About this topic
Summary Intentionality is the property of being about, directed at, or representing events, objects, properties and states of affairs.  The mind is the original source of intentionality.  The study of collective intentionality is the study of intentionality in the social context.  What is distinctive about the study of collective intentionality within the broader study of social interactions and structures is its focus on the conceptual and psychological features of joint or shared actions and attitudes, that is, actions and attitudes of (or apparent attributions of such to) groups or collectives, their relations to individual actions and attitudes, and their implications for the nature of social groups and their functioning.  It subsumes the study of collective action, responsibility, reasoning, thought, intention, emotion, phenomenology, decision-making, knowledge, trust, rationality, cooperation, competition, and related issues, as well as how these underpin social practices, organizations, conventions, institutions and social ontology.  Collective intentionality is a rapidly growing interdisciplinary area of research that draws on philosophy, logic, linguistics, cognitive science, sociology, computer science, psychology, economics, political science, legal theory, and cultural and evolutionary anthropology.
Key works Pioneering work by philosophers Raimo Tuomela (Tuomela & Miller 1988) and Margaret Gilbert (Gilbert 1990; Gilbert 1989) in the 1980s led to a rapid expansion of interest in joint action and intention in the 1990s, with important contributions by Michael Bratman (Bratman 1992; Bratman 1993) and John Searle (Searle 1990; Searle 1995; Searle 2009).  Tuomela, Gilbert and Searle offer non-reductive accounts of joint intention. Bratman (Bratman 2014), Miller (Miller 2001) and Ludwig (Ludwig 2007)(Ludwig 2016)(Ludwig 2017) offer reductive accounts. This has been attended by work on collective attitudes, reasoning, emotions, and so on more generally (Schmitt 2003).
Introductions Tollefsen 2004, Schweikard & Schmid 2012, Jankovic & Ludwig 2016, Ludwig & Jankovic 2018
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  1. Searle’s Contradictory Theory of Social Reality.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    John Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status functions with deontic powers are created by collective acceptance that is not analysable into individual acceptance. I point out three self-contradictions in Searle’s exposition.
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  2. Individual Minds as Groups, Group Minds as Individuals.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    This is a long-abandoned draft, written in 2013, of what was supposed to be a paper for an edited collection (one that, in the end, didn't come together). The paper "Group Minds and Natural Kinds" descends from it.
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  3. Concepts as shared regulative ideals.Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter - manuscript
    What is it to share the same concept? The question is an important one since sharing the same concept explains our ability to non-accidentally coordinate on the same topic over time and between individuals. Moreover, concept identity grounds key logical relations among thought contents such as samesaying, contradiction, validity, and entailment. Finally, an account of concept identity is crucial to explaining and justifying epistemic efforts to better understand the precise contents of our thoughts. The key question, then, is what psychological (...)
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  4. Language and Consciousness; How Language Implies Self-awareness.Mehran Shaghaghi - manuscript
    The relationship between language and consciousness has been debated since ancient times, but the details have never been fully articulated. Certainly, there are animals that possess the same essential auditory and vocal systems as humans, but acquiring language is seemingly uniquely human. In this essay, we investigate the relationship between language and consciousness by demonstrating how language usage implies the self-awareness of the user. We show that the self-awareness faculty encompasses the language faculty and how this self-awareness, that is uniquely (...)
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  5. Scientific Competition: Theory and Policy, Conferences on New Political Economy.M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen & S. Voigt (eds.) - forthcoming - Mohr Siebeck.
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  6. A Theory of Collective Virtue.Matthew Baddorf & Noah McKay - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    We introduce Imitationism, a new theory of collective virtue—that is, of virtues and vices held by collectives such as corporations and governments. This theory has the advantage of clearly explaining how collectives can have virtues in robustly non-reductive ways without appealing to group minds. We then use this theory to elucidate some examples of collective virtue and respond to some objections.
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  7. Group Responsibility and Historicism.Stephanie Collins & Niels de Haan - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or revise historicism. We pursue the third option. We formulate a Manipulation Condition and a (...)
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  8. Collective Understanding — A conceptual defense for when groups should be regarded as epistemic agents with understanding.Sven Delarivière - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2).
    Could groups ever be an understanding subject (an epistemic agent ascribed with understanding) or should we keep our focus exclusively on the individuals that make up the group? The way this paper will shape an answer to this question is by starting from a case we are most willing to accept as group understanding, then mark out the crucial differences with an unconvincing case, and, ultimately, explain why these differences matter. In order to concoct the cases, however, we need to (...)
