About this topic
Summary Intentionality is the property of being about, directed at, or representing events, objects, properties and states of affairs.  The mind is the original source of intentionality.  The study of collective intentionality is the study of intentionality in the social context.  What is distinctive about the study of collective intentionality within the broader study of social interactions and structures is its focus on the conceptual and psychological features of joint or shared actions and attitudes, that is, actions and attitudes of (or apparent attributions of such to) groups or collectives, their relations to individual actions and attitudes, and their implications for the nature of social groups and their functioning.  It subsumes the study of collective action, responsibility, reasoning, thought, intention, emotion, phenomenology, decision-making, knowledge, trust, rationality, cooperation, competition, and related issues, as well as how these underpin social practices, organizations, conventions, institutions and social ontology.  Collective intentionality is a rapidly growing interdisciplinary area of research that draws on philosophy, logic, linguistics, cognitive science, sociology, computer science, psychology, economics, political science, legal theory, and cultural and evolutionary anthropology.
Key works Pioneering work by philosophers Raimo Tuomela (Tuomela & Miller 1988) and Margaret Gilbert (Gilbert 1990; Gilbert 1989) in the 1980s led to a rapid expansion of interest in joint action and intention in the 1990s, with important contributions by Michael Bratman (Bratman 1992; Bratman 1993) and John Searle (Searle 1990; Searle 1995; Searle 2009).  Tuomela, Gilbert and Searle offer non-reductive accounts of joint intention. Bratman (Bratman 2014), Miller (Miller 2001) and Ludwig (Ludwig 2007)(Ludwig 2016)(Ludwig 2017) offer reductive accounts. This has been attended by work on collective attitudes, reasoning, emotions, and so on more generally (Schmitt 2003).
Introductions Tollefsen 2004, Schweikard & Schmid 2012, Jankovic & Ludwig 2016, Ludwig & Jankovic 2018
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  1. added 2020-05-26
    Consultation, Consent, and the Silencing of Indigenous Communities.Leo Townsend & Dina Lupin Townsend - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (online ahead of print).
    Over the past few decades, Indigenous communities have successfully campaigned for greater inclusion in decision-making processes that directly affect their lands and livelihoods. As a result, two important participatory rights for Indigenous peoples have now been widely recognized: the right to consultation and the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Although these participatory rights are meant to empower the speech of these communities—to give them a proper say in the decisions that most affect them—we argue that the way (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-23
    Proprietary Reasons and Joint Action.Abraham Roth - forthcoming - In A. Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency.
    Some of the reasons one acts on in joint action are shared with fellow participants. But others are proprietary: reasons of one’s own that have no direct practical significance for other participants. The compatibility of joint action with proprietary reasons serves to distinguish the former from other forms of collective agency; moreover, it is arguably a desirable feature of joint action. Advocates of “team reasoning” link the special collective intention individual participants have when acting together with a distinctive form of (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-18
    The Freedom(s) Within Collective Agency: Tuomela and Sartre.Basil Vassilicos - 2020 - Bulletin D’Analyse Phénoménologique 2 (XVI):112-137.
    In this paper, the goal is to investigate the nature of freedom enjoyed by participants in collective agency. Specifically, we aim to address the fol- lowing questions: in what respects are participants in collective agency able to exercise freedom in some weaker or stronger sense? In what ways is such col- lective or common freedom distinct from the freedom ascribed to individuals? Might there be different sorts of freedoms involved in and tolerated by collec- tive agency, each of which has (...)
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  4. added 2020-05-11
    Proxy Assertion.Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In proxy assertion an individual or group asserts something through a spokesperson. The chapter explains proxy assertion as resting on the assignment of a status role to a person (that of spokesperson) whose utterances acts in virtue of that role have the status function of signaling that the principal is committed in a way analogous to an individual asserting that in his own voice. The chapter briefly explains how status functions and status roles are grounded and then treats, in turn, (...)
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  5. added 2020-04-27
    Collective Understanding — A Conceptual Defense for When Groups Should Be Regarded as Epistemic Agents with Understanding.Sven Delarivière - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2).
