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  1. Intelligence Cycle.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    The intelligence cycle is a set of processes used to provide useful information for decision-making. The cycle consists of several processes. The related counter-intelligence area is tasked with preventing information efforts from others. A basic model of the process of collecting and analyzing information is called the "intelligence cycle". This model can be applied, and, like all the basic models, it does not reflect the fullness of real-world operations. Through intelligence cycle activities, information is collected and assembled, raw information is (...)
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  2. Epistemically Different Epistemic Peers.Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro & Bryan Frances - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.
    For over a decade now epistemologists have been thinking about the peer disagreement problem of whether a person is reasonable in not lowering her confidence in her belief P when she comes to accept that she has an epistemic peer on P who disbelieves P. However, epistemologists have overlooked a key realistic way how epistemic peers can, or even have to, differ epistemically—a way that reveals the inadequacy of both conformist and non-conformist views on peer disagreement by uncovering how the (...)
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  3. From Joint Attention to Common Knowledge [Critical Notice]. [REVIEW]Michael Wilby - 2020 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 41 (3 and 4):293-306.
    What is the relation between joint attention and common knowledge? On the one hand, the relation seems tight: the easiest and most reliable way of knowing something in common with another is for you and that other to be attentively aware of what you are together experiencing. On the other hand, they couldn’t seem further apart: joint attention is a mere perceptual phenomena that infants are capable of engaging in from nine months of age, whereas common knowledge is a cognitive (...)
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  4. Shared Intentions, Loose Groups and Pooled Knowledge.Olivier Roy & Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2019 - Synthese.
    We study shared intentions in what we call “loose groups”. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is, a condition on what the group members know and believe (...)
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  5. We‐Experiences, Common Knowledge, and the Mode Approach to Collective Intentionality.Olle Blomberg - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):183-203.
    According to we-mode accounts of collective intentionality, an experience is a "we-experience"—that is, part of a jointly attentional episode—in virtue of the way or mode in which the content of the experience is given to the subject of experience. These accounts are supposed to explain how a we-experience can have the phenomenal character of being given to the subject "as ours" rather than merely "as my experience" (Zahavi 2015), and do so in a relatively conceptually and cognitively undemanding way. Galotti (...)
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  6. Two Paradoxes of Common Knowledge: Coordinated Attack and Electronic Mail.Harvey Lederman - 2018 - Noûs:921-945.
    The coordinated attack scenario and the electronic mail game are two paradoxes of common knowledge. In simple mathematical models of these scenarios, the agents represented by the models can coordinate only if they have common knowledge that they will. As a result, the models predict that the agents will not coordinate in situations where it would be rational to coordinate. I argue that we should resolve this conflict between the models and facts about what it would be rational to do (...)
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  7. Common Knowledge.Harvey Lederman - 2018 - In Marija Jankovic & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. pp. 181-195.
    An opinionated introduction to philosophical issues connected to common knowledge.
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  8. The Fragility of Common Knowledge.Cédric Paternotte - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):451-472.
    Ordinary common knowledge is formally expressed by strong probabilistic common belief. How strong exactly? The question can be answered by drawing from the similar equivalence, recently explored, between plain and probabilistic individual beliefs. I argue that such a move entails that common knowledge displays a double fragility: as a description of a collective state and as a phenomenon, because it can respectively disappear as group size increases, or more worryingly as the epistemic context changes. I argue that despite this latter (...)
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  9. Common Knowledge and Reductionism About Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.
    Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It (...)
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  10. People with Common Priors Can Agree to Disagree.Harvey Lederman - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):11-45.
    Robert Aumann presents his Agreement Theorem as the key conditional: “if two people have the same priors and their posteriors for an event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal” (Aumann, 1976, p. 1236). This paper focuses on four assumptions which are used in Aumann’s proof but are not explicit in the key conditional: (1) that agents commonly know, of some prior μ, that it is the common prior; (2) that agents commonly know that each of them updates (...)
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  11. Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.Christian List - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1601-1622.
    This paper offers a comparison of three different kinds of collective attitudes: aggregate, common, and corporate attitudes. They differ not only in their relationship to individual attitudes—e.g., whether they are “reducible” to individual attitudes—but also in the roles they play in relation to the collectives to which they are ascribed. The failure to distinguish them can lead to confusion, in informal talk as well as in the social sciences. So, the paper’s message is an appeal for disambiguation.
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  12. El razonamiento ordinario y sus heurísticas.María G. Navarro - 2013 - In Magda Bandera (ed.), La Uni en la calle. Libro de textos. La marea ediciones.
    Las heurísticas son procedimientos de estimación utilizados por todos nosotros al razonar en nuestra vida ordinaria.
