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Summary Compatibilist views of free will hold that free will is compatible with causal determinism. Classical compatibilists argued that determinism does not entail that agents lack alternative possibilities. They often advanced conditional accounts of alternatives (eg, the agent can do otherwise if, were she to want to do otherwise, she would). In more recent times, compatibilists have often denied that we need a power to do otherwise for freedom. Most contemporary compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with but does not require determinism. So-called Hobartian compatibilists hold that determinism is required for free will.
Key works Compatibilism was influentially defended by David 1955 and Hobbes 1651. Hume defended the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise. Hobart 1934 argued that free will actually requires determinism to be true. Non-traditional compatibilist accounts stem fromFrankfurt 1969, which argues that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility (and, presumably, freedom). In Frankfurt 1971, an influential hierarchical account of free will is defended. Strawson 1962 develops an account of free will on which agents' reactive attitudes towards others is central. Very recently, there has been a rival of something like a conditional analysis of freedom, inspired by Lewisian work on dispositions; Vihvelin 2004 is an excellent defence of the view.
Introductions As usual, the entry in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - McKenna 2008 - is excellent. Though he is not (quite) a compatibilist himself, Fischer 2007 is a thorough articulation and defence, as is Haji 2002.
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  1. added 2018-11-13
    Autonomy and Free Will.David Weissman - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (5):609-645.
  2. added 2018-11-13
    Moral Responsibility and Intentional Action: Sehon on Freedom and Purpose.Corrado Michael Louis - 2017 - Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (2):246-264.
  3. added 2018-11-13
    Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, Written by Manuel Vargas. [REVIEW]Justin A. Capes - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2):245-248.
  4. added 2018-11-06
    Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck*: ALFRED R. MELE.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):274-293.
    My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic. That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of “determinism,” few philosophers believe that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue to argue about whether free (...)
  5. added 2018-11-01
    La posibilidad de la "acción libre" en las disertaciones de Epicteto.Rodrigo Braicovich - 2008 - Revista de Filosofía 64:17-31.
    El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar dos alternativas presentes en las Disertaciones de Epicteto como posibles vías de acceso a la libertad y la eudaimonía: a) identificar nuestro querer con el querer de la divinidad; b) concentrarnos exclusivamente en aquello de "depende de nosotros". Dado que ambos caminos parecen conducir al solipsismo y la pasividad, ofreceremos una alternativa de interpretación que permite conciliar ambas estrategias con la impronta práctica que caracteriza a la ética del autor. The aim of (...)
  6. added 2018-10-26
    Moral Responsibility and History: Problems with Frankfurtian Nonhistoricism.J. Angelo Corlett - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (2):205-223.
    This article examines the nonhistoricist higher-order compatibilist theory of moral responsibility devised and defended by Harry G. Frankfurt. Intuitions about certain kinds of cases of moral responsibility cast significant doubt on the wide irrelevancy clause of the nonhistoricist feature of Frankfurt’s theory. It will be argued that, while the questions of the nature and ascription of moral responsibility must be separated in doing moral responsibility theory, the questions of whether or not and the extent to which an agent is morally (...)
  7. added 2018-10-25
    Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism.Taylor W. Cyr - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    In this paper, I defend a version of compatibilism against luck-related objections. After introducing the types of luck that some take to be problematic for moral responsibility, I consider and respond to two recent attempts to show that compatibilism faces the same problem of luck that libertarianism faces—present luck. I then consider a different type of luck—constitutive luck—and provide a new solution to this problem. One upshot of the present discussion is a reason to prefer a history-sensitive compatibilist account over (...)
  8. added 2018-10-17
    Just Deserts: Can We Be Held Morally Responsible for Our Actions? Yes, Says Daniel Dennett. No, Says Gregg Caruso.Gregg D. Caruso & Daniel C. Dennett - 2018 - Aeon 1 (Oct. 4):1-20.
  9. added 2018-09-27
    Gilberto Gomes é mesmo um compatibilista?Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3):179-188.
    This paper focuses on Gilberto Gomes’ work on free will. In a series of contributions that have had a significant impact on the respective literature, Gomes developed a conception about free will and argued that its existence is consistent with recent scientific findings, specially in neuroscience. In this paper, I object to a claim of Gomes about his conception of free will, namely the claim that it is a compatibilist conception. I seek to show that Gomes does not use the (...)
  10. added 2018-09-16
    Moral Sense and the Foundations of Responsibility.Paul Russell - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. New York, NY, USA: pp. 199-220.
