Competence and Performance

Wittgenstein has shown that that life, in the sense that applies in the first place to human beings, is inherently linguistic. In this paper, I ask what is involved in language, given that it is thus essential to life, answering that language – or concepts – must be both alive and the ground for life. This is explicated by a Wittgensteinian series of entailments of features. According to the first feature, concepts are not intentional engagements. The second feature brings life (...) back to concepts by describing them as inflectible: Attitudes, actions, conversations and other engagements inflect concepts, i.e., concepts take their particular characters in our actual engagements. However, inflections themselves would be reified together with the life they ground unless they could preserve the openness of concepts: hence the third feature of re-inflectibility. Finally, the openness of language must be revealed in actual life. This entails the possibility of conceptual ambivalence. (shrink)

Eu começo com alguns comentários famosos pelo filósofo (psicólogo) Ludwig Wittgenstein porque Pinker compartilha com a maioria de povos (devido às configurações padrão de nosso psychology inata evoluído) determinados preconceitos sobre o funcionamento da mente, e Porque Wittgenstein oferece insights únicos e profundos sobre o funcionamento da linguagem, pensamento e realidade (que ele viu como mais ou menos coextensivo) não encontrado em nenhum outro lugar. Ore é apenas referência a Wittgenstein neste volume, que é mais lamentável, considerando que ele foi (...) o mais brilhante e original analista de linguagem. No último capítulo, usando a famosa metáfora da caverna de Platão, ele lindamente resume o livro com uma visão geral de como a mente (linguagem, pensamento, psicologia intencional)-um produto de egoísmo cego, moderado apenas ligeiramente por altruísmo automatizado para fechar parentes carregando cópias de nossos genes (inclusive fitness)--funciona automaticamente, mas tenta terminar em uma nota otimista, dando-nos esperança de que podemos, no entanto, empregar suas vastas capacidades para cooperar e tornar o mundo um lugar decente para viver. Pinker é certamente consciente de mas diz pouco sobre o fato de que muito mais sobre a nossa psicologia é deixada de fora do que incluído. Entre as janelas na natureza humana que são deixadas de fora ou dada a mínima atenção são matemática e geometria, música e sons, imagens, eventos e causalidade, ontologia (classes de coisas ou o que sabemos), a maioria da epistemologia (como sabemos), disposições (acreditando, pensando, julgando, pretendendo etc.) e o resto da psicologia intencional de ação, neurotransmissores e entheogens, Estados espirituais (por exemplo, Satori e iluminação, estimulação cerebral e gravação, danos cerebrais e comportamentais déficits e distúrbios, jogos e esportes, teoria da decisão (incluindo teoria do jogo e economia comportamental), comportamento animal (muito pouca linguagem, mas um bilhão de anos de genética compartilhada). Muitos livros foram escritos sobre cada uma dessas áreas de psicologia intencional. Os dados neste livro são descrições, não explicações que mostram por que os nossos cérebros fazê-lo desta forma ou como é feito. Como sabemos usar as frases de sua maneira (ou seja, conhecer todos os seus significados)? Esta é a psicologia evolutiva que opera em um nível mais básico-o nível em que Wittgenstein é mais ativo. E há pouca atenção ao contexto em que as palavras são usadas = uma arena que Wittgenstein foi pioneira. No entanto, este é um trabalho clássico e com estes cuidados ainda é bem vale a pena ler. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

In this second of two essays on the topic of ancient Greek inscriptions, I will briefly explore and discuss the textuality of ritual norms or, 'sacred laws', by looking 1) at the reasons for these ritual norms to have been written down in the first place and 2) how these norms/laws/decrees were able to get their observers to adhere to them. Throughout the essay I have made use of J.L. Austin's Speech Act Theory to better contextualize the meaning of the (...) inscriptions dealt with. (shrink)

In this first of two essays written on the topic of ancient greek inscriptions, I will briefly explore and discuss the role of the written word and of visual language within the cult of Asclepius at Epidauros, by both looking at the creation and function of the Epidaurian sanctuary's healing inscriptions—also called 'iamata'. Throughout the essay I have made use of J.L. Austin's Speech Act Theory to better contextualize the meaning of the inscriptions dealt with.

