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Summary Compatibilist views of free will hold that free will is compatible with causal determinism. Classical compatibilists argued that determinism does not entail that agents lack alternative possibilities. They often advanced conditional accounts of alternatives (eg, the agent can do otherwise if, were she to want to do otherwise, she would). In more recent times, compatibilists have often denied that we need a power to do otherwise for freedom. Most contemporary compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with but does not require determinism. So-called Hobartian compatibilists hold that determinism is required for free will.
Key works Compatibilism was influentially defended by Hume 1955 and Hobbes 1651. Hume defended the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise. Hobart 1934 argued that free will actually requires determinism to be true. Non-traditional compatibilist accounts stem fromFrankfurt 1969, which argues that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility (and, presumably, freedom). In Frankfurt 1971, an influential hierarchical account of free will is defended. Strawson 1962 develops an account of free will on which agents' reactive attitudes towards others is central. Very recently, there has been a rival of something like a conditional analysis of freedom, inspired by Lewisian work on dispositions; Vihvelin 2004 is an excellent defence of the view.
Introductions As usual, the entry in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - McKenna 2008 - is excellent. Though he is not (quite) a compatibilist himself, Fischer 2007 is a thorough articulation and defence, as is Haji 2002.
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  1. added 2020-05-20
    Why Frankfurt Examples Beg the Question.P. A. Woodward - 2002 - Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (4):540-547.
  2. added 2020-05-11
    Intuition, Orthodoxy, and Moral Responsibility in Advance.John Ross Churchill - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
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  3. added 2020-05-11
    Alfred Mele, Manipulated Agents: A Window Into Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]Robert J. Hartman - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Review of Manipulated Agents: A Window into Moral Responsibility. By Alfred R. Mele.
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  4. added 2020-05-11
    Freedom of the Will, by Ferenc Huoranszki. [REVIEW]Simon Kittle - 2013 - Disputatio 5:368-374.
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  5. added 2020-04-07
    Scheler e o problema do livre arbítrio.Nathalie de la Cadena - 2019 - In Roberto Kahlmeyer-Mertens, Katyana M. Weyh, Eduardo Henrique Silveira Kisse & Marcelo Ribeiro da Silva (eds.), Max Scheler: Novas Recepções. Toledo, Brasil: Vivens. pp. 217-250.
    Max Scheler apresentou sua formulação sobre o problema do livre arbítrio no opúsculo Phänomenologie und Metaphysik der Freiheit, de 1912- 1914, publicado em Gesammelte Werke, Band X. No presente capítulo, esta compreensão é apresentada de maneira resumida e, em seguida, apreciada à luz do debate contemporâneo entre o compatibilismo e o incompatibilismo. Ao fim, se pretende justificar a hipótese de que a posição scheleriana neste debate seria em favor do incompatibilismo libertarianista.
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  6. added 2020-03-19
    The CMT Model of Free Will.Louis Vervoort & Tomasz Blusiewicz - manuscript
    Here we propose a compatibilist theory of free will, in the tradition of naturalized philosophy, that attempts: 1) to provide a synthesis of a variety of well-known theories, capable of addressing problems of the latter; 2) to account for the fact that free will comes in degrees; 3) to interface with natural sciences, especially neurobiology. We argue that free will comes in degrees, as suggested by neuroscience. We suggest that a concept that can precisely ‘measure’ the variability of free will (...)
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  7. added 2020-03-19
    In Defense of Mill's Theory of Free Will.Bernard Berofsky - 2014 - In Antis Loizides (ed.), Mill’s a System of Logic: Critical Appraisals. New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
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  8. added 2020-02-13
    Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1):57-73.
    In response to the increasingly popular manipulation argument against compatibilism, some have argued that libertarian accounts of free will are vulnerable to parallel manipulation arguments, and thus manipulation is not uniquely problematic for compatibilists. The main aim of this article is to give this point a more detailed development than it has previously received. Prior attempts to make this point have targeted particular libertarian accounts but cannot be generalized. By contrast, I provide an appropriately modified manipulation that targets all libertarian (...)
