Computability

Although Fuzzy logic and Fuzzy Mathematics is a widespread subject and there is a vast literature about it, yet the use of Fuzzy issues like Fuzzy sets and Fuzzy numbers was relatively rare in time concept. This could be seen in the Fuzzy time series. In addition, some attempts are done in fuzzing Turing Machines but seemingly there is no need to fuzzy time. Throughout this article, we try to change this picture and show why it is helpful to consider (...) the instants of time as Fuzzy numbers. In physics, though there are revolutionary ideas on the time concept like B theories in contrast to A theory also about central concepts like space, momentum… it is a long time that these concepts are changed, but time is considered classically in all well-known and established physics theories. Seemingly, we stick to the classical time concept in all fields of science and we have a vast inertia to change it. Our goal in this article is to provide some bases why it is rational and reasonable to change and modify this picture. Here, the central point is the modified version of “Unexpected Hanging” paradox as it is described in "Is classical Mathematics appropriate for theory of Computation".This modified version leads us to a contradiction and based on that it is presented there why some problems in Theory of Computation are not solved yet. To resolve the difficulties arising there, we have two choices. Either “choosing” a new type of Logic like “Para-consistent Logic” to tolerate contradiction or changing and improving the time concept and consequently to modify the “Turing Computational Model”. Throughout this paper, we select the second way for benefiting from saving some aspects of Classical Logic. In chapter 2, by applying quantum Mechanics and Schrodinger equation we compute the associated fuzzy number to time. These, provides a new interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.More exactly what we see here is "Particle-Fuzzy time" interpretation of quantum Mechanics, in contrast to some other interpretations of Quantum Mechanics like " Wave-Particle" interpretation. At the end, we propound a question about the possible solution of a paradox in Physics, the contradiction between General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. (shrink)

Throughout this paper, we are trying to show how and why our Mathematical frame-work seems inappropriate to solve problems in Theory of Computation. More exactly, the concept of turning back in time in paradoxes causes inconsistency in modeling of the concept of Time in some semantic situations. As we see in the first chapter, by introducing a version of “Unexpected Hanging Paradox”,first we attempt to open a new explanation for some paradoxes. In the second step, by applying this paradox, it (...) is demonstrated that any formalized system for the Theory of Computation based on Classical Logic and Turing Model of Computation leads us to a contradiction. We conclude that our mathematical frame work is inappropriate for Theory of Computation. Furthermore, the result provides us a reason that many problems in Complexity Theory resist to be solved.(This work is completed in 2017 -5- 2, it is in vixra in 2017-5-14, presented in Unilog 2018, Vichy). (shrink)

Here, by introducing a version of “Unexpected hanging paradox” first we try to open a new way and a new explanation for paradoxes, similar to liar paradox. Also, we will show that we have a semantic situation which no syntactical logical system could support it. Finally, we propose a claim in Theory of Computation about the consistency of this Theory. One of the major claim is:Theory of Computation and Classical Logic leads us to a contradiction.

A Simulating Halt Decider (SHD) computes the mapping from its input to its own accept or reject state based on whether or not the input simulated by a UTM would reach its final state in a finite number of simulated steps. -/- A halt decider (because it is a decider) must report on the behavior specified by its finite string input. This is its actual behavior when it is simulated by the UTM contained within its simulating halt decider while this (...) SHD remains in UTM mode. (shrink)

This is an explanation of a key new insight into the halting problem provided in the language of software engineering. Technical computer science terms are explained using software engineering terms. -/- To fully understand this paper a software engineer must be an expert in the C programming language, the x86 programming language, exactly how C translates into x86 and what an x86 process emulator is. No knowledge of the halting problem is required.

The halting theorem counter-examples present infinitely nested simulation (non-halting) behavior to every simulating halt decider. The pathological self-reference of the conventional halting problem proof counter-examples is overcome. The halt status of these examples is correctly determined. A simulating halt decider remains in pure simulation mode until after it determines that its input will never reach its final state. This eliminates the conventional feedback loop where the behavior of the halt decider effects the behavior of its input.

By making a slight refinement to the halt status criterion measure that remains consistent with the original a halt decider may be defined that correctly determines the halt status of the conventional halting problem proof counter-examples. This refinement overcomes the pathological self-reference issue that previously prevented halting decidability.

