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  1. Lilian Alweiss (2003). Collective Guilt and Responsibility Some Reflections. European Journal of Political Theory 2 (3):307-318.
    Does our responsibility extend to deeds that have been performed in our name? Is our modern understanding of responsibility in need of revision? Arendt holds that it is not necessary to revise our conception of responsibility since there are two forms of responsibility: a moral and a political one. Margalit, in turn, argues that our conception of responsibility is too narrow. We are not only morally responsible for the deeds we have performed or neglected to perform but also for the (...)
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  2. Lilian Alweiss (2003). Collective Guilt and Responsibility. European Journal of Political Theory 2 (3):307-318.
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  3. Rachel A. Ankeny (2007). Individual Responsibility and Reproduction. In Rosamond Rhodes, Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics. Blackwell.
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  4. Karl-Otto Apel (1993). How to Ground a Universalistic Ethics of Co-Responsibility for the Effects of Collective Actions and Activities? Philosophica 52:9-29.
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  5. Denis G. Arnold (2006). Corporate Moral Agency. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):279–291.
    "The main conclusion of this essay is that it is plausible to conclude that corporations are capable of exhibiting intentionality, and as a result that they may be properly understood as moral agents" (p. 281).
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  6. Paul H. Arthur (1998). Collective Responsibility: A Pragmatic Approach to Large-Scale Moral Problems. Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
    There are many cases of conduct for which responsibility can plausibly be ascribed to a group, in addition to any responsibility ascribable to the group's constituent members. It is important to be able to make such ascriptions because without them we are unable to assign responsibilities for many sorts of humanly-caused harms for which responsibility cannot reasonably be ascribed to individuals alone. Two recent theories of collective responsibility advance our understanding of why it is important to be able to hold (...)
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  7. Ian Ashman & Diana Winstanley (2007). For or Against Corporate Identity? Personification and the Problem of Moral Agency. Journal of Business Ethics 76 (1):83-95.
    This article explores the concept of corporate identity from a moral perspective. In it we argue that the reification and personification involved in attributing an identity to an organization has moral repercussions. Through a discussion of 'intentionality' we suggest that it is philosophically problematic to treat an abstraction of the corporation as possessing identity or acting as a conscious moral agent. The article moves to consider practical and ethical issues in the areas of organizational commitment, of health and safety, and (...)
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  8. Robin Attfield (1971). Collective Responsibility. Analysis 32 (1):31 - 32.
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  9. Carmela Parisani Axeman (1990). The Duo-Dimensionality of Corporate Responsibility. Dissertation, Michigan State University
    This dissertation addresses a contemporary business ethics query regarding moral accountability of the large business corporation: Can the corporation be held morally responsible for its untoward actions? Also, the question is raised as to whether the large business corporation is a moral person. For if the corporation is a moral person, then it can be held morally responsible for its actions. On the other hand, if the corporation is not a moral person, then opposing arguments regarding legal and human moral (...)
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  10. Guy Axtell, Responsibilism: A Proposed Shared Research Program.
    Originally titled “Institutional, Group, and Individual Virtue,” this was my paper for an Invited Symposium on "Intersections between Social, Feminist, and Virtue Epistemologies," APA Pacific Division Meeting, April 2011, San Diego. -/- Abstract: This paper examines recent research on individual, social, and institutional virtues and vices; the aim is to explore and make proposals concerning their inter-relationships, as well as to highlight central questions for future research with the study of each. More specifically, the paper will focus on how these (...)
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  11. Alison Bailey (2001). Taking Responsibility for Community Violence. In Peggy DesAutels & JoAnne Waugh (eds.), FEMINISTS DOING ETHICS.
    This article examines the responses of two communities to hate crimes in their cities. In particular it explores how community understandings of responsibility shape collective responses to hate crimes. I use the case of Bridesberg, Pennsylvania to explore how anti-racist work is restricted by backward-looking conceptions of moral responsibility (e.g. being responsible). Using recent writings in feminist ethics.(1) I argue for a forward-looking notion that advocates an active view: taking responsibility for attitudes and behaviors that foster climates in which hate (...)
