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Addictions and compulsions pose, most centrally, the question of how we ought to understand our actions when they are, by common understanding, not entirely free. On the one hand, are the compelled and addicts forced to act? If so, do they force themselves, or are they forced by their psychology, or by their neurobiology? Each of these possible explanations are problematic. How do we force ourselves? Why is part of our psychology independent of "us"? What relationship is there between neurological explanations and psychological explanations? On the other hand, if the compelled and addicts are not forced to act, what accounts for their consistently bad and even self-defeating actions and for their regularly violating their own resolutions to change their actions? Such attempts to explain addiction and compulsion also shed light on ordinary actions and action explanations and on what it means for actions to be free.

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  1. added 2019-11-07
    Holton, Richard . Willing, Wanting, Waiting . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 203. $49.95 (Cloth).Helen Steward - 2010 - Ethics 120 (3):604-608.
  2. added 2019-11-06
    Contingency, Arbitrariness, and Failure.Michael Loughlin - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (3):261-264.
  3. added 2019-08-21
    Habitual Weakness.Kenneth Silver - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):270-277.
    The standard case of weakness of will involves a strong temptation leading us to reconsider or act against our judgments. Here, however, I consider cases of what I call ‘habitual weakness', where we resolve to do one thing yet do another not to satisfy any grand desire, but out of habit. After giving several examples, I suggest that habitual weakness has been under-discussed in the literature and explore why. These cases are worth highlighting for their ubiquity, and I show three (...)
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  4. added 2019-06-06
    Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality.Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-05
    Book ReviewJon Elster,. Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 450. $59.95 ; $18.95 .Jon Elster,. Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Behavior.Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999. Pp. 252. $15.95. [REVIEW]O. H. Green - 2002 - Ethics 112 (2):371-375.
  6. added 2019-06-05
    Breakdown of Will.Ainslie George - 2001 - New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    Ainslie argues that our responses to the threat of our own inconsistency determine the basic fabric of human culture. He suggests that individuals are more like populations of bargaining agents than like the hierarchical command structures envisaged by cognitive psychologists. The forces that create and constrain these populations help us understand so much that is puzzling in human action and interaction: from addictions and other self-defeating behaviors to the experience of willfulness, from pathological over-control and self-deception to subtler forms of (...)
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  7. added 2019-04-03
    An Integral Foundation for Addiction Treatment.Guy Pierre Du Plessis - 2017 - AZ, Tuscan: Integral publishers.
    Currently there is such a cornucopia of conflicting theories in the field of addiction studies that it has become exceedingly difficult for treatment providers, therapists, and policymakers to integrate this vast field of knowledge into effective treatment. Since such a chaotic overabundance of treatment theories, styles, and definitions cloud the field of addictionology, many therapists claim their field is in need of a paradigm shift. -/- In the last 20 years an integrative and compound model has emerged known as the (...)
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  8. added 2019-03-28
    Integrated Recovery Therapy: Towards an Integrally Informed Psychotherapy for Addicted Populations.Guy Pierre Du Plessis - 2102 - Journal of Integral Theory and Practice 7 (1):124-148.
    Abstract This article proposes and outlines an integrally informed 12 Step-based therapy that is adapted for treating addicted populations. Integrated Recovery Therapy (IRT) as a therapeutic orientation is an Integral Methodological Pluralism to therapy for treating addiction. Its two main features are paradigmatic and meta-paradigmatic. The paradigmatic aspect refers to the recognition, compilation and implementation of various methodologies in a comprehensive and inclusive manner. The meta-paradigmatic aspect refers to IRT’s capacity to weave together, relate and integrate the various paradigmatic practices. (...)
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  9. added 2019-03-26
    The Integrated Recovery Model for Addiction Treatment and Recovery.Guy Du Plessis - 2010 - Journal of Integral Theory and Practice 5 (3):68-87.
    This article outlines an integrally informed model for addictionon treatment and recover that is being pioneered and developed at Tabankulu Secondary Addiction Recovery Center in Cape Town, South Africa. Tabankulu is the world’s first inpatient Addictionon treatment center to implement an integrally informed treatment model. The Integrated Recovery model is a comprehensive, balanced, multi-phased, and multi-disciplinary approach to the treatment of and recovery from addiction. Its philosophy is derived from integrang a 12 Step abstinence-based methodology, mindfulness-based interventions, positive psychology, and (...)
