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  1. Sankey on Kuhn and Epistemological Coherentism: A Commentary.Juan V. Mayoral - 2022 - In Pablo Melogno, Hernán Miguel & Leandro Giri (eds.), Perspectives on Kuhn: Contemporary Approaches to the Philosophy of Thomas Kuhn. Springer. pp. 15-24.
    In his paper, “Kuhn, Coherentism and Perception,” Howard Sankey shows that Kuhn’s epistemology does not fit squarely in the coherentist framework, though some aspects of his theory are akin to that position. Sankey examines and then criticizes a previous work by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen that argues that Kuhn’s work fits in well with a coherentist approach and with a realistic position in which the correspondence theory of truth is still defensible. I will not examine Kuukkanen’s argument here. I will only comment (...)
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  2. Coherentism.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2012 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum.
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  3. A reductio of coherentism.Tom Stoneham - 2007 - Analysis 67 (295):254-257.
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  4. Foundationalism and coherentism in moral epistemology.Noah Lemos - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
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  5. Varieties of Metaphysical Coherentism.Jan Swiderski - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-26.
    According to metaphysical coherentism, grounding relations form an interconnected system in which things ground each other and nothing is ungrounded. This potentially viable view’s logical territory remains largely unexplored. In this paper, I describe that territory by articulating four varieties of metaphysical coherentism. I do not argue for any variety in particular. Rather, I aim to show that not all issues which might be raised against coherentism will be equally problematic for all the versions of that view, which features far (...)
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  6. Knowledge as Objectively Justified Belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):397-414.
    According to Lehrer’s defeasibility account of knowledge, we can understand knowledge as undefeated justified true belief. But this account faces many serious problems. One important problem is that from one’s subjective point of view, one can hardly bridge the gap between one’s personal justification and objective truth. Another important problem is that this account can hardly accommodate the externalist intuition that the epistemic status of a belief is not entirely determined by factors that are internal to the subject’s perspective. The (...)
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  7. Bonjour's Positions on Empirical Knowledge: From Coherentism to Foundationalism.Soo Young Byun - unknown
    Lawrence Bonjour supported coherentism in the early period, but turns to foundationalism in the later period. In this paper I shall focus on two sides in relation to his epistemology. To understand his early and later positions, first, I shall explain his coherentism and foundationalism. Second, I shall consider what objections have been raised to each position. Thus we can evaluate why Bonjour abandoned his coherentism and why his foundationalism succeeds as a plausible theory for empirical justification.
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  8. Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality.Marc-Kevin Daoust - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Structural requirements of rationality prohibit various things, like having inconsistent combinations of attitudes, having means-end incoherent combinations of attitudes, and so on. But what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? And do we fall under an obligation to be structurally rational? These issues have been at the heart of significant debates over the past fifteen years. Some philosophers have recently argued that we can unify the structural requirements of rationality by analyzing what is constitutive of our attitudes. (...)
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  9. Coherentism.Erik J. Olsson - 2022 - Cambridge University Press.
    Perhaps the most fundamental question of epistemology asks on what grounds our knowledge of the world ultimately rests. The traditional Cartesian answer is that it rests on indubitable facts arrived at through rational insight or introspection. Coherentists reject this answer, claiming instead that knowledge arises from relations of coherence or mutual support: if our beliefs cohere, we can be sure that they are mostly true. The first part of this Element introduces the reader to the main ideas and problems of (...)
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  10. How can we know whether fish feel pain? Epistemology of the scientific study of fish sentience.Victor Duran-Le Peuch - 2021 - Dissertation,
    I start by defining sentience and giving an analysis of the epistemological problems that plague its scientific study; this consists mainly in justifying that the attribution of sentience is underdetermined by the data. Second I show that as a result of this situation of underdetermination, most of the types of arguments used to infer sentience from the data are inconclusive and lead to a stalemate. Third, I argue that the stalemates arise from a foundationalist epistemology which needlessly leads to skeptical (...)
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  11. Explanatory Coherence and the Impossibility of Confirmation by Coherence.Ted Poston - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):835-848.
    The coherence of independent reports provides a strong reason to believe that the reports are true. This plausible claim has come under attack from recent work in Bayesian epistemology. This work shows that, under certain probabilistic conditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of the target claim. These theorems are taken to demonstrate that epistemic coherentism is untenable. To date no one has investigated how these results bear on different conceptions of coherence. I investigate this situation using Thagard’s ECHO model of (...)