    Could groups ever be an understanding subject (an epistemic agent ascribed with understanding) or should we keep our focus exclusively on the individuals that make up the group? The way this paper will shape an answer to this question is by starting from a case we are most willing to accept as group understanding, then mark out the crucial differences with an unconvincing case, and, ultimately, explain why these differences matter. In order to concoct the cases, however, we need to (...)
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  6. added 2020-04-27
    Emotions, Reasons, and Norms.Evan Simpson - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):72-97.
    A tension between acting morally and acting rationally is apparent in analyses of moral emotions that ascribe an inherent subjectivity to ethical thinking, leading thence to irresolvable differences between rational agents. This paper offers an account of emotional worthiness that shows how, even if moral reasons fall short of philosophical criteria of rationality, we can still accord reasonableness to them and recognize that the deliberative weight of social norms is sufficient to address the moral limitations of strategic rationality.
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  7. added 2020-04-27
    A frame of analysis for collective free improvisation on the bridge between Husserl’s phenomenology of time and some recent readings of the predictive coding model.Lucia Angelino - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (2):349-369.
    The kind of collective improvisation attained by the “free jazz” at the beginning of the sixties sets a challenge to analytic theories of collective intentionality, that emphasize the role played by future-directed plans in the interlocking and interdependent intentions of the individual participants, because in the free jazz case the performers’ interdependence or [interplay] stems from an intuitive understanding between musicians. Otherwise said: what happens musically is not planned in advance, but arises from spontaneous interactions in the group. By looking (...)
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  8. added 2020-04-27
    Circularity in Searle’s Social Ontology: With a Hegelian Reply.José Luis Fernández - 2020 - International Journal of Society, Culture and Language 8 (1):16-24.
    John Searle’s theory of social ontology posits that there are indispensable normative components in the linguistic apparatuses termed status functions, collective intentionality, and collective recognition, all of which, he argues, make the social world. In this paper, I argue that these building blocks of Searle’s social ontology are caught in a petitio of constitutive circularity. Moreover, I note how Searle fails to observe language in reciprocal relation to the institutions which not only are shaped by it but also shape language’s (...)
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  9. added 2020-04-27
    Collective intentionality and the further challenge of collective free improvisation.Lucia Angelino - 2020 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):49-65.
    The kind of collective improvisation attained by free jazz at the beginning of the sixties appears interesting from the perspective of contemporary debates on collective intentionality for several reasons. The most notable of these, is that it holds a mirror up to what analytical philosophers of action identify as “the complexly interwoven sets of collective intentions” that make a group more than the sum of its parts. But at the same time, free jazz poses a challenge to these philosophical theories (...)
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  10. added 2020-04-27
    Constitutive Justice and Human Rights.Rastko Jovanov & Marija Velinov - 2019 - Filozofija I Društvo 30 (4):478-492.
    In order to show the validity of here proposed conception of social ontology and its advantages over descriptive theories of social reality, which in the analysis of the socio-ontological status of human rights find only legally understood normativity as present in social reality, we will first lay out Searle’s interpretation of human rights. In the second step, we will introduce the methodical approach and basic concepts of our socio-ontological position, and explain the structure of the relationship between justice, law, morality, (...)
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  11. added 2020-04-27
    Force, Content and the Varieties of Subject.Michael Schmitz - 2019 - Language and Communication 69:115-129.
    This paper argues that to account for group speech acts, we should adopt a representationalist account of mode / force. Individual and collective subjects do not only represent what they e.g. assert or order. By asserting or ordering they also indicate their theoretical or practical positions towards what they assert or order. The ‘Frege point’ cannot establish the received dichotomy of force and propositional content. On the contrary, only the representationalist account allows a satisfactory response to it. It also allows (...)
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  12. added 2020-04-27
    Social Ontology, Practical Reasonableness, and Collective Reasons for Action.Polycarp Ikuenobe - 2019 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 49 (3):264-281.
    Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, EarlyView.
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  13. added 2020-04-27
    Constitutive Justice and Human Rights.Marija Velinov Rastko Jovanov - 2019 - Filozofija I Društvo 30 (4):478-492.
    In order to show the validity of here proposed conception of social ontology and its advantages over descriptive theories of social reality, which in the analysis of the socio-ontological status of human rights find only legally understood normativity as present in social reality, we will first lay out Searle’s interpretation of human rights. In the second step, we will introduce the methodical approach and basic concepts of our socio-ontological position, and explain the structure of the relationship between justice, law, morality, (...)