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  9. The Concept of Action and the Relevance of Intentional Collective Action in History.Doris Gerber - forthcoming - New Content is Available for Journal of the Philosophy of History.
    _ Source: _Page Count 13 The article starts with the theses that it is the very concept of action that is at stake in many debates between philosophers and historians. Whereas in philosophy actions are conceptualized by reference to their beginning, namely their motives or intentions, in historiography the consequences of actions are much more in the focus of interest. Especially the debate about the dualism of structure and agency is characterized by different concepts of action. In the article it (...)
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  10. On collectively assigning features to artifacts.Rodrigo A. Dos S. Gouvea - forthcoming - Filosofia Unisinos:1-12.
    The common notion of artifacts characterizes them as the products of successful activities of their makers, guided by intentions that such objects would instantiate certain features, such as their specific functions. Many counterexamples, however, reveal the unsuitability of the common notion. In the face of this acknowledgment, the paper explores the possibility that features of artifacts, and more specifically, the possession of their functions, may arise, at least partially, from collective assignments. In order to achieve the mentioned goal, the paper (...)
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  11. Joint Attention and Communication.Rory Harder - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Joint attention occurs when two (or more) individuals attend together to some object. It has been identified by psychologists as an early form of our joint engagement, and is thought to provide us with an understanding of other minds that is basic in that sophisticated conceptual resources are not involved. Accordingly, it has also attracted the interest of philosophers. Moreover, a very recent trend in the psychological and philosophical literature on joint attention consists of developing the suggestion that it holds (...)
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  12. Becoming episodic: The Development of Objectivity.Frauke Hildebrandt & Ramiro Glauer - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    We argue that objectivity is acquired by learning to refer to particular situations, that is, by developing episodicity. This contrasts with the widespread idea that genericity is crucial in developing humans’ ability to conceive of an objective world. According to the collective intentionality account, objectivity is acquired by contrasting one’s particular perspective in the “here and now” with a generic group perspective on how things are generally. However, this line of argument rests on confusing two independent notions of genericity: social (...)
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  13. Collective Memory: Metaphor or Real?Premjit Laikhuram - forthcoming - Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science.
    Collective memory researchers predominantly in the cultural and social sciences have commonly understood the concept of collective memory as a mere metaphor, as something not existing in itself as memory but useful only as a tool for referring to the way groups construct shared representations of their past. Few have however addressed the question of whether it is a metaphor or literal in its own right. This paper looks at the plausibility of the claim that collective memory is a mere (...)
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  14. Collective Memory: Metaphor or Real?Premjit Laikhuram - forthcoming - Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science.
    Collective memory researchers predominantly in the cultural and social sciences have commonly understood the concept of collective memory as a mere metaphor, as something not existing in itself as memory but useful only as a tool for referring to the way groups construct shared representations of their past. Few have however addressed the question of whether it is a metaphor or literal in its own right. This paper looks at the plausibility of the claim that collective memory is a mere (...)
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  15. Agent‐Switching, Plight Inescapability, and Corporate Agency.Olof Leffler - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Realists about group agency, according to whom corporate agents may have mental states and perform actions over and above those of their individual members, think that individual agents may switch between participating in individual and corporate agency. My aim is, however, to argue that the inescapability of individual agency spells out a difficulty for this kind of switching – and, therefore, for realism about corporate agency. To do so, I develop Korsgaard's notion of plight inescapability. On my take, it suggests (...)
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  16. An Introduction to Collective Intentionality: In Action, Thought, and Society.Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic - forthcoming - New York: Routledge.
    This is an introduction to collective intentionality. It discusses collection action and intention, collective belief, distributed cognition, collective intentionality and language, conventions and status functions, institutions and social ontology, and collective responsibility.
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  17. Mindscapes and Landscapes: Hayek and Simon on Cognitive Extension.Leslie Marsh - forthcoming - In Roger Frantz & Robert Leeson (eds.), Hayek and Behavioral Economics. Palgrave.
    Hayek’s and Simon’s social externalism runs on a shared presupposition: mind is constrained in its computational capacity to detect, harvest, and assimilate “data” generated by the infinitely fine-grained and perpetually dynamic characteristic of experience in complex social environments. For Hayek, mind and sociality are co-evolved spontaneous orders, allowing little or no prospect of comprehensive explanation, trapped in a hermeneutically sealed, i.e. inescapably context bound, eco-system. For Simon, it is the simplicity of mind that is the bottleneck, overwhelmed by the ambient (...)