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  9. added 2020-02-11
    Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life.David L. Hull - 1995 - Ethics 107 (1):170-174.
  10. added 2020-02-11
    Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Daniel C. Dennett.Mark Thornton - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):543-544.
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  11. added 2020-01-26
    Why Compatibilists Must Be Internalists.Taylor Cyr - 2019 - Journal of Ethics 23 (4):473-484.
    Some compatibilists are internalists. On their view, whether an agent is morally responsible for an action depends only on her psychological structure at that time. Other compatibilists are externalists. On their view, an agent’s history can make a difference as to whether or not she is morally responsible. In response to worries about manipulation, some internalists have claimed that compatibilism requires internalism. Recently, Alfred Mele has argued that this internalist response is untenable. The aim of this paper is to vindicate (...)
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  12. added 2020-01-25
    Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):207-209.
    Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility. By Mele Alfred R..).
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  13. added 2020-01-25
    Causation and Free Will, Written by Carolina Sartorio. [REVIEW]Taylor W. Cyr - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (4):475-478.
  14. added 2020-01-15
    Free Will of an Ontologically Open Mind.Jan Scheffel - manuscript
    The problem of free will has persistently resisted a solution throughout centuries. There is reason to believe that new elements need to be introduced into the analysis in order to make progress. In the present physicalist approach, these elements are emergence and information theory in relation to universal limits set by quantum physics. Furthermore, the common, but vague, characterization of having free will as "being able to act differently" is, in the spirit of Carnap, rephrased into an explicatum more suitable (...)
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  15. added 2019-12-28
    Free Will and Compatibilism.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    The author mounts a case against the libertarian and hard determinist's thesis that free will is impossible in a deterministic world. He charges incompatibilists with misconstruing ordinary 'free will' talk by overlaying common language with their own metaphysical presuppositions. Through a review of ordinary discourse and recent developments in jurisprudence and the sciences, he draws together the four key factors required for an act to be free. He then puts his 4C theory to work in giving a credible account of (...)
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  16. added 2019-12-28
    Frankfurt Cases and 'Could Have Done Otherwise'.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    In his seminal essay, Harry Frankfurt argued that our exercise of free will and allocation of moral responsibility do not depend on us being able to do other than we did. Leslie Allan defends this moral maxim from Frankfurt's attack. Applying his character-based counterfactual conditional analysis of free acts to Frankfurt's counterexamples, Allan unpacks the confusions that lie at the heart of Frankfurt's argument. The author also explores how his 4C compatibilist theory measures up against Frankfurt’s conclusions.
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  17. added 2019-11-14
    The Tension in Critical Compatibilism.Robert H. Wallace - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-12.
    Paul Russell’s The Limits of Free Will is more than the sum of its parts. Among other things, Limits offers readers a comprehensive look at Russell’s attack on the problematically idealized assumptions of the contemporary free will debate. This idealization, he argues, distorts the reality of our human predicament. Herein I pose a dilemma for Russell’s position, critical compatibilism. The dilemma illuminates the tension between Russell’s critical and compatibilist commitments. The problem is not obviously insurmountable, and as a compatibilist who (...)
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  18. added 2019-09-17
    Que tipo de determinação é compatível com que tipo de liberdade? – Uma resposta a Marcelo Fischborn.Gilberto Gomes - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 2 (20):113-127.
    While agreeing with Fischborn’s (2018) contention that, according to one traditional definition of compatibilism, my position should be classified as that of a libertarian incompatibilist, I argue here for a different view of compatibilism. This view involves, on the one hand, local probabilistic causation of decisions (rather than universal strict determinism) and, on the other, free will conceived as involving decisions generated by a decision-making process carried out by the brain, which consciously contemplates different alternatives and could in principle have (...)
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  19. added 2019-09-11
    Contextualizing Free Will.Romy Jaster - forthcoming - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung.