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  14. added 2020-04-27
    Being One of Us. Group Identification, Joint Actions, and Collective Intentionality.Alessandro Salice & Kengo Miyazono - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (1):42-63.
    ABSTRACTWithin social psychology, group identification refers to a mental process that leads an individual to conceive of herself as a group member. This phenomenon has recently attracted a great d...
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  15. added 2020-04-27
    Kollektives Verstehen.Rico Hauswald - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (3):373-391.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 67 Heft: 3 Seiten: 373-391.
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  16. added 2020-04-27
    Collective Intentionality, Team Reasoning and the Example of Economic Behavior.Raffaela Giovagnoli - 2019 - Edukacja Filozoficzna 67 (1):89-102.
    Abstract: Collective Intentionality is essential to the understanding of how we act as a "team". We will offer an overview on the contemporary debate on the sense of acting together. There are some theories which focus on unconscious processes and on the capabilities we share with animals (Tomasello, Walther, Hudin) and others which concentrate on the voluntary, conscious processes of acting together (Searle, Tuomela, Bratman, Gilbert). Collective intentionality represents also a relevant issue for economic theories. The theories of team reasoning (...)
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  17. added 2020-04-27
    A Sociological Formalization of Searle's Social Ontology.Kevin McCaffree - 2018 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 48 (3):330-349.
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  18. added 2020-04-27
    Shared Emotions: A Steinian Proposal.Gerhard Thonhauser - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):997-1015.
    The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based (...)
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  19. added 2020-04-27
    Phenomenal Consciousness, Collective Mentality, and Collective Moral Responsibility.Matthew Baddorf - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2769-2786.
    Are corporations and other complex groups ever morally responsible in ways that do not reduce to the moral responsibility of their members? Christian List, Phillip Pettit, Kendy Hess, and David Copp have recently defended the idea that they can be. For them, complex groups (sometimes called collectives) can be irreducibly morally responsible because they satisfy the conditions for morally responsible agency; and this view is made more plausible by the claim (made by Theiner) that collectives can have minds. In this (...)
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  20. added 2020-04-27
    Religiöse Symbole Im Öffentlichen Raum: Symbolwirkung Als Kollektive Intentionalität Einer Deutungsgemeinschaft.Jens Schlieter - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft 25 (2):196-232.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft Jahrgang: 25 Heft: 2 Seiten: 196-232.
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  21. added 2020-04-27
    Feelings of Being Together and Caring with One Another: A Contribution to the Debate on Collective Affective Intentionality.Szanto Thomas - 2017 - Journal of Social Ontology 3 (2):267-273.
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  22. added 2020-04-27
    Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation.Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7:1-17.
    The present paper proposes an integrative account of social forms of practical irrationality and corresponding disruptions of individual and group-level emotion regulation. I will especially focus on disruptions in emotion regulation by means of collaborative agential and doxastic akrasia. I begin by distinguishing mutual, communal and collaborative forms of akrasia. Such a taxonomy seems all the more needed as, rather surprisingly, in the face of huge philosophical interest in analysing the possibility, structure and mechanisms of individual practical irrationality, with very (...)
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  23. added 2020-04-27
    Experiencing the Other. How Expressivity and Value-Based Perception Provide a Non-Solipsistic Account of Empathy.Maria Chiara Bruttomesso - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):350-364.
    : The problem of intersubjectivity has undergone multifold discussions in the philosophical, neuroscientific and psychological fields. Currently, the predominant theories in this ongoing debate contend that simulation or explicit reasoning must ground other-understanding. Yet this contention confines the subject to solipsistic self-projection without actual communication. I will provide an analysis suggesting that the roots of the concept of “empathy” reveal not only a dualistic inner-outer distinction but also an emerging reference to the bodily dimension. I claim that, by examining the (...)
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  24. added 2020-04-27
    Ist der Geist Im Kopf?: Beiträge Zur These des Erweiterten Geistes.Jan G. Michel, Kim J. Boström & Michael Pohl (eds.) - 2016 - Münster: mentis.