This article surveys the philosophical literature on theoretical linguistics. The focus of the paper is centred around the major debates in the philosophy of linguistics, past and present, with specific relation to how they connect to the philosophy of science. Specific issues such as scientific realism in linguistics, the scientific status of grammars, the methodological underpinnings of formal semantics, and the integration of linguistics into the larger cognitive sciences form the crux of the discussion.

Eli Alshanetsky considers how we make our thoughts clear to ourselves in the process of putting them into words and examines the paradox of those difficult cases where we do not already know what we are struggling to articulate.

I present a novel, collaborative, methodology for linguistics: what I call the ‘explanatory economy’. According to this picture, multiple models/theories are evaluated based on the extent to which they complement one another with respect to data coverage. I show how this model can resolve a long-standing worry about the methodology of generative linguistics: that by creating too much distance between data and theory, the empirical credentials of this research program are tarnished. I provide justifications of such methodologically central distinctions as (...) the competence/performance and core/periphery distinction, and then show how we can understand the push for simplicity in the history of generative grammar in this light. (shrink)

According to one prominent view of exercising abilities (e.g., Millar 2009), a subject, S, counts as exercising an ability to ϕ if and only if S successfully ϕs. Such an ‘exercise-success’ thesis looks initially very plausible for abilities, perhaps even obviously or analytically true. In this paper, however, I will be defending the position that one can in fact exercise an ability to do one thing by doing some entirely distinct thing, and in doing so I’ll highlight various reasons (epistemological, (...) metaphysical and linguistic) that favor the alternative approach I develop over views that hold that the exercise of an ability is a success notion in the sense Millar maintains. (shrink)

According to standard assumptions in semantics, ordinary users of a language have implicit beliefs about the truth-conditions of sentences in that language, and they often agree on those beliefs. For example, it is assumed that if Anna and John are both competent users of English and the former utters ‘grass is green’ in conversation with the latter, they will both believe that that sentence is true if and only if grass is green. These assumptions play an important role in an (...) intuitively compelling picture of communication, according to which successful communication through literal assertoric utterances is normally effected thanks to our shared beliefs about the truth-conditions of the sentences uttered in the course of the conversation. Against these standard assumptions, this paper argues that the participants in a conversation rarely have the same beliefs about the truth-conditions of the sentences involved in a linguistic interaction. More precisely, it argues for Variance, the thesis that nearly every utterance is such that there is no proposition which more than one language user believes to be that utterance’s truth-conditional content. If Variance is true, we must reject the standard picture of communication. Towards the end of the paper I identify three ways in which ordinary conversations can be communication-like despite the truth of Variance and argue that the most natural amendments to the standard picture fail to explain them. (shrink)

In the literature seeking to explain concepts in terms of their point, talk of ‘the point’ of concepts remains under-theorised. I propose a typology of points which distinguishes practical, evaluative, animating, and inferential points. This allows us to resolve tensions such as that between the ambition of explanations in terms of the points of concepts to be informative and the claim that mastering concepts requires grasping their point; and it allows us to exploit connections between types of points to understand (...) why they come apart, and whether they do so for problematic ideological reasons or for benignly functional reasons. (shrink)

In the history of formal semantics, the successful joining of linguistic and philosophical work brought with it some difficult foundational questions concerning the nature of meaning and the nature of knowledge of language in the domain of semantics: questions in part about “what’s in the head” of a competent language-user. This paper, part of a project on the history of formal semantics, revisits the central issues of (Partee, 1979) in a historical context, as a clash between two traditions, Fregean and (...) Chomskyan, a clash that accompanied early work combining Montague’s semantics with Chomskyan syntax. Recent advances in philosophy of mind (from, e.g., Stalnaker and Burge) go a long way towards changing the framework of arguments about “psychological reality” and “competence”, challenging the suppositions on which the original dichotomy rested, thus largely defusing the tension. (shrink)

In formal semantics intuition plays a key role, in two ways. Intuitions about semantic properties of expressions are the primary data, and intuitions of the semanticists are the main access to these data. The paper investigates how this dual role is related to the concept of competence and the role that this concept plays in semantics. And it inquires whether the self-reflexive role of intuitions has consequences for the methodology of semantics as an empirical discipline.

