Cognitivism in Psychology

E. C. Tolman's 'purposive behaviorism' is commonly interpreted as an attempt to operationalize a cognitivist theory of learning by the use of the 'Intervening Variable' (IV). Tolman would thus be a counterinstance to an otherwise reliable correlation of cognitivism with realism, and S-R behaviorism with operationalism. A study of Tolman's epistemological background, with a careful reading of his methodological writings, shows the common interpretation to be false. Tolman was a cognitivist and a realist. His 'IV' has been systematically misinterpreted by (...) both behaviorists and antibehaviorists. For this reason, Tolman's alliance with modern cognitivism and his influence on its development have been underestimated. (shrink)

It has been claimed that cognitive therapists endorse sets of uplifting beliefs BECAUSE the client feels better believing them: not because they lead towards greater verisimilitude, a purported cognitivist‟s hallmark of rational choice. Since the therapist asks us to choose sets of beliefs that interpret evidence on the basis of grater individual happiness (all other things being equal), this suggests that the basis of choice goes beyond rationality. I contend that the case against the rationality of cognitive therapy is not (...) made if one allows a broadening of what to count as rational cognitive therapy. The rationality of therapy consist in how well it achieves its goal. My claim is that at least one goal is, or ought to be, greater information value of the client‟ dialogues. Among other things, information values encode affect. Understanding reason in this way effectively transforms our understanding of rationality in a way that may be incommensurable with the standard view. If incommensurable, there is no way to discover that we are still talking about the same thing. So, a challenge for this competing view is to say on what basis the term cognitive therapy may be projectable. I identify some constraints on this project and sketch a possible solution. (shrink)

This paper deals with two theories Husserl worked out on imagery in order to see if the properties a phenomenological description ascribes to imagery are fit to give meaningful constraints upon theoretical models that guide empirical research. Husserlian descriptions and Kosslyn and colleagues models are hence compared as to their explanatory strategy and implications.

The rise and some more recent developments of the machine-simulation methodology of living-organism behavior are discussed in this paper. In putting forward these issue, my aim is that of isolating recurring themes which help understanding the development of such a machine-simulation methodology, from its, so to speak, discovery during the first half of the twentieth century up to the present time. The machine designed by the engineer S. Bent Russell in 1913 seems to share the core of at least some (...) points of such a methodology. This machine was designed with the aim of embodying certain hypotheses on the plasticity of nervous connections, pointed out at the time by psychologists in order to explain the physical bases of learning. I would like to suggest that this machine might be viewed as a case-study of the discovery of the above mentioned simulative methodology, further on developed by cyberneticians beginning from the 1940s. Certain present-day steps toward such a methodology are briefly touched upon in the concluding section of the paper. (shrink)

In this paper I start from a definition of “culture of the artificial” which might be stated by referring to the background of philosophical, methodological, pragmatical assumptions which characterizes the development of the information processing analysis of mental processes and of some trends in contemporary cognitive science: in a word, the development of AI as a candidate science of mind. The aim of this paper is to show how (with which plausibility and limitations) the discovery of the mentioned background might (...) be dated back to a period preceding the cybernetic era, the decade 1930–1940 at least. Therefore a somewhat detailed analysis of Hull's “robot approach” is given, as well as of some of its independent and future developments. -/- Reprinted in R.L. Chrisley (ed.), Artificial Intelligence: Critical Concepts in Cognitive Science, vol. 1, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, pp. 301-326. (shrink)

In this paper some applications and methodological developments of mechanical models in psychology in the 1950s are examined. During that period, a new conception of the theory-model relationship in psychology become evident, which had been proposed earlier by the mechanistic trend in psychology in the 1930s. Such a conception allowed psychologists a new approach to many problems in theoretical psychology, such as the role of hypotheses and neurophysiology in psychological explanation and the positions of psychologists concerning neobehavioristic theories of behaviour (...) and the operational method. The ideas of psychologists who accepted mechanical model (and had also been influenced by the advancement of cybernetics) were not homogeneous in that period. Two trend are examined in this paper: the first (in turn not a homogeneous one), which prevailed during the previous decade and was more influenced by cybernetics, was developed during the first half of the 1950s (Deutsch’ machine with insight, Wyckoff model for learning, Broadbent’s model for attention); the second, which originated around the middle of the 1950’s and was dominant in in the next decades, is Newell and Simon’s Information Processing Psychology. Several methodological principles that characterize those two trends are discussed in this paper, along with their similarities and above all their differences. (shrink)

It is shown that the Fodor's interpretation of the frame problem is the central indication that his version of the Modularity Thesis is incompatible with computationalism. Since computationalism is far more plausible than this thesis, the latter should be rejected.