    Hawthorne makes the interesting suggestion that ascriptions of free will might be contextsensitive. Yet, the specific freedom contextualist account he presents makes freedom contextualism look like a non-starter. In this paper, I shall step into the breach for freedom contextualism. My aim is twofold. On the one hand, I shall argue that freedom contextualism can be motivated on the basis of our ordinary practice of freedom attribution, which shows that the view is anything but ad hoc and explains data which (...)
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  20. added 2019-08-23
    Responsibility and the Limits of Good and Evil.Robert Wallace - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2705-2727.
    P.F. Strawson’s compatibilism has had considerable influence. However, as Watson has argued in “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil”, his view appears to have a disturbing consequence: extreme evil exempts an agent from moral responsibility. This is a reductio of the view. Moreover, in some cases our emotional reaction to an evildoer’s history clashes with our emotional expressions of blame. Anyone’s actions can be explained by his or her history, however, and thereby can conflict with our present blame. Additionally, we (...)
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  21. added 2019-08-22
    Libertà del volere – dalla filosofia teoretica alla filosofia pratica. Un dialogo con Sandro Nannini.Christoph Lumer - 2018 - In Christoph Lumer & Giacomo Romano (eds.), Dalla filosofia dell’azione alla filosofia della mente. Riflessioni in onore di Sandro Nannini. Messina, Italy: corisco. pp. 53-84.
    The article, first, reconstructs and criticizes Sandro Nannini’s incompatibilistic concept of freedom of decision and, second, develops a compatibilistic alternative, a synthesis of a rationalistic and an autonomous approach. Nannini justifies his conception primarily from a naturalistic point of view: it reflects our sense of agency, so he says. This is criticized as empirically wrong and methodically mistaken: The theory of freedom of decision is, actually, normative; it is about good decisions; naturalism cannot establish normative claims. The alternative is based, (...)
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  22. added 2019-08-21
    Libertà del volere – dalla filosofia teoretica alla filosofia pratica. Un dialogo con Sandro Nannini.Christoph Lumer - 2018 - In Christoph Lumer & Giacomo Romano (eds.), Libertà del volere – dalla filosofia teoretica alla filosofia pratica. Un dialogo con Sandro Nannini. Roma; Messina (Italy): corisco. pp. 53-84.
    The article, first, reconstructs and criticizes Sandro Nannini’s incompatibilistic concept of freedom of decision and, second, develops a compatibilistic alternative, a synthesis of a rationalistic and an autonomous approach. Nannini justifies his conception primarily from a naturalistic point of view: it reflects our sense of agency, so he says. This is criticized as empirically wrong and methodically mistaken: The theory of freedom of decision is, actually, normative; it is about good decisions; naturalism cannot establish normative claims. The alternative is based, (...)
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  23. added 2019-07-29
    Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2019 - Oup Usa.
    In Manipulated Agents, Alfred R. Mele examines the role one's history plays in whether or not one is morally responsible for one's actions. Mele develops a "history-sensitive" theory of moral responsibility through reflection on a wide range of thought experiments which feature agents who have been manipulated or designed in ways that directly affect their actions.
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  24. added 2019-07-29
    Free Will, Resiliency and Flip-Flopping.James Cain - 2019 - Southwest Philosophy Review 35 (1):91-98.
    Many philosophers accept with certainty that we are morally responsible but take it to be an open question whether determinism holds. They treat determinism as epistemically compatible with responsibility. Should one who accepts this form of epistemic compatibilism also hold that determinism is metaphysically compatible with responsibility—that it is metaphysically possible for determinism and responsibility to coexist? John Martin Fischer gives two arguments that appear to favor an affirmative answer to this question. He argues that accounts of responsibility, such as (...)
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  25. added 2019-07-01
    Free Will Hunting.Ken Michael Levy - 1999 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
    Philosophers misleadingly speak of "the problem of free will". This is misleading because there is not just one but several different problems of free will. "The problem" to which philosophers usually refer is the question: is free will even possible? I address this question in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 2, I argue that if free will entails ultimate self-causation, then free will is indeed impossible. But I then argue in Chapter 3 that free will does not entail ultimate (...)
