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  1. Epistemic Complicity.Cameron Boult - manuscript
    There is a widely accepted distinction between being directly responsible for a wrongdoing versus being somehow indirectly or vicariously responsible for the wrongdoing of another person or collective. Often this is couched in analyses of complicity, and complicity’s role in the relationship between individual and collective wrongdoing. Complicity is important because, inter alia, it allows us to make sense of individuals who may be blameless or blameworthy to a relatively low degree for their immediate conduct, but are nevertheless blameworthy to (...)
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  2. Dynamically rational judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - manuscript
    Judgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as coherence of judgments at a given time, defined as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. This paper asks whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light (...)
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  3. Viewpoint Convergence as a Philosophical Defect (work in progress, committed to volume Attitude in Philosophy, eds. Goldberg & Walker).Grace Helton - manuscript
    What can we know? How should we live? What is there? Philosophers famously diverge in the answers they give to these and other philosophical questions. It is widely presumed that a lack of convergence on these questions suggests that philosophy is not progressing at all, is not progressing fast enough, or is not progressing as fast as other disciplines, such as the natural sciences. Call the view that ideal philosophical progress is marked by at least some degree of convergence on (...)
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  4. WikiSilo: A Self-organizing, Crowd Sourcing System for Interdisciplinary Science [Supporting Paper].David Pierre Leibovitz, Robert L. West & Mike Belanger - manuscript
    WikiSilo is a tool for theorizing across interdisciplinary fields such as Cognitive Science, and provides a vocabulary for talking about the problems of doing so. It can be used to demonstrate that a particular cognitive theory is complete and coherent at multiple levels of discourse, and commensurable with and relevant to a wider domain of cognition. WikiSilo is also a minimalist theory and methodology for effectively doing science. WikiSilo is simultaneously similar to and distinct, as well as integrated and separated (...)
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  5. Epistemic vice predicts acceptance of Covid-19 misinformation.Marco Meyer, Mark Alfano & Boudewijn De Bruin - manuscript
    Why are mistaken beliefs about Covid-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only a part of individual differences in the susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible (...)
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  6. Jeffrey Pooling.Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg - manuscript
    How should your opinion change in light of an epistemic peer's? We show that the pooling rule known as “upco” is the unique answer satisfying some natural desiderata. If your revised opinion will impact your other views by Jeffrey conditionalization, then upco is the only standard pooling rule that ensures the order in which peers are consulted makes no difference. Popular alternatives like linear pooling, geometric pooling, and harmonic pooling cannot boast the same. In fact, no alternative can that possesses (...)
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  7. Believing is said of groups in many ways (and so it should be said of them in none).Richard Pettigrew -
    In the first half of this paper, I argue that group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What's more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. In the second half, I argue that this ambiguity often has bad consequences when a group belief ascription is heard and taken as testimony. And indeed it has these consequences even when the ascription is (...)
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  8. The Wisdom of the Small Crowd: Myside Bias and Group Discussion.Edoardo Baccini, Stephan Hartmann, Rineke Verbrugge & Zoé Christoff - forthcoming - Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation.
    The my-side bias is a well-documented cognitive bias in the evaluation of arguments, in which reasoners in a discussion tend to overvalue arguments that confirm their prior beliefs, while undervaluing arguments that attack their prior beliefs. The first part of this paper develops and justifies a Bayesian model of myside bias at the level of individual reasoning. In the second part, this Bayesian model is implemented in an agent-based model of group discussion among myside-biased agents. The agent-based model is then (...)
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  9. The Anti-Individualistic Turn in the Ethics of Collegiality: Can Good Colleagues Be Epistemically Vicious?Andrea Berber & Vanja Subotić - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry (x):1-18.
    The aim of this paper is to show that the nascent field of ethics of collegiality may considerably benefit from a symbiosis with virtue and vice epistemology. We start by bringing the epistemic virtue and vice perspective to the table by showing that competence, deemed as an essential characteristic of a good colleague (Betzler & Löschke 2021), should be construed broadly to encompass epistemic competence. By endorsing the anti-individualistic stance in epistemology as well as context-specificity of epistemic traits, we show (...)