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  18. Why the extended mind is nothing special but is central.Giulio Ongaro, Doug Hardman & Ivan Deschenaux - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    The extended mind thesis states that the mind is not brain-bound but extends into the physical world. The philosophical debate around the thesis has mostly focused on extension towards epistemic artefacts, treating the phenomenon as a special capacity of the human organism to recruit external physical resources to solve individual tasks. This paper argues that if the mind extends to artefacts in the pursuit of individual tasks, it extends to other humans in the pursuit of collective tasks. Mind extension to (...)
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  19. How to be minimalist about shared agency.Jules Salomone-Sehr - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared agency in terms of the notion of plan, and an explanation of undertheorized agency‐sharing mechanisms. (...)
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  20. Explaining the Cultural Evolution of large-scale Collaboration: Conventionality as an Alternative for Collective Intentionality.Marc Slors - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    The scalar notion of collective intentionality has been used to characterize the evolution of largely uncollaborative apes to highly collaborative ones. This proposal covers human evolution up until and including the formation of hunter-gather groups. But can collective intentionality also explain the emergence of complex societies? I argue that it cannot. Instead of collective intentionality, collaboration in complex societies hinges on a set of non-strategic attitudes and standardized human interactions so that role divisions, institutions, norms and conventions can emerge as (...)
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  21. A Beginner’s Guide to Group Minds.Georg Theiner - forthcoming - In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Conventional wisdom in the philosophy of mind holds that (1) minds are exclusively possessed by individuals, and that (2) no constitutive part of a mind can have a mind of its own. For example, the paradigmatic minds of human beings are in the purview of individual organisms, associated closely with their brains, and no parts of the brain that are constitutive of a human mind are considered as capable of having a mind. Let us refer to the conjunction of (1) (...)
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  22. Discursive Injustice and the Speech of Indigenous Communities.Leo Townsend - forthcoming - In Leo Townsend, Preston Stovall & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Social Institution of Discursive Norms. New York: pp. 248-263.
    Recent feminist philosophy of language has highlighted the ways that the speech of women can be unjustly impeded, because of the way their gender affects the uptake their speech receives. In this chapter, I explore how similar processes can undermine the speech of a different sort of speaker: Indigenous communities. This involves focusing on Indigeneity rather than gender as the salient social identity, and looking at the ways that group speech, rather than only individual speech, can be unjustly impeded. To (...)
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  23. The unity and plurality of sharing.Dan Zahavi - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Many accounts of collective intentionality target rather sophisticated types of cooperative activities, i.e., activities with complex goals that require prior planning and various coordinating and organizing roles. But although joint action is of obvious importance, an investigation of collective intentionality should not merely focus on the question of how we can share agentive intentions. We can act and do things together, but it is not obvious that the awe felt and shared by a group of Egyptologists when they gain entry (...)
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  24. The Therapeutic vs. Constructive Approach to the Transformative Character of Collective Intentionality. The Interpersonal Level of Explanation.Daniel Żuromski - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    In their article, Andrea Kern and Henrike Moll (2017) argue in support of a certain vision of shared/collective intentionality and its role in understanding our cognitive capacities. This vision is based on two aspects: a negative one, i.e. a theoretical diagnosis of the contemporary debate on shared/collective intentionality, and a positive one, referring to the proposals for shared/collective intentionality. As regards the negative aspect, the main thesis concerns the arbitrary assumptions underlying the whole debate on shared/collective intentionality. According to Kern (...)
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  25. Cooperative activity, shared intention, and exploitation.Olle Blomberg & Erik Malmqvist - 2024 - Ethics 134 (3):387-401.
    Jules Salomone-Sehr argues that an activity is cooperative if and only if, roughly, it consists of several participants’ actions that are (i) coordinated for a common purpose (ii) in ways that do not undermine any participant’s agency. He argues that guidance by shared intention is neither necessary nor sufficient for cooperation. Thereby, he claims to “topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory." In response, we argue that Salomone-Sehr’s account captures another notion of cooperation than the sociopsychological notion shared agency theory (...)
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  26. On the social nature of artefacts.Tim Juvshik - 2024 - Theoria 89 (6):910-932.