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  10. added 2019-03-25
    An Existential Perspective on Addiction Treatment: A Logic-Based Therapy Case Study.Guy Du Plessis - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Practice 5 (1).
    In this essay I argue that a comprehensive understanding of addiction and its treatment should include an existential perspective. I provide a brief overview of an existential perspective of addiction and recovery, which will contextualize the remainder of the essay. I then present a case study of how the six-step philosophical practice method of Logic-Based Therapy can assist with issues that often arise in addiction treatment framed through an existential perspective.
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  11. added 2019-03-25
    An Integral Ontology of Addiction: A Multiple Object Existing as a Continuum of Ontological Complexity. Journal of Integral Theory and Practice, 9(1), 38–54.Guy du Plessis - 2014 - Journal of Integral Theory and Practice 9 (1):38-54.
    ABSTRACT In previous work I explored how Integral Theory can be applied as a metatheoretical and transdisciplinary framework, in an attempt to arrive at an integrally informed metatheory of addiction. There was an overemphasis on Integral Methodological Pluralism in that thread of research, without clarifying the ontological pluralism of addiction as a multiple object enacted by various methodologies. To arrive at a comprehensive integral metatheory and integral ontology of addiction, I believe it is necessary to include the conception of Integral (...)
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  12. added 2019-03-25
    Toward an Integral Model of Addiction: By Means of Integral Methodological Pluralism as a Metatheoretical and Integrative Conceptual Framework.Guy Du Plessis - 2012 - Journal of Integral Theory and Practice 7 (3):1-24.
  13. added 2019-03-08
    Against Time Bias.Preston Greene & Meghan Sullivan - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):947-970.
    Most of us display a bias toward the near: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our near future and painful experiences to be in our distant future. We also display a bias toward the future: we prefer pleasurable experiences to be in our future and painful experiences to be in our past. While philosophers have tended to think that near bias is a rational defect, almost no one finds future bias objectionable. In this essay, we argue that this hybrid (...)
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  14. added 2019-02-06
    Addiction in the Light of African Values: Undermining Vitality and Community (Repr.).Thaddeus Metz - 2019 - In Yamikani Ndasauka & Grivas Kayange (eds.), Addiction in South and East Africa. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 9-31.
    Reprint of an article that first appeared in Monash Bioethics Review (2018).
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  15. added 2019-01-11
    Persuasion, Compulsion and Freedom in Plato's Laws.Christopher Bobonich - 1991 - Classical Quarterly 41 (2):365-388.
    One of the distinctions that Plato in the Laws stresses most heavily in his discussion of the proper relation between the individual citizen and the laws of the city is that between persuasion and compulsion. Law, Plato believes, should try to persuade rather than compel the citizens. Near the end of the fourth book of the Laws, the Athenian Stranger, Plato's spokesman in this dialogue, asks whether the lawgiver for their new city of Magnesia should in making laws ‘explain straightaway (...)
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  16. added 2018-10-26
    Addiction in the Light of African Values: Undermining Vitality and Community.Thaddeus Metz - 2018 - Monash Bioethics Review 36 (1):36-53.
    In this article I address the question of what makes addiction morally problematic, and seek to answer it by drawing on values salient in the sub-Saharan African philosophical tradition. Specifically, I appeal to life-force and communal relationship, each of which African philosophers have at times advanced as a foundational value, and spell out how addiction, or at least salient instances of it, could be viewed as unethical for flouting them. I do not seek to defend either vitality or community as (...)
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  17. added 2018-08-19
    Review: Toward a Phenomenology of Addiction. [REVIEW]Peter Antich - 2018 - Phenomenological Reviews 1:1.
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  18. added 2018-07-11
    Gambling: Some Afterthoughts.Lisa H. Newton - 2003 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (1):405-418.
    In all the criticisms that have shadowed the financial industry in recent years, the burden seems to be, that the reckless (as opposed to malicious) bankers too often took money of which they were the appointed stewards, and used it for speculation, especially in junk bonds. AsShaheen Borna and James Lowry argue in their "Gambling and Speculation" (the only article on gambling that I was able to raise on my computer) business speculation is probably wrong, since it is very like (...)
