Computer Ethics

Much of the work in the rapidly growing field of computer ethics relies on the concepts and theories of Western philosophy. With this article my aim is to help stimulate conversations that draw on a wider range of ethical perspectives. I build on recent work on the sense in which the regular operations of the attention economy might violate our right to attention, and I do so through looking to a range of Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhist texts. As I argue, (...) these texts should inspire us to realize that we have more than just the right to direct our attention as we will and the right to be free from distraction. This is because there is a third right to attention that the recent literature overlooks, namely the right to strengthen our ordinarily weak capacity to control our attention. (shrink)

In Cultural Analytics, Lev Manovich (2020) outlines the recent developments and the historical roots of a new, exciting research field called cultural analytics. Cultural analytics emerges as a discipline that utilizes methods from computer science, data visualization, and media arts for the exploration and analysis of cultural objects and their user interactions. Manovich continuously admonishes future researchers to think hard about the challenges of how cultural phenomenon can be represented as data to avoid the reductivism trap, as he quotes Gitelman (...) and Jackson: “our zeal for more and more data can become a faith in their neutrality and autonomy, their objectivity. . .” Clearly, big, clever, and rigorous data must be the foundation for the advance of science in the 21st century. -/- ".” Her entire being is like an ethereal painting, a playful creation of nature using colors, lines, dots, strokes, and patches. One can only exclaim, “Absolutely enchanting. Is this real or an illusion?" - In The Philosophy of Awakening, Wild Wise Weird: The Kingfisher Story Collection, Vuong (2025)- . (shrink)

Responsibility gaps traditionally refer to scenarios in which no one is responsible for harm caused by artificial agents, such as autonomous machines or collective agents. By carefully examining the different ways this concept has been defined in the social ontology and ethics of technology literature, I argue that our current concept of responsibility gaps is defective. To address this conceptual flaw, I argue that the concept of responsibility gaps should be revised by distinguishing it into two more precise concepts: epistemic (...) responsibility gaps (ERG) and control misalignments (CM). ERG functions as a refined version addressing specific aspects of responsibility attribution. It captures the challenge of identifying who is to blame. CM, on the other hand, introduces a new dimension by focusing on misalignments of control. These revisions offer better guidelines for the development and oversight of artificial agents, both in terms of assigning blame and ensuring the right distribution of control. (shrink)

This paper engages the ongoing debate around the possibility of virtue friendships in the Aristotelian sense through online mediation. However, I argue that since the current literature has remained overly focused on the mere possibility of virtual friendship, it has obscured the more common phenomena of using digital communication to sustain previous in-person friendships which are now at a distance. While I agree with those who argue that entirely virtual friendship is possible, I argue that the current rebuttals to the (...) objections regarding embodiment are lacking. We can see this more clearly when we shift our consideration to more ordinary cases of virtual friendship. I discuss this problem of disembodiment by engaging with an interpretive issue of Aristotle’s “living together” which has played a key role in the current literature. I then turn to expand the current debate by examining how physical absence, disembodiment, and the technology we use to overcome such disembodiment, shapes and impacts friendships at a distance. In short, I explore the tendencies of technology of which virtual friends ought to be aware. I argue that even though virtual virtue friendships are possible via technology, the medium makes it harder and limits the possible experiences within friendships. Even if we overcome these tendencies, technologically mediated virtue friendships require more discipline for a diminished experience. While these limitations and extra disciplines in no way make virtual friendship unimportant, I argue that the fullest possible virtual friendship will be lesser than the fullest possible traditional friendship. (shrink)

Is the pool of fair predictive algorithms fair? It depends, naturally, on both the criteria of fairness and on how we pool. We catalog the relevant facts for some of the most prominent statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness and the dominant approaches to pooling forecasts: linear, geometric, and multiplicative. Only linear pooling, a format at the heart of ensemble methods, preserves any of the central criteria we consider. Drawing on work in the social sciences and social epistemology on the theoretical (...) foundations of the wisdom of crowds, we explain how our observations present an exception to the general trend of finding tradeoffs between the accuracy and fairness of forecasts. (shrink)