    Recent work in metaphysics has focused on the nature of artefacts, most accounts of which assume that artefacts depend on the intentions of their individual makers. Artefacts are thus importantly different from institutional kinds, which involve collective intentions. However, recent work in social ontology has yielded renewed focus on the social dimensions of various kinds, including artefacts. As a result, some philosophers have suggested that artefacts have a distinctly social dimension that goes beyond their makers' individual intentions but which stops (...)
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  27. Shared action: An existential phenomenological account.Nicolai Knudsen - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (1):63-83.
    Drawing on recent phenomenological discussions of collective intentionality and existential phenomenological accounts of agency, this article proposes a novel interpretation of shared action. First, I argue that we should understand action on the basis of how an environment pre-reflectively solicits agents to behave based on (a) the affordances or goals inflected by their abilities and dispositions and (b) their self-referential commitment to a project that is furthered by these affordances. Second, I show that this definition of action is sufficiently flexible (...)
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  28. John Searle’s ontology of money, and its critics.Louis Larue - 2024 - In Joseph Tinguely (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Money. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    John Searle has proposed one of the most influential contemporary accounts of social ontology. According to Searle, institutional facts are created by the collective assignment of a specific kind of function —status-function— to pre-existing objects. Thus, a piece of paper counts as money in a certain context because people collectively recognize it as money, and impose a status upon it, which in turn enables that piece of paper to deliver certain functions (means of payment, etc.). The first part of this (...)
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  29. Against Corporate Responsibility.Lars J. K. Moen - 2024 - Journal of Social Philosophy 55 (1):44–61.
    Can a group be morally responsible instead of, or in addition to, its members? An influential defense of corporate responsibility is based on results in social choice theory suggesting that a group can form and act on attitudes held by few, or even none, of its members. The members therefore cannot be (fully) responsible for the group’s behavior; the group itself, as a corporate agent, must be responsible. In this paper, I reject this view of corporate responsibility by showing how (...)
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  30. Conditional Intentions and Shared Agency.Matthew Rachar - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):271-288.
    Shared agency is a distinctive kind of sociality that involves interdependent planning, practical reasoning, and action between participants. Philosophical reflection suggests that agents engage in this form of sociality when a special structure of interrelated psychological attitudes exists between them, a set of attitudes that constitutes a collective intention. I defend a new way to understand collective intention as a combination of individual conditional intentions. Revising an initial statement of the conditional intention account in response to several challenges leads to (...)
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  31. Normative Cognition in the cognitive science of religion.Mark Addis - 2023 - In Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Religion. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 149-162.
    Ideas from Wittgenstein are developed to provide suggestions about how both the nature and acquisition of normative cognition in the cognitive science of religion might be understood. As part of this there is some consideration of more general issues about the nature and status of claims in the cognitive science of religion and of appropriate methodologies for the cognitive study of religion. The gaining, production, distribution and implementation of social concepts and norms involves the possession of certain cognitive skills and (...)
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  32. Thomas Aquinas on the Ontology of the Political Community.Fabrizio Amerini - 2023 - In Jenny Pelletier & Christian Rode (eds.), The Reality of the Social World: Medieval, Early Modern, and Contemporary Perspectives on Social Ontology. Springer Verlag. pp. 15-39.
    Does Aquinas have a theory of social ontology? It is not easy to answer this question. On the one hand, Aquinas never discusses the ontology of those entities that we today consider significant for social ontology. On the other hand, though, there are places where Aquinas addresses the mereological question of the relation between aggregates and the individuals that compose them, and these places are significant for bringing to light what Aquinas had to say, if anything, about social ontology. In (...)
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  33. Single-minded animals sharing intentionality and norms: Preston Stovall: The single-minded animal: shared intentionality, normativity, and the foundations of discursive cognition. New York: Routledge, 2022, 398 pp, $136.00 HB, $42.36 PB. [REVIEW]Brandon Beasley - 2023 - Metascience 32 (3):437-440.
  34. Team Reasoning, Mode, and Content.Olle Blomberg - 2023 - In Andrés G. Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 39-54.
    A “we-intention” is the kind of intention that an individual acts on when participating in joint intentional action. In discussions about what characterises such a we-intention, one fault line concerns whether the “we-ness” is a feature of a we-intention’s mode or content. According to Björn Petersson, it is an agent-perspectival feature of its mode. Petersson argues that content accounts are incompatible with theories of so-called “group identification” and “team reasoning”. Insofar as such group identification and team reasoning are commonplace in (...)