    Im Jahre 1998 verblüfften Andy Clark und David Chalmers die philosophische Gemeinschaft mit der sog. These des erweiterten Geistes, die im Kern besagt, dass kognitive Systeme nicht-biologische Komponenten enthalten können und sich damit über die Grenzen biologischer Organismen hinaus erstrecken können. Mittlerweile wird diese These nicht nur von Philosophen, sondern auch von Kognitions- und Neurowissenschaftlern intensiv und kontrovers diskutiert. -/- In den begutachteten Beiträgen des vorliegenden ersten deutschsprachigen Band zur These des erweiterten Geistes geht es u.a. um die folgenden Fragen: (...)
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  25. added 2020-04-27
    Husserl on Collective Intentionality.Thomas Szanto - 2016 - In Alessandro Salice & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality. Springer Verlag.
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  26. added 2020-04-27
    La teoria critica ha bisogno di un'ontologia sociale (e viceversa)?Italo Testa - 2016 - Politica E Società 1:47-72.
    In this article I argue that contemporary critical theory needs the conceptual tools of social ontology in order to make its own ontological commitments explicit and strengthen its interdisciplinary approach. On the other hand, contemporary analytic social ontology needs critical theory in order to be able to focus on the role that social change, power, and historicity play in the constitution of social facts, and to see the shortcomings of an agential and intentionalist approach to social facts. My thesis is (...)
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  27. added 2020-04-27
    Inabilities, Excuses and Exemptions.David Botting - 2015 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 14 (1):104-127.
    In this paper I will argue, following Moody-Adams’s paper “Culture, responsibility and affected ignorance,” that inability does not excuse in general, but against Moody-Adams I will argue that this is not because of “affected ignorance” but simply because of responsibilities individual agents have by virtue of belonging to and participating in the collective actions of a certain kind of collective. Excusability has been misdiagnosed as depending on whether the ignorance of wrongdoing involved is culpable or non-culpable.
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  28. added 2020-04-27
    The Disrupted 'We': Schizophrenia and Collective Intentionality.A. Salice - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):145-171.
    In various ways, schizophrenia seems to involve an anomalous form of collective intentionality. Many patients report notable difficulties in establishing and maintaining relationships to others, which often may lead to social withdrawal, isolation, and pro-found feelings of solitude. What is puzzling is of course not that patients, despite their interpersonal difficulties, participate in or try to participate in various social activities, but that some of these social activities appear quite tolerable to the patients, whereas other activities seem almost unbearable. The (...)
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  29. added 2020-04-27
    Distributing Collective Moral Responsibility to Group Members.David J. Zoller - 2014 - Journal of Social Philosophy 45 (4):478-497.
    There has been considerable recent interest in the “collective moral autonomy” thesis (CMA), that is, the notion that we can predicate moral successes, failures, and duties of collectives even if there are no comparable successes, failures, and duties among members. One reason why this position looks appealing is because the opposing individualist position seems to have what we might call an accounting problem. Individualists maintain that only individuals can be subjects of moral success, failure, or duty; however, many reasonable judgments (...)
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  30. added 2020-04-27
    Can We Say What We Mean?: Expressibility and Background.Jesús Navarro - 2009 - Pragmatics and Cognition 17 (2):283-308.
    The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said. It specifically targets John Searle's account of this idea, focusing on his Principle of Expressibility . In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity and its relevance for the philosophy of language , mind , society and action . In the critical part, the notion of Background is (...)
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  31. added 2020-04-27
    Can We Say What We Mean?: Expressibility and Background.Jesús Navarro-Reyes - 2009 - Pragmatics and Cognition 17 (2):283-308.
    The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said. It specifically targets John Searle’s account of this idea, focussing on his Principle of Expressibility (PE henceforth). In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity (1) and its relevance for the philosophy of language (2), mind (3), society and action (4). In the critical part, the notion of (...)
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  32. added 2020-04-27
    Theories of Team Agency.Robert Sugden & Natalie Gold - 2007 - In Fabienne Peter & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Rationality and Commitment. Oxford University Press.
    We explore the idea that a group or ‘team’ of individuals can be an agent in its own right and that, when this is the case, individual team members use team reasoning, a distinctive mode of reasoning from that of standard decision theory. Our approach is to represent team reasoning explicitly, by means of schemata of practical reasoning in which conclusions about what actions should be taken are inferred from premises about the decision environment and about what agents are seeking (...)