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  12. Isabelle Baker (2011). To What Extent Can We Overcome the „Bystander Effects‟ of Collective Responsibility in Matters of Global Injustice?“. Emergent Australasian Philosophers 4 (1).
    Where do we draw the line between individual and collective responsibilities? Can collectives be „morally responsible‟ in the same way that individuals can? This paper explores the Bystander Effect – how an individual‟s sense of personal responsibility can become „diffused‟ when they become part of a collective. This is compared to the issue of the collective responsibility of the „developed world‟ to aid the „Third World‟ that ethicists, such Peter Singer and Iris Marion Young believe to be true. I consider (...)
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  13. Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (forthcoming). Individual Responsibility for Carbon Emissions: Is There Anything Wrong with Overdetermining Harm? In Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice. Cambridge University Press.
    Climate change and other harmful large-scale processes challenge our understandings of individual responsibility. People throughout the world suffer harms—severe shortfalls in health, civic status, or standard of living relative to the vital needs of human beings—as a result of physical processes to which many people appear to contribute. Climate change, polluted air and water, and the erosion of grasslands, for example, occur because a great many people emit carbon and pollutants, build excessively, enable their flocks to overgraze, or otherwise stress (...)
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  14. Saba Bazargan (2013). Complicitous Liability in War. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):177-195.
    Jeff McMahan has argued against the moral equivalence of combatants (MEC) by developing a liability-based account of killing in warfare. On this account, a combatant is morally liable to be killed only if doing so is an effective means of reducing or eliminating an unjust threat to which that combatant is contributing. Since combatants fighting for a just cause generally do not contribute to unjust threats, they are not morally liable to be killed; thus MEC is mistaken. The problem, however, (...)
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  15. Martin Benjamin (1998). Why Blame the Organization? A Pragmatic Analysis of Collective Moral Responsibility. Teaching Philosophy 21 (2):201-204.
  16. Martin Benjamin (1976). Can Moral Responsibility Be Collective and Nondistributive? Social Theory and Practice 4 (1):93-106.
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  17. Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). On Individual and Shared Obligations: In Defense of the Activist’s Perspective. In Mark Budolfson, Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford University Press.
    We naturally attribute obligations to groups, and take such obligations to have consequences for the obligations of group members. The threat posed by anthropogenic climate change provides an urgent case. It seems that we, together, have an obligation to prevent climate catastrophe, and that we, as individuals, have an obligation to contribute. However, understood strictly, attributions of obligations to groups might seem illegitimate. On the one hand, the groups in question—the people alive today, say—are rarely fully-fledged moral agents, making it (...)
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  18. Gunnar Björnsson (2014). Essentially Shared Obligations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
    This paper lists a number of puzzles for shared obligations – puzzles about the role of individual influence, individual reasons to contribute towards fulfilling the obligation, about what makes someone a member of a group sharing an obligation, and the relation between agency and obligation – and proposes to solve them based on a general analysis of obligations. On the resulting view, shared obligations do not presuppose joint agency.
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  19. Gunnar Björnsson (2011). Joint Responsibility Without Individual Control: Applying the Explanation Hypothesis. In Jeroen van den Hoven, Ibo van de Poel & Nicole Vincent (eds.), Moral Responsibility: beyond free will and determinism. Springer.
    This paper introduces a new family of cases where agents are jointly morally responsible for outcomes over which they have no individual control, a family that resists standard ways of understanding outcome responsibility. First, the agents in these cases do not individually facilitate the outcomes and would not seem individually responsible for them if the other agents were replaced by non-agential causes. This undermines attempts to understand joint responsibility as overlapping individual responsibility; the responsibility in question is essentially joint. Second, (...)