This paper investigates how human interactions with AI-powered chatbots may offend human dignity. Current chatbots, driven by large language models (LLMs), mimic human linguistic behaviour but lack the moral and rational capacities essential for genuine interpersonal respect. Human beings are prone to anthropomorphise chatbots—indeed, chatbots appear to be deliberately designed to elicit that response. As a result, human beings’ behaviour toward chatbots often resembles behaviours typical of interaction between moral agents. Drawing on a second-personal, relational account of dignity, we argue (...) that interacting with chatbots in this way is incompatible with the dignity of users. We show that, since second-personal respect is premised on reciprocal recognition of second-personal moral authority, behaving towards chatbots in ways that convey second-personal respect is bound to misfire in morally problematic ways, given the lack of reciprocity. Consequently, such chatbot interactions amount to subtle but significant violations of self-respect—the respect we are dutybound to show for our own dignity. We illustrate this by discussing four actual chatbot use cases (information retrieval, customer service, advising, and companionship), and propound that the increasing societal pressure to engage in such interactions with chatbots poses a hitherto underappreciated threat to human dignity. (shrink)

Raul Hakli & Pekka Mäkelä (2016, 2019) make a popular assumption in machine ethics explicit by arguing that artificial agents cannot be responsible because they are designed. Designed agents, they think, are analogous to manipulated humans and therefore not meaningfully in control of their actions. Contrary to this, I argue that under all mainstream theories of responsibility, designed agents can be responsible. To do so, I identify the closest parallel discussion in the literature on responsibility and free will, which concerns (...) ‘design cases’. Design cases are theoretical examples of agents that appear to lack responsibility because they were designed, philosophers use these cases to explore the relationship between design and responsibility. This paper presents several replies to design cases from the responsibility literature and uses those replies to situate the corresponding positions on the design and responsibility of artificial agents in machine ethics. I argue that each reply can support the design of responsible agents. However, each reply also entails different levels of severity in the constraints for the design of responsible agents. I offer a brief discussion of the nature of those constraints, highlighting the challenges respective to each reply. I conclude that designing responsible agents is possible, with the caveat that the difficulty of doing so will vary according to one’s favoured reply to design cases. (shrink)

The conventional discourse on existential risks (x-risks) from AI typically focuses on abrupt, dire events caused by advanced AI systems, particularly those that might achieve or surpass human-level intelligence. These events have severe consequences that either lead to human extinction or irreversibly cripple human civilization to a point beyond recovery. This discourse, however, often neglects the serious possibility of AI x-risks manifesting incrementally through a series of smaller yet interconnected disruptions, gradually crossing critical thresholds over time. This paper contrasts the (...) conventional "decisive AI x-risk hypothesis" with an "accumulative AI x-risk hypothesis". While the former envisions an overt AI takeover pathway, characterized by scenarios like uncontrollable superintelligence, the latter suggests a different causal pathway to existential catastrophes. This involves a gradual accumulation of critical AI-induced threats such as severe vulnerabilities and systemic erosion of economic and political structures. The accumulative hypothesis suggests a boiling frog scenario where incremental AI risks slowly converge, undermining societal resilience until a triggering event results in irreversible collapse. Through systems analysis, this paper examines the distinct assumptions differentiating these two hypotheses. It is then argued that the accumulative view can reconcile seemingly incompatible perspectives on AI risks. The implications of differentiating between these causal pathways --- the decisive and the accumulative --- for the governance of AI as well as long-term AI safety are discussed. (shrink)