Há de entre as ciências, uma que ainda carrega vestígios muito visíveis que denunciam seus vínculos familiares com a mãe. Essa ciência cujos precursores ainda revelam-se sagazes pensadores, capazes de construir conhecimento, e não perpetuadores de uma escola especializada em ordenar e classificar a realidade. Essa ciência, é a ciência Psicológica. PSICOLOGIAS é uma introdução ao estudo da Psicologia, apresentada em seus vários aspetos: história, temas básicos, áreas de conhecimento, principais características da profissão, análises de temas cotidianos (vistos sob a (...) ótica da Psicologia), e outros. Estudo esse que dessacraliza o universo da alma – historifica-o, humaniza-o. Ridiculariza qualquer processo de deificação do homem. Sugere, fidelidade a Terra. (shrink)

Two stories have dominated the historiography of early modern philosophy: one in which a seventeenth century Age of Reason spawned the Enlightenment, and another in which a skeptical crisis cast a shadow over subsequent philosophy, resulting in ever narrower "limits to knowledge." I combine certain elements common to both into a third narrative, one that begins by taking seriously seventeenth-century conceptions of the topics and methods central to the rise of a "new" philosophy. In this revisionist story, differing approaches to (...) the central subject matter of early modern metaphysics--knowledge of substances through their essences and causal powers--arise as a result of disagreements about the powers of the human cognitive faculties. Methodological writings are seen as attempts to direct readers in the proper use of their cognitive faculties. The early modern rejection of the Aristotelian theory of cognition ranks equally in importance with rejection of Aristotelian doctrines about nature. Skepticism is more often than not a tool to be used in teaching the reader the proper use of the cognitive faculties, or indeed in convincing the reader of the existence or inexistence of certain cognitive faculties or powers. Instead of early modern "epistemology" or "theory of knowledge," one speaks, with seventeenth century writers, of theories of the cognitive faculties and their implications for the possibility of human knowledge. The early modern rejection of Aristotelian logic can then be seen as reflecting a negative assessment about the fit between syllogistic reasoning and logic as an art of reasoning or thinking which refines the use of the cognitive faculties. -/- Central to this new historiography is the story of the relation between the intellect and senses as cognitive faculties or powers. The development of philosophy from Descartes to Kant can be portrayed as a series of claims about the power of the intellect to know the essences of things, with resulting consequences for ontology and the foundations of natural philosophy. I illustrate this revised narrative by comparing three conceptions of the intellect in three philosophical settings, provided by several late scholastic Aristotelians, Descartes, and Locke. I have two aims: first, to exhibit the central role played by the conception of intellect or understanding in these authors, and, second, to locate their discussions of the cognitive faculties in relation to recent understandings of psychology, epistemology, logic, mind, and their relations. Early modern writings do not easily fit into the modern categories of epistemology and psychology; more generally, the early modern concern with the workings of mind does not coincide with recent conceptions of naturalism. These findings can help us to see problems with our current categories. (shrink)

Review of THEO C. MEYERING, Historical Roots of Cognitive Science : The Rise of a Cognitive Theory of Perception from Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century. Boston: Kluwer, xix + 250 pp. $69.00. Examines the author's interpretation of Aristotelian theories of perceptual cognition, early modern theories, and Helmholtz's theory.

Gary Hatfield examines theories of spatial perception from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century and provides a detailed analysis of the works of Kant and Helmholtz, who adopted opposing stances on whether central questions about spatial perception were fully amenable to natural-scientific treatment. At stake were the proper understanding of the relationships among sensation, perception, and experience, and the proper methodological framework for investigating the mental activities of judgment, understanding, and reason issues which remain at the core of philosophical psychology (...) and cognitive science. (shrink)

In the book, I argue that the mind can be explained computationally because it is itself computational—whether it engages in mental arithmetic, parses natural language, or processes the auditory signals that allow us to experience music. All these capacities arise from complex information-processing operations of the mind. By analyzing the state of the art in cognitive science, I develop an account of computational explanation used to explain the capacities in question.