OBJECTIVE: (a) To measure the effect of a guideline-based training on the performance of ontology developers compared with the performance after unspecific training by a competency question based evaluation; and (b) to provide empirical evidence for the applicability of competency questions in formal ontology evaluation in general. BACKGROUND: A close connection between ontology development and ontology evaluation as quality management procedure can been attained with the use of competency questions. Competency questions are often used as a semi-formal specification of requirements (...) for an ontology under development. Hence they can also be used as evaluation instruments, in order to check how far an ontology fulfills these requirements. METHODS: A randomized controlled trial was conducted with two groups of 12 students each. The intervention consisted in a differential guideline-based training on ontology development vs. unspecific training. After a group-specific training focusing on three topics per group, performance of students was assessed with 12 exercises (2 exercises per topic), in which the students had to apply their skills. Different types of competency questions were elaborated for the analysis of the students' ontologies. We used the proportion of correct answers as a measure of ontology quality. RESULTS: On single topic level, the performance of ontology developers increased after guideline-based training for two out of the six topics: it increased from a proportion of 0.46 to 0.63 for the topic Process \& Participation and from 0.44 to 0.53 for the topic Collective Material Entity. In regression analysis, a positive correlation was shown between the performance of students on untrained topics and the performance after specific guideline-based training. Moreover, in multiple regression analysis an overall effect of specific training of 0.09 was calculated (p < 0.1). CONCLUSION: The results show an effect of a specific guideline-based training on the performance of ontology developers compared to the performance after unspecific training by an increase of about 10 \% on the rate of correct competency questions. In addition, this study has shown the general applicability of competency questions in a formal ontology evaluation scenario. However, the study also shows that the training of ontology developers and their performance evaluation is a tedious task. The resulting performance of ontology developers is more dependent on the a priori individual competencies than on the specific acquired skills after training. (shrink)

The style, tone and tenor of the New Testament writers are unique and exceptional. Jesus of Nazareth, Hebraic roots, Old Testament literature, oral tradition, Hellenistic influence, Roman governance, 1st century socio-politics, and multifarious linguistic elements combined to immortalize their literary records and make them indelible in the minds of contemplative readers. This book acknowledges previous work and seeks to connect the thoughts gleaned from them to seminal ideas that have their locus in the inquiry of how language can influence thought (...) and vice-versa. The information has been sourced from the fields of religion, biblical studies, linguistics, English literature, grammar learning, geo-politics, philology, psychology, philosophy, and artificial intelligence as they have to do with thought, language, and society. The carefully quoted and paraphrased opinions of writers from the related disciplines since the fourth century BCE are presented here. However, the volume reflects the very marked influence of 20th century thinkers who have had the benefit of perusing the work of their predecessors and 21st century pioneers who have at their disposal ultra-modern technology, computing power, and easy access to a global community to which the ideas may be applied for comparative analysis. (shrink)

The majority rule has caught much attention in recent debate about the aggregation of judgments. But its role in finding the truth is limited. A majority of expert judgments is not necessarily authoritative, even if all experts are equally competent, if they make their judgments independently of each other, and if all the judgments are based on the same source of (good) evidence. In this paper I demonstrate this limitation by presenting a simple counterexample and a related general result. I (...) pave the way for this argument by introducing a Bayesian model of evidence and expert judgment in order to give a precise account of the basic problem. (shrink)