We investigate a typology of socially and ethically risky phenomena emerging from the interaction between humans and large language model (LLM)-based conversational systems. As they relate to the way in which humans attribute social identity components, such as role and face, to LLM-based conversational systems, we term these phenomena 'social misattributions.' Drawing on classical theories of social identity and recent debates in the philosophy of technology, we argue that these social misattributions represent higher-order forms of anthropomorphisation of LLM-based conversational systems (...) that are not justified by their technical capabilities and follow from the social context of conversational interactions. We discuss the risks these misattributions pose to human users, including emotional manipulation and unwarranted trust, and propose mitigation strategies. Our recommendations emphasise the importance of fostering social transparency and exploring approaches, such as frictional design, that are currently promoted in the research domain of human-centred artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Technology companies are increasingly being asked to take responsibility for the technologies they create. Many of them are rising to the challenge. One way they do this is by implementing “guardrails”: restrictions on functionality that prevent people from misusing their technologies (per some standard of misuse). While there can be excellent reasons for implementing guardrails (and doing so is sometimes morally obligatory), I argue that the unrestricted authority to implement guardrails is incompatible with proper respect for user freedom, and is (...) not something we should welcome. I argue instead that guardrails should be implemented for only two reasons: to prevent accidental misuse of the technology, and as a proportionate means of preventing people from using the technology to violate other people’s rights. If I’m right, then we may have to get more comfortable with developers releasing technologies that can, and to some extent inevitably will, be misused; people using technologies in ways we disagree with is one of the costs of liberty, but it is a cost we have excellent reasons to bear. (shrink)

In a bid to boost their below-replacement fertility levels, some countries, such as China, India, Iran, and Japan, have launched state-sponsored dating apps, with more potentially following. However, the use of dating apps as tools for social engineering has been largely neglected by political theorists and public policy experts. This article fills this gap. While acknowledging the risks and historical baggage of social engineering, the article provides a qualified defense of using these apps for three purposes: raising below-replacement birth rates, (...) increasing social cohesion, and preventing certain genetic diseases. (shrink)

In this article, firstly, cooperative interaction between robots and humans is discussed; specifically, the possibility of human/robot joint action and (relatedly) the possibility of robots occupying institutional roles alongside humans. The discussion makes use of concepts developed in social ontology. Secondly, certain key moral (or ethical—these terms are used interchangeably here) issues arising from this cooperative action are discussed, specifically issues that arise from robots performing (including qua role occupants) morally significant actions jointly with humans. Such morally significant human/robot joint (...) actions, supposing they exist, could potentially range from humans and robots jointly caring for the infirm through to jointly killing enemy combatants. (shrink)

With the rapid expansion of parameters in large language models (LLMs) and the application of Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF), there has been a noticeable growth in the moral competence of LLMs. However, several questions warrant further exploration: Is it really possible for LLMs to fully align with human values through RLHF? How can the current moral growth be philosophically contextualized? We identify similarities between LLMs’ moral growth and Deweyan ethics in terms of the discourse of human moral development. (...) We then attempt to use Dewey’s theory on an experimental basis to examine and further explain the extent to which the current alignment pathway enables the development of LLMs. A beating experiment serves as the foundational case for analyzing LLMs’ moral competence across various parameters and stages, including basic moral cognition, moral dilemma judgment, and moral behavior. The results demonstrate that the moral competence of the GPT series has seen a significant improvement, and Dewey’s Impulse-Habit-Character theory of moral development can be used to explain this: the moral competence of LLMs has been enhanced through experience-based learning, supported by human feedback. Nevertheless, LLMs’ moral development through RLHF remains constrained and does not reach the character stage described by Dewey, possibly due to their lack of self-consciousness. This fundamental difference between humans and LLMs underscores both the limitations of LLMs’ moral growth and the challenges of applying RLHF for AI alignment. It also emphasizes the need for external societal governance and legal regulation. (shrink)

The paper develops a conception of the good life within a digitalized society. Martha Nussbaum’s capability theory offers an adequate normative framework for that purpose as it systematically integrates the analysis of flourishing human lives with a normative theory of justice. The paper argues that a theory of good digital lives should focus on everyday life, on the impact digitalization has on ordinary actions, routines and corresponding practical knowledge. Based on Nussbaum’s work, the paper develops a concept of digital capabilities. (...) Digital capabilities are combined capabilities: To possess a digital capability, an individual must acquire certain skills and abilities (internal capabilities) and needs access to devices and external infrastructures like internet connections. If societies as a whole and everyday environments are digitalized to a certain degree, the possession of specific digital capabilities is a crucial precondition for a flourishing life. The paper likewise analyzes challenges that are connected to digital capabilities. Digital structures are constantly changing. In consequence, digital capabilities are never acquired once and for all, but always precarious and in danger of being lost—with serious consequences for individual everyday lives in digitalized environments. As digital capabilities are crucial for leading a good life, people are entitled to develop and maintain them. They describe demands of justice. Using the examples of filling in an online form and digital education, the paper finally illustrates the size of institutional changes that are necessary to meet these demands. (shrink)