Combinatorial operations on sets are almost never well defined on Turing degrees, a fact so obvious that counterexamples are worth exhibiting. The case we focus on is the symmetric-difference operator; there are pairs of degrees for which the symmetric-difference operation is well defined. Some examples can be extracted from the literature, e.g. from the existence of nonzero degrees with strong minimal covers. We focus on the case of incomparable r.e. degrees for which the symmetric-difference operation is well defined.

We survey recent advances on the interface between computability theory and algorithmic randomness, with special attention on measures of relative complexity. We focus on (weak) reducibilities that measure (a) the initial segment complexity of reals and (b) the power of reals to compress strings, when they are used as oracles. The results are put into context and several connections are made with various central issues in modern algorithmic randomness and computability.

Bedau's influential (1997) account analyzes weak emergence in terms of the non-derivability of a system’s macrostates from its microstates except by simulation. I offer an improved version of Bedau’s account of weak emergence in light of insights from information theory. Non-derivability alone does not guarantee that a system’s macrostates are weakly emergent. Rather, it is non-derivability plus the algorithmic compressibility of the system’s macrostates that makes them weakly emergent. I argue that the resulting information-theoretic picture provides a metaphysical account of (...) weak emergence rather than a merely epistemic one. (shrink)

At its core this book is concerned with logic and computation with respect to the mathematical characterization of sentient biophysical structure and its behavior. -/- Three related theories are presented: The first of these provides an explanation of how sentient individuals come to be in the world. The second describes how these individuals operate. And the third proposes a method for reasoning about the behavior of individuals in groups. -/- These theories are based upon a new explanation of experience in (...) nature, the construction of senses, and motile behavior. This new approach is developed from first principles to enable a rigorous and systematic explanation of the variety of associated intelligent behaviors. -/- Alongside this development is a further account that focuses upon the nature of our work. It discusses the existential aspects of scientific inquiry, its epistemology and logic. It seeks to clarify the nature of the mathematical characterization and computation of natural behaviors, dealing with questions in the foundations of logic. It explores methodological issues related to reduction and the refinement of ideas from intuition to formal logical structure. -/- In support of this inquiry we work toward the development of a calculus for biophysical construction and its dynamics. If successful this mechanics mathematically characterizes sensory and motile behavior. -/- Upon this foundation we propose a model of apprehension and explore how its products are processed by the organism. Finally, we develop a probabilistic theory that enables us to reason about inaccessible factors in group behavior. -/- The mechanics we propose suggests the design and physical realization of a new model of computation; one in which structure and the concurrency of action are a first-order consideration. -/- We identify opportunities for experimental verification of the theory and we suggest a proof of our results in practice by the identification of this mechanism, allowing the construction of machines that experience. (shrink)

Review by: Johanna N. Y. Franklin The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 115-118, March 2013.

Elvira Mayordomo and Wolfgang Merkle The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 135-136, March 2013.

Recently, a connection has been established between two branches of computability theory, namely between algorithmic randomness and algorithmic learning theory. Learning-theoretical characterizations of several notions of randomness were discovered. We study such characterizations based on the asymptotic density of positive answers. In particular, this note provides a new learning-theoretic definition of weak 2-randomness, solving the problem posed by (Zaffora Blando, Rev. Symb. Log. 2019). The note also highlights the close connection between these characterizations and the problem of convergence on random (...) sequences. (shrink)

A problem is a multivalued function from a set of instances to a set of solutions. We consider only instances and solutions coded by sets of integers. A problem admits preservation of some computability-theoretic weakness property if every computable instance of the problem admits a solution relative to which the property holds. For example, cone avoidance is the ability, given a noncomputable set A and a computable instance of a problem ${\mathsf {P}}$, to find a solution relative to which A (...) is still noncomputable.In this article, we compare relativized versions of computability-theoretic notions of preservation which have been studied in reverse mathematics, and prove that the ones which were not already separated by natural statements in the literature actually coincide. In particular, we prove that it is equivalent to admit avoidance of one cone, of $\omega $ cones, of one hyperimmunity or of one non- $\Sigma ^{0}_1$ definition. We also prove that the hierarchies of preservation of hyperimmunity and non- $\Sigma ^{0}_1$ definitions coincide. On the other hand, none of these notions coincide in a nonrelativized setting. (shrink)