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  10. Access to Collective Epistemic Reasons: Reply to Mitova.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - Asian Joural of Philosophy:1-11.
    In this short paper, I critically examine Veli Mitova’s proposal that social-identity groups can have collective epistemic reasons. My primary focus is the role of privileged access in her account of how collective reasons become epistemic reasons for social-identity groups. I argue that there is a potentially worrying structural asymmetry in her account of two different types of cases. More specifically, the mechanisms at play in cases of “doxastic reasons” seem fundamentally different from those at play in cases of “epistemic-conduct (...)
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  11. Pluralistic Summativism about Group Belief.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    In what sense do groups have beliefs? This paper provides a novel answer to this question by combining pluralism and summativism about group belief. The resulting view is called pluralistic summativism. The paper starts by critically assessing the three main debates in the literature—the disputes between monism and pluralism, summativism and non-summativism, and believism and rejectionism—and draws a general methodological lesson for the summativism/non-summativism debate—namely, that intuitions about cases alone are not enough to adjudicate between views of group belief, and (...)
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  12. Pluralistic Ignorance and Collective Belief: A DDL Approach.Proietti Carlo - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic.
  13. Real Life Collective Epistemic Virtue and Vice.Boudewijn de Bruin & Barend de Rooij - forthcoming - In Mark Alfano, Colin Klein & Jeroen De Ridder (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. New York: pp. 396-423.
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  14. Collective Understanding — A conceptual defense for when groups should be regarded as epistemic agents with understanding.Sven Delarivière - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2).
    Could groups ever be an understanding subject (an epistemic agent ascribed with understanding) or should we keep our focus exclusively on the individuals that make up the group? The way this paper will shape an answer to this question is by starting from a case we are most willing to accept as group understanding, then mark out the crucial differences with an unconvincing case, and, ultimately, explain why these differences matter. In order to concoct the cases, however, we need to (...)
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  15. Developing a Trusted Human-AI Network for Humanitarian Benefit.Susannah Kate Devitt, Jason Scholz, Timo Schless & Larry Lewis - forthcoming - Journal of Digital War:TBD.
    Humans and artificial intelligences (AI) will increasingly participate digitally and physically in conflicts yet there is a lack of trusted communications across agents and platforms. For example, humans in disasters and conflict already use messaging and social media to share information, however, international humanitarian relief organisations treat this information as unverifiable and untrustworthy. AI may reduce the ‘fog-of-war’ and improve outcomes, however current AI implementations are often brittle, have a narrow scope of application and wide ethical risks. Meanwhile, human error (...)
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  16. Authority in the context of distributed knowledge.Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss - forthcoming - Common Knowledge.
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  17. Attunement: On the Cognitive Virtues of Attention.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Social Virtue Epistemology.
    I motivate three claims: Firstly, attentional traits can be cognitive virtues and vices. Secondly, groups and collectives can possess attentional virtues and vices. Thirdly, attention has epistemic, moral, social, and political importance. An epistemology of attention is needed to better understand our social-epistemic landscape, including media, social media, search engines, political polarisation, and the aims of protest. I apply attentional normativity to undermine recent arguments for moral encroachment and to illuminate a distinctive epistemic value of occupying particular social positions. A (...)
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  18. Bullshit in Politics Pays.Adam F. Gibbons - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    Politics is full of people who don’t care about the facts. Still, while not caring about the facts, they are often concerned to present themselves as caring about them. Politics, in other words, is full of bullshitters. But why? In this paper I develop an incentives-based analysis of bullshit in politics, arguing that it is often a rational response to the incentives facing different groups of agents. In a slogan: bullshit in politics pays, sometimes literally. After first outlining an account (...)
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  19. Group Lies and the Narrative Constraint.Säde Hormio - forthcoming - Episteme 19 (First View):1-20.