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  26. added 2019-06-06
    Default Compatibilism and Narrativity: Comments on John Martin Fischer’s Ways and Stories.Michael Nelson - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):35-45.
    I discuss two claims defended in Fischer’s recent work. The first is the default status of compatibilism. This is part of a conception of our agency and moral responsibility as being independent of the truth or the falsity of the thesis of determinism. I try to further bolster Fischer’s arguments in favor of this position. The second is Fischer’s defense of the narrative conception of moral responsibility, according to which the value of self-expression supports and explicates the value of being (...)
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  27. added 2019-06-06
    Non‐Relativist Contextualism About Free Will.Marcus Willaschek - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):567-587.
    : Contextualist accounts of free will recently proposed by Hawthorne and Rieber imply that the same action can be both free and unfree. This paradoxical consequence can be avoided by thinking of contexts not as constituted by arbitrary moves in a conversation, but rather by social practices. The following two conditions are suggested as each necessary and jointly sufficient for free will: the agent is able to form considered practical judgements and to act accordingly, and the agent is the original (...)
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  28. added 2019-06-06
    More Prepunishment for Compatibilists: A Reply to Beebee.Saul Smilansky - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):260-263.
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  29. added 2019-06-06
    Prepunishment for Compatibilists: A Reply to Kearns.Saul Smilansky - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):254-257.
    I have argued recently that compatibilism cannot resist in a principled way the temptation to prepunish people, and that it thus emerges as a much more radical view than is typically presented and perceived; and is at odds with fundamental moral intuitions (Smilansky 2007a). Stephen Kearns (2008) has replied, arguing that ‘Smilansky has not shown that compatibilism cannot resist prepunishment. Prepunishment is so bizarre that it can be resisted by just about anybody’. I would like to examine his challenging arguments.
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  30. added 2019-06-06
    The Pre-Critical Roots of Kant’s Compatibilism.Coleen P. Zoller - 2007 - Philosophy and Theology 19 (1/2):197-213.
    Although other scholars have pointed out why reading Kant as a compatibilist is superior to interpreting him as a libertarian incompatibilist, the infancy of his unique compatibilism has not been amply addressed. Here I marshal evidence from Kant’s pre-critical works to demonstrate that what the pre-critical Kant calls ‘freedom’ is consistent with what Kant will later call ‘autonomy.’ Once a pre-critical version of autonomy is acknowledged, one will see that both the positive and negative formulations of freedom that pervade the (...)
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  31. added 2019-06-06
    Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):307-330.
  32. added 2019-06-06
    Intentionality and Intentional Action.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):319-326.
    Those who argue that free will is an illusion are wrong. They base their argument on scientific evidence that tests the wrong level of description for intentional action. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider. In this paper, I describe the kind of intentionality that goes with the exercise of free will.
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  33. added 2019-06-06
    Difficulties for the Reconciling and Estranging Projects: Some Symmetries.David H. Sanford - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):240-244.
    Suppose that Susan did not go to the movies. The reconciling project attempts to show that this plus Determinism does not imply that Susan could not have gone to the movies. The estranging project attempts to show the opposite. A counter-entailment argument is of the form A is consistent with C, and C entails not-B, therefore A does not entail B. An instance of the counter-entailment arguments undermines a central argument for the reconciling project. Another instance undermines a central argument (...)
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  34. added 2019-06-06
    Pastoral Counsel for the Anxious Naturalist: Daniel Dennett's.Timothy O'connor - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (4):436-448.
    The church-going philosopher who settles in for an extended reading of Dan Dennett’s new book will find himself in a familiar circumstance. What one confronts is a lot more like an extended sermon than it is a typical philosophical treatise. And, whatever one’s Sunday morning habits, one can’t help but admire the preaching skills artfully displayed. The delivery is powerful and assured; the argument is streamlined, peppered with evocative and delightful illustrations that will be recalled long after the particular points (...)
