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  1. Dr Afsar Abbas, A "Layers of Reality to a Web of Induction" Hypothesis.
    It is shown that as knowledge is structured, it comes in modules. This provides different " layers of reality ". Each layer of reality has its own distinctive inductive logic which may differ from that of the others. All this is woven together to form a " web of induction " in a multidimensional space. It is the overall resilience, firmness and consistent interconnectedness of the whole web which justifies induction globally and which allows science to continue to "read" nature (...)
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  2. Jack Arnold & Stewart Shapiro (2007). Where in the (World Wide) Web of Belief is the Law of Non-Contradiction? Noûs 41 (2):276–297.
    It is sometimes said that there are two, competing versions of W. V. O. Quine’s unrelenting empiricism, perhaps divided according to temporal periods of his career. According to one, logic is exempt from, or lies outside the scope of, the attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. This logic-friendly Quine holds that logical truths and, presumably, logical inferences are analytic in the traditional sense. Logical truths are knowable a priori, and, importantly, they are incorrigible, and so immune from revision. The other, radical (...)
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  3. Selim Berker (2015). Coherentism Via Graphs. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):322-352.
    Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...)
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  4. Yves Bouchard (ed.) (2002). Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe.
  5. Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann (2006). An Impossibility Result for Coherence Rankings. Philosophical Studies 128 (1):77-91.
    If we receive information from multiple independent and partially reliable information sources, then whether we are justified to believe these information items is affected by how reliable the sources are, by how well the information coheres with our background beliefs and by how internally coherent the information is. We consider the following question. Is coherence a separable determinant of our degree of belief, i.e. is it the case that the more coherent the new information is, the more justified we are (...)
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  6. Peter Brössel (2013). Assessing Theories: The Coherentist Approach. Erkenntnis 79 (3):593-623.
    In this paper we show that the coherence measures of Olsson (J Philos 94:246–272, 2002), Shogenji (Log Anal 59:338–345, 1999), and Fitelson (Log Anal 63:194–199, 2003) satisfy the two most important adequacy requirements for the purpose of assessing theories. Following Hempel (Synthese 12:439–469, 1960), Levi (Gambling with truth, New York, A. A. Knopf, 1967), and recently Huber (Synthese 161:89–118, 2008) we require, as minimal or necessary conditions, that adequate assessment functions favor true theories over false theories and true and informative (...)
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  7. Peter Brössel (2013). Correlation and Truth. In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 41--54.
  8. Andrew D. Cling (2002). Justification-Affording Circular Arguments. Philosophical Studies 111 (3):251 - 275.
    An argument whose conclusion C is essential evidence for one of its premises can provide its target audience with justification for believing C. This is possible because we can enhance our justification for believing a proposition C by integrating it into an explanatory network of beliefs for which C itself provides essential evidence. I argue for this in light of relevant features of doxastic circularity, epistemic circularity, and explanatory inferences. Finally, I confirm my argument with an example and respond to (...)
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  9. Earl Conee (1995). Isolation and Beyond. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):129-146.
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  10. C. B. Cross (2006). Review: Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (459):790-793.
    This is a review of Erik J. Olsson, AGAINST COHERENCE: TRUTH, PROBABILITY AND JUSTIFICATION (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).
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  11. Charles B. Cross (1999). Coherence and Truth Conducive Justification. Analysis 59 (263):186–193.
    In a 1994 ANALYSIS article Peter Klein and Ted Warfield show that an epistemically more coherent set of beliefs often has a smaller unconditional probability of joint truth than some of its less coherent subsets. They conclude that epistemic justification, as understood in one version of a coherence theory of justification, is not truth conducive. After getting clear about what truth conduciveness requires, I show that their argument does not tell against BonJour's coherence theory.
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  12. Charles B. Cross (1995). Probability, Evidence, and the Coherence of the Whole Truth. Synthese 103 (2):153 - 170.
    The coherence of the whole truth is a presupposition of any holistic coherence theory of justification that postulates a positive connection between justification and truth, for unless the whole truth is itself systemically coherent there is no reason to look for systemic coherence when deciding whether one is justified in accepting a given body of beliefs as true. This paper develops a formal model of holistic evidential coherence and uses this model to formalize and defend the claim that the whole (...)
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  13. Finnur Dellsén (forthcoming). Review of Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coheretism, by Ted Poston. [REVIEW] Dialectica.
  14. Franz Dietrich & Luca Moretti (2005). On Coherent Sets and the Transmission of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 72 (3):403-424.