Who is responsible for a harm caused by AI, or a machine or system that relies on artificial intelligence? Given that current AI is neither conscious nor sentient, it’s unclear that AI itself is responsible for it. But given that AI acts independently of its developer or user, it’s also unclear that the developer or user is responsible for the harm. This gives rise to the so-called responsibility gap: cases where AI causes a harm, but no one is responsible for (...) it. Two central questions in the literature are whether responsibility gaps exist, and if yes, whether they’re morally problematic in a way that counts against developing or using AI. While some authors argue that responsibility gaps exist, and they’re morally problematic, some argue that they don’t exist. In this paper, I defend a novel position. First, I argue that current AI doesn’t generate a new kind of concern about responsibility that the older technologies don’t. Then, I argue that responsibility gaps exist but they’re unproblematic. (NOTE: Email me for a copy.). (shrink)

Research under real-world conditions is crucial to the development and deployment of robust AI systems. Exposing large language models to complex use settings yields knowledge about their performance and impact, which cannot be obtained under controlled laboratory conditions or through anticipatory methods. This epistemic need for real-world research is exacerbated by large-language models’ opaque internal operations and potential for emergent behavior. However, despite its epistemic value and widespread application, the ethics of real-world AI research has received little scholarly attention. To (...) address this gap, this paper provides an analysis of real-world research with LLMs and generative AI, assessing both its epistemic value and ethical concerns such as the potential for interpersonal and societal research harms, the increased privatization of AI learning, and the unjust distribution of benefits and risks. This paper discusses these concerns alongside four moral principles influencing research ethics standards: non-maleficence, beneficence, respect for autonomy, and distributive justice. I argue that real-world AI research faces challenges in meeting these principles and that these challenges are exacerbated by absent or imperfect current ethical governance. Finally, I chart two distinct but compatible ways forward: through ethical compliance and regulation and through moral education and cultivation. (shrink)

Explanations are conceived to ensure the trustworthiness of AI systems. Yet, relying solemnly on algorithmic solutions, as provided by explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), might fall short to account for sociotechnical risks jeopardizing their factuality and informativeness. To mitigate these risks, we delve into the complex landscape of ethical risks surrounding XAI systems and their generated explanations. By employing a literature review combined with rigorous thematic analysis, we uncover a diverse array of technical risks tied to the robustness, fairness, and evaluation (...) of XAI systems. Furthermore, we address a broader range of contextual risks jeopardizing their security, accountability, reception alongside other cognitive, social, and ethical concerns of explanations. We advance a multi-layered risk assessment framework, where each layer advances strategies for practical intervention, management, and documentation of XAI systems within organizations. Recognizing the theoretical nature of the framework advanced, we discuss it in a conceptual case study. For the XAI community, our multifaceted investigation represents a path to practically address XAI risks while enriching our understanding of the ethical ramifications of incorporating XAI in decision-making processes. (shrink)

Recent claims that artificial intelligence (AI) systems demonstrate “emergent abilities” have fueled excitement but also fear grounded in the prospect that such systems may enable a wider range of parties to make unprecedented advances in areas that include the development of chemical or biological weapons. Ambiguity surrounding the term “emergent abilities” has added avoidable uncertainty to a topic that has the potential to destabilize the strategic landscape, including the perception of key parties about the viability of nonproliferation efforts. To avert (...) these problems in the future, scientists, developers, policymakers, and other parties should take credible steps to strengthen the health of the scientific ecosystem around AI. (shrink)