In this survey we discuss work of Levin and V’yugin on collections of sequences that are non-negligible in the sense that they can be computed by a probabilistic algorithm with positive probability. More precisely, Levin and V’yugin introduced an ordering on collections of sequences that are closed under Turing equivalence. Roughly speaking, given two such collections $\mathcal {A}$ and $\mathcal {B}$, $\mathcal {A}$ is below $\mathcal {B}$ in this ordering if $\mathcal {A}\setminus \mathcal {B}$ is negligible. The degree structure associated (...) with this ordering, the Levin–V’yugin degrees, can be shown to be a Boolean algebra, and in fact a measure algebra. We demonstrate the interactions of this work with recent results in computability theory and algorithmic randomness: First, we recall the definition of the Levin–V’yugin algebra and identify connections between its properties and classical properties from computability theory. In particular, we apply results on the interactions between notions of randomness and Turing reducibility to establish new facts about specific LV-degrees, such as the LV-degree of the collection of 1-generic sequences, that of the collection of sequences of hyperimmune degree, and those collections corresponding to various notions of effective randomness. Next, we provide a detailed explanation of a complex technique developed by V’yugin that allows the construction of semi-measures into which computability-theoretic properties can be encoded. We provide two examples of the use of this technique by explicating a result of V’yugin’s about the LV-degree of the collection of Martin-Löf random sequences and extending the result to the LV-degree of the collection of sequences of DNC degree. (shrink)

Saul Kripke once noted that there is a tight connection between computation and de re knowledge of whatever the computation acts upon. For example, the Euclidean algorithm can produce knowledge of which number is the greatest common divisor of two numbers. Arguably, algorithms operate directly on syntactic items, such as strings, and on numbers and the like only via how the numbers are represented. So we broach matters of notation. The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between (...) the notations acceptable for computation, the usual idealizations involved in theories of computability, flowing from Alan Turing’s monumental work, and de re propositional attitudes toward numbers and other mathematical objects. (shrink)

Saul Kripke once noted that there is a tight connection between computation and de re knowledge of whatever the computation acts upon. For example, the Euclidean algorithm can produce knowledge of _which number_ is the greatest common divisor of two numbers. Arguably, algorithms operate directly on syntactic items, such as strings, and on numbers and the like only via how the numbers are represented. So we broach matters of _notation_. The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between (...) the notations acceptable for computation, the usual idealizations involved in theories of computability, flowing from Alan Turing’s monumental work, and de re propositional attitudes toward numbers and other mathematical objects. (shrink)

Several results about the game of cops and robbers on infinite graphs are analyzed from the perspective of computability theory. Computable robber-win graphs are constructed with the property that no computable robber strategy is a winning strategy, and such that for an arbitrary computable ordinal \, any winning strategy has complexity at least \}\). Symmetrically, computable cop-win graphs are constructed with the property that no computable cop strategy is a winning strategy. Locally finite infinite trees and graphs are explored. The (...) Turing computability of a binary relation used to classify cop-win graphs is studied, and the computational difficulty of determining the winner for locally finite computable graphs is discussed. (shrink)

A dichotomy result of Sevenster (2014) [29] completely classified the quantifier prefixes of regular Independence-Friendly (IF) logic according to the patterns of quantifier dependence they contain. On one hand, prefixes that contain “Henkin” or “signalling” patterns were shown to characterize fragments of IF logic that capture NP-complete problems; all the remaining prefixes were shown instead to be essentially first-order. In the present paper we develop the machinery which is needed in order to extend the results of Sevenster to non-prenex, regular (...) IF sentences. This involves shifting attention from quantifier prefixes to a (rather general) class of syntactical tree prefixes. We partially classify the fragments of regular IF logic that are thus determined by syntactical trees; in particular, a) we identify four classes of tree prefixes that are neither signaling nor Henkin, and yet express NP-complete problems and other second-order concepts; and b) we give more general criteria for checking the first-orderness of an IF sentence. (shrink)