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  13. The Epistemic Core of Weak Joint Action.Cedric Paternotte - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (1):1-24.
    Over the last three decades, joint action has received various definitions, which for all their differences share many features. However, they cannot fit some perplexing cases of weak joint action, such as demonstrations, where agents rely on distinct epistemic sources, and as a result, have no first-hand knowledge about each other. I argue that one major reason why the definition of such collective actions is akin to the classical ones is that it crucially relies on the concept of common knowledge. (...)
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  14. Garantía y Cooperación Epistémica.Rodrigo Laera - 2012 - Logos: Revista de la Facultad de Filosofia y Humanidades 21:193-211.
    This paper discusses there is no sustainable theoretical alternative for building knowledge without principles including cooperation –aimed at the preparation and distribution of beliefs– among individuals. This principle helps to conceive both the relation among internalist and externalist theories, and a cognitive explanation based on the concept of epistemic warrant. The concluding remark is that concepts, like evidence or reliability, can only be conceived as skills of subjects belonging to a community.
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  15. The New Political Blogosphere.Nicholas John Munn - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (1):55-70.
    This article discusses the current epistemological status of the political blogosphere, in light both of the concerns raised by Alvin Goldman in his 2008 paper ?The Social Epistemology of Blogging? and the recent drastic changes in the structure of the blogosphere. I argue that the political blogosphere replicates epistemically beneficial functions of the mainstream media for the functioning of democracy, and defend this claim from objections to the blogosphere that have been levelled by Goldman and Richard Posner. I then provide (...)
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  16. Being Realistic About Common Knowledge: A Lewisian Approach.Cedric Paternotte - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):249-276.
    Defined and formalized several decades ago, widely used in philosophy and game theory, the concept of common knowledge is still considered as problematic, although not always for the right reasons. I suggest that the epistemic status of a group of human agents in a state of common knowledge has not been thoroughly analyzed. In particular, every existing account of common knowledge, whether formal or not, is either too strong to fit cognitively limited individuals, or too weak to adequately describe their (...)
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  17. The Simplicity of Mutual Knowledge.Michael Wilby - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):83-100.
    Mutual perceptual knowledge is a prevalent feature of our everyday lives, yet appears to be exceptionally difficult to characterise in an acceptable way. This paper argues for a renewed understanding of Stephen Schiffer’s iterative approach to mutual knowledge, according to which mutual knowledge requires an infinite number of overlapping, embedded mental states. It is argued that the charge of ‘psychological implausibility’ that normally accompanies discussion of this approach can be offset by identifying mutual knowledge, not with the infinite iterations themselves, (...)
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  18. Common Knowledge and Convention.Giacomo Sillari - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):29-39.
    This paper investigates the epistemic assumptions that David Lewis makes in his account of social conventions. In particular, I focus on the assumption that the agents have common knowledge of the convention to which they are parties. While evolutionary analyses show that the common knowledge assumption is unnecessary in certain classes of games, Lewis’ original account (and, more recently, Cubitt and Sugden’s reconstruction) stresses the importance of including it in the definition of convention. I discuss arguments pro et contra to (...)
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  19. Comparing Justified and Common Knowledge.Evangelia Antonakos - 2006 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12.
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  20. Sexual Assault: Availability of the Defence of Belief in Consent.Lucinda Vandervort - 2005 - Canadian Bar Review 84 (1):89-105.
    Despite amendments to the sexual assault provisions in the Criminal Code, decisions about the availability and operation of the defence of belief in consent remain vulnerable to the influence of legally extraneous considerations. The author proposes an approach designed to limit the influence of such considerations.
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  21. Varieties of Interpersonal Compatibility of Beliefs.Giacomo Bonanno - 1999 - In Jelle Gerbrandy, Maarten Marx, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema (eds.), Essays dedicated to Johan van Benthem on the occasion of his 50th birthday. Amsterdam University Press.
    Since Lewis’s (1969) and Aumann’s (1976) pioneering contributions, the concepts of common knowledge and common belief have been discussed extensively in the literature, both syntactically and semantically1. At the individual level the difference between knowledge and belief is usually identified with the presence or absence of the Truth Axiom ( iA → A), which is interpreted as ”if individual i believes that A, then A is true”. In such a case the individual is often said to know that A (thus (...)
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  22. Naive Physics.Barry Smith & Roberto Casati - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):227 – 247.
    The project of a 'naive physics' has been the subject of attention in recent years above all in the artificial intelligence field, in connection with work on common-sense reasoning, perceptual representation and robotics. The idea of a theory of the common-sense world is however much older than this, having its roots not least in the work of phenomenologists and Gestalt psychologists such as K hler, Husserl, Schapp and Gibson. This paper seeks to show how contemporary naive physicists can profit from (...)
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