    Throughout much of the first half of the twentieth century, the free-will debate was largely concerned with the question of what kind of freedom was required for moral responsibility and whether the kind of freedom required was compatible with the thesis of determinism. This issue was itself addressed primarily with reference to the question of how freedom is related to alternative possibilities and what the relevant analysis of “could have done otherwise” comes to. The discussion of these topics made little (...)
  11. added 2018-09-15
    Free Will Pessimism.Paul Russell - 2017 - In Vitterhetsakademien Yearbook 2017/ Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities. Stockholm, Sweden: pp. 47-63..
  12. added 2018-09-15
    “Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich’s Third Way”.Paul Russell - 2017 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity. London, UK: Palgrave. pp. Pp. 159-79..
    In the third and final part of his A Theory of Determinism (TD) Ted Honderich addresses the fundamental question concerning “the consequences of determinism.” The critical question he aims to answer is what follows if determinism is true? This question is, of course, intimately bound up with the problem of free will and, in particular, with the question of whether or not the truth of determinism is compatible or incompatible with the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility. It is (...)
  13. added 2018-09-15
    Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P.F. Strawson's Freedom and Resentment.Paul Russell - 2016 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
    The philosophical debate about free will and responsibility has been of great importance throughout the history of philosophy. In modern times this debate has received an enormous resurgence of interest and the contribution in 1962 by P.F. Strawson with the publication of his essay "Freedom and Resentment" has generated a wide range of discussion and criticism in the philosophical community and beyond. The debate is of central importance to recent developments in the free will literature and has shaped the way (...)
  14. added 2018-09-15
    Hume's Lengthy Digression: Free Will in the Treatise.Paul Russell - 2015 - In Donald Ainslie & Annemarie Butler (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume's Treatise. Cambridge, UK: pp. 231-251.
    David Hume’s views on the subject of free will are among the most influential contributions to this long-disputed topic. Throughout the twentieth century, and into this century, Hume has been widely regarded as having presented the classic defense of the compatibilist position, the view that freedom and responsibility are consistent with determinism. Most of Hume’s core arguments on this issue are found in the Sections entitled “Of liberty and necessity,” first presented in Book 2 of A Treatise of Human Nature (...)
  15. added 2018-09-07
    Responsibility and the Limits of Good and Evil.Robert H. Wallace - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    P.F. Strawson’s compatibilism has had considerable influence. However, as Gary Watson has argued in “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” (1987/2008), his view appears to have a disturbing consequence: extreme evil exempts an agent from moral responsibility. This is a reductio of the view. Moreover, in some cases our emotional reaction to an evildoer’s history clashes with our emotional expressions of blame. Anyone’s actions can be explained by his or her history, however, and thereby can conflict with our present blame. (...)
  16. added 2018-08-20
    On Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1535-1543.
    In this article I review the core elements of Carolina Sartorio’s actual causal sequence account of free will and moral responsibility, and propose two revisions. First, I suggest replacing the contested notion of absence causation by the relatively uncontroversial notion of causal explanation by absences. Second, I propose retaining explanation by unreduced dispositions, of which Sartorio appears to be wary. I then set out a response to her critical treatment of manipulation arguments against compatibilism. Lastly, I point out that Sartorio’s (...)
  17. added 2018-08-20
    Free Will, Causation, and Absence.Randolph Clarke - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1517-1524.
    This paper comments on Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will, challenging the non-modal conception of reasons-sensitivity that Sartorio advances.
  18. added 2018-08-20
    Diana and Ernie Return: On Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1525-1533.
    In the final chapter of her Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio offers a novel reply to an original-design argument for the thesis that determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility, an argument that resembles Alfred Mele’s zygote argument in Free Will and Luck. This article assesses the merits of her reply. It is concluded that Sartorio has more work to do if she is to lay this style of argument to rest.
  19. added 2018-08-20
    Causation and Free Will.Peter J. Graham, Andrew Law & Jonah Nagashima - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):371-373.
    Causation and Free Will By SartorioCarolinaOxford University Press, 2016. viii + 188 pp. £35.00.
    No categories
  20. added 2018-08-20
    Précis of Causation and Free Will.Carolina Sartorio - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1513-1516.
    This is a precis of my book Causation and Free Will. I go over the main features of my compatibilist account of free will, which is based on the actual causes of our behavior.