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  19. added 2018-03-11
    Thomistic Hylomorphism, Self-Determination, Neuroplasticity, and Grace: The Case of Addiction.Daniel D. De Haan - 2011 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85:99-120.
    This paper presents a Thomistic analysis of addiction that incorporates scientific, philosophical, and theological features of addiction. I will argue first, that a Thomistic hylomorphic anthropology provides a cogent explanation of the causal interactions between human action and neuroplasticity. I will employ Karol Wojtyła’s account of self-determination to further clarify the kind of neuroplasticity involved in addiction. Next, I will elucidate how a Thomistic anthropology can accommodate, without reductionism, both the neurophysiological and psychological elements of addiction, and finally, I will (...)
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  20. added 2018-02-17
    The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness.George Graham - 2010 - Routledge.
    _The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness, second edition_ examines and explains, from a philosophical standpoint, what mental disorder is: its reality, causes, consequences, and more. It is also an outstanding introduction to philosophy of mind from the perspective of mental disorder. Revised and updated throughout, this _second edition_ includes new discussions of grief and psychopathy, the problems of the psychophysical basis of disorder, the nature of selfhood, and clarification of the relation between rationality and (...)
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  21. added 2018-02-16
    Willing Addicts, Unweilling Additicts, and Acting of One's Own Free Will.James Stacey Taylor - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):237-262.
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  22. added 2017-05-16
    Addiction as a Disorder of Self-Control.Edmund Henden - forthcoming - In Hanna Pickard & Serge Ahmed (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction. Routledge.
    Impairment of self-control is often said to be a defining feature of addiction. Yet many addicts display what appears to be a considerable amount of control over their drug-oriented actions. Not only are their actions clearly intentional and frequently carried out in a conscious and deliberate manner, there is evidence that many addicts are responsive to a wide range of ordinary incentives and counter-incentives. Moreover, addicts have a wide variety of reasons for using drugs, reasons which often seem to go (...)
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  23. added 2017-05-16
    The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction.Hanna Pickard & Serge Ahmed (eds.) - 2018 - Routledge.
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  24. added 2017-05-16
    Brains Are Important Too: Reply to Hall, Carter, and Barnett.Marc Lewis - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):111-114.
    The authors and I agree on many features of addiction, such as its developmental nature. But because I rely on much of the same data as the Brain Disease Model of Addiction, they seem to conflate my work with that of my opponents. Indeed they are generally skeptical of the use of neuroscientific data to help understand addiction, calling it "immature." Thus my work is also suspect. Hall and colleagues believe that it is impossible to look at neural and social (...)
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  25. added 2017-05-16
    Searching for Norms to Violate. Reply to Henden & Gjelsvik.Marc Lewis - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):79-81.
    Although I reject neuronormativity -- an idea central to the Brain Disease Model of Addiction -- Henden and Gjelsvik argue that the disease definition might refer to normativity in nonneural domains. They profess that a cognitive dysfunction, or a mismatch of evolutionary intentions, could also qualify as norm violations, thus legitimizing the disease label. The need for dividing lines is questioned as well. I rebut these criticisms in turn, but I must admit they are thought provoking.
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  26. added 2017-05-16
    Addiction and the Concept of Disorder, Part 2: Is Every Mental Disorder a Brain Disorder?Jerome Wakefield - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):55-67.
    In this two-part analysis, I analyze Marc Lewis’s arguments against the brain-disease view of substance addiction and for a developmental-learning approach that demedicalizes addiction. I focus especially on the question of whether addiction is a medical disorder. In Part 1, I argued that, even if one accepts Lewis’s critique of the brain evidence presented for the brain-disease view, his arguments fail to establish that addiction is not a disorder. Relying on my harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder, I defended the view (...)
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  27. added 2017-05-16
    Free Will, Black Swans and Addiction.Ted Fenton & Reinout W. Wiers - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):157-165.
    The current dominant perspective on addiction as a brain disease has been challenged recently by Marc Lewis, who argued that the brain-changes related to addiction are similar to everyday changes of the brain. From this alternative perspective, addictions are bad habits that can be broken, provided that people are motivated to change. In that case, autonomous choice or “free will” can overcome bad influences from genes and or environments and brain-changes related to addiction. Even though we concur with Lewis that (...)