We systematically study the completion of choice problems in the Weihrauch lattice. Choice problems play a pivotal rôle in Weihrauch complexity. For one, they can be used as landmarks that characterize important equivalences classes in the Weihrauch lattice. On the other hand, choice problems also characterize several natural classes of computable problems, such as finite mind change computable problems, non-deterministically computable problems, Las Vegas computable problems and effectively Borel measurable functions. The closure operator of completion generates the concept of total (...) Weihrauch reducibility, which is a variant of Weihrauch reducibility with total realizers. Logically speaking, the completion of a problem is a version of the problem that is independent of its premise. Hence, studying the completion of choice problems allows us to study simultaneously choice problems in the total Weihrauch lattice, as well as the question which choice problems can be made independent of their premises in the usual Weihrauch lattice. The outcome shows that many important choice problems that are related to compact spaces are complete, whereas choice problems for unbounded spaces or closed sets of positive measure are typically not complete. (shrink)

We present an abstract framework in which we give simple proofs for Gödel’s First and Second Incompleteness Theorems and obtain, as consequences, Davis’, Chaitin’s and Kritchman-Raz’s Theorems.

Recent work in computability theory has focused on various notions of asymptotic computability, which capture the idea of a set being “almost computable.” One potentially upsetting result is that all four notions of asymptotic computability admit “almost computable” sets in every Turing degree via coding tricks, contradicting the notion that “almost computable” sets should be computationally close to the computable sets. In response, Astor introduced the notion of intrinsic density: a set has defined intrinsic density if its image under any (...) computable permutation has the same asymptotic density. Furthermore, introduced various notions of intrinsic computation in which the standard coding tricks cannot be used to embed intrinsically computable sets in every Turing degree. Our goal is to study the sets which are intrinsically small, i.e. those that have intrinsic density zero. We begin by studying which computable functions preserve intrinsic smallness. We also show that intrinsic smallness and hyperimmunity are computationally independent notions of smallness, i.e. any hyperimmune degree contains a Turing-equivalent hyperimmune set which is “as large as possible” and therefore not intrinsically small. Our discussion concludes by relativizing the notion of intrinsic smallness and discussing intrinsic computability as it relates to our study of intrinsic smallness. (shrink)

There has recently been work by multiple groups in extracting the properties associated with cardinal invariants of the continuum and translating these properties into similar analogous combinatorial properties of computational oracles. Each property yields a highness notion in the Turing degrees. In this paper we study the highness notions that result from the translation of the evasion number and its dual, the prediction number, as well as two versions of the rearrangement number. When translated appropriately, these yield four new highness (...) notions. We will define these new notions, show some of their basic properties and place them in the computability-theoretic version of Cichoń's diagram. (shrink)

Normative positions are sometimes illustrated in diagrams, in particular in didactic contexts. Traditional examples are the Aristotelian polygons of opposition for deontic modalities (squares, triangles, hexagons, etc.), and the Hohfeldian squares for obligative and potestative concepts. Relying on previous work, we show that Hohfeld’s framework can be used as a basis for developing several Aristotelian polygons and more complex diagrams. Then, we illustrate how logical theories of increasing strength can be built based on these diagrams, and how those theories enable (...) us to determine in a computably efficient way whether a set of normative positions can be derived from another set of normative positions. (shrink)

We characterize Weihrauch reducibility in $ \operatorname {\mathrm {E-PA^{\omega }}} + \operatorname {\mathrm {QF-AC^{0,0}}}$ and all systems containing it by the provability in a linear variant of the same calculus using modifications of Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation that incorporate ideas from linear logic, nonstandard arithmetic, higher-order computability, and phase semantics.

Infinite time Turing machines represent a model of computability that extends the operations of Turing machines to transfinite ordinal time by defining the content of each cell at limit steps to be the lim sup of the sequences of previous contents of that cell. In this paper, we study a computational model obtained by replacing the lim sup rule with an ‘eventually constant’ rule: at each limit step, the value of each cell is defined if and only if the content (...) of that cell has stabilized before that limit step and is then equal to this constant value. We call these machines weak infinite time Turing machines. We study different variants of wITTMs adding multiple tapes, heads, or bidimensional tapes. We show that some of these models are equivalent to each other concerning their computational strength. We show that wITTMs decide exactly the arithmetic relations on natural numbers. (shrink)

The main objective of this paper is the following two results. There exists a computable bi-orderable group that does not have a computable bi-ordering; there exists a bi-orderable, two-generated computably presented solvable group with undecidable word problem. Both of the groups can be found among two-generated solvable groups of derived length $3$. [a]nswers a question posed by Downey and Kurtz; answers a question posed by Bludov and Glass in Kourovka Notebook.One of the technical tools used to obtain the main results (...) is a computational extension of an embedding theorem of B. Neumann that was studied by the author earlier. In this paper we also compliment that result and derive new corollaries that might be of independent interest. (shrink)

We characterize the linear order types $\tau $ with the property that given any countable linear order $\mathcal {L}$, $\tau \cdot \mathcal {L}$ is a computable linear order iff $\mathcal {L}$ is a computable linear order, as exactly the finite nonempty order types.