  21. added 2018-08-20
    The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays.Paul Russell (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    The Limits of Free Will presents influential articles by Paul Russell concerning free will and moral responsibility. The problems arising in this field of philosophy, which are deeply rooted in the history of the subject, are also intimately related to a wide range of other fields, such as law and criminology, moral psychology, theology, and, more recently, neuroscience. These articles were written and published over a period of three decades, although most have appeared in the past decade. Among the topics (...)
  22. added 2018-08-20
    Determinism, compatibilism and free will scepticism.Rafael Miranda-Rojas - 2017 - Cinta de Moebio 60:295-305.
    Resumen: El presente escrito tiene por objetivo discutir los alcances de la postura denominada escepticismo sobre el libre albedrío y evaluar si el debate compatibilismo - incompatibilismo supone una postura racionalista y/o necesitarista respecto a si un sujeto S actúa libremente. La discusión de los últimos diez años sobre este tópico permite establecer una distinción relevante entre que una acción sea libre, sin que ello descarte antecedentes causales de esa acción. En particular, sin que ello conduzca a un compromiso con (...)
  23. added 2018-08-20
    Free Will Pessimism.Paul Russell - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 4. New York, NY, USA: pp. 93-120..
    The immediate aim of this paper is to articulate the essential features of an alternative compatibilist position, one that is responsive to sources of resistance to the compatibilist program based on considerations of fate and luck. The approach taken relies on distinguishing carefully between issues of skepticism and pessimism as they arise in this context. A compatibilism that is properly responsive to concerns about fate and luck is committed to what I describe as free will pessimism, which is to be (...)
  24. added 2018-08-20
    Free Will and Open Alternatives.Carlos J. Moya - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):167-191.
    In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom are motivated by (...)
  25. added 2018-08-20
    Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense.Mike Almeida - 2016 - In Hugh J. McCann (ed.), Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Free Will in Perfect Being Theology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 56- 70.
  26. added 2018-08-03
    Compatibilist Fatalism.Paul Russell - 2000 - In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 199--218.
    Compatibilists argue, famously, that it is a simple incompatibilist confusion to suppose that determinism implies fatalism. Incompatibilists argue, on the contrary, that determinism implies fatalism, and thus cannot be consistent with the necessary conditions of moral responsibility. Despite their differences, however, both parties are agreed on one important matter: the refutation of fatalism is essential to the success of the compatibilist strategy. In this paper I argue that compatibilism requires a richer conception of fatalistic concern; one that recognizes the _legitimacy_ (...)
  27. added 2018-06-22
    The Free Will Problem [Hobbes, Bramhall and Free Will].Paul Russell - 2011 - In Desmond M. Clarke & Catherine Wilson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 424-444.
    This article examines the free will problem as it arises within Thomas Hobbes' naturalistic science of morals in early modern Europe. It explains that during this period, the problem of moral and legal responsibility became acute as mechanical philosophy was extended to human psychology and as a result human choices were explained in terms of desires and preferences rather than being represented as acts of an autonomous faculty. It describes how Hobbes changed the face of moral philosophy, through his Leviathan, (...)
  28. added 2018-06-18
    Fähigkeiten und das Problem des Determinismus.Romy Jaster & Ansgar Beckermann - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 3 (72):317-342.
    Nicht nur Locke war der Auffassung, dass Willensfreiheit voraussetzt, dass ein Mensch bestimmte Fähigkeiten besitzt. Aber kann ein Mensch die für Freiheit entscheidenden Fähigkeiten auch dann besitzen, wenn der Weltverlauf vollständig determiniert ist? Unsere These ist, dass Akteure auch in einer deterministischen Welt über die freiheitsrelevanten Fähigkeiten verfügen können. Unser Argument hat vier Schritte. Im ersten Schritt argumentieren wir dafür, dass eine Fähigkeitstheorie bestimmte Anforderungen erfüllen muss, die sich im Zusammenhang mit freiheitsrelevanten Fähigkeiten als einschlägig erweisen werden, und stellen exemplarisch (...)
  29. added 2018-05-14
    Free Will and Abilities to Act.Randolph Clarke - forthcoming - In Streit um die Freiheit: Philosophische und theologische Beiträge. Paderborn: Schoeningh/Brill.
    This paper examines the view of abilities to act advanced by Kadri Vihvelin in Causes, Laws, and Free Will. Vihvelin argues that (i) abilities of an important kind are “structurally” like dispositions such as fragility; (ii) ascriptions of dispositions can be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals; (iii) ascriptions of abilities of the kind in question can be analyzed similarly; and (iv) we have the free will we think we have by having abilities of this kind and being in circumstances (...)