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  20. Gunnar Björnsson & Bengt Brülde (forthcoming). Normative Responsibilities: Structure and Sources. In Kristien Hens, Dorothee Horstkötter & Daniela Cutas (eds.), Parental Responsibility in the Context of Neuroscience and Genetics. Springer.
    Attributions of what we shall call normative responsibilities play a central role in everyday moral thinking. It is commonly thought, for example, that parents are responsible for the wellbeing of their children, and that this has important normative consequences. Depending on context, it might mean that parents are morally required to bring their children to the doctor, feed them well, attend to their emotional needs, or to see to it that someone else does. Similarly, it is sometimes argued that countries (...)
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  21. Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess (2016). Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1).
    Recently, a number of people have argued that certain entities embodied by groups of agents themselves qualify as agents, with their own beliefs, desires, and intentions; even, some claim, as moral agents. However, others have independently argued that fully-fledged moral agency involves a capacity for reactive attitudes such as guilt and indignation, and these capacities might seem beyond the ken of “collective” or “ corporate ” agents. Individuals embodying such agents can of course be ashamed, proud, or indignant about what (...)
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  22. Olle Blomberg (2016). Common Knowledge and Reductionism About Shared Agency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.
    Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It (...)
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  23. T. Boyer, C. Mayo-Wilson & M. Weisberg (eds.) (forthcoming). Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge.
  24. Matthew Braham & Martin Van Hees, Responsibility in Games.
    SOCREAL 2010: 2nd International Workshop on Philosophy and Ethics of Social Reality. Sapporo, Japan, 2010-03-27/28. Session 3: Responsibility and Collective Agency.
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  25. Ingar Brinck, Vasudevi Reddy & Dan Zahavi (eds.) (2016). The Primacy of the We? MIT Press.
    The question of the relation between the collective and the individual has had a long but patchy history within both philosophy and psychology. In this chapter we consider some arguments that could be adopted for the primacy of the we, and examine their conceptual and empirical implications. We argue that the we needs to be seen as a developing and dynamic identity, not as something that exists fully fledged from the start. The concept of we thus needs more nuanced and (...)
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  26. Evelyn Brister (2013). Global Warming and the Problem of Failed Intentions. Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 3 (1):247-271.
    Effective solutions to global warming will likely require coordinated national and international policies. But in the short term, individuals might choose to take actions or not take actions which will reduce their own contribution to global warming. Philosophers have argued that individual action to curb climate emissions is not morally inconsequential. A strong case can be made for individual causal responsibility for the production of the moral harms which would result from climate change. However, the nature of human moral psychology (...)
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  27. Thom Brooks (2002). Cosmopolitanism and Distributing Responsibilities. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 5 (3):92-97.
    David Miller raises a number of interesting concerns with both weak and strong variants of cosmopolitanism. As an alternative, he defends a connection theory to address remedial responsibilities amongst states. This connection theory is problematic as it endorses a position where states that are causally and morally responsible for deprivation and suffering in other states may not be held remedially responsible for their actions. In addition, there is no international mechanism to ensure either that remedially responsible states offer assistance to (...)
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  28. Alexander Brown (2005). If We Value Individual Responsibility, Which Policies Should We Favour? Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):23–44.
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  29. A. Cappelen, E. Sørensen & B. Tungodden, Responsibility for What? Fairness and Individual Responsibility.
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  30. Robert F. Card (2005). Individual Responsibility Within Organizational Contexts. Journal of Business Ethics 62 (4):397-405.
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  31. Guozhen Cen (2008). Chinese Adolescents' Attitudes Towards Collective and Communicable Responsibility. Journal of Moral Education 37 (2):185-203.
    This research explored the attitudes of 386 Chinese adolescent students toward collective and communicable responsibility, using three scenarios involving school, society and history, with two different situations and two types of projections per scenario. The results showed that: (1) the majority of Chinese adolescents believed that collective and communicable responsibility was unjust, and this belief differed significantly with different age groups; (2) the majority expressed the view that collective and communicable responsibility could be understood and accepted; (3) their feelings toward (...)
