Computationalism

We consider processes of emergence within the conceptual framework of the Information Loss principle and the concepts of systems conserving information; systems compressing information; and systems amplifying information. We deal with the supposed incompatibility between emergence and computability tout-court. We distinguish between computational emergence, when computation acquires properties, and emergent computation, when computation emerges as a property. The focus is on emergence processes occurring within computational processes. Violations of Turing-computability such as non-explicitness and incompleteness are intended to represent partially the (...) properties of phenomenological emergence, such as logical openness, given by the observer’s cognitive role; structural dynamics where change regards rules rather than only values; and multi-modelling where multiple non-equivalent models are required to model such structural dynamics. In this way, we validate, from an epistemological viewpoint, models and simulations of phenomenological emergence where the sequence of events constitutes the natural, analogical non-Turing computation which a cognitive complex system can reproduce through learning. Reproducibility through learning is different from Turing-like computational iteration. This paper aims to open a new, non-reductionist understanding of the conceptual relationship between emergence and computability. (shrink)

‘The art of living with ICTs ’ today not only means finding new ways to cope, interact and create new lifestyles on the basis of the new digital technologies individually, as ‘consumer-citizens’. It also means inventing new modes of living, producing and, not in the least place, struggling collectively, as workers and producers. As the so-called digital revolution unfolds in the context of a neoliberal cognitive and consumerist capitalism, its ‘innovations’ are predominantly employed to modulate and control both production processes (...) and consumer behavior in view of the overall goal of extracting surplus value. Today, the digital networks overwhelmingly destroy social autonomy, instead engendering increasing social heteronomy and proletarianization. Yet it is these very networks themselves, as technical pharmaka in the sense of French ‘technophilosopher’ Bernard Stiegler, that can be employed as no other to struggle against this tendency. This paper briefly explores this possibility by reflecting upon current diagnoses of our ‘technological situation’ by some exemplary post-operaist Marxists from a Stieglerian, pharmacological perspective. (shrink)

A version of the Church-Turing Thesis states that every effectively realizable physical system can be simulated by Turing Machines (‘Thesis P’). In this formulation the Thesis appears to be an empirical hypothesis, subject to physical falsification. We review the main approaches to computation beyond Turing definability (‘hypercomputation’): supertask, non-well-founded, analog, quantum, and retrocausal computation. The conclusions are that these models reduce to supertasks, i.e. infinite computation, and that even supertasks are no solution for recursive incomputability. This yields that the realization (...) of hypercomputing devices is implausible, and that Thesis P is not essentially different from the standard Church-Turing Thesis. (shrink)

When computing is defined as the causal implementation of algorithms and algorithms are defined as effective decision procedures, human thought is mental computation only if it is governed by mental algorithms. An examination of ordinary thinking, however, suggests that most human thought processes are non-algorithmic. Digital machines, moreover, are mark-manipulating or string-processing systems whose marks or strings do not stand for anything for those systems, while minds are semiotic systems for which signs stand for other things for those systems. Computing, (...) at best, turns out to be no more than a special kind of thinking. (shrink)

The present paper discusses a topic often neglected by contemporary philosophy of biology: The relation between metaphorical notions of living organisms as information processing systems, the attempts to model such systems by computational means, and the idea that life itself is a computational phenomenon. This question has ramifications in theoretical biology and thedefinition of Iife, in theoretical computer science and the concept of computation, and in semiotics, and the concept of the interpreter. It is argued, that the theory of autopoietic (...) systems known from theoretical biology should be integrated with a biosemiotic reflection on the natural history of signs. (shrink)

This article examines Plotinus’ conception of metaxý – the human as interval between animals and gods – and its resonances in the work of Jacques Lacan, who implicitly retains and reconfigures the notion of the human being as a mediator. Lacan replicates this ancient narrative, but does so within the context of a cyberneticism that replaces gods and angels with symbolic computation. Humanity, according to such a conception, is tacitly regarded not only as a mediator, but as that which is (...) mediated, the subject caught within a significative network modelled on the basis of then-new systems of digital computation. (shrink)

This is a book review of Nir Fresco's book, published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (0004-8402). Vol. 94 (2016), 2, p. 396-399.

Computers have invaded our offices, our homes, cars and coffee-pots; they have become ubiquitous. However, the advance of computing technologies is associated with an increasing lack of “visibility” of the underlying software and hardware technologies. While we use and accept the computer, we neither know its history nor functionality. In this paper, we argue that this is not a healthy situation. Also, recruitment onto UK Computing degree courses is steadily falling; these courses are appearing less attractive to school-leavers. This may (...) be associated with the increasing ubiquity. In this paper we reflect on an MSc. module of instruction, Concepts and Philosophy of Computing, and a BSc. module Computer Games Development developed at the University of Worcester which address these issues. We propose that the elements of these modules form a necessary part of the education of all citizens, and we suggest how this may be realized. We also suggest how to re-enthuse our youth about computing as a discipline and halt the drop in recruitment. (shrink)

Robust, concrete and abstract, mathematical computation and inference on the scale now becoming possible should change the discourse about many matters mathematical. These include: what mathematics is, how we know something, how we persuade each other, what suffices as a proof, the infinite, mathematical discovery or invention, and other such issues.

The Church-Turing Thesis is widely regarded as true, because of evidence that there is only one genuine notion of computation. By contrast, there are nowadays many different formal logics, and different corresponding foundational frameworks. Which ones can deliver a theory of computability? This question sets up a difficult challenge: the meanings of basic mathematical terms are not stable across frameworks. While it is easy to compare what different frameworks say, it is not so easy to compare what they mean. We (...) argue for some minimal conditions that must be met if two frameworks are to be compared; if frameworks are radical enough, comparison becomes hopeless. Our aim is to clarify the dialectical situation in this bourgeoning area of research, shedding light on the nature of non-classical logic and the notion of computation alike. (shrink)

Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In _The Mind Doesn't Work That Way_, Fodor has developed the dark message of _The Modularity of Mind_ regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and the role of recent (...) empirical developments in the cognitive sciences in assessing Fodor's position. (shrink)

The chapter is concerned with the role of art and design in the history and philosophy of computing, and the role of computing in models of design and art. It offers insights arising from research into a period in the 1960s and 70s, particularly in the UK, when computing became more available to artists and designers, focusing on Bruce Archer and John Lansdown in London. It suggests that models of computing interacted with conceptualisations of art, design and creative activities in (...) important ways. (shrink)

Physical Computation is the summation of Piccinini’s work on computation and mechanistic explanation over the past decade. It draws together material from papers published during that time, but also provides additional clarifications and restructuring that make this the definitive presentation of his mechanistic account of physical computation. This review will first give a brief summary of the account that Piccinini defends, followed by a chapter-by-chapter overview of the book, before finally discussing one aspect of the account in more critical detail.