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  28. added 2017-05-16
    No Need for the Disease Label: Choice is Complicated. Reply to Heather.Marc Lewis - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):125-127.
    Despite its historical contribution, Heather sees the Brain Disease Model of Addiction as failing to relieve stigma, increasing fatalism, and fundamentally wrong. He also sees “choice” as partly volitional and partly unconscious, implying no moral violation. I agree on all counts. Heather then presents a disorder-of-choice model of addiction, highlighting the failure of self-regulation with respect to immediate goals. Not only do I endorse such modeling, but the neural mechanisms I describe may help to explicate it more thoroughly.
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  29. added 2017-05-16
    What Evolution Intended? Reply to Wakefield.Marc Lewis - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):69-70.
    Wakefield doesn't mind my focus on parallels between addiction and love. But love can fall outside the bounds of what evolution intended. So, he claims, comparing addiction with love does not preclude a naturally defined "disorder." I counter with the argument that evolution handed us such highly general response systems, the bounds of normality cannot be defined.
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  30. added 2017-05-16
    Chronic Automaticity in Addiction: Why Extreme Addiction is a Disorder.Steve Matthews - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):199-209.
    Marc Lewis argues that addiction is not a disease, it is instead a dysfunctional outcome of what plastic brains ordinarily do, given the adaptive processes of learning and development within environments where people are seeking happiness, or relief, or escape. They come to obsessively desire substances or activities that they believe will deliver happiness and so on, but this comes to corrupt the normal process of development when it escalates beyond a point of functionality. Such ‘deep learning’ emerges from consumptive (...)
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  31. added 2017-05-16
    Addicted to Love: What Is Love Addiction and When Should It Be Treated?Brian D. Earp, Olga A. Wudarczyk, Bennett Foddy & Julian Savulescu - 2017 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (1):77-92.
    By nature we are all addicted to love... meaning we want it, seek it and have a hard time not thinking about it. We need attachment to survive and we instinctively seek connection, especially romantic connection. [But] there is nothing dysfunctional about wanting love.Throughout the ages, love has been rendered as an excruciating passion. Ovid was the first to proclaim: “I can’t live with or without you”—a locution made famous to modern ears by the Irish band U2. Contemporary film expresses (...)
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  32. added 2017-05-16
    Responsibility Without Blame for Addiction.Hanna Pickard - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):169-180.
    Drug use and drug addiction are severely stigmatised around the world. Marc Lewis does not frame his learning model of addiction as a choice model out of concern that to do so further encourages stigma and blame. Yet the evidence in support of a choice model is increasingly strong as well as consonant with core elements of his learning model. I offer a responsibility without blame framework that derives from reflection on forms of clinical practice that support change and recovery (...)
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  33. added 2017-05-16
    How to Recover From a Brain Disease: Is Addiction a Disease, or Is There a Disease-Like Stage in Addiction?Snoek Anke - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):185-194.
    People struggling with addiction are neither powerless over their addiction, nor are they fully in control. Lewis vigorously objects to the brain disease model of addiction, because it makes people lose belief in their self-efficacy, and hence hinders their recovery. Although he acknowledges that there is a compulsive state in addiction, he objects to the claim that this compulsion is carved in stone. Lewis argues that the BDMA underestimates the agency of addicted people, and hence hinder their recovery. Lewis’s work (...)
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  34. added 2017-05-16
    Enough Comparing! Addiction is Its Own Thing. Reply to Matthews.Marc Lewis - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):211-214.
    Both Matthews and I see addiction as the outcome of developmental processes that arrive at diverse levels of dysfunction for different individuals at different stages. Matthews characterizes "late-stage" addiction in terms of lost control and extreme automaticity, a degree of dysfunction he calls a "disorder" and compares to another disorder -- depersonalization. I don't mind the label "disorder." Yet addiction is no more like depersonalization than it is like other conditions, most notably obsessive-compulsive disorder. Automaticity is never pure or total. (...)
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  35. added 2017-05-16
    Self-Efficacy: Now You See It, Now You Don’T. Reply to Snoek.Marc Lewis - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):195-197.