How must we and the world be constituted if science is possible? René Descartes had some ideas: For example, he wrote in 1639 to Marin Mersenne, “The imagination, which is the part of the mind that most helps mathematics, is more of a hindrance than a help in metaphysical speculation.” In another missive he suggested that, “besides [local] memory, which depends on the body, I believe there is also another one, entirely intellectual, which depends on the soul alone” (pp. 59, (...) 52). Peter Schouls marshals brief passages such as these alongside discussions of Descartes’ major works to sketch a partial portrait of the human being and the universe. Schouls touches on both metaphysics and cognition, asking how things must be arranged to allow Descartes’ famous method to be mobilized. His conclusions run as follows. First, what should come as no surprise, Descartes “insists on a thoroughgoing dualism that allows him to characterize human beings as essentially free and to characterize nature as causally determined.” (44) Second, Schouls develops from Descartes’ cues a theory of cognition that allows for the pursuit of science by the exploitation of that free human creativity. ). Third, Schouls brings the previous points into full development with a speculative discussion of intellectual argument and scientific method. (shrink)

The seal of the a priori is imprinted on the reception of Kant's philosophy. Piaget's epistemological argumentation seems to ascribe knowledge a more fruitful constructiveness than Kant, seeing the a priori as rooted in unvarying reason. Yet, it seems, he failed to recognize the complexity of Kant's theory, which does not always follow a quid iuris line. Moments of experience, analysis and self-observation played more than a marginal role in his discovery of the a priori. Indeed, Kant himself raises the (...) question of ontogenetic category assimilation in a review which pre-empts Piaget, borrowing the category of `original acquisition' from the doctrine of the laws of natural right. And although Kant should not be elevated to the harbinger of the knowledge on development issues delivered thus far by the history of science and experiments, he did recognize the temporal reference of their categories in principle without resolving their validity in psychogenetic terms. Key Words: a priori • categories • genetic epistemology • Geneva School • neo-Kantianism • original acquisition • Jean Piaget • psychogenesis • self-observation. (shrink)

Embodied social cognition (ESC) aims to explicate how our embodiment shapes our knowledge of others, and in what this knowledge of others consists. Although there is much diversity amongst ESC accounts, common to all these accounts is the idea that our normal everyday interactions consist in non-mentalistic embodied engagements. In recent years, several theorists have developed and defended innovative and controversial accounts of ESC. These accounts challenge, and offer deflationary alternatives to, the standard cognitivist accounts of social cognition. As ESC (...) accounts grow in number and prominence, the time has come for a dedicated, sustained debate on ESC and its most controversial and innovative elements. The goal of this special issue is to host such a debate with the aim of bringing clarity to the discussion of social cognition. (shrink)

I analyze the historical background and philosophical considerations of Karl Bühler and his student Karl Popper regarding the crisis of psychology. They share certain Kantian questions and methods for reflection on the state of the art in psychology. Part 1 outlines Bühler’s diagnosis and therapy for the crisis in psychology as he perceived it, leading to his famous theory of language. I also show how the Kantian features of Bühler’s approach help to deal with objections to his crisis diagnosis and (...) to aspects of his linguistic theory. Part 2 turns to Popper’s dissertation, completed in 1928 under Bühler. I analyze Popper’s disapproval of Schlick’s physicalism in psychology, as well as Popper’s attempt to extend Bühler’s Kantian strategy to the domain of the psychology of thinking. In conclusion, I indicate how these approaches to the crisis in psychology differ from Thomas Kuhn’s notions of crisis and revolution, which are still all too popular in current philosophical discussions of psychology. (shrink)

Mathematical thinking skills are very important in mathematics, both to learn math or as learning goals. Thinking skills can be seen from the description given answers in solving mathematical problems faced. Mathematical thinking skills can be seen from the types, levels, and process. Proportionally questions given to students at universities in Indonesia (semester I, III, V, and VII). These questions are a matter of description that belong to the higher-level thinking. Students choose 5 of 8 given problem. Qualitatively, the answers (...) were analyzed by descriptive to see the tendency to think mathematically used in completing the test. The results show that students tend to choose the issues relating to the calculation. They are more use cases, examples and not an example, to evaluate the conjecture and prove to belong to the numeric argumentation. Used mathematical thinking students are very personal (intelligence, interest, and experience), and the situation (problems encountered). Thus, the level of half of the students are not guaranteed and shows the level of mathematical thinking. (shrink)