    A group is lying when it makes a statement that it believes to be untrue but wants the addressee(s) to believe. But how can we distinguish statements that the group believes to be untrue from honest group statements based on mistaken beliefs or confusion within the group? I will suggest a narrative constraint for honest group statements, made up of two components. Narrative coherence requires that a new group statement should not conflict with group knowledge on the matter, or beliefs (...)
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  20. Epistemic Courage and the Harms of Epistemic Life.Ian James Kidd - forthcoming - In Heather Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook to Virtue Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 244-255.
    Since subjection to harm is an intrinsic feature of our social and epistemic lives, there is a perpetual need for individual and collective agents with the virtue of epistemic courage. In this chapter, I survey some of the main issues germane to this virtue, such as the nature of courage and of harm, the range of epistemic activities that can manifest courage, and the status of epistemic courage as a collective and as a professional virtue.
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  21. On Group Background Beliefs.Nate Lauffer - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies (Forthcoming):1-13.
    In this paper, I argue that the following claims are jointly inconsistent: (1) that an agent’s justification for belief, if it’s constituted by evidence, depends on the profile of her background beliefs, (2) that whether or not a group believes a proposition is solely dependent on whether the proposition is jointly accepted by its members, and (3) that prototypical group beliefs are justified. I also raise objections to attempts to resolve the tension by retaining (2) and (3). The upshot is (...)
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  22. Mindscapes and Landscapes: Hayek and Simon on Cognitive Extension.Leslie Marsh - forthcoming - In Roger Frantz & Robert Leeson (eds.), Hayek and Behavioral Economics. Palgrave.
    Hayek’s and Simon’s social externalism runs on a shared presupposition: mind is constrained in its computational capacity to detect, harvest, and assimilate “data” generated by the infinitely fine-grained and perpetually dynamic characteristic of experience in complex social environments. For Hayek, mind and sociality are co-evolved spontaneous orders, allowing little or no prospect of comprehensive explanation, trapped in a hermeneutically sealed, i.e. inescapably context bound, eco-system. For Simon, it is the simplicity of mind that is the bottleneck, overwhelmed by the ambient (...)
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  23. Hayek and the “Use of Knowledge in Society”.Leslie Marsh - forthcoming - In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences.
    Encyclopedia entry: http://www.sagepub.com/books/Book234813#tabview=title.
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  24. Optimizing Political Influence: A Jury Theorem with Dynamic Competence and Dependence.Thomas Mulligan - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.
    The purpose of this paper is to illustrate, formally, an ambiguity in the exercise of political influence. To wit: A voter might exert influence with an eye toward maximizing the probability that the political system (1) obtains the correct (e.g. just) outcome, or (2) obtains the outcome that he judges to be correct (just). And these are two very different things. A variant of Condorcet's Jury Theorem which incorporates the effect of influence on group competence and interdependence is developed. Analytic (...)
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  25. Capturing the Conspiracist's Imagination.Daniel Munro - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-29.
    Some incredibly far-fetched conspiracy theories circulate online these days. For most of us, clear evidence would be required before we’d believe these extraordinary theories. Yet, conspiracists often cite evidence that seems transparently very weak. This is puzzling, since conspiracists often aren’t irrational people who are incapable of rationally processing evidence. I argue that existing accounts of conspiracist belief formation don’t fully address this puzzle. Then, drawing on both philosophical and empirical considerations, I propose a new explanation that appeals to the (...)
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  26. Cults, Conspiracies, and Fantasies of Knowledge.Daniel Munro - forthcoming - Episteme:1-22.
    There’s a certain pleasure in fantasizing about possessing knowledge, especially possessing secret knowledge to which outsiders don’t have access. Such fantasies are typically a source of innocent entertainment. However, under the right conditions, fantasies of knowledge can become epistemically dangerous, because they can generate illusions of genuine knowledge. I argue that this phenomenon helps to explain why some people join and eventually adopt the beliefs of epistemic communities who endorse seemingly bizarre, outlandish claims, such as extreme cults and online conspiracy (...)