    Snoek, like other commentators, conflates some of my neural claims with those of the Brain Disease Model of Addiction. But she sees other details of my modeling with precision and depth. I welcome her emphasis on individual and developmental differences in addicts' capacity to recognize and deploy their personal agency. In fact we agree that belief in personal agency is a critical first step to cultivating it. Yet I wish to steer away from the disease nomenclature, to give that belief (...)
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  36. added 2017-05-16
    Is Addiction a Brain Disease?Kent Berridge - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):29-33.
    Where does normal brain or psychological function end, and pathology begin? The line can be hard to discern, making disease sometimes a tricky word. In addiction, normal ‘wanting’ processes become distorted and excessive, according to the incentive-sensitization theory. Excessive ‘wanting’ results from drug-induced neural sensitization changes in underlying brain mesolimbic systems of incentive. ‘Brain disease’ was never used by the theory, but neural sensitization changes are arguably extreme enough and problematic enough to be called pathological. This implies that ‘brain disease’ (...)
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  37. added 2017-05-16
    If Addiction is Not Best Conceptualized a Brain Disease, Then What Kind of Disease is It?Sally L. Satel & Scott O. Lilienfeld - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):19-24.
    A modest opposition to the brain disease concept of addiction has been mounting for at least the last decade. Despite the good intentions behind the brain disease rhetoric – to secure more biomedical funding for addiction, to combat “stigma,” and to soften criminal approaches – the very concept of addiction as a brain disease is deeply conceptually confused. We question whether Lewis goes far enough in his challenge, robust as it is, of the brain disease concept. For one thing, the (...)
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  38. added 2017-05-16
    Can the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis Explain Why Addiction is a Medical Disorder?: Reply to Marc Lewis.Jerome Wakefield - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (2):313-317.
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  39. added 2017-05-16
    Disease or Developmental Disorder: Competing Perspectives on the Neuroscience of Addiction.Wayne Hall, Adrian Carter & Anthony Barnett - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):103-110.
    Lewis’ neurodevelopmental model provides a plausible alternative to the brain disease model of addiction that is a dominant perspective in the USA. We disagree with Lewis’ claim that the BDMA is unchallenged within the addiction field but we agree that it provides unduly pessimistic prospects of recovery. We question the strength of evidence for the BDMA provided by animal models and human neuroimaging studies. We endorse Lewis’ framing of addiction as a developmental process underpinned by reversible forms of neuroplasticity. His (...)
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  40. added 2017-05-16
    Hijacking Addiction.Neil Levy - 2017 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (1):97-99.
    Neuroscientists and clinicians often speak of addictive drugs ‘hijacking’ the brain. Earp et al. want to do to the notion of addiction what drugs allegedly do to the brains of addicts; hijack it and put it to other purposes. There are, as they point out, clear commonalities between addiction and being in love. But there are also very important differences. These differences are significant enough to entail that it is at best highly misleading to describe love as an addiction. Hijacking (...)
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  41. added 2017-05-16
    Frankfurt’s Unwilling and Willing Addicts.Chandra Sripada - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):781-815.
    Harry Frankfurt’s Unwilling Addict and Willing Addict cases accomplish something fairly unique: they pull apart the predictions of control-based views of moral responsibility and competing self-expression views. The addicts both lack control over their actions but differ in terms of expression of their respective selves. Frankfurt’s own view is that—in line with the predictions of self-expression views—the unwilling addict is not morally responsible for his drug-directed actions while the willing addict is. But is Frankfurt right? In this essay, I put (...)
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  42. added 2017-05-16
    Addiction and the Brain: Development, Not Disease.Lewis Marc - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):7-18.
    I review the brain disease model of addiction promoted by medical, scientific, and clinical authorities in the US and elsewhere. I then show that the disease model is flawed because brain changes in addiction are similar to those generally observed when recurrent, highly motivated goal seeking results in the development of deep habits, Pavlovian learning, and prefrontal disengagement. This analysis relies on concepts of self-organization, neuroplasticity, personality development, and delay discounting. It also highlights neural and behavioral parallels between substance addictions, (...)
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  43. added 2017-05-16
    Resetting the Brain as Well as the Nomenclature. Reply to Szalavitz.Marc Lewis - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):87-89.