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  35. Tuomela on Social Norms and Group-Social Normativity.Olle Blomberg - 2023 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez & Rachael Mellin (eds.), Tuomela on Sociality. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 219-241.
    In everyday life, as members of larger or smaller groups, we hold each other accountable with respect to social norms. For this practice to be intelligible, we must arguably by and large be justified in demanding that other group members comply with these norms. Other things being equal, it seems that we have a group membership-based pro tanto reason to comply with the social norms of our group. In this chapter, I examine how such demands and reasons for compliance can (...)
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  36. Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity.Niels de Haan - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (1):1-22.
    Collective moral agents can cause their own moral incapacity. If an agent is morally incapacitated, then the agent is exempted from responsibility. Due to self-induced moral incapacity, corporate responsibility gaps resurface. To solve this problem, I first set out and defend a minimalist account of moral competence for group agents. After setting out how a collective agent can cause its own moral incapacity, I argue that self-induced temporary exempting conditions do not free an agent from diachronic responsibility once the agent (...)
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  37. Group Agents, Moral Competence, and Duty-bearers: The Update Argument.Niels de Haan - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5-6):1691-1715.
    According to some collectivists, purposive groups that lack decision-making procedures such as riot mobs, friends walking together, or the pro-life lobby can be morally responsible and have moral duties. I focus on plural subject- and we-mode-collectivism. I argue that purposive groups do not qualify as duty-bearers even if they qualify as agents on either view. To qualify as a duty-bearer, an agent must be morally competent. I develop the Update Argument. An agent is morally competent only if the agent has (...)
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  38. Introduction to the special issue on relational autonomy and collective intentionality.Shaun Gallagher - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (S1):1-7.
    This essay introduces the 40th Annual Spindel Conference special issue on relational autonomy and collective intentionality. Autonomy is often discussed in contexts of individual intention formation and moral decision making. When we consider collective intention formation and the decision-making practices of institutions, a number of questions can be raised: How does the individual autonomy of participants affect the collective process? How do such collective processes modulate the autonomy of the individuals involved? How do institutional decisions and practices affect individual autonomy (...)
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  39. Institutional Proxy Agency: A We-Mode Approach.Miguel Garcia-Godinez - 2023 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez & Rachael Mellin (eds.), Tuomela on Sociality. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 151–176.
    Proxy agency is the capacity of individuals and groups to act for other individuals or groups in specific social transactions. For example, a legal team acts as a proxy for a client in a courtroom, or the Prime Minister acts as a proxy for the UK Government when attending international meetings, etc. Although a very common social phenomenon, it has not yet received enough philosophical treatment. Currently, the most developed account of this capacity is Ludwig’s proxy agency in collective action. (...)
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  40. Tuomela on Sociality.Miguel Garcia-Godinez & Rachael Mellin (eds.) - 2023 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Raimo Tuomela, late Professor Emeritus at the Centre for Philosophy of Social Sciences (TINT), University of Helsinki, is widely regarded as one of the most important philosophers of our time. He published extensively on various topics within social philosophy; particularly, on social action, cooperation, group belief, group responsibility, group reasoning, social practices, and institutions. To celebrate his legacy, this volume engages with and delves deeply into his philosophy of sociality. By gathering original essays from a world-class line-up of social ontologists, (...)
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  41. Introduction.Miguel Garcia-Godinez & Rachael Mellin - 2023 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez & Rachael Mellin (eds.), Tuomela on Sociality. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 1-10.
    Raimo Tuomela (1940-2020) was a leading figure within social philosophy and a pioneer of contemporary social ontology. His main research and publications helped define the scholarly agenda of a philosophical investigation of social reality. Working first on (social) scientific realism and (social) action theory, he then developed an unprecedented account of collective intentionality—the kind of intentionality that individual agents require in order for them to perform intentional actions together, as a group.
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  42. The Ontology of Social Practices.Miguel Garcia Godinez - 2023 - Journal of Social Ontology 9 (1).
    Although social practices are widely considered to be essential building blocks in the construction of our social world, there is not much of an agreement regarding what kind of entities they are and what constitutes their nature. As an attempt to make progress in this direction, I provide here a general account of their ontology. By implementing specific resources from contemporary social ontology and collective intentionality, I argue that social practices are composite, material entities socially constructed by organised social groups (...)
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  43. Response to LÖhr: Why We Still Need a New Normativism.Javier Gomez-Lavin & Matthew Rachar - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1067-1076.
