About this topic
Summary Collective Action covers the examination of intentionality and agency in a social context. In particular the investigation of what it means to act together.
Key works Key works in this area include Bratman 2009 and Gilbert 1990
Introductions Roth 2011
Related categories

395 found
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1 — 50 / 395
  1. The Commonwealth as Agent: Group Action, the Common Good, and the General Will.[author unknown] - unknown
    In this dissertation, I argue for a Rousseauvian vision of an ideal society: one in which the people constitute a group agent, unified under a collective will, willing action that constitutes the common good. Most have tended to believe that the contrasts between an individual agent and an entire people are stark, and so accounts of the commonwealth that appeal to group agency at all usually emphasize the differences between them. I will argue, however, that members of a society collectively (...)
  2. Distributing Collective Obligation.Sean Aas - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (3).
    In this paper I develop an account of member obligation: the obligations that fall on the members of an obligated collective in virtue of that collective obligation. I use this account to argue that unorganized collections of individuals can constitute obligated agents. I argue first that, to know when a collective obligation entails obligations on that collective’s members, we have to know not just what it would take for each member to do their part in satisfying the collective obligation, but (...)
  3. Prejudice Reduction, Collective Action, and Then What?Dominic Abrams, Milica Vasiljevic & Hazel M. Wardrop - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (6):425-426.
    Despite downsides, it must, on balance, be good to reduce prejudice. Despite upsides, collective action can also have destructive outcomes. Improving intergroup relations requires multiple levels of analysis involving a broader approach to prejudice reduction, awareness of potential conflict escalation, development of intergroup understanding, and promotion of a wider human rights perspective.
  4. Elements of a Strategy of Collective Action.Laurie E. Adkin - 1998 - In Roger Keil (ed.), Political Ecology: Global and Local. Routledge. pp. 285.
  5. Action and Knowledge in Alternating-Time Temporal Logic.Thomas Ågotnes - 2006 - Synthese 149 (2):375-407.
    Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) is a branching time temporal logic in which statements about what coalitions of agents can achieve by strategic cooperation can be expressed. Alternating-time temporal epistemic logic (ATEL) extends ATL by adding knowledge modalities, with the usual possible worlds interpretation. This paper investigates how properties of agents’ actions can be expressed in ATL in general, and how properties of the interaction between action and knowledge can be expressed in ATEL in particular. One commonly discussed property is that (...)
  6. Collaborative Distributed Decision Making for Large Scale Disaster Relief Operations: Drawing Analogies From Robust Natural Systems.Roberto G. Aldunate, Feniosky Pena‐Mora & Gene E. Robinson - 2005 - Complexity 11 (2):28-38.
  7. Collective Willing and Truth.S. Alexander - 1913 - Mind 22 (85):14-47.
  8. Mixed Motives in the Equilibrium View of Joint Intention.Nicholas Almendares & Dimitri Landa - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):733-755.
    We develop a theory of joint intention in contexts in which participants have mixed motives that can manifest in all-things-considered reasons to deviate from contributing to the desired project, e.g., contexts with collective action problems. Our theory is based on strategic equilibrium-based reasoning, which links the characterization of joint intention in terms of individual intentions with conditions on strategy profiles of the underlying strategic games. We use elements of equilibrium reasoning to construct a counterfactual account of joint intention in the (...)
  9. Reductive Views of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - forthcoming - In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. Routledge.
  10. The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions.James E. Alt & Michael Gilligan - 1994 - Journal of Political Philosophy 2 (2):165–192.
  11. Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer.Chrisoula Andreou - 2006 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (1):95-108.
    I show, building on Warren Quinn's puzzle of the self-torturer, that destructive conduct with respect to the environment can flourish even in the absence of interpersonal conflicts. As Quinn's puzzle makes apparent, in cases where individually negligible effects are involved, an agent, whether it be an individual or a unified collective, can be led down a course of destruction simply as a result of following its informed and perfectly understandable but intransitive preferences. This is relevant with respect to environmental ethics, (...)
  12. Can Groups Be Autonomous Rational Agents? A Challenge to the List-Pettit Theory.Vuko Andrić - 2014 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents - Contributions to Social Ontology. Springer. pp. 343-353.
    Christian List and Philip Pettit argue that some groups qualify as rational agents over and above their members. Examples include churches, commercial corporations, and political parties. According to the theory developed by List and Pettit, these groups qualify as agents because they have beliefs and desires and the capacity to process them and to act on their basis. Moreover, the alleged group agents are said to be rational to a high degree and even to be fit to be held morally (...)
  13. Antibiotics and Animal Agriculture: The Need for Global Collective Action.Jonny Anomaly - 2018 - In Michael Selgelid (ed.), Ethics and Antimicrobial Resistance. New York: Springer.
