From Affect Programs to Dynamical Discrete Emotions.Giovanna Colombetti - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):407-425.
    According to Discrete Emotion Theory, a number of emotions are distinguishable on the basis of neural, physiological, behavioral and expressive features. Critics of this view emphasize the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions. This paper discusses some of these criticisms, and argues that they do not undermine the claim that emotions are discrete. This paper also presents some works in dynamical affective science, and argues that to conceive of discrete emotions as self-organizing and softly assembled patterns of various processes accounts more (...)
  27. added 2016-12-12
    Philosophy and the Emotions.Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    This major volume of original essays maps the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the relation between consciousness and body; by analysing the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by emotions; and by exploring questions of value in making sense of emotions at a political, ethical and personal level. Leading researchers in the field reflect on the nature of human feelings, (...)
  28. added 2016-12-12
    Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    Emotions shape the landscape of our mental and social lives. Like geological upheavals in a landscape, they mark our lives as uneven, uncertain and prone to reversal. Are they simply, as some have claimed, animal energies or impulses with no connection to our thoughts? Or are they rather suffused with intelligence and discernment, and thus a source of deep awareness and understanding? In this compelling book, Martha C. Nussbaum presents a powerful argument for treating emotions not as alien forces but (...)
  29. added 2016-12-08
    Neither Here nor There: The Cognitive Nature of Emotion.Remy Debes - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):1-27.
    The philosophy of emotion has long been divided over the cognitive nature of emotion. In this paper I argue that this debate suffers from deep confusion over the meaning of “cognition” itself. This confusion has in turn obscured critical substantive agreement between the debate’s principal opponents. Capturing this agreement and remedying this confusion requires re-conceptualizing “the cognitive” as it functions in first-order theories of emotion. Correspondingly, a sketch for a new account of cognitivity is offered. However, I also argue that (...)
  30. added 2016-12-05
    A Tear is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion.Jerome Neu - 2000 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Is jealousy eliminable? If so, at what cost? What are the connections between pride the sin and the pride insisted on by identity politics? How can one question an individual's understanding of their own happiness or override a society's account of its own rituals? What makes a sexual desire "perverse," or particular sexual relations undesirable or even unthinkable? These and other questions about what sustains and threatens our identity are pursued using the resources of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and other disciplines. The (...)
  31. added 2016-11-03
    Posidonije o Emocijama I Nekonceptualnom Sadržaju.Bill Wringe - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (2):185-213.
    In this paper I argue that the work of the unorthodox Stoic Posidonius - as reported to us by Galen - can be seen as making an interesting contribution to contemporary debates about the nature of emotion. Richard Sorabji has already argued that Posidonius' contribution highlights the weaknesses in some well-known contemporary forms of cognitivism. Here I argue that Posidonius might be seen as advocating a theory of the emotions which sees them as being, in at least some cases, two-level (...)
  32. added 2016-08-18
    Natural Kinds, Social Constructions, and Ordinary Language: Clarifying the Crisis in the Science of Emotion.Cecilea Mun - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):247-269.
    I argue for the importance of clarifying the distinction between metaphysical, semantic, and meta-semantic concerns regarding what Emotion is. This allows us to see that those involved in the Scientific Emotion Project and the Folk Emotion Project are in fact involved in the same project – the Science of Emotion. It also helps us understand why questions regarding the natural kind status of Emotion, as well as answers to questions regarding the value of ordinary language emotion terms or concepts to (...)
  33. added 2016-03-15
    Capturing Emotional Thoughts: The Philosophy of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy.Michael McEachrane - 2009 - In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This chapter examines two premises of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) - that emotions are caused by beliefs and that those beliefs are represented in the mind as words or images. Being a philosophical examination, the chapter also seeks to demonstrate that these two premises essentially are philosophical premises. The chapter begins with a brief methodological suggestion of how to properly evaluate the theory of CBT. From there it works it way from examining the therapeutic practice of capturing the mental representations that (...)
  34. added 2016-03-08
    The Rationality of Grief.Carolyn Price - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):20-40.
    Donald Gustafson has argued that grief centres on a combination of belief and desire: The belief that the subject has suffered an irreparable loss. The desire that this should not be the case. And yet, as Gustafson points out, if the belief is true, the desire cannot be satisfied. Gustafson takes this to show that grief inevitably implies an irrational conflict between belief and desire. I offer a partial defence of grief against Gustafson's charge of irrationality. My defence rests on (...)
  35. added 2015-11-02
    Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2012 - In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 6. ATINER. pp. 83-91.
    Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, (...)
  36. added 2015-10-20
    Emotions as Psychological Reactions.Edoardo Zamuner - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):22-43.
    Sometimes we speak of behaviours and actions as reactions, just as we speak of physical conditions and mental states as reactions. But what do we mean when we say that emotions are reactions? I answer this question by developing an account of emotions as psychological reactions to presentations or representations of states of affairs. I show that this account may provide a novel conceptual framework for explaining aspects of the intentionality, phenomenology and behavioural manifestation of emotions. I conclude by showing (...)