  30. added 2018-04-21
    A Modest Classical Compatibilism.Matthew J. Hart - 2017 - Disputatio (45):265–285.
    The advent of Frankfurt-style counterexamples in the early 1970s posed a problem not merely for incompatibilists, but for compatibilists also. At that time compatibilists too were concerned to hold that the presence of alternative possibilities was necessary for moral responsibility. Such a classical compatibilism, I argue in this paper, should not have been left behind. I propose that we can use a Kratzer-style semantics of ‘can’ to model ‘could have done otherwise’ statements in such a way that the truth of (...)
  31. added 2018-04-12
    Freiheitsskepsis auf dem Prüfstand. Zu Sven Walters Neubewertung der empirischen Herausforderungen für die Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (3):418-424.
    In seinem Buch Illusion freier Wille? verfolgt Sven Walter zwei Hauptziele. Das erste besteht in dem detaillierten Nachweis, dass die in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten öffentlichkeitswirksam vorgetragene kognitions- und neurowissenschaftlich begründete Freiheitsskepsis durch die empirischen Befunde nicht gedeckt sei. Das zweite Hauptziel ist, aufzuzeigen, dass Willensfreiheit bzw. „unsere intuitive Freiheitsgewissheit“ durchaus empirisch erforschbaren Beeinträchtigungen unterliegt, aber anderen als von den Wortführern der neurobiologischen Freiheitskritik angeführten: „Unbewusste situationale Einflüsse“ auf unsere Willens- und Entscheidungsbildung seien zwar nicht per se, wohl aber dann (...)
  32. added 2018-04-12
    Libertarische Freiheit für natürliche Wesen. Zu Ansgar Beckermanns Freiheitsauffassung.Geert Keil - 2011 - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 36 (2):154-176.
    Der Beitrag ist ein Kommentar zu Ansgar Beckermanns kompatibilistischer Freiheitsauffassung. Nach Beckermann können libertarische Auffassungen die Willensfreiheit nicht verständlich machen. Durch ihre Ablehnung des Determinismus sähen sie sich zwei unattraktiven Optionen gegenüber: die Freiheit auf Akteurskausalität zu gründen oder auf den Zufall. Ich stimme Beckermann darin zu, dass Akteurskausalität schwer verständlich und das Zufallsproblem eine große Herausforderung für den Libertarismus ist. Ob der Kompatibilismus in einer besseren Lage ist, ist aber fraglich. Es gibt zwei Arten von Kompatibilisten: solche, die den (...)
  33. added 2018-03-05
    Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to Do Otherwise.Patrick Todd - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):395-407.
    I provide a manipulation-style argument against classical compatibilism—the claim that freedom to do otherwise is consistent with determinism. My question is simple: if Diana really gave Ernie free will, why isn't she worried that he won't use it precisely as she would like? Diana's non-nervousness, I argue, indicates Ernie's non-freedom. Arguably, the intuition that Ernie lacks freedom to do otherwise is stronger than the direct intuition that he is simply not responsible; this result highlights the importance of the denial of (...)
  34. added 2018-03-05
    Neuroscientific Prediction and the Intrusion of Intuitive Metaphysics.David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (2):482-502.
    How might advanced neuroscience—in which perfect neuro-predictions are possible—interact with ordinary judgments of free will? We propose that peoples' intuitive ideas about indeterminist free will are both imported into and intrude into their representation of neuroscientific scenarios and present six experiments demonstrating intrusion and importing effects in the context of scenarios depicting perfect neuro-prediction. In light of our findings, we suggest that the intuitive commitment to indeterminist free will may be resilient in the face of scientific evidence against such free (...)
  35. added 2018-02-18
    Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy.John Martin Fischer (ed.) - 2005 - Routledge.
    Over the last three decades there has been a tremendous amount of philosophical work in the Anglo-American tradition on the cluster of topics pertaining to Free Will. Contemporary work has in some instances been in the form of lively debates between proponents of different viewpoints, and literature surrounding the area is therefore characterized by a genuine vitality. This collection selects the very best of this material and presents it in a single, accessible set of volumes.
  36. added 2018-02-17
    Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist’s Problems.Ned Markosian - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383-398.
    In a recent paper I argued that agent causation theorists should be compatibilists. In this paper, I argue that compatibilists should be agent causation theorists. I consider six of the main problems facing compatibilism: (i) the powerful intuition that one can't be responsible for actions that were somehow determined before one was born; (ii) Peter van Inwagen's modal argument, involving the inference rule (β); (iii) the objection to compatibilism that is based on claiming that the ability to do otherwise is (...)