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  33. added 2020-04-27
    Collective Intentionality, Complex Economic Behavior, and Valuation.John B. Davis - 2003 - ProtoSociology 18:163-183.
    This paper argues that collective intentionality analysis provides a theoretical framework, complementary to traditional instrumental rationality analysis, that allows us to explain economic behavior as ‘complex.’ Economic behavior may be regarded as complex if it cannot be reduced to a single explanatory framework. Contemporary mainstream economics, in its reliance on instrumental rationality as the exclusive basis for explaining economic behavior, does not offer an account of economic behavior as complex. Coupling collective intentionality analysis with instrumental rationality analysis, however, makes such (...)
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  34. added 2020-04-15
    Introduction to Special Issue on 'Group Speech Acts'.Leo Townsend & Michael Schmitz - 2020 - Language & Communication 72:53-55.
  35. added 2020-04-01
    What Are Group Speech Acts?Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - Language & Communication 70:46-58.
    The paper provides a taxonomy of group speech acts whose main division is that between collective speech acts (singing Happy Birthday, agreeing to meet) and group proxy speech acts in which a group, such as a corporation, employs a proxy, such as a spokesperson, to convey its official position. The paper provides an analysis of group proxy speech acts using tools developed more generally for analyzing institutional agency, particularly the concepts of shared intention, proxy agent, status role, status function, convention (...)
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  36. added 2020-03-13
    Are Institutions Created by Collective Acceptance?Danny Frederick - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-13.
    John Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status functions with deontic powers are created by collective acceptance. I argue that collective acceptance can create new status functions with deontic powers only if other status functions with deontic powers already exist, so that collective acceptance can create new institutions only if other institutions are presupposed. So, the claim that institutions depend upon collective acceptance involves a vicious infinite regress. I provide an example to show how an (...)
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  37. added 2020-03-10
    Towards Collective Self-Knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say ‘Google knows such-and-such,’ or ‘Amazon intends to do such-and-such.’ This observation of ordinary parlance also found its way into philosophical accounts of social groups and collective intentionality. However, these discussions are usually quiet about how groups self-ascribe their own beliefs and intentions. Apple might explain to its shareholders that it intends to bring a new iPhone to the market next year. But how does Apple know what it intends? (...)
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  38. added 2020-02-16
    Interpersonal Obligation in Joint Action.Abraham Roth - 2018 - In Marija Jankovic & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. New York: Routledge. pp. 45-57.
  39. added 2020-02-12
    Of Layers and Lawyers.Michael Schmitz - forthcoming - In Miguel Garcia, Rachael Mellin & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Philosophy of Law. Berlin: De Gruyter.
    How can the law be characterized in a theory of collective intentionality that treats collective intentionality as essentially layered and tries to understand these layers in terms of the structure and the format of the representations involved? And can such a theory of collective intentionality open up new perspectives on the law and shed new light on traditional questions of legal philosophy? As a philosopher of collective intentionality who is new to legal philosophy, I want to begin exploring these questions (...)
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  40. added 2020-01-29
    Intentional Cooperation and Acting as Part of a Single Body.Olle Blomberg - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of him- or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action (...)
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  41. added 2020-01-29
    Collective Responsibility and Acting Together.Olle Blomberg & Frank Hindriks - 2020 - In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility. Routledge.
    What is the moral significance of the contrast between acting together and strategic interaction? We argue that while collective moral responsibility is not uniquely tied to the former, the degree to which the participants in a shared intentional wrongdoing are blameworthy is normally higher than when agents bring about the same wrong as a result of strategic interaction. One argument for this claim focuses on the fact that shared intentions cause intended outcomes in a more robust manner than the intentions (...)
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  42. added 2019-11-25
    Successor Identity.Mihailis Diamantis - 2019 - Yale Journal on Regulation 36:1-44.
    The law of successor criminal liability is simple—corporate successors are liable for the crimes of their predecessors. Always. Any corporation that results from any merger, consolidation, spin-off, etc., is on the hook for all the crimes of all the corporations that went into the process. Such a coarse-grained, onetrack approach fails to recognize that not all reorganizations are cut from the same cloth. As a result, it skews corporate incentives against reorganizing in more socially beneficial ways. It also risks punishing (...)