The human factor in information systems is a large vulnerability when implementing cybersecurity, and many approaches, including technical and policy driven solutions, seek to mitigate this vulnerability. Decisions to apply technical or policy solutions must consider how an individual’s values and moral stance influence their responses to these implementations. Our research aims to evaluate how individuals prioritise different ethical principles when making cybersecurity sensitive decisions and how much perceived choice they have when doing so. Further, we sought to use participants’ (...) responses to cybersecurity scenarios to create profiles that describe their values and individual factors including personality. Participants (n = 193) in our study responded to five different ethically sensitive cybersecurity scenarios in random order, selecting their action in that scenario and rating and ranking of the ethical principles (i.e., Beneficence, Non-Maleficence, Justice, Autonomy, Explicability) behind that action. Using participants’ demographics, personality, values, and cyber hygiene practices, we created profiles using machine learning to predict participants’ choices and the principle of most importance to them across scenarios. Further, we found that, generalising, for our participants Autonomy was the most important ethical principle in our scenarios, followed by Justice. Our study also suggests that participants felt they had some agency in their decision making and they were able to weigh up different ethical principles. (shrink)

Urban Digital Twins (UDTs) have become the new buzzword for researchers, planners, policymakers, and industry experts when it comes to designing, planning, and managing sustainable and efficient cities. It encapsulates the last iteration of the technocratic and ultra-efficient, post-modernist vision of smart cities. However, while more applications branded as UDTs appear around the world, its conceptualization remains ambiguous. Beyond being technically prescriptive about what UDTs are, this article focuses on their aspects of interaction and operationalization in connection to people in (...) cities, and how enhanced by metaverse ideas they can deepen societal divides by offering divergent urban experiences based on different stakeholder preferences. Therefore, firstly this article repositions the term UDTs by comparing existing concrete and located applications that have a focus on interaction and participation, including some that may be closer to the concept of UDT than is commonly assumed. Based on the components found separately in the different studied cases, it is possible to hypothesize about possible future, more advanced realizations of UDTs. This enables us to contrast their positive and negative societal impacts. While the development of new immersive interactive digital worlds can improve planning using collective knowledge for more inclusive and diverse cities, they pose significant risks not only the common ones regarding privacy, transparency, or fairness, but also social fragmentation based on urban digital multiplicities. The potential benefits and challenges of integrating this multiplicity of UDTs into participatory urban governance emphasize the need for human-centric approaches to promote socio-technical frameworks able to mitigate risks as social division. (shrink)

This paper examines the ontological and epistemological implications of artificial intelligence (AI) through posthumanist philosophy, integrating the works of Deleuze, Foucault, and Haraway with contemporary computational methodologies. It introduces concepts such as negative augmentation, praxes of revealing, and desedimentation, while extending ideas like affirmative cartographies, ethics of alterity, and planes of immanence to critique anthropocentric assumptions about identity, cognition, and agency. By redefining AI systems as dynamic assemblages emerging through networks of interaction and co-creation, the paper challenges traditional dichotomies such (...) as human versus machine and subject versus object. Bridging analytic and continental philosophical traditions, the analysis unites formal tools like attribution analysis and causal reasoning with the interpretive and processual methodologies of continental thought. This synthesis deepens the understanding of AI’s epistemic and ethical dimensions, expanding philosophical inquiry while critiquing anthropocentrism in AI design. The paper interrogates the spatial foundations of AI, contrasting Euclidean and non-Euclidean frameworks to examine how optimization processes and adversarial generative models shape computational epistemologies. Critiquing the reliance on Euclidean spatial assumptions, it positions alternative geometries as tools for modeling complex, recursive relationships. Furthermore, the paper addresses the political dimensions of AI, emphasizing its entanglements with ecological, technological, and sociopolitical systems that perpetuate inequality. Through a politics of affirmation and intersectional approaches, it advocates for inclusive frameworks that prioritize marginalized perspectives. The concept of computational qualia is also explored, highlighting how subjective-like dynamics emerge within AI systems and their implications for ethics, transparency, and machine perception. Finally, the paper calls for a posthumanist framework in AI ethics and safety, emphasizing interconnectivity, plurality, and the transformative capacities of machine intelligence. This approach advances epistemic pluralism and reimagines the boundaries of intelligence in the digital age, fostering novel ontological possibilities through the co-creation of dynamic systems. (shrink)