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  27. 3.2 Collective Quality: How to design collective standards of knowledge?Gloria Origgi - forthcoming - Common Knowledge: The Challenge of Transdisciplinarity.
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  28. The diversity-ability trade-off in scientific problem solving.Samuli Reijula & Jaakko Kuorikoski - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science (Supplement).
    According to the diversity-beats-ability theorem, groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers. We argue that the model introduced by Lu Hong and Scott Page is inadequate for exploring the trade-off between diversity and ability. This is because the model employs an impoverished implementation of the problem-solving task. We present a new version of the model which captures the role of ‘ability’ in a meaningful way, and use it to explore the trade-offs between diversity and ability (...)
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  29. The Curious Case of the Jury-shaped Hole: A Plea for Real Jury Research.Lewis Ross - forthcoming - International Journal of Evidence and Proof.
    Criminal juries make decisions of great importance. A key criticism of juries is that they are unreliable in a multitude of ways, from exhibiting racial or gendered biases, to misunderstanding their role, to engaging in impropriety such as internet research. Recently, some have even claimed that the use of juries creates injustice on a large-scale, as a cause of low conviction rates for sexual criminality. Unfortunately, empirical research into jury deliberation is undermined by the fact that researchers are unable to (...)
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  30. Can Real Social Epistemic Networks Deliver the Wisdom of Crowds?Emily Sullivan, Max Sondag, Ignaz Rutter, Wouter Meulemans, Scott Cunningham, Bettina Speckmann & Mark Alfano - forthcoming - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, we explain and showcase the promising methodology of testimonial network analysis and visualization for experimental epistemology, arguing that it can be used to gain insights and answer philosophical questions in social epistemology. Our use case is the epistemic community that discusses vaccine safety primarily in English on Twitter. In two studies, we show, using both statistical analysis and exploratory data visualization, that there is almost no neutral or ambivalent discussion of vaccine safety on Twitter. Roughly half the (...)
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  31. General-Purpose Institutional Decision-Making Heuristics: The Case of Decision-Making under Deep Uncertainty.David Thorstad - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Recent work in judgment and decisionmaking has stressed that institutions, like individuals, often rely on decisionmaking heuristics. But most of the institutional decisionmaking heuristics studied to date are highly firm- and industry-specific. This contrasts to the individual case, in which many heuristics are general-purpose rules suitable for a wide range of decision problems. Are there also general-purpose heuristics for institutional decisionmaking? In this paper, I argue that a number of methods recently developed for decisionmaking under deep uncertainty have a good (...)
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  32. Слепые тени Нарцисса.Roberto Thomas Arruda - 2023 - São Paulo: Terra à Vista.
    В данной работе рассматриваются важнейшие вопросы о коллективном воображаемом и его отношениях с реальностью и истиной. Сначала мы рассмотрим эту тему в концептуальных рамках, а затем проведем соответствующий фактологический анализ наглядных поведенческих реалий. Мы будем опираться не только на методологию, но и, главным образом, на постулаты и положения аналитической философии, которые, безусловно, будут проявляться на протяжении всего исследования и могут быть идентифицированы по признакам, описанным Пересом : Рабосси (1975) отстаивает идею, что аналитическая философия может быть идентифицирована путем рассмотрения некоторых семейных (...)
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  33. Group Epistemology and Structural Factors in Online Group Polarization.Kenneth Boyd - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):57-72.
    There have been many discussions recently from philosophers, cognitive scientists, and psychologists about group polarization, with online and social media environments in particular receiving a lot of attention, both because of people's increasing reliance on such environments for receiving and exchanging information and because such environments often allow individuals to selectively interact with those who are like-minded. My goal here is to argue that the group epistemologist can facilitate understanding the kinds of factors that drive group polarization in a way (...)
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  34. Group belief and direction of fit.Jessica Brown - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10):3161-3178.