    Szalavitz’s model and mine share a good many components. Foremost among them is the conviction that addiction is a developmental trajectory, not a disease. Szalavitz is correct that we should consider controlled substance use an acceptable outcome, though I would like her to shift her terminology away from the medical mainstream. Finally, I suggest that Szalavitz's important idea of a "reset" in brain development might best be addressed by the notion of kindling.
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  44. added 2017-05-16
    Addiction and Moralization: The Role of the Underlying Model of Addiction.Lily E. Frank & Saskia K. Nagel - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):129-139.
    Addiction appears to be a deeply moralized concept. To understand the entwinement of addiction and morality, we briefly discuss the disease model and its alternatives in order to address the following questions: Is the disease model the only path towards a ‘de-moralized’ discourse of addiction? While it is tempting to think that medical language surrounding addiction provides liberation from the moralized language, evidence suggests that this is not necessarily the case. On the other hand non-disease models of addiction may seem (...)
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  45. added 2017-05-16
    Yes, Precision is a Good Thing. Reply to Flanagan.Marc Lewis - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):99-101.
    Flanagan asserts that my model of addiction would apply as well to sonnet writing. Yet his most interesting point is that “addiction” is an imprecise label for a cluster of distinct phenomena. I agree with him that we need to examine these distinctions, but that doesn’t negate their shared features. Neuroscience can play an important role in advancing our understanding of both commonalities and distinctions within the phenomena of addiction.
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  46. added 2017-05-16
    Addiction and the Concept of Disorder, Part 1: Why Addiction is a Medical Disorder.C. Wakefield Jerome - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):39-53.
    In this two-part analysis, I analyze Marc Lewis’s arguments against the brain-disease view of substance addiction and for a developmental-learning approach that demedicalizes addiction. I focus especially on the question of whether addiction is a medical disorder. Addiction is currently classified as a medical disorder in DSM-5 and ICD-10. It is further labeled a brain disease by NIDA, based on observed brain changes in addicts that are interpreted as brain damage. Lewis argues that the changes result instead from normal neuroplasticity (...)
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  47. added 2017-05-16
    Stigma and Self-Stigma in Addiction.Steve Matthews, Robyn Dwyer & Anke Snoek - 2017 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 14 (2):275-286.
    Addictions are commonly accompanied by a sense of shame or self-stigmatization. Self-stigmatization results from public stigmatization in a process leading to the internalization of the social opprobrium attaching to the negative stereotypes associated with addiction. We offer an account of how this process works in terms of a range of looping effects, and this leads to our main claim that for a significant range of cases public stigma figures in the social construction of addiction. This rests on a social constructivist (...)
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  48. added 2017-05-16
    Introduction: Testing and Refining Marc Lewis’s Critique of the Brain Disease Model of Addiction.Steve Matthews & Anke Snoek - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):1-6.
    In this introduction we set out some salient themes that will help structure understanding of a complex set of intersecting issues discussed in this special issue on the work of Marc Lewis: conceptual foundations of the disease model, tolerating the disease model given socio-political environments, and A third wave: refining conceptualization of addiction in the light of Lewis’s model.
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  49. added 2017-05-16
    Addiction Doesn’T Exist, But It is Bad for You.Owen Flanagan - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):91-98.
    There is a debate about the nature of addiction, whether it is a result of brain damage, brain dysfunction, or normal brain changes that result from habit acquisition, and about whether it is a disease. I argue that the debate about whether addiction is a disease is much ado about nothing, since all parties agree it is “unquestionably destructive.” Furthermore, the term ‘addiction’ has disappeared from recent DSM’s in favor of a spectrum of ‘abuse’ disorders. This may be a good (...)
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  50. added 2017-05-16
    Neurocentrism and Name-Calling: Let’s Agree to Agree. Reply to Satel & Lilienfeld.Marc Lewis - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):25-27.
    Although these authors sometimes resort to medical terminology, we strongly agree that addiction is not a disease and that the Brain Disease Model of Addiction captures only one part of the story and distorts the big picture. Yet Satel and Lilienfeld continue to conflate a neurobiological model with a disease model. They also complain that my modeling of addiction reveals a hidden “neurocentric” bias, despite my integration of multiple levels of analysis, exactly as they recommend.
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