Digitalisation has lent the right to privacy increasing philosophical and legal relevance. However, privacy’s epistemic status and associated normative values are constantly subject to radical criticisms. This article investigates the validity, in theory and practice, of three radical critiques of privacy. A review of the philosophical and interdisciplinary discourse on privacy during the last half century is followed by analyses of recent legal developments within the EU. Privacy emerges as a highly differentiated and powerful tool to protect individuals and social (...) relations and to limit and redistribute power. However, the right to privacy remains far from realising its practical potential. (shrink)

This paper examines the ongoing challenges of interdisciplinary collaboration in Machine Ethics (ME), particularly the integration of ethical decision-making capacities into AI systems. Despite increasing demands for ethical AI, ethicists often remain on the sidelines, contributing primarily to metaethical discussions without directly influencing the development of moral machines. This paper revisits concerns highlighted by Tolmeijer et al. (2020), who identified the pitfall that computer scientists may misinterpret ethical theories without philosophical input. Using the MACHIAVELLI moral benchmark and the Delphi artificial (...) moral agent as case studies, we analyze how these challenges persist. Our analysis indicates that the creators of MACHIAVELLI and Delphi “copy” ethical concepts and embed them in LLMs without questioning or challenging these concepts themselves sufficiently. If an ethical concept causes friction with the computer code, they only reduce and simplify the ethical concept in order to stay as close as possible to the original. We propose that ME should expand its focus to include both interdisciplinary efforts that embed existing ethical work into AI, and transdisciplinary research that fosters new interpretations of ethical concepts. Interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches are crucial for creating AI systems that are not only effective but also socially responsible. To enhance collaboration between ethicists and computer scientists, we recommend the use of Socratic Dialogue as a methodological tool, promoting deeper understanding of key terms and more effective integration of ethics in AI development. (shrink)

Despite the widespread use of automated decision-making (ADM) systems, they are often developed without involving the public or those directly affected, leading to concerns about systematic biases that may perpetuate structural injustices. Existing formal fairness approaches primarily focus on statistical outcomes across demographic groups or individual fairness, yet these methods reveal ambiguities and limitations in addressing fairness comprehensively. This paper argues for a holistic approach to algorithmic fairness that integrates procedural fairness, considering both decision-making processes and their outcomes. Procedural fairness (...) emphasizes the importance of fair decision-making procedures, which aligns with theories of relational justice that stress the quality of social relations and power dynamics. We highlight the need for substantive procedural fairness to ensure better outcomes and address forward-looking responsibilities. Additionally, we propose leveraging Public Engagement, a core dimension within the well-established Responsible Research and Innovation framework, to enhance procedural fairness in ADM systems. Our contribution underscores the value of Public Engagement in fostering fairer ADM processes, thereby expanding the current focus beyond technical outcome-based approaches to encompass broader procedural considerations. (shrink)

This perspective paper critically examines value-laden challenges that emerge when using standards to support regulation in the field of artificial intelligence, particularly within the context of the AI Act. It presents a dilemma arising from the inherent vagueness and contestable nature of the AI Act’s requirements. The effective implementation of these requirements necessitates addressing hard normative questions that involve complex value judgments. These questions, such as determining the acceptability of risks or the appropriateness of accuracy levels, need to be addressed (...) in order to achieve compliance with the AI Act. However, this creates a dilemma: either the hard normative questions left open by the AI Act are addressed by the standards or they are addressed by the actors involved in the conformity assessment. This paper argues that the latter approach is more likely. Consequently, regulatory intermediaries such as notified bodies will be responsible for making critical value judgments while evaluating compliance with the AI Act’s value-laden requirements. This shift raises a series of concerns and implications that warrant further exploration. (shrink)