    In this paper, we identify a new and mathematically well-defined sense in which the coherence of a set of hypotheses can be truth-conducive. Our focus is not, as usually, on the probability but on the confirmation of a coherent set and its members. We show that, if evidence confirms a hypothesis, confirmation is "transmitted" to any hypotheses that are sufficiently coherent with the former hypothesis, according to some appropriate probabilistic coherence measure such as Olsson’s or Fitelson’s measure. Our findings have (...)
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  15. R. Elio (ed.) (2002). Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science (Vol. 11). Oxford University Press.
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  16. Hector Ferreiro (2016). Der Streit Um Die Hundert Taler: Begriff Und Erkenntnis des Wirklichen Bei Kant Und Hegel. Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos 21:23-38.
    In the Transcendental Dialectic (KrV, A 599-560/B 627-628), Kant presents the argument of the hundred talers as a concrete example of his general claim against conceiving existence as a real predicate. According to Kant, the content of concepts can be completely determined as merely possible content; in the existential judgment, the subject then relates the completely determined content of his internal thoughts with perception: it is only through perception that the subject knows the content of his concepts as real things (...)
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  17. Branden Fitelson, The Central Thesis as Involving “Inference to the Best Explanation”.
    • Two competing explanations (independence of S i favors R over CB): (CB) there is a coherence bias in a’s S -formation process.
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  18. David Glass (2007). Coherence Measures and Inference to the Best Explanation. Synthese 157 (3):275-296.
    This paper considers an application of work on probabilistic measures of coherence to inference to the best explanation. Rather than considering information reported from different sources, as is usually the case when discussing coherence measures, the approach adopted here is to use a coherence measure to rank competing explanations in terms of their coherence with a piece of evidence. By adopting such an approach IBE can be made more precise and so a major objection to this mode of reasoning can (...)
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  19. Samuel D. Gosling, Peter J. Rentfrow & William B. Swann Jr (2003). A Very Brief Measure of the Big-Five Personality Domains. Journal of Research in Personality 37 (6):504-528.
    When time is limited, researchers may be faced with the choice of using an extremely brief measure of the Big-Five personality dimensions or using no measure at all. To meet the need for a very brief measure, 5 and 10-item inventories were developed and evaluated. Although somewhat inferior to standard multi-item instruments, the instruments reached adequate levels in terms of: convergence with widely used Big-Five measures in self, observer, and peer reports, test–retest reliability, patterns of predicted external correlates, and convergence (...)
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  20. Michael Huemer (2006). Review of Erik Olsson, Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (5).
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  21. Valeriano Iranzo (1998). Coherencia y justificación. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 20 (1):91.
    El articulo analiza dos enfoques coherentistas de lajíístifícación (K. Lehrer y L. Boniour). Ambas versiones se consideran insatisfactorias. En primer lugar, sobrecargan el aparato introspectivo del sujeto cpistémi co, lo cual impide dar cuenta de nuestras intuiciones preanalíticas sobre sujetos "limitados" (niños o animales>. Por otro lado, no consiguen esta blecer un viculo convincente entre justificación ----entendida como cohe í'encia--- y verdad entendida como correspondencia.
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  22. Anna Ivanova (2015). Coherentist Justification and Perceptual Beliefs. Balkan Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):107-114.
    A common objection to coherence theories of justification comes from belief revision processes: in a system of knowledge, perceptual beliefs seem to bear more importance than other members of the coherent set do. They are more stable in the face of confronting evidence, and may be preserved despite their degrading effect on the coherence properties of the system. This appears to be inconsistent with coherentism, according to which beliefs cannot possess independent credibility. In order to abide by the coherence theory, (...)
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  23. Christoph Jäger (2007). Is Coherentism Coherent? Analysis 67 (4):341 - 344.
    In ‘A reductio of coherentism’ (Analysis 67, 2007) Tom Stoneham offers a novel argument against epistemological coherentism. ‘On the face of it’, he writes, ‘the argument gives a conclusive reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. But that cannot be right, can it?’ (p. 254). It could be right, but it isn’t. I argue that coherentists need not accept the central premises of Stoneham’s argument and that, even if these premises were acceptable and true, Stoneham’s reductio would not (...)
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  24. Peter Klein (1985). The Virtues of Inconsistency. The Monist 68 (1):105-135.
    I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets.
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  25. Peter D. Klein (2003). Coherence, Knowledge and Skepticism. In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 281--297.