  37. added 2015-10-04
    The Unity of Emotion: An Unlikely Aristotelian Solution.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):101-114.
    Most researchers of emotions agree that although cognitive evaluations such as beliefs, thoughts, etc. are essential for emotion, bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions are also required. Yet, only a few explain how all these diverse aspects of emotion are related to form the unity or oneness of emotion. The most prevalent account of unity is the causal view, which, however, has been shown to be inadequate because it sees the relations between the different parts of emotion as external and (...)
  38. added 2015-09-28
    On the Emotions.Richard Wollheim - 1999 - Yale University Press.
    Distinguished philosopher Richard Wollheim's rich and thought-provoking account of the emotions considers what emotions are, how they arise in our lives, and how standard and "moral" emotions differ.
  39. added 2015-09-18
    Emotion as Patheception.Raja Bahlul - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):104-122.
    Emotion as patheception. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2013.874494.
  40. added 2015-09-18
    How Can Emotions Be Both Cognitive and Bodily?Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):513-531.
    The long-standing debate between cognitive and feeling theories of emotion stems, in part, from the assumption that cognition and thought are abstract, intellectual, disembodied processes, and that bodily feelings are non-intentional and have no representational content. Working with this assumption has led many emotions theorists to neglect the way in which emotions are simultaneously bodily and cognitive-evaluative. Even hybrid theories, such as those set forth by Prinz and Barlassina and Newen, fail to account fully for how the cognitive and bodily (...)
  41. added 2015-09-18
    The Subtlety of Emotions.Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 2001 - Bradford.
    Aaron Ben-Ze'ev carries out what he calls "a careful search for general patterns in the primeval jungle of emotions.".
  42. added 2015-09-18
    "The Structure of Emotions" by Robert M. Gordon. [REVIEW]Kent Bach - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):362.
  43. added 2015-09-18
    The Nature of Emotions.Aaron Ben-Zeev - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (3):393 - 409.
  44. added 2015-09-01
    Gefuhle.Eva-Maria Engelen & Verena Mayer - 2008 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (2):471.
    Nach Erläuterung der wesentlichen Begriffe wie „Emotion“ und „Gefühl“ stellt Eva-Maria Engelen die wichtigsten theoretischen Ansätze vor. Dabei spielen sowohl Theorien aus der Philosophie, der Psychologie als auch aus den Neurowissenschaften eine wichtige Rolle. Geklärt wird in weiteren Kapiteln das Verhältnis von Gefühlen und Emotionen zum Verstand, zum Bewusstsein und zu Werten.
  45. added 2015-08-25
    Love's Bitter Fruits: Martha C. Nussbaum The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. [REVIEW]Catherine Osborne - 1996 - Philosophical Investigations 19 (4):318-328.
    I explore the connections between love, resentment and anger, and challenge Nussbaum's assumption that love is self-seeking, leads to resentment when the benefits are withdrawn, and that anger is invariably a vicious response. I sketch an alternative view of genuine love, and of the importance of the anger that springs from seeing a loved one unjustly treated.
  46. added 2015-08-21
    Emotion, Cognition and Feeling.Stephen Grant - 2008 - Synthesis Philosophica 23 (1):53-71.
    This article examines recent developments in cognitivist theories of the emotions, and seeks to develop an original theory within that approach. The article specifically considers the criticism that such theories over-intellectualise emotions by reducing them to attitudes towards propositions and by excluding feelings. I argue that few cognitivists have ever held the former position, and that it is possible to claim that emotions are partly-constituted by feelings and remain within the parameters of a cognitivist theory. This is possible in virtue (...)
  47. added 2015-08-21
    Emotions Are Not Mere Judgments: Against Nussbaum’s Judgmentalism.Sunny Yang - 2006 - Philosophical Writings 33 (3).
    My aim, in this paper, is to demonstrate that Nussbaum’s cognitivism ignores a ‘feeling’ component. Although Nussbaum tries to address the feeling component by distinguishing two kinds of feelings, one with a rich intentional or cognitive content, and the other lacking such content, she downplays the feeling component. She claims that the latter kind of feeling is neither necessary nor sufficient for emotions, while feelings of the former kind, which she claims are ‘terminological variations’ of perceptions and judgments, are necessary (...)
  48. added 2015-08-21
    Review of 'What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories', by Paul E. Griffiths. [REVIEW]Louis C. Charland - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (3):318-324.
  49. added 2015-08-21
    What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. By Paul E. Griffiths.A. Ben-Ze'ev - 2000 - The European Legacy 5 (2):267-268.
  50. added 2015-08-21
    Forensic Applications of Theories of Cognition and Emotion.Debra A. Bekerian & Susan J. Goodrich - 1999 - In Tim Dalgleish & M. J. Powers (eds.), Handbook of Cognition and Emotion. Wiley. pp. 783--798.
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