  37. added 2018-02-17
    Free Will and Education.Johannes Giesinger - 2010 - Philosophy of Education 44 (4):515-528.
    It is commonly assumed that to educate means to control or guide a person's acting and development. On the other hand, it is often presupposed that the addressees of education must be seen as being endowed with free will. The question raised in this paper is whether these two assumptions are compatible. It might seem that if the learner is free in her will, she cannot be educated; however, if she is successfully educated, then it is doubtful whether she can (...)
  38. added 2018-02-17
    Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis.Ferenc Huoranszki - 2010 - Routledge.
    _Freedom of the Will_ provides a novel interpretation of G. E. Moore’s famous conditional analysis of free will and discusses several questions about the meaning of free will and its significance for moral responsibility. Although Moore’ theory has a strong initial appeal, most metaphysicians believe that there are conclusive arguments against it. Huoranszki argues that the importance of conditional analysis must be reevaluated in light of some recent developments in the theory of dispositions. The original analysis can be amended so (...)
  39. added 2018-02-17
    Moral Responsibility and the Irrelevance of Physics: Fischer’s Semi-Compatibilism Vs. Anti-Fundamentalism.Helen Steward - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (2):129-145.
    The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer's plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a (...)
  40. added 2018-02-17
    Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan.Johannes Brandl (ed.) - 2002 - Atlanta: Rodopi.
    ... Studien-26 THEMES IN MY PHILOSOPHICAL WORK Terry HORGAN University of Memphis This paper is an overview of my philosophical work. ...
  41. added 2018-02-17
    Freedom, Causation, and the Consequence Argument.Laura W. Ekstrom - 1998 - Synthese 115 (3):333-354.
    The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: (...)
  42. added 2018-02-17
    A Paradox in Compatibilist Accounts of Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Carlos Moya - 1995 - Critica 27 (80):119-127.
  43. added 2018-02-17
    Doxastic Freedom: A Compatibilist Alternative.Tomis Kapitan - 1989 - American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1):31-41.
  44. added 2018-02-17
    Review Article: Freedom and Determinism, Edited by Keith Lehrer.Stephen C. Pepper & Bernard Berofsky - 1969 - Journal of Value Inquiry 3 (2):147-156.
  45. added 2018-02-16
    Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction.Michael McKenna & Derk Pereboom - 2015 - Routledge.
    If my ability to react freely is constrained by forces beyond my control, am I still morally responsible for the things I do? The question of whether, how and to what extent we are responsible for our own actions has always been central to debates in philosophy and theology, and has been the subject of much recent research in cognitive science. And for good reason- the views we take on free will affect the choices we make as individuals, the moral (...)
  46. added 2018-02-16
    Smilansky's Alleged Refutation of Compatibilism.Helen Beebee - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):258-260.
  47. added 2018-02-16
    Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will.Timothy O'Connor (ed.) - 1995 - Oxford University Press.
    Many philosophers are persuaded by familiar arguments that free will is incompatible with causal determinism. Yet, notoriously, past attempts to articulate how the right type of indeterminism might secure the capacity for autonomous action have generally been regarded as either demonstrably inadequate or irremediably obscure. This volume gathers together the most significant recent discussions concerning the prospects for devising a satisfactory indeterministic account of freedom of action. These essays give greater precision to traditional formulations of the problems associated with indeterministic (...)
  48. added 2018-02-14
    Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil.Guillaume Bignon - 2017 - Eugene: Pickwick Publications.
  49. added 2017-12-29
    On Flew’s Compatibilism and His Objections to Theistic Libertarianism.Hakan Gundogdu - 2015 - Kaygı Uludağ University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Philosophy 25:115-142.
    Flew strongly defends a compatibilist thesis in the free will debate before going on to totally object to theistic libertarianism. His objections basically rely on his compatibilism embracing the notion of agent causation, which is not very common in compatibilist theses. Since he is a strong proponent of ordinary language philosophy, he also holds that linguistic analyses can certainly solve the free will problem as well as many other problems of philosophy. In doing so, he first uses the paradigm cases (...)
  50. added 2017-11-20
    Can Physics Make Us Free?Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Physics 5.
    A thoroughly physical view on reality and our common sense view on agency and free will seem to be in a direct conflict with each other: if everything that happens is determined by prior physical events, so too are all our actions and conscious decisions; you have no choice but to do what you are destined to do. Although this way of thinking has intuitive appeal, and a long history, it has recently began to gain critical attention. A number of (...)
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