  14. The Elementary Theory of Collective Action.Leo Apostel - 1978 - Philosophica 21:129-157.
  15. Individuality and Cooperative Action.Susan J. Armstrong - 1991 - Process Studies 20 (4):248-252.
  16. Book Review:Collective Action. Russell Hardin. [REVIEW]Richard J. Arneson - 1984 - Ethics 94 (2):336-.
  17. Corporate Moral Agency.Denis G. Arnold - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):279–291.
    "The main conclusion of this essay is that it is plausible to conclude that corporations are capable of exhibiting intentionality, and as a result that they may be properly understood as moral agents" (p. 281).
  18. The Human Collective Causing of Environmental Problems and Theory of Collective Action.V. P. J. Arponen - 2013 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (1):47-65.
    A range of multidisciplinarily arguments and observations can and have been employed to challenge the view that the human relationship to nature is fundamentally a cognitive matter of collectively held cultural ideas and values about nature. At the same time, the very similar cognitivist idea of collective sharing of conceptual schemes, normative orientations, and the like as the engine of collective action remains the chief analytic tool offered by many influential philosophical and sociological theories of collective action and human sociality (...)
  19. How I Learned to Worry About the Spaghetti Western: Collective Responsibility and Collective Agency.Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):anx067.
    In recent years, collective agency and responsibility have received a great deal of attention. One exciting development concerns whether collective, non-distributive responsibility can be assigned to collective non-agents, such as crowds and nation-states. I focus on an underappreciated aspect of these arguments—namely, that they sometimes derive substantive ontological conclusions about the nature of collective agents from these responsibility attributions. I argue that this order of inference, whose form I represent in what I call the Spaghetti Western Argument, largely fails, even (...)
  20. Review Essay: Chant, Sara Rachel, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer, Editors. From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 240. [REVIEW]Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (3):318–331.
    I summarize and evaluate the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer in the context of the on-going debate about collective intentionality and group agency. I then consider the individual essays contained therein, both from the perspective of how they advance the collection’s goals and the coherence of their individual arguments.
  21. Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.
    Most theories of intentional action agree that if acting for a reason is a necessary condition for the action in question to be an intentional action, the reason need not genuinely justify it. The same should hold for shared intentional action, toward which philosophers of action have recently turned their attention. I argue that some of the necessary conditions proposed for shared intention turn out to require that we deny this claim. They entail that shared intention is possible only if (...)
  22. Social Action In Large Groups.Ulrich Baltzer - 2003 - ProtoSociology 18:127-136.
    Large Groups are not constituted simply by adding further members to small groups. There is a qualitative difference between the social actions which take place in small communities and those in large ones. Large communities are irreducibly characterized by anonymity, i.e., the members of large groups don’t know of most of the other members as individual. Therefore, social action in large groups is based on a sign process: each member of a large group is understood as a representative of the (...)
  23. Joint Action of Large Groups.Ulrich Baltzer - 2002 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts & Collective Intentionality. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen.
  24. On Collective Intentions: Collective Action in Economics and Philosophy.Nicholas Bardsley - 2007 - Synthese 157 (2):141-159.
    Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of (...)
  25. Practice as Collective Action.Barry Barnes - 2001 - In Theodore R. Schatzki, K. Knorr-Cetina & Eike von Savigny (eds.), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory. Routledge. pp. 17--28.
  26. El concepto de acción social según Ortega (Crítica de la fundamentación weberiana de la sociología) / The Concept of Social Action according to Ortega (Critique of the Weberian Foundation of Sociology).Antonio Benítez López - 1983 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 13 (3-4):505-522.
  27. Is Amnesty a Collective Act of Forgiveness?Christopher Bennett - 2003 - Contemporary Political Theory 2 (1):67-76.
    Amnesty in the context of national reconciliation involves waiving or cancelling the punishment of convicted or suspected criminals in the name of peace. We can distinguish three positions: amnesty is wrong because it is unjust; amnesty is unjust, but necessary; and amnesty is just because it expresses forgiveness. The third position sounds promising. However, it assumes that when we forgive, we can justifiably waive or cancel the need for punishment. I argue that only punishment that expresses repentance and atonement brings (...)
  28. Une Action Collective Analysée Par Ses Acteurs : Une Association D’Irrigants En Tunisie.Azza Ben Mustapha, Nicolas Faysse, Serge Marlet & Jean-Yves Jamin - forthcoming - Natures Sciences Sociétés.
  29. The Company They Keep.Terry L. Besser & Nancy J. Miller - 2011 - Business Ethics Quarterly 21 (3):503-525.
    Business networks, which include joint ventures, supply chains, industry and trade associations, industrial districts, and community business associations, are considered the signature organizational form of the global economy. However, little is known about how they affect the social performance of their members. We utilize institutional theory to develop the position that business social performance has collectivist roots that deserve at least as much scholarly attention as owner/manager characteristics and business attributes. Hypotheses are tested using multilevel analysis on data gathered from (...)