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  12. Janus‐Faced Coherentism and the Forgotten Role of Formal Principles.Rodrigo Camarena González - 2021 - Ratio Juris 34 (3):263-281.
    Coherentists fail to distinguish between the individual revision of a conviction and the intersubjective revision of a rule. This paper fills this gap. A conviction is a norm that, according to an individual, ought to be ascribed to a provision. By contrast, a rule is a judicially ascribed norm that controls a case and is protected by the formal principles of competence, certainty, and equality. A revision of a rule is the invalidation or modification such a judicially ascribed norm, provided (...)
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  13. Coherence as Competence.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):353-376.
    Being incoherent is often viewed as a paradigm kind of irrationality. Numerous authors attempt to explain the distinct-seeming failure of incoherence by positing a set of requirements of structural rationality. I argue that the notion of coherence that structural requirements are meant to capture is very slippery, and that intuitive judgments – in particular, a charge of a distinct, blatant kind of irrationality – are very imperfectly correlated with respecting the canon of structural requirements. I outline an alternative strategy for (...)
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  14. The accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition.David Thorstad - forthcoming - British Journal for Philosophy of Science.
    I argue that bounded agents face a systematic accuracy-coherence tradeoff in cognition. Agents must choose whether to structure their cognition in ways likely to promote coherence or accuracy. I illustrate the accuracy-coherence tradeoff by showing how it arises out of at least two component tradeoffs: a coherence-complexity tradeoff between coherence and cognitive complexity, and a coherence-variety tradeoff between coherence and strategic variety. These tradeoffs give rise to an accuracy-coherence tradeoff because privileging coherence over complexity or strategic variety often leads to (...)
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  15. Understanding Philosophy.Michael Hannon & James Nguyen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    What is the primary intellectual aim of philosophy? The standard view is that philosophy aims to provide true answers to philosophical questions. But if our aim is to settle controversy by answering such questions, our discipline is an embarrassing failure. Moreover, taking philosophy to aim at providing true answers to these questions leads to a variety of puzzles: How do we account for philosophical expertise? How is philosophical progress possible? Why do job search committees not care about the truth or (...)
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  16. Theories of Epistemic Justification.Salah Ismail - 2000 - Arab Journal for the Humanities 18 (69):110-151.
    Knowledge is not only true belief, because some true beliefs are supported by lucky guesswork and hence do not describe knowledge. Knowledge requires possession of good reasons that elevates a true belief to the status of knowledge. This is justification condition. However, this concept of knowledge has been disputed by Gettier and requires modification. Some philosophers say that we must add the condition that the complete justification that a man has for what he believes must not depend on any false (...)
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  17. Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations of the Impossibility Theorems.Ted Poston - 2022 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):83-111.
    It is a widespread intuition that the coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true. Formal results by Huemer, M. 1997. “Probability and Coherence Justification.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 35: 463–72, Olsson, E. 2002. “What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?” Journal of Philosophy XCIX : 246–72, Olsson, E. 2005. Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. Oxford University Press., Bovens, L., and S. Hartmann. 2003. Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford University Press, prove that, under (...)
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  18. A Scientific-Realist Account of Common Sense.Orly Shenker - 2020 - In Rik Peels & René Van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy. Cambridge: pp. 333-351.
    There are good reasons to endorse scientific realism and good reasons to endorse common-sense realism. However, it has sometimes been suggested that there is a tension between the two which makes it difficult to endorse both. Can the common-sense picture of the world be reconciled with the strikingly different picture presented to us by our best confirmed theories of science? This chapter critically examines proposals for doing so, and it offers a new one, which is essentially this. It is a (...)
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  19. Sellars, Price, and the Myth of the Given.Michael R. Hicks - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (7).
    Wilfrid Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" begins with an argument against sense-datum epistemology. There is some question about the validity of this attack, stemming in part from the assumption that Sellars is concerned with epistemic foundationalism. This paper recontextualizes Sellars's argument in two ways: by showing how the argument of EPM relates to Sellars's 1940s work, which does not concern foundationalism at all; and by considering the view of H.H. Price, Sellars's teacher at Oxford and the only classical (...)