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  35. added 2019-06-06
    Hans Jonas: Freedom and Determinism in the Ancient World.Emidio Spinelli - 2001 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 23 (1):71-84.
  36. added 2019-06-06
    Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions.Magill Kevin - 1997 - London: author open access, originally MacMillan.
    Most of us take it for granted that we are free agents: that we can sometimes act so as to shape our own lives and those of others, that we have choices about how to do so and that we are responsible for what we do. But are we really justified in believing this? For centuries philosophers have argued about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism or natural causation, and they seem no closer to agreeing about (...)
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  37. added 2019-06-06
    A Reconstruction of Hegel’s Account of Freedom of the Will.Darrel Moellendorf - 1992 - The Owl of Minerva 24 (1):5-18.
    “Will which is actually free is the unity of theoretical and practical spirit.” So opens the section of Hegel’s Encyclopedia known as “Free Spirit.” This text as well as both its immediate textual predecessor “Practical Spirit” and the introduction to the Philosophy of right comprise the mature Hegel’s attempt to give an account of freedom of the will, and mark a full departure from the Kantian standpoint on the matter. While Kant sees the evidence of freedom of the will in (...)
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  38. added 2019-06-06
    Regarding Rich’s “Compatibilism Argument” and the ‘Ought- Implies-‘Can’ Argument.Don Fawkes - 1990 - Southwest Philosophy Review 6 (2):123-124.
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  39. added 2019-06-06
    Compatibilism and the ‘Ought’-Implies-‘Can’ Argument.Gregory Rich - 1989 - Southwest Philosophy Review 5 (2):9-16.
  40. added 2019-06-06
    Compatibilism, Values, and “Could Have Done Otherwise”.David Shatz - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):151-200.
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  41. added 2019-06-06
    On Two Arguments for Compatibilism.Peter van Inwagen - 1985 - Analysis 45 (3):161.
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  42. added 2019-06-06
    Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue. [REVIEW]James J. Valone - 1982 - Teaching Philosophy 5 (2):170-171.
  43. added 2019-06-06
    ‘Can,’ Compatibilism, and Possible Worlds.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1981 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4):679-691.
    Most compatibilists have sought to defend their view by means of an analysis of the concept of ‘can’ in terms of subjunctive conditionals. Keith Lehrer opposes this analysis; he nevertheless embraces compatibilism. In a recent paper he has proposed a novel analysis of the concept of ‘can’ within the framework of possible-world semantics. The paper has provoked considerable discussion. In it Lehrer claims that he demonstrates the truth of compatibilism. Others have claimed that this is not so, but at least (...)
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  44. added 2019-06-06
    The Stoics. [REVIEW]E. B. F. - 1976 - Review of Metaphysics 29 (3):559-560.
    For many years Professor Sandbach, Emeritus Professor of Classics at Cambridge, lectured on the Stoics. His book—reflecting a contemporary interest in Stoicism—is most welcome, even if it is not the long and comprehensive undertaking his friends were hoping for. Even so it is deceptively short and simple, containing vast erudition and a masterly touch for evaluating sources. Sandbach begins with the life of Zeno and his influences, to put Stoicism in perspective, goes on to treat the "system," and ends with (...)
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  45. added 2019-06-06
    Free Will and Practical Reason.Richard Reilly - 1976 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 50:51.
  46. added 2019-06-06
    Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Clarendon Press.
  47. added 2019-06-06
    Doing the Impossible: A Second Try.Keith Lehrer - 1964 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):249-251.
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  48. added 2019-06-06
    XIII.—Free Will and Responsibility.A. K. Stout - 1936 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 37 (1):213-230.
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  49. added 2019-06-06
    Freedom, Necessity, and Mind.Edward Gleason Spaulding - 1933 - Philosophical Review 42:156.
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  50. added 2019-06-06
    Determinism of Free Will: With Reference to the Preceding Article.Paul Carus - 1917 - The Monist 27 (2):306-311.
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