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  43. added 2019-11-22
    Intercorporeity and the first-person plural in Merleau-Ponty.Philip J. Walsh - 2020 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):21-47.
    A theory of the first-person plural occupies a unique place in philosophical investigations into intersubjectivity and social cognition. In order for the referent of the first-person plural—“the We”—to come into existence, it seems there must be a shared ground of communicative possibility, but this requires a non-circular explanation of how this ground could be shared in the absence of a pre-existing context of communicative conventions. Margaret Gilbert’s and John Searle’s theories of collective intentionality capture important aspects of the We, but (...)
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  44. added 2019-09-09
    Existence, Really? Tacit Disagreements About “Existence” in Disputes About Group Minds and Corporate Agents.Johannes Himmelreich - forthcoming - Synthese:1-15.
    A central dispute in social ontology concerns the existence of group minds and actions. I argue that some authors in this dispute rely on rival views of existence without sufficiently acknowledging this divergence. I proceed in three steps in arguing for this claim. First, I define the phenomenon as an implicit higher-order disagreement by drawing on an analysis of verbal disputes. Second, I distinguish two theories of existence—the theory-commitments view and the truthmaker view—in both their eliminativist and their constructivist variants. (...)
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  45. added 2019-09-09
    Joint Commitment.Thomas H. Smith - 2018 - ProtoSociology 35:38-52.
    I defend some of Gilbert’s central claims about our capacity jointly to commit ourselves, and what follows from an exercise of it. I argue that, to explain these claims, we do not need to suppose, as Gilbert does, that we ever are jointly committed, that is, jointly in a state of being committed. I offer a diagnosis of why the gratuitousness of this supposition has been overlooked.
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  46. added 2019-09-03
    Joint Action Without Robust Theory of Mind.Daniel Story - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Intuitively, even very young children can act jointly. For instance, a child and her parent can build a simple tower together. According to developmental psychologists, young children develop theory of mind by, among other things, participating in joint actions like this. Yet many leading philosophical accounts of joint action presuppose that participants have a robust theory of mind. In this article, I examine two philosophical accounts of joint action designed to circumvent this presupposition, and then I proffer my own novel (...)
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  47. added 2019-07-05
    Group Assertion and Group Silencing.Leo Townsend - 2020 - Language & Communication 1 (70):28-37.
    Jennifer Lackey (2018) has developed an account of the primary form of group assertion, according to which groups assert when a suitably authorized spokesperson speaks for the group. In this paper I pose a challenge for Lackey's account, arguing that her account obscures the phenomenon of group silencing. This is because, in contrast to alternative approaches that view assertions (and speech acts generally) as social acts, Lackey's account implies that speakers can successfully assert regardless of how their utterances are taken (...)
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  48. added 2019-06-25
    Language and Consciousness; How Language Implies Self-Awareness.Mehran Shaghaghi - manuscript
    The relationship between language and consciousness has been debated since ancient times, but the details have never been fully articulated. Certainly, there are animals that possess the same essential auditory and vocal systems as humans, but acquiring language is seemingly uniquely human. In this essay, we investigate the relationship between language and consciousness by demonstrating how language usage implies the self-awareness of the user. We show that the self-awareness faculty encompasses the language faculty and how this self-awareness, that is uniquely (...)
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  49. added 2019-06-21
    Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge.Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson & Michael Weisberg (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Current scientific research almost always requires collaboration among several (if not several hundred) specialized researchers. When scientists co-author a journal article, who deserves credit for discoveries or blame for errors? How should scientific institutions promote fruitful collaborations among scientists? In this book, leading philosophers of science address these critical questions.
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  50. added 2019-06-14
    The Principle of Relevance in the Light of Cooperation and Trust: Discussing Sperber and Wilsons Theory.Cristián Santibañez - 2012 - Pragmatics and Cognition 20 (3):483-504.
    The principle of relevance of Sperber and Wilson (1995) underestimates the role of cooperation, and the theory’s inclination toward an individual intentionality is problematic. These are two of the critical observations that this paper introduces and discusses. Through a constant counterpoint with the aforementioned authors, the core arguments of their theory are analyzed in each section of this paper. The discussion will allow us to observe why it is necessary to include the notions of cooperation and collective intention in the (...)
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