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  20. Coherentism.Erik J. Olsson - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 310-322.
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  21. Explanations in Design Thinking: New Directions for an Obfuscated Field.Ameer Sarwar & Patrick Fraser - 2019 - She Ji: The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation 5 (4):343-355.
    Design plays an integral role in the functions of modern society. Yet the abstract process by which designers carry out their work is not obvious. The study of design thinking has grown in recent years into a major area of academic research, yet it presently lacks a clear theoretical basis; and as a discipline, its methodologies are disparate. Here, we outline and clarify the framework of the scholarly study of design thinking, introducing the major ideas and concepts upon which the (...)
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  22. Kuhn, Coherentism and Perception.Howard Sankey - 2023 - In Leandro Giri, Pablo Melogno & Hernán Miguel (eds.), Perspectives on Kuhn: Contemporary Approaches to the Philosophy of Thomas Kuhn. Cham: Springer. pp. 1-14.
    The paper takes off from the suggestion of Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen that Kuhn’s account of science may be understood in coherentist terms. There are coherentist themes in Kuhn’s philosophy of science. But one crucial element is lacking. Kuhn does not deny the existence of basic beliefs which have a non-doxastic source of justification. Nor does he assert that epistemic justification only derives from inferential relationships between non-basic beliefs. Despite this, the coherentist interpretation is promising and I develop it further in this (...)
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  23. Coherentism and the symmetry of epistemic support.Nicholas Shackel - 2008 - Analysis 68 (299):226-234.
    In this paper I prove that holistic coherentism is logically equivalent to the conjunction of symmetry and quasi-transitivity of epistemic support and a condition on justified beliefs. On the way I defend Tom Stoneham from a criticism made by Darrell Rowbottom and prove a premiss of Stoneham’s argument to be an entailment of coherentism.
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  24. Benign Infinity.Matthias Steup - 2019 - In Cherie Braden, Rodrigo Borges & Branden Fitelson (eds.), Themes From Klein. Springer Verlag. pp. 235-57.
    According to infinitism, all justification comes from an infinite series of reasons. Peter Klein defends infinitism as the correct solution to the regress problem by rejecting two alternative solutions: foundationalism and coherentism. I focus on Klein's argument against foundationalism, which relies on the premise that there is no justification without meta-justification. This premise is incompatible with dogmatic foundationalism as defended by Michael Huemer and Time Pryor. It does not, however, conflict with non-dogmatic foundationalism. Whereas dogmatic foundationalism rejects the need for (...)
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  25. Why Bayesian Coherentism Isn't Coherentism.Lydia McGrew - 2015 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 11 (1):37-56.
    It is sometimes assumed in the Bayesian coherentist literature that the project of finding a truth-conducive measure of coherence of testimonial contents will, if successful, be helpful to the coherentist theory of justification. Various impossibility results in the Bayesian coherentist literature are consequently taken to be prima facie detrimental to the coherentist theory of justification. These attempts to connect Bayesian coherentism to the coherentist/ foundationalist debate in classical epistemology rest upon a confusion between the justification of a proposition and the (...)
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  26. Reflective Equilibrium: Justification without Intuitions.Rettig Cristian - 2017 - Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):39-54.
    Does the method of reflective equilibrium involve ethical intuitions? If not, what are the so-called “considered judgments” invoked at the beginning of the process of reflective equilibrium? Contrary to the principal tendency in moral and political philosophy, I provide a negative answer to the first question. I hold that ethical intuitions are non-inferential beliefs. I then claim that RE does not involve ethical intuitions because its coherentist character rejects, by definition, any type of non-inferentiality. Concerning the second question above, I (...)
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  27. Carnap’s Relevance Measure as a Probabilistic Measure of Coherence.Jakob Koscholke - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):339-350.
    Tomoji Shogenji is generally assumed to be the first author to have presented a probabilistic measure of coherence. Interestingly, Rudolf Carnap in his Logical Foundations of Probability discussed a function that is based on the very same idea, namely his well-known relevance measure. This function is largely neglected in the coherence literature because it has been proposed as a measure of evidential support and still is widely conceived as such. The aim of this paper is therefore to investigate Carnap’s measure (...)
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  28. The Truth-Conduciveness Problem of Coherentism and a Sellarsian Explanatory Coherence Theory.Byeong D. Lee - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (1):63-79.