We show that there is a cuppable c.e. degree, all of whose cupping partners are high. In particular, not all cuppable degrees are ${\operatorname {\mathrm {low}}}_3$-cuppable, or indeed ${\operatorname {\mathrm {low}}}_n$ cuppable for any n, refuting a conjecture by Li. On the other hand, we show that one cannot improve highness to superhighness. We also show that the ${\operatorname {\mathrm {low}}}_2$-cuppable degrees coincide with the array computable-cuppable degrees, giving a full understanding of the latter class.

We study computable Polish spaces and Polish groups up to homeomorphism. We prove a natural effective analogy of Stone duality, and we also develop an effective definability technique which works up to homeomorphism. As an application, we show that there is a $\Delta ^0_2$ Polish space not homeomorphic to a computable one. We apply our techniques to build, for any computable ordinal $\alpha $, an effectively closed set not homeomorphic to any $0^{}$-computable Polish space; this answers a question of Nies. (...) We also prove analogous results for compact Polish groups and locally path-connected spaces. (shrink)

We show that there is a minimal pair in the nonuniform generic degrees, and hence also in the uniform generic degrees. This fact contrasts with Igusa’s result that there are no minimal pairs for relative generic computability and answers a basic structural question mentioned in several papers in the area.

Barendregt gave a sound semantics of the simple type assignment system λ → by generalizing Tait’s proof of the strong normalization theorem. In this paper, we aim to extend the semantics so that the completeness theorem holds.

We study the logical and computational properties of basic theorems of uncountable mathematics, in particular Pincherle's theorem, published in 1882. This theorem states that a locally bounded function is bounded on certain domains, i.e. one of the first ‘local-to-global’ principles. It is well-known that such principles in analysis are intimately connected to (open-cover) compactness, but we nonetheless exhibit fundamental differences between compactness and Pincherle's theorem. For instance, the main question of Reverse Mathematics, namely which set existence axioms are necessary to (...) prove Pincherle's theorem, does not have an unique or unambiguous answer, in contrast to compactness. We establish similar differences for the computational properties of compactness and Pincherle's theorem. We establish the same differences for other local-to-global principles, even going back to Weierstrass. We also greatly sharpen the known computational power of compactness, for the most shared with Pincherle's theorem however. Finally, countable choice plays an important role in the previous, we therefore study this axiom together with the intimately related Lindelöf lemma. (shrink)

We prove a number of elementary facts about computability in partial combinatory algebras. We disprove a suggestion made by Kreisel about using Friedberg numberings to construct extensional pca’s. We then discuss separability and elements without total extensions. We relate this to Ershov’s notion of precompleteness, and we show that precomplete numberings are not 1–1 in general.

Yuri Matiyasevich's theorem states that the set of all Diophantine equations which have a solution in non-negative integers is not recursive. Craig Smoryński's theorem states that the set of all Diophantine equations which have at most finitely many solutions in non-negative integers is not recursively enumerable. Let R be a subring of Q with or without 1. By H_{10}(R), we denote the problem of whether there exists an algorithm which for any given Diophantine equation with integer coefficients, can decide whether (...) or not the equation has a solution in R. We prove that a positive solution to H_{10}(R) implies that the set of all Diophantine equations with a finite number of solutions in R is recursively enumerable. We show the converse implication for every infinite set R \subseteq Q such that there exist computable functions \tau_1,\tau_2:N \to Z which satisfy (\forall n \in N \tau_2(n) \neq 0) \wedge ({\frac{\tau_1(n)}{\tau_2(n)}: n \in N}=R). This implication for R=N guarantees that Smoryński's theorem follows from Matiyasevich's theorem. Harvey Friedman conjectures that the set of all polynomials of several variables with integer coefficients that have a rational solution is not recursive. Harvey Friedman conjectures that the set of all polynomials of several variables with integer coefficients that have only finitely many rational solutions is not recursively enumerable. These conjectures are equivalent by our results for R=Q. (shrink)