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  32. Sara Rachel Chant (2015). Collective Responsibility in a Hollywood Standoff. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):83-92.
    In this paper, I advance a counterexample to the collective agency thesis.
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  33. Richard Child (2009). Should We Hold Nations Responsible? Res Publica 15 (2):195-202.
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  34. Chris Chulos (2010). The Collective and the Individual in Russia. The European Legacy 6 (4):513-516.
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  35. Daihyun Chung (2015). A Redemptive Analysis of Suffering. Philosophy Study 5 (10):530-536.
    The notion of suffering carries with it aspects which are private and individual on the one hand and social and lingual on the other. I would pay attention to the latter part of the suffering notion, where the notion of suffering is recognized to be primitive by almost all the theories of human values. This primitive character allows a commensurable basis on the basis of which most plural theories share something in common to talk objectively to each other. In this (...)
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  36. P. L. Cochran & D. Nigh (forthcoming). ÔIllegal Corporate Behavior and the Question of Moral Agency: An Empirical ExaminationÕ. Empirical Studies of Business Ethics and Values, V.(Jai Press, Greenwich, Ct).
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  37. Zac Cogley (2012). Tamler Sommers: Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility. Reviewed By. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 7.
  38. Stephanie Collins (2013). Collectives' Duties and Collectivisation Duties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231-248.
    Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears to leave us at a loss (...)
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  39. Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith (2015). Collectives’ and Individuals’ Obligations: A Parity Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):1-21.
    Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what (...)
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  40. D. E. Cooper (1968). Collective Responsibility. Philosophy 43 (165):258 - 268.
    Philosophers constantly discuss Responsibility. Yet in every discussion of which I am aware, a rather obvious point is ignored. The obvious point is that responsibility is ascribed to collectives, as well as to individual persons. Blaming attitudes are held towards collectives as well as towards individuals. Responsibility is often ascribed to nations, towns, clubs, groups, teams, and married couples. ‘Germany was responsible for the Second World War’; ‘The club as a whole is to blame for being relegated’. Such statements are (...)
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  41. David E. Cooper (1969). Collective Responsibility—Again: PHILOSOPHY. Philosophy 44 (168):153-155.
    I shall not try to deal with all of the interesting points Mr. R. S. Downie raises against my paper, Collective Responsibility . I shall deal with a matter of clarification, one of the lesser issues between us, and the major issue between us. . On one point, surely, Downie has simply misunderstood what I said. He claims that my criticisms do not work against the common view that Responsibility is analytically tied to blameworthiness; but only apainst the claim that (...)
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  42. David E. Cooper (1969). Collective Responsibility: Again. Philosophy 44 (168):153 - 155.
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  43. David Copp (2012). The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis: Reply to Ludwig and Miller. Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (1):78-95.
  44. David Copp (1986). Book Review:Collective and Corporate Responsibility. Peter A. French. [REVIEW] Ethics 96 (3):636-.
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  45. David Irwin Copp (1976). Individuals, Collectives and Moral Agency. Dissertation, Cornell University
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  46. J. Angelo Corlett (2001). Collective Moral Responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (4):573–584.
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  47. Neta C. Crawford (2007). Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity. Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2):187–212.
  48. Rebecca Elizabeth Mary Curzon, Expanding Individualism : Moral Responsibility for Social Structural Harms.
    The central concern of this thesis is the examination of individual agents’ moral responsibilities in large-scale social structures. I begin with a discussion of the emergence of social structural harm and the history of the collective responsibility debate. I suggest that previous attempts to make accurate responsibility ascriptions in cases of social structural harm have fallen short, leaving responsibility for the harm caused underdetermined. Arguing that collectivist approaches to large-scale harms are inadequate, because those participating in social structures cannot satisfy (...)
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  49. Norman Daniels (1985). Family Responsibility Initiatives and Justice Between Age Groups. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 13 (4):153-159.
  50. John R. Danley (1980). Corporate Moral Agency. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:140-149.
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