    We standardly attribute beliefs to both individuals and organised groups, such as governments, corporations and universities. Just as we might say that an individual believes something, for instance that oil prices are rising, so we might say that a government or corporation does. If groups are to genuinely have beliefs, then they need states with the characteristic features of beliefs. One feature standardly taken to characterise beliefs is their mind to world direction of fit: they should fit the way the (...)
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  35. Lackey on group justified belief and evidence.Jessica Brown - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-7.
    In this paper, I examine one central strand of Lackey’s The Epistemology of Groups, namely her account of group justified belief and the puzzle cases she uses to develop it. Her puzzle cases involve a group of museum guards most of whom justifiably believe a certain claim but do so on different bases. Consideration of these cases leads her to hold that a group justifiably believes p if and only if (1) a significant proportion of its operative members (a) justifiably (...)
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  36. Collective Deception: Toward a Network Model of Epistemic Responsibility.Cayla Clinkenbeard - 2023 - Synthese 202 (3):1-19.
    What kind of collective is responsible for the deception that follows disinformation campaigns? Jennifer Lackey argues in The Epistemology of Groups that a group agent is responsible for such deception. She analyzes this deception as a group lie, which involves a group misrepresenting its own beliefs through a jointly accepted assertion or a spokesperson. Against this view, I argue that the group responsible for disinformation campaigns is a diffuse network. This deception involves misrepresenting scientific knowledge, not a group belief. Taking (...)
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  37. Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity.Niels de Haan - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (1):1-22.
    Collective moral agents can cause their own moral incapacity. If an agent is morally incapacitated, then the agent is exempted from responsibility. Due to self-induced moral incapacity, corporate responsibility gaps resurface. To solve this problem, I first set out and defend a minimalist account of moral competence for group agents. After setting out how a collective agent can cause its own moral incapacity, I argue that self-induced temporary exempting conditions do not free an agent from diachronic responsibility once the agent (...)
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  38. Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge.Avram Hiller & R. Wolfe Randall - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (1):30-46.
    How a group G can know that p has been the subject of much investigation in social epistemology in recent years. This paper clarifies and defends a form of non-supervenient, non-summative group knowledge: G can know that p even if none of the members of G knows that p, and whether or not G knows that p does not locally supervene on the mental states of the members of G. Instead, we argue that what is central to G knowing that (...)
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  39. Pluralism About Group Knowledge: A Reply to Jesper Kallestrup.Avram Hiller & R. Wolfe Randall - 2023 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (1):39-45.
    Jesper Kallestrup has provided an insightful response to our paper, “Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge”. Kallestrup identifies some important issues pertaining to our non-summative, non-supervenient account of group knowledge which we did not address in our original paper. Here, we develop our view further in light of Kallestrup’s helpful reply.
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  40. 从“文化叠加性”的角度概述越南社会的“三教合流”.Ruining Jin & Quan-Hoang Vuong - 2023 - Osf Preprints.
    该研究简要介绍了儒家、佛教和道教在越南的起源和发展,以及它们如何通过 "文化叠加性 "来共存、互动、影响越南社会。基于文化叠加性的成本效益分析,本文进一步说明了儒家思想如何在越南社会中占主导地位,道教思想如何与儒家思想共存,以及为什么佛教影响力逐渐在越南民间消失。.
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  41. Multidimensionalism, Resistance, and The Demographic Problem.Ian James Kidd - 2023 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 19 (1):5-30.
    Linda Martín Alcoff and others have emphasised that the discipline of philosophy suffers from a ‘demographic problem’. The persistence of this problem is partly the consequence of various forms of resistance to efforts to address the demographic problem. Such resistance is complex and takes many forms and could be responded to in different ways. In this paper, I argue that our attempts to explain and understand the phenomenon of resistance should use a kind of explanatory pluralism that, following Quassim Cassam, (...)
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  42. Group Assertions and Group Lies.Neri Marsili - 2023 - Topoi 42 (2):369-384.
    Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to offer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s influential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to (...)
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  43. Why It's OK Not to Think for Yourself.Jonathan Matheson - 2023 - Routledge.