I give a detailed review of 'The Outer Limits of Reason' by Noson Yanofsky from a unified perspective of Wittgenstein and evolutionary psychology. I indicate that the difficulty with such issues as paradox in language and math, incompleteness, undecidability, computability, the brain and the universe as computers etc., all arise from the failure to look carefully at our use of language in the appropriate context and hence the failure to separate issues of scientific fact from issues of how language works. (...) I discuss Wittgenstein's views on incompleteness, paraconsistency and undecidability and the work of Wolpert on the limits to computation. To sum it up: The Universe According to Brooklyn---Good Science, Not So Good Philosophy. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Eu li muitas discussões recentes sobre os limites da computação e do universo como computador, na esperança de encontrar alguns comentários sobre o trabalho surpreendente do físico polimatemático e teórico da decisão David Wolpert, mas não encontrei uma única citação e assim que eu apresento este muito breve Resumo. Wolpert provou alguma impossibilidade impressionante ou teoremas da incompletude (1992 a 2008-Veja arxiv dot org) nos limites à inferência (computação) que são tão gerais que são independentes do dispositivo que faz a (...) computação, e mesmo independente das leis da física, para que eles se apliquem em computadores, física e comportamento humano. Eles fazem uso da diagonalização de cantor, o paradoxo mentiroso e worldlines (linhas do mundo) para fornecer o que pode ser o teorema final na teoria da máquina de Turing, e, aparentemente, fornecer insights sobre a impossibilidade, incompletude, os limites da computação, e do universo como computador, em todos os universos possíveis e todos os seres ou mecanismos, gerando, entre outras coisas, um princípio de incerteza mecânica não quântica e uma prova de monoteísmo. Há umas conexões óbvias ao trabalho clássico de Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov e Wittgenstein e à noção que nenhum programa (e assim nenhum dispositivo) pode gerar uma seqüência (ou dispositivo) com maior complexidade do que possui. Pode-se dizer que este corpo de trabalho implica ateísmo, uma vez que não pode haver qualquer entidade mais complexa do que o universo físico e do ponto de vista Wittgensteiniano, ' mais complexo ' é sem sentido (não tem condições de satisfação, ou seja, criador de verdade ou teste). Mesmo um ' Deus ' (ou seja, um ' dispositivo ' com tempo ilimitado/espaço e energia) não pode determinar se um determinado ' número ' é ' aleatório ', nem encontrar uma determinada maneira de mostrar que uma determinada ' fórmula ', ' teorema ' ou ' sentença ' ou ' Device ' (todos estes sendo linguagem complexa jogos) faz parte de um determinado «sistema». Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

I develop a theory of counterfactuals about relative computability, i.e. counterfactuals such as 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then the halting problem would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is true, and 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then arithmetical truth would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is false. These counterfactuals are counterpossibles, i.e. they have metaphysically impossible antecedents. They thus pose a challenge to the orthodoxy about counterfactuals, which would treat them as uniformly true. What’s more, I (...) argue that these counterpossibles don’t just appear in the periphery of relative computability theory but instead they play an ineliminable role in the development of the theory. Finally, I present and discuss a model theory for these counterfactuals that is a straightforward extension of the familiar comparative similarity models. (shrink)

In this paper I address the question of whether the incompleteness theorems imply that “the mind cannot be mechanized,” where this is understood in the specific sense that “the mathematical outputs of the idealized human mind do not coincide with the mathematical outputs of any idealized finite machine.” Gödel argued that his incompleteness theorems implied a weaker, disjunctive conclusion to the effect that either “the mind cannot be mechanized” or “mathematical truth outstrips the idealized human mind.” Others, most notably, Lucas (...) and Penrose, have claimed more—they have claimed that the incompleteness theorems actually imply the first disjunct. I will show that by sharpening the fundamental concepts involved and articulating the background assumptions governing them, one can prove Gödel’s disjunction, one can show that the arguments of Lucas and Penrose fail, and one can see what likely led proponents of the first disjunct astray. (shrink)