Recently, theorists have pointed to the role of improvisation in practical reasoning and in gaining new moral knowledge. Laura and François Schroeter have gone even further by suggesting an account of competence with evaluative terms based on holistic improvisation. I argue, however, that they fail in their task. Through a challenge of their key claim against Allan Gibbard’s alternative account, I demonstrate that Schroeter and Schroeter provide only partial constraints on competence, and thus that their account lacks the content to (...) provide an alternative to substantive accounts in metaethics such as minimalism and neo-descriptivism. (shrink)

This is a three part discussion on linguistic relativity and the New Testament which provides some perspectives towards understanding the inter-relatedness of society, culture, and language as they would have impacted the writers of the New Testament. The ideas discussed should provide useful information for further research into the application of modern linguistics to New Testament hermeneutics, systematic theology, and biblical exegesis. The implications of linguistic relativity theory applied to this genre of literature are of extreme importance in light of (...) resurgence in interest and work in biblical languages and modern linguistics in the last quarter of a century. The tripartite analysis focuses on: transcription of oral tradition, the influence of languages on the autographs, and the implications of linguistic relativity for exegesis. (shrink)

A supposition which underlies and guides much theoretical work in linguistics and philosophy is that ordinary speakers "internally represent" recursive systems of linguistic rules. This supposition is not only pervasive; it is also extremely persuasive, for it is supported by a nest of very powerful arguments. Perhaps the most compelling of these is the argument from linguistic creativity, viz. that apparently the only explanation of how ordinary speakers with finite brains can understand an infinite number of sentences involves such systems (...) of rules. Now, this argument and others like it raise an interesting problem for the student of the later Wittgenstein. On the one hand, they are entirely incompatible with this philosopher's adamant rejection of the "calculus" view of language. On the other hand, since they were formulated only after Wittgenstein's death, it is not clear how Wittgenstein would try to undermine them. ;The challenge, then, is to mount, on the basis of Wittgenstein's later writings, an attack against these arguments and the methodological supposition which they bolster. This challenge is met by my dissertation. I show first that the argument from linguistic creativity tacitly presupposes very basic views of understanding and meaning which Wittgenstein had compelling, albeit neglected, reasons for rejecting. I then argue that, contrary to the opinion of most analytic philosophers and linguists, Wittgenstein can account for the ordinary speaker's ability to understand an infinite number of sentences without invoking recursive systems of rules. ;Finally, I demonstrate that all of the remaining evidence for the methodological supposition either is a disguised version of the argument from linguistic creativity or is based upon highly controversial philosophical assumptions. (shrink)

The goals ofthis paper are to identify (in Section II) some general features of problem solving strategies in science, to discuss (in Section III) how Chomsky has employed two particularly popular discovery strategies in science, and to show (in Section IV) how these strategies inform Chomskyan linguistics. In Section IV I will discuss (1) how their employment in linguistics manifests features of scientific problem solving outlined in Section Il and (2) how an analysis in terms of those features suggests a (...) natural account for many controversial aspects 0fChomsky’s methods. I will specifically examine how this analysis bears on Chomsky’s claims concerning competence theories’ centrality in psychology and their psychological reality. Although no methodological considerations bar Chomsky from tinkering with our notion ofpsychology, competence theories mus! eventually offer some fruitful empirical connections with psycholinguistics and that part of mainstream cognitive psychology concerned with language study tojustify that tinkering. After twenty years of research such connections have proven rare enough to raise important doubts about thejustification ofChomsl·:y’s claims for the place of competence theory in cognitive psychology {and for the psychological reality of the mechanism it describes). Although I will argue (contra man) tf C}iom.rk_y’s critics) that his methods are unexceptionable, still [contra Chomsky) his theories have not proven sufficiently robust empirically to justify his strong claims concerning their position in cognitive psychology. (shrink)