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  26. Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield (1994). What Price Coherence? Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.
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  27. Jakob Koscholke & Michael Schippers (forthcoming). Against Relative Overlap Measures of Coherence. Synthese:1-10.
    Coherence is the property of propositions hanging or fitting together. Intuitively, adding a proposition to a set of propositions should be compatible with either increasing or decreasing the set’s degree of coherence. In this paper we show that probabilistic coherence measures based on relative overlap are in conflict with this intuitive verdict. More precisely, we prove that according to the naive overlap measure it is impossible to increase a set’s degree of coherence by adding propositions and that according to the (...)
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  28. Erik Krag (2015). Coherentism and Belief Fixation. Logos and Episteme 6 (2):187–199.
    Plantinga argues that cases involving ‘fixed’ beliefs refute the coherentist thesis that a belief’s belonging to a coherent set of beliefs suffices for its having justification (warrant). According to Plantinga, a belief cannot be justified if there is a ‘lack of fit’ between it and its subject’s experiences. I defend coherentism by showing that if Plantinga means to claim that any ‘lack of fit’ destroys justification, his argument is obviously false. If he means to claim that significant ‘lack of fit’ (...)
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  29. Jonathan Kvanvig (2012). Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.
    The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.
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  30. Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  31. Jonathan Kvanvig (2003). ``Propositionalism and the Perspectival Character of Justification&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):3-18.
    The flight from foundationalism in the earlier part of this century left several options in its wake. Distress over the possibility of foundationalist replies to the regress problem, coupled with consternation over the thought of circular reasoning mysteriously becoming acceptable as the circle gets large led to the attraction of holistic theories of a coherentist variety. Yet, such coherentisms seemed to leave the belief system cut off from the world, and perhaps a better idea was to abandon the approach to (...)
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  32. Jonathan Kvanvig (1995). Coherentists' Distractions. Philosophical Topics 23 (1):257-274.
    The heart of coherentism is found in two aspects, one negative and one positive. On the negative side, coherentism is a contrary of foundationalism, the view that the epistemic status of our beliefs ultimately traces to, or derives from, basic beliefs.
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  33. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2005). On Denying a Presupposition of Sellars' Problem:A Defense of Propositionalism. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):173-190.
    There is a great divide between two approaches to epistemology over the past thirty to forty years. Some label the divide that between internalists and externalists, and that characterization may be accurate on some account of the distinction. I will pursue the divide from a different direction, in part because the literature on the distinction between internalism and externalism has become a mess, and I don’t want to clean up the mess here.
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  34. Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Wayne D. Riggs (1992). Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States? Philosophical Studies 67 (3):197-217.
    Coherence theorists have universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of) belief states, in contradistinction to other theories, such as some versions of founda­tionalism, which define justification as a relation on belief states and appearance states.
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  35. Noah M. Lemos (1982). Coherence and Epistemic Priority. Philosophical Studies 41 (3):299 - 315.
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  36. Elijah Millgram (2000). Coherence: The Price of the Ticket. Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):82-93.
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  37. Luca Moretti (forthcoming). Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism. BY TED POSTON (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Pp. 208. Price £ 60.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly.
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  38. Luca Moretti (2007). Ways in Which Coherence is Confirmation Conducive. Synthese 157 (3):309 - 319.
    Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive – in the sense that, given suitable ceteris paribus conditions, more coherent sets of statements are always more probable – is dubious and possibly false. From this, it does not follows that coherence is a useless notion in epistemology and philosophy of science. Dietrich and Moretti (Philosophy of science 72(3): 403–424, 2005) have proposed a formal of account of how coherence is confirmation conducive—that is, of how the (...)
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  39. Luca Moretti & Ken Akiba (2007). Probabilistic Measures of Coherence and the Problem of Belief Individuation. Synthese 154 (1):73 - 95.
    Coherentism in epistemology has long suffered from lack of formal and quantitative explication of the notion of coherence. One might hope that probabilistic accounts of coherence such as those proposed by Lewis, Shogenji, Olsson, Fitelson, and Bovens and Hartmann will finally help solve this problem. This paper shows, however, that those accounts have a serious common problem: the problem of belief individuation. The coherence degree that each of the accounts assigns to an information set (or the verdict it gives as (...)
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  40. Rinat M. Nugayev (2014). Mature Scientific Theory Change: Intertheoretic Context. In Vladimir I. Arshinov & Ilya T. Kasavin (eds.), Science and Social Map of the World. Academician V.S.Stepin's Fesrchrift. Alpha. pp. 266-279.