    We tend to applaud those who think for themselves: the ever-curious student, for example, or the grownup who does their own research. Even as we’re applauding, however, we ourselves often don’t think for ourselves. This book argues that’s completely OK. -/- In fact, it’s often best just to take other folks’ word for it, allowing them to do the hard work of gathering and evaluating the relevant evidence. In making this argument, philosopher Jonathan Matheson shows how 'expert testimony' and 'the (...)
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  44. A Polarization-Containing Ethics of Campaign Advertising.Attila Mráz - 2023 - Analyse & Kritik 45 (1):111-135.
    (OPEN ACCESS) This paper establishes moral duties for intermediaries of political advertising in election campaigns. First, I argue for a collective duty to maintain the democratic quality of elections which entails a duty to contain some forms of political polarization. Second, I show that the focus of campaign ethics on candidates, parties and voters—ignoring the mediators of campaigns—yields mistaken conclusions about how the burdens of the latter collective duty should be distributed. Third, I show why it is fair to require (...)
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  45. Ngụ Ngôn Bói Cá: Tập truyện cho cả trẻ em và người trưởng thành. [REVIEW]Nguyễn Phương Tri - 2023 - Kinh Tế Và Dự Báo.
    Thông qua các câu chuyện, tác giả đã khéo léo mượn hình ảnh về chú chim Bói Cá đầy khôi hài và châm biếm để thể hiện các triết lý nhân sinh quan trong cuộc sống.
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  46. Vice epistemology, norm-maintenance and epistemic evasiveness.Adam Piovarchy - 2023 - Synthese 201 (105):1-20.
    Vice epistemology studies how character traits, attitudes, or thinking styles systematically get in the way of knowledge, while doxastic responsibility is concerned with what kinds of responses are appropriate towards agents who believe badly. This paper identifies a new connection between these two fields, arguing that our propensity to take responsibility for our doxastic failures is directly relevant for vice epistemology, and in particular, understanding the social obstacles to knowledge that epistemic vices can create. This is because responses to norm (...)
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  47. Collective arrogance: a norms-based account.Henry Roe - 2023 - Synthese 202 (32):1-18.
    How should we understand the arrogance of groups that do not seem to exhibit group agency? Specifically, how should we understand the putative epistemic arrogance ascribed to men and privileged or powerful groups in cases raised in the extant philosophical literature? Groups like these differ from others that are usually the subject of work on collective vice and virtue insofar as they seem to lack essential features of group agency; they are sub-agential groups. In this article, I ask whether extant (...)
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  48. Collective vice and collective self-knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - 2023 - Synthese 201 (19):1-18.
    Groups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one’s own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one’s own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an account of such collective self-knowledge. I suggest that collective self-knowledge of vices is partially based (...)
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  49. An anchored joint acceptance account of group justification.Lukas Schwengerer - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):432-450.
    When does a group justifiedly believe that p? One answer to this question has been developed first by Schmitt and then by Hakli: when the group members jointly accept a reason for the belief. Call this the joint acceptance account of group justification. Their answer has great explanatory power, providing us with a way to account for cases in which the group's justification can diverge from the justification individual members have. Unfortunately, Jennifer Lackey developed a powerful argument against joint acceptance (...)
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  50. Epistemology of ignorance: the contribution of philosophy to the science-policy interface of marine biosecurity.Anne Schwenkenbecher, Chad L. Hewitt, Remco Heesen, Marnie L. Campbell, Oliver Fritsch, Andrew T. Knight & Erin Nash - 2023 - Frontiers in Marine Science 10:1-5.
    Marine ecosystems are under increasing pressure from human activity, yet successful management relies on knowledge. The evidence-based policy (EBP) approach has been promoted on the grounds that it provides greater transparency and consistency by relying on ‘high quality’ information. However, EBP also creates epistemic responsibilities. Decision-making where limited or no empirical evidence exists, such as is often the case in marine systems, creates epistemic obligations for new information acquisition. We argue that philosophical approaches can inform the science-policy interface. Using marine (...)
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