This is a superb introduction to the application of Chomskian linguistics in cognitive psychology and the study of linguistic performance. It is exceptionally clear, accurate, concise, and well-organized; so very well done, in fact, that it can be read by someone who knows nothing about recent linguistics or about its use in psychological experimentation, and yet can delight and profit readers who know a great deal about both subjects. Greene begins by giving a clear and discrete account of the linguistic (...) theory of Syntactic Structures and the later "standard theory" of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. This historical approach is helpful because the first psycholinguistic applications derived from the first theory: e.g., attempts were made by George Miller, et alia to confirm that the time taken to grasp a sentence depended on the number of optional transformations involved in its generation—a "kernel sentence" with no optional transformations would take less time than its passive or negative transform, and these in turn less than, say, its passive and negative transform. Since there are neither kernel sentences nor the relevant optional transformations in Aspects standard theory, later experimentation has been concerned with confirming the psychological reality of deep, as against surface, structure: e.g., Bever’s attempt to show that, given that a subject who hears an anomalous click while listening to a sentence will psychologically displace the click to a position between major sentence constituents, there is some tendency for the displacement to operate in terms of what the grammar indicates are deep structure divisions rather than surface ones. (shrink)

In light of the sharp linguistic turn philosophy has taken in this century, this collection provides a much-needed and long-overdue reference for philosophical discussion. The first collection of its kind, it explores questions of the nature and existence of linguistic objects--including sentences and meanings--and considers the concept of truth in linguistics. The status of linguistics and the nature of language now take a central place in discussions of the nature of philosophy; the essays in this volume both inform these discussions (...) and lay the groundwork for further examination. (shrink)

The book from which these sections are excerpted is concerned with the prospects for assimilating the study of human intelligence and its products to the natural sciences through the investigation of cognitive structures, understood as systems of rules and representations that can be regarded as These mental structui′es serve as the vehicles for the exercise of various capacities. They develop in the mind on the basis of an innate endowment that permits the growth of rich and highly articulated structures along (...) an intrinsically determined course under the triggering and partially shaping effect of experience, which fixes parameters in an intricate system of predetermined form. It is argued that the mind is modular in character, with a diversity of cognitive structures, each with its specific properties arid principles. Knowledge of language, of the behavior of objects, and much else crucially involves these mental structures, and is thus not characterizable in terms of capacities, dispositions, or practical abilities, nor is it necessarily grounded in experience in the standard sense of this term. (shrink)

Phonological change of vowel length in Farsi -/- Author / Authors : Reza Heidarizadi Page no. 50 - 55 Discipline : Persian Linguistics/language Script/language : Roman/English Category : Research paper Keywords: Farsi vowels, vowel length, Compensatory lengthening.

This article deals with the cognitive relationship between a speaker and her internal grammar. In particular, it takes issue with the view that such a relationship is one of belief or knowledge (I call this view the ‘Propositional Attitude View’, or PAV). I first argue that PAV entails that all ordinary speakers (tacitly) possess technical concepts belonging to syntactic theory, and second, that most ordinary speakers do not in fact possess such concepts. Thus, it is concluded that speakers do not (...) literally ‘know’ or ‘believe’ much of the contents of their grammars, and moreover, that these contents can only be attributed at a subpersonal level. (shrink)

It is common knowledge that Wittgenstein cannot be called fundamentally a religious writer. All the same, he did not dismiss the reality 'religion' as nonsense. It is opined here that, Wittgenstein was very consistent in his references to it. We strongly claim that religion was a subject of his philosophical preoccupation positioned among his general striking similes, arresting moments and connections of his general methods. Religion gained occasional and/or scattered referencing in his works (e.g. the notes of 1938, the positioning (...) of religion and/or theology as grammar in the 'Philosophical Investigations (PI: 373; p.283), Zettel and the later work 'Culture and Value). Despite the above, we have to agree, with Wittgenstein, that his poetic compositions are to be understood and seen in consistent connections (PI: 122) even when they look disconnected. (shrink)