    According to the truth-conduciveness problem of coherentism, the coherence theory of justification can hardly show that coherentist justification is truth-conducive. This problem is generally conceived as the most recalcitrant problem with the coherence theory. The purpose of this paper is to show that it does not pose a serious problem for a certain version of coherentism, namely a Sellarsian explanatory coherence theory of justification combined with the deflationary theory of truth. On this version of coherentism, our epistemic goal is to (...)
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  29. The Nature of Thought: Volume I.Brand Blanshard - 1964 - London, England: Routledge.
    First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  30. Coherence in text, coherence in mind.T. Givón - 1993 - Pragmatics and Cognition 1 (2):171-227.
    This paper suggests that text coherence is a multi-factored affair that, ultimately, pertains to the mental organization of episodic memory, most likely as a partially-hierarchic mental structure. What text researchers usually describe as coherence is merely an artifact of the cognitive phenomenon. The role of grammatical clues in signalling text coherence is investigated, and it is suggested that the grammar processing channel merely supplements an evolutionarily older channel of lexically-guided coherence. Coherence is both local and global, and both properties can (...)
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  31. Coherence Without Conservation.Georgi Gardiner - 2016 - Syndicate Philosophy 1:1-8.
    In Reason and Explanation Ted Poston advances an explanatory coherentist view of justification, according to which the justification of a person’s beliefs consists in how well those beliefs fit within a virtuous explanatory system. Poston argues that epistemic conservatism, which holds that in at least some cases belief itself generates epistemic merit, plays an essential role in such an account. Poston’s version of conservatism holds that “mere belief” – belief in cases of empty symmetrical evidence, where the subject lacks any (...)
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  32. Theory Assessment and Coherence.Peter Brössel - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (1):57-71.
    One of the most important questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science is: what is a good theory and when is a theory better than another theory, given some observational data? The coherentist‟s answer would be the following twofold conjecture: A theory is a good theory given some observational data iff that theory coheres with the observational data and a theory is better than another theory given some observational data iff the first theory coheres more with the observational data (...)
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  33. Kuhn, the correspondence theory of truth and coherentist epistemology.Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (3):555-566.
    Kuhn argued against both the correspondence theory of truth and convergent realism. Although he likely misunderstood the nature of the correspondence theory, which it seems he wrongly believed to be an epistemic theory, Kuhn had an important epistemic point to make. He maintained that any assessment of correspondence between beliefs and reality is not possible, and therefore, the acceptance of beliefs and the presumption of their truthfulness has to be decided on the basis of other criteria. I will show that (...)
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  34. Immediacy, Mediacy, and Coherence. [REVIEW]Wendell T. Bush - 1908 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (9):246-249.
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  35. A Problem Taken from Bonjour’s Coherentism.Jane Duran - 2000 - Idealistic Studies 30 (1):1-6.
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  36. The Myth of the Given, Coherentism, and the Justification of Empirical Knowledge Claims.Dieter Freundlieb - 2003 - Idealistic Studies 33 (1):39-56.
    In this paper I make some critical comments on John McDowell’s Mind and World and offer suggestions as to how it might be possible to solve John McDowell’s problem of finding a safe passage between the Scylla of the “Myth of the Given” (Sellars) and the Charybdis of a Davidsonian linguistic coherentism. McDowell’s defense of a minimal empiricism depends on the largely unargued and ultimately untenable assumption that epistemic justification can only operate at the level of conceptual or propositional entities. (...)
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  37. Coherence and Its Critics.Errol E. Harris - 1975 - Idealistic Studies 5 (3):208-230.
    The Coherence Theory of Truth does not stand upon its own feet; it is the corollary of a metaphysic, without which it has no claim to credence and is without cogency. Likewise, no critique of the theory can have weight against it if it merely assumes an incompatible metaphysic which it does not validate and unless it can demonstrate the falsity of that on which the Coherence Theory rests. If metaphysics is simply a matter of taste and temperament discussion and (...)
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  38. Foundational Beliefs and Persuading with Humor: Reflections Inspired by Reid and Kierkegaard.Daniel M. Johnson & Adam C. Pelser - 2014 - Faith and Philosophy 31 (3):267-285.