  30. From Joint Attention to Communicative Action Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 41 (6):593-608.
    In this article I consider the relevance of Tomasello’s work on social cognition to the theory of communicative action. I argue that some revisions are needed to cope with Tomasello’s results, but they do not affect the core of the theory. Moreover, they arguably reinforce both its explanatory power and the plausibility of its normative claims. I proceed in three steps. First, I compare and contrast Tomasello’s views on the ontogeny of human social cognition with the main tenets of Habermas’ (...)
  31. Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.
    In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint (...)
  32. Agoral Gathering: A New Conception of Collective Behavior.Adam Biela - 1989 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 19 (3):311–336.
  33. On Individual and Shared Obligations: In Defense of the Activist’s Perspective.Gunnar Björnsson - forthcoming - In Mark Budolfson, Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford University Press.
    We naturally attribute obligations to groups, and take such obligations to have consequences for the obligations of group members. The threat posed by anthropogenic climate change provides an urgent case. It seems that we, together, have an obligation to prevent climate catastrophe, and that we, as individuals, have an obligation to contribute. However, understood strictly, attributions of obligations to groups might seem illegitimate. On the one hand, the groups in question—the people alive today, say—are rarely fully-fledged moral agents, making it (...)
  34. Essentially Shared Obligations.Gunnar Björnsson - 2014 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
    This paper lists a number of puzzles for shared obligations – puzzles about the role of individual influence, individual reasons to contribute towards fulfilling the obligation, about what makes someone a member of a group sharing an obligation, and the relation between agency and obligation – and proposes to solve them based on a general analysis of obligations. On the resulting view, shared obligations do not presuppose joint agency.
  35. Common Knowledge and Reductionism About Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.
    Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It (...)
  36. Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally \ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their \-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if (...)
  37. Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):377-379.
  38. Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together By Michael Bratman. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):346-348.
  39. Shared Goals and Development.Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):94-101.
    In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a "shared goal"—a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a part in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to choose means that are (...)
  40. Joint Action Without and Beyond Planning.Olle Blomberg - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Leading philosophical accounts of joint activity, such as Michael Bratman’s account of ‘shared intentional activity’, take joint activity to be the outcome of two or more agents having a ‘shared intention’, where this is a certain pattern of mutually known prior intentions (plans) that are directed toward a common goal. With Bratman’s account as a foil, I address two lacunas that are relatively unexplored in the philosophical literature. The first lacuna concerns how to make sense of the apparently joint cooperative (...)
  41. Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action.Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
    According to a widely accepted constraint on the content of intentions, here called the exclusivity constraint, one cannot intend to perform another agent’s action, even if one might be able to intend that she performs it. For example, while one can intend that one’s guest leaves before midnight, one cannot intend to perform her act of leaving. However, Deborah Tollefsen’s (2005) account of joint activity requires participants to have intentions-in-action (in John Searle’s (1983) sense) that violate this constraint. I argue (...)
  42. An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour.Olle Blomberg - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag.
    Philosophical accounts of joint action are often prefaced by the observation that there are two different senses in which several agents can intentionally perform an action Φ, such as go for a walk or capture the prey. The agents might intentionally Φ together, as a collective, or they might intentionally Φ in parallel, where Φ is distributively assigned to the agents, considered as a set of individuals. The accounts are supposed to characterise what is distinctive about activities in which several (...)
  43. Essais Sur la Théorie Générale de la Rationalité: Action Sociale Et Sens Commun.Raymond Boudon - 2007 - Presses Universitaires de France.
  44. Short-Cycle Higher Education and the Pitfalls of Collective Action.Raymond Boudon, Philippe Cibois & Janina Lagneau - 1976 - Minerva 14 (1):33-60.
  45. Raisons Pratiques Sur la Théorie de L'Action.Pierre Bourdieu - 1994
  46. Joint Action and the Expression of Shared Intentions: An Expanded Taylorian Account.Sean Bowden - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    After having identified several shortcomings of the so-called ‘standard accounts’ of shared intentions, this paper will develop a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework to be advanced hinges on a notion of ‘expression’, as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed—that is, manifested, grasped, shaped and clarified—throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviours that accompany joint action. This claim will be defended with particular (...)
  47. Ethics and Agency Theory: An Introduction.Norman E. Bowie & R. Edward Freeman (eds.) - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
  48. The Logic of Capitalist Collective Action.J. R. Bowman - 1982 - Social Science Information 21 (4-5):571-604.
  49. Book Review:Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Dennis Chong. [REVIEW]Bernard Boxill - 1993 - Ethics 103 (3):602-.
  50. Shared Agency.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press. pp. 41--59.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways. Forms of shared activity matter to us a great deal, both intrinsically – think of friendship and love, singing duets, and the joys of conversation -- and instrumentally – think of how we frequently manage to work together to achieve complex goals. My focus will be on activities of small, adult groups in the absence of asymmetric authority relations within those groups. My approach begins with an underlying model of individual planning agency, and (...)
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