Digital sovereignty is a term increasingly used by academics and policymakers to describe efforts by states, private companies, and citizen groups to assert control over digital technologies. This descriptive conception of digital sovereignty is normatively deficient as it centres discussion on how power is being asserted rather than evaluating whether actions are legitimate. In this article, I argue that digital sovereignty should be understood as a normative concept that centres on authority (i.e., legitimate control). A normative approach to digital sovereignty (...) is beneficial as it supports critical discourse about the desirability of actors’ assertions of control. It is also more closely aligned with traditional definitions of sovereignty that are grounded in ideas of sovereign authority. To operationalise this normative approach to digital sovereignty and demonstrate the deficiencies of a descriptive approach, the role that “Big Tech” companies are playing in controlling artificial intelligence is considered from both perspectives. Through this case study, it is highlighted that Big Tech companies assert a high degree of control (i.e., descriptive digital sovereignty), but that they lack strong input legitimacy and have a questionable amount of output legitimacy. For this reason, it is argued that Big Tech companies should only be considered quasi-sovereigns over AI. (shrink)

Online privacy policies or terms and conditions ideally provide users with information about how their personal data are being used. The reality is that very few users read them: they are long, often hard to understand, and ubiquitous. The average internet user cannot realistically read and understand all aspects that apply to them and thus give informed consent to the companies who use their personal data. In this article, we provide a basic overview of a solution to the problem. We (...) suggest that software could allow users to delegate the consent process and consent could thus be automated. The article investigates the practical feasibility of this idea. After suggesting that it is feasible, we develop some normative issues that we believe should be addressed before automated consent is implemented. (shrink)

Coghlan and Cox (Between death and suffering: Resolving the gamer’s dilemma. Ethics and Information Technology) offer a new resolution to the Gamer’s Dilemma (Luck, The Gamer’s Dilemma. Ethics and Information Technology). They argue that, while it is fitting for a person committing virtual child molestation to feel self-repugnance, it is not fitting for a person committing virtual murder to feel the same, and the fittingness of this feeling indicates each act’s moral permissibility. The aim of this paper is to determine (...) whether this resolution – the repugnant resolution – successfully resolves the Gamer’s Dilemma. We argue that it does not. (shrink)

The increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in our daily life through various applications, services, and products explains the significance of trust/distrust in AI from a user perspective. AI-driven systems have significantly diffused into various fields of our lives, serving as beneficial tools used by human agents. These systems are also evolving to act as co-assistants or semi-agents in specific domains, potentially influencing human thought, decision-making, and agency. Trust/distrust in AI plays the role of a regulator and could significantly (...) control the level of this diffusion, as trust can increase, and distrust may reduce the rate of adoption of AI. Recently, varieties of studies have paid attention to the variant dimension of trust/distrust in AI, and its relevant considerations. In this systematic literature review, after conceptualization of trust in the current AI literature review, we will investigate trust in different types of human-Machine interaction, and its impact on technology acceptance in different domains. In addition to that, we propose a taxonomy of technical (i.e., safety, accuracy, robustness) and non-technical axiological (i.e., ethical, legal, and mixed) trustworthiness metrics, and some trustworthy measurements. Moreover, we examine some major trust-breakers in AI (e.g., autonomy and dignity threat), and trust makers; and propose some future directions and probable solutions for the transition to a trustworthy AI. (shrink)

Deepfakes raise various concerns: risks of political destabilization, depictions of persons without consent and causing them harms, erosion of trust in video and audio as reliable sources of evidence, and more. These concerns have been the focus of recent work in the philosophical literature on deepfakes. However, there has been almost no sustained philosophical analysis of deepfakes from the perspective of concerns about honesty and dishonesty. That deepfakes are potentially deceptive is unsurprising and has been noted. But under what conditions (...) does the use of deepfakes fail to be honest? And which human agents, involved in one way or another in a deepfake, fail to be honest, and in what ways? If we are to understand better the morality of deepfakes, these questions need answering. Our first goal in this paper, therefore, is to offer an analysis of paradigmatic cases of deepfakes in light of the philosophy of honesty. While it is clear that many deepfakes are morally problematic, there has been a rising counter-chorus claiming that deepfakes are not essentially morally bad, since there might be uses of deepfakes that are not morally wrong, or even that are morally salutary, for instance, in education, entertainment, activism, and other areas. However, while there are reasons to think that deepfakes can supply or support moral goods, it is nevertheless possible that even these uses of deepfakes are dishonest. Our second goal in this paper, therefore, is to apply our analysis of deepfakes and honesty to the sorts of deepfakes hoped to be morally good or at least neutral. We conclude that, perhaps surprisingly, in many of these cases the use of deepfakes will be dishonest in some respects. Of course, there will be cases of deepfakes for which verdicts about honesty and moral permissibility do not line up. While we will sometimes suggest reasons why moral permissibility verdicts might diverge from honesty verdicts, we will not aim to settle matters of moral permissibility. (shrink)