    Guido Löhr's recent article makes several insightful and productive suggestions about how to proceed with the empirical study of collective action. However, their critique of the conclusions drawn in Gomez-Lavin & Rachar (2022) is undermined by some issues with the interpretation of the debate and paper. This discussion article clears up those issues, presents new findings from experiments developed in response to Löhr's critiques, reflects on the role of experimental research in the development and refinement of philosophical theories, and adds (...)
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  44. Conceptualizing Interstate Cooperation.Moritz S. Graefrath & Marcel Jahn - 2023 - International Theory 15 (1):24-52.
    There seems to exist a general consensus on how to conceptualize cooperation in the field of international relations (IR). We argue that this impression is deceptive. In practice, scholars working on the causes of international cooperation have come to implicitly employ various understandings of what cooperation is. Yet, an explicit debate about the discipline's conceptual foundations never materialized, and whatever discussion occurred did so only latently and without much dialog across theoretical traditions. In this paper, we develop an updated conceptual (...)
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  45. Collective Intentionality and Methodological Individualism.Jens Greve - 2023 - In Nathalie Bulle & Francesco Di Iorio (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Methodological Individualism: Volume II. Springer Verlag. pp. 3-27.
    Collective intentionality (CI) designates a form of intentionality that cannot be understood in a summative way. For example, two persons who make a walk together do not simply intend individually to go their own way. Therefore, the question arises to what extent intentionality has to be understood as a concept that has to be extended beyond individual mental states. In this chapter, different approaches to CI are presented. According to the “reductive” analysis, CI can be analyzed in terms of individual (...)
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  46. We-mode in Theory and Action.Raul Hakli, Kaarlo Miller & Pekka Mäkelä - 2023 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez & Rachael Mellin (eds.), Tuomela on Sociality. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 11-35.
    We reflect on Raimo Tuomela’s philosophy of social action and group action on the basis of our collaboration in his research group over the years. We will give a brief introduction to Tuomela’s career, his research endeavours, and the development of the field of collective intentionality and social ontology in which he was one of the central figures. We will focus on the development of three central themes in his research: we-intentions, we-reasoning, and collective responsibility.
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  47. We and us: The power of the Third for the first-person plural.Tris Hedges - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    Phenomenological discussions of sociality have long been concerned with the relations between the I, the You, and the We. Recently, dialogue between phenomenology and analytic philosophical work on collective intentionality has given rise to a corpus of literature oriented around the first-person plural 'we'. In this paper, I demonstrate how these dominant accounts of the 'we' are not exhaustive of first-person plural experiences as such. I achieve these aims by arguing for a phenomenological distinction between an experience of being part (...)
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  48. A Philosophy of Collective Intentionality and the Transformation of Meaning During the Contemporary Rituals of Birth.Anna M. Hennessey - 2023 - In Raffaela Giovagnoli & Robert Lowe (eds.), The Logic of Social Practices II. Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 147-157.
    This paper examines collective intentionality, one of the three fundamental elements in a classic theory of social ontology, and how we locate its emergence in the way that individuals and social groups transform the meaning of art and other objects used in the context of contemporary birth rituals. In this context, religious art and other objects often undergo an ontological transformation during the rituals of birth when participants secularize them, marking them with new status functions that diverge from their original (...)
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  49. On group lies and lying to oneself: comment on Jennifer Lackey’s The Epistemology of Groups.Megan Hyska - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-8.
    In The Epistemology of Groups, Jennifer Lackey investigates the conditions for the possibility of groups telling lies. Central to this project is the goal of holding groups, and individuals within groups, accountable for their actions. I show that Lackey’s total account of group phenomena, however, may open up a means by which groups can evade accusations of having lied, thus allowing them to evade responsibility in precisely the way Lackey set out to avoid. Along the way, I also take note (...)
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  50. Social Entities with and without Explicit Establishment.Ludger Jansen - 2023 - In Jenny Pelletier & Christian Rode (eds.), The Reality of the Social World: Medieval, Early Modern, and Contemporary Perspectives on Social Ontology. Springer Verlag. pp. 139-157.
    Much work in social ontology analyzes how social entities are based on collective intentionality. A neglected perspective is, however, the distinction between those social entities that are explicitly established (often called formal institutions, like marriages), those that are established but not explicitly (informal institutions, like friendships), and those that are not established at all (social macro entities, like episodes of inflation). To shed more light on this trichotomy, a collection of examples taken from the works of John Searle will be (...)
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