    A brief account of epistemological models that try to unfold the intertheoretic context of theory change is proposed. It is stated that all of them has a host of drawbacks, the most salient one being the lack of adequate description of the research traditions interaction process. The epistemological model of mature theory change, eliminating the drawback, is contemplated and illustrated.
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  41. E. J. Olsson (2001). Why Coherence is Not Truth-Conducive. Analysis 61 (3):236-241.
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  42. Erik Olsson & Stefan Schubert (2007). Reliability Conducive Measures of Coherence. Synthese 157 (3):297-308.
    A measure of coherence is said to be truth conducive if and only if a higher degree of coherence results in a higher likelihood of truth. Recent impossibility results strongly indicate that there are no probabilistic coherence measures that are truth conducive. Indeed, this holds even if truth conduciveness is understood in a weak ceteris paribus sense. This raises the problem of how coherence could nonetheless be an epistemically important property. Our proposal is that coherence may be linked in a (...)
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  43. William Roche & Michael Schippers (2014). Coherence, Probability and Explanation. Erkenntnis 79 (4):821-828.
    Recently there have been several attempts in formal epistemology to develop an adequate probabilistic measure of coherence. There is much to recommend probabilistic measures of coherence. They are quantitative and render formally precise a notion—coherence—notorious for its elusiveness. Further, some of them do very well, intuitively, on a variety of test cases. Siebel, however, argues that there can be no adequate probabilistic measure of coherence. Take some set of propositions A, some probabilistic measure of coherence, and a probability distribution such (...)
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  44. Hans Rott (2003). Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Part II: Iterated Belief Change Without Dispositional Coherence. Journal of Logic and Computation 13 (1):111-145.
    This paper studies the idea of conservatism with respect to belief change strategies in the setting of unary, iterated belief revision functions (based on the conclusions of Rott, ‘Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief, Part I: Finding the Right Framework’, Erkenntnis 50, 1999, 387–412). Special attention is paid to the case of ‘basic belief change’ where neither the (weak) AGM postulates concerning conservatism with respect to beliefs nor the (stong) supplementary AGM postulates concerning dispositional coherence need to be (...)
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  45. Hans Rott (1999). Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief Part I: Finding the Right Framework. Erkenntnis 50 (2):387-412.
    In this paper I discuss the foundations of a formal theory of coherent and conservative belief change that is suitable to be used as a method for constructing iterated changes of belief, sensitive to the history of earlier belief changes, and independent of any form of dispositional coherence. I review various ways to conceive the relationship between the beliefs actually held by an agent and her belief change strategies, show the problems they suffer from, and suggest that belief states should (...)
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  46. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2007). A Refutation of Foundationalism? Analysis 67 (296):345–346.
  47. Michael Schippers (forthcoming). Bayesian Coherentism]Bayesian Coherentism and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity. Logic Journal of the IGPL:jzw028.
  48. Michael Schippers (forthcoming). Competing Accounts of Contrastive Coherence. Synthese:1-13.
    The proposition that Tweety is a bird coheres better with the proposition that Tweety has wings than with the proposition that Tweety cannot fly. This relationship of contrastive coherence is the focus of the present paper. Based on recent work in formal epistemology we consider various possibilities to model this relationship by means of probability theory. In a second step we consider different applications of these models. Among others, we offer a coherentist interpretation of the conjunction fallacy.
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  49. Michael Schippers (2016). The Problem of Coherence and Truth Redux. Erkenntnis 81 (4):817-851.
    In “What price coherence?”, Klein and Warfield put forward a simple argument that triggered an extensive debate on the epistemic virtues of coherence. As is well-known, this debate yielded far-reaching impossibility results to the effect that coherence is not conducive to truth, even if construed in a ceteris paribus sense. A large part of the present paper is devoted to a re-evaluation of these results. As is argued, all explications of truth-conduciveness leave out an important aspect: while it might not (...)
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  50. Michael Schippers (2015). Towards a Grammar of Bayesian Coherentism. Studia Logica 103 (5):955-984.
    One of the integral parts of Bayesian coherentism is the view that the relation of ‘being no less coherent than’ is fully determined by the probabilistic features of the sets of propositions to be ordered. In the last one and a half decades, a variety of probabilistic measures of coherence have been put forward. However, there is large disagreement as to which of these measures best captures the pre-theoretic notion of coherence. This paper contributes to the debate on coherence measures (...)
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