    The most important and common solution to the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s regress problem is foundationalism. Reason-giving must stop somewhere, argues the foundationalist, and the fact that it does stop does not threaten knowledge or justification. The foundationalist has a problem, though; while foundationalism might adequately answer skepticism, it does not allow for a satisfying reply to the skeptic. The feature that makes a belief foundationally justified is not the sort of thing that can be given to another as a reason. Thus, (...)
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  39. Doubt, Scepticism, and a Serious Justification Game.Alfred Schramm - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1):71-87.
    Keith Lehrer describes in his Theory of Knowledge a Justification Game which is played by a Claimant who tries to establish his justification for some contingent claim and a rather harmless Skeptic who tries to stop the Claimant. The doubts of a serious philosophical skeptic are - in opposition to Lehrer - analyzed as doubts concerning the justification of our beliefs and not their contents. Making the reglementations for a solid philosophical argumentation more precise the setting of a Serious Justification (...)
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  40. Reid and Lehrer.Daniel Schulthess - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1):135-147.
    The contrast between Thomas Reid's epistemological concerns and a common core of the classical approach to epistemology is the following one: Reid abandons the classical use for criteria of knowledge and pushes the problem of the justification of beliefs to the level of the mental faculties from which the beliefs arise. A similar shift plays various roles in Keith Lehrer's coherentist epistemology. However, this shift raises several difficulties: (i) the impact of epistemological concerns on actual intellectual inquiries gets lost; (ii) (...)
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  41. Drearning On.Paul Davis - 1993 - Cogito 7 (2):135-140.
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  42. Can coherence solve prior probabilities for Bayesianism?Susannah K. Devitt - unknown
    Coherence between propositions promises to fix the vexing circumstance of prior probabilities for subjective Bayesians. This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of justification for Bayesian agents, particularly the argument that all propositions must cohere within an agent’s ‘web of belief’, aka confirmational holism. Unfortunately, Confirmational holism runs across a potentially devastating argument that a more coherent set of beliefs resulting from the addition of a belief to a less coherent set of beliefs is less likely to (...)
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  43. Epistemic inconsistency and categorical coherence: a study of probabilistic measures of coherence.Michael Hughes - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3153-3185.
    Is logical consistency required for a set of beliefs or propositions to be categorically coherent? An affirmative answer is often assumed by mainstream epistemologists, and yet it is unclear why. Cases like the lottery and the preface call into question the assumption that beliefs must be consistent in order to be epistemically rational. And thus it is natural to wonder why all inconsistent sets of propositions are incoherent. On the other hand, Easwaran and Fitelson have shown that particular kinds of (...)
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  44. Basic beliefs and the perceptual learning problem: A substantial challenge for moderate foundationalism.Bram Vaassen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):133-149.
    In recent epistemology many philosophers have adhered to a moderate foundationalism according to which some beliefs do not depend on other beliefs for their justification. Reliance on such ‘basic beliefs’ pervades both internalist and externalist theories of justification. In this article I argue that the phenomenon of perceptual learning – the fact that certain ‘expert’ observers are able to form more justified basic beliefs than novice observers – constitutes a challenge for moderate foundationalists. In order to accommodate perceptual learning cases, (...)
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  45. Coherence and truth conducive justification.C. B. Cross - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):186-193.
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  46. Epistemic disaster averted.S. Hetherington - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):194-200.
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  47. Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):93-108.
    A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, (...)
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  48. Equivalent testimonies as a touchstone of coherence measures.Mark Siebel & Werner Wolff - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):167-182.
    Over the past years, a number of probabilistic measures of coherence have been proposed. As shown in the paper, however, many of them do not conform to the intuitition that equivalent testimonies are highly coherent, regardless of their prior probability.
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  49. Weak Bayesian coherentism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Synthese 157 (3):337-346.
    Recent results in probability theory have cast doubt on coherentism, purportedly showing (a) that coherence among a set of beliefs cannot raise their probability unless individual beliefs have some independent credibility, and (b) that no possible measure of coherence makes coherence generally probability-enhancing. I argue that coherentists can reject assumptions on which these theorems depend, and I derive a general condition under which the concurrence of two information sources lacking individual credibility can raise the probability of what they report.
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  50. Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):151-176.
    Knowledge requires both freedom and friction . Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense, and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction and freedom, the viability of (...)
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1 — 50 / 290