Newly powerful large language models have burst onto the scene, with applications across a wide range of functions. We can now expect to encounter their outputs at rapidly increasing volumes and frequencies. Some commentators claim that large language models are bullshitting, generating convincing output without regard for the truth. If correct, that would make large language models distinctively dangerous discourse participants. Bullshitters not only undermine the norm of truthfulness (by saying false things) but the normative status of truth itself (by (...) treating it as entirely irrelevant). So, do large language models really bullshit? I argue that they can, in the sense of issuing propositional content in response to fact-seeking prompts, without having first assessed that content for truth or falsity. However, I further argue that they need not bullshit, given appropriate guardrails. So, just as with human speakers, the propensity for a large language model to bullshit depends on its own particular make-up. (shrink)

In this special issue, we focus on the connection between conceptual engineering and the philosophy of technology. Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of introducing, eliminating, or revising words and concepts. The philosophy of technology examines the nature and significance of technology. We investigate how technologies such as AI and genetic engineering (so-called “socially disruptive technologies”) disrupt our practices and concepts, and how conceptual engineering can address these disruptions. We also consider how conceptual engineering can enhance the practice of ethical design. (...) The issue features seven articles that discuss a range of topics, including trust in blockchain applications and the evolving concept of nature. These articles highlight that as technology changes the world and our concepts, conceptual engineering provides invaluable tools and frameworks to reflect on these changes and adapt accordingly. (shrink)

AI-driven journalism refers to various methods and tools for gathering, verifying, producing, and distributing news information. Their potential is to extend human capabilities and create new forms of augmented journalism. Although scholars agreed on the necessity to embed journalistic values in these systems to make AI systems accountable, less attention was paid to data quality, while the results’ accuracy and efficiency depend on high-quality data in any machine learning task. Assessing data quality in the context of AI-driven journalism requires a (...) broader and interdisciplinary approach, relying on the challenges of data quality in machine learning and the ethical challenges of using machine learning in journalism. To better identify these, we propose a data quality assessment framework to support the collection and pre-processing stages in machine learning. It relies on three of the core principles of ethical journalism—accuracy, fairness, and transparency—and participates in the shift from model-centric to data-centric AI, by focusing on data quality to reduce reliance on large datasets with errors, making data labelling consistent, and better integrating journalistic knowledge. (shrink)

The world is about to be swamped by an unprecedented wave of AI-generated content. We need reliable ways of identifying such content, to supplement the many existing social institutions that enable trust between people and organisations and ensure social resilience. In this paper, we begin by highlighting an important new development: providers of AI content generators have new obligations to support the creation of reliable detectors for the content they generate. These new obligations arise mainly from the EU’s newly finalised (...) AI Act, but they are enhanced by the US President’s recent Executive Order on AI, and by several considerations of self-interest. These new steps towards reliable detection mechanisms are by no means a panacea—but we argue they will usher in a new adversarial landscape, in which reliable methods for identifying AI-generated content are commonly available. In this landscape, many new questions arise for policymakers. Firstly, if reliable AI-content detection mechanisms are available, who should be required to use them? And how should they be used? We argue that new duties arise for media and Web search companies arise for media companies, and for Web search companies, in the deployment of AI-content detectors. Secondly, what broader regulation of the tech ecosystem will maximise the likelihood of reliable AI-content detectors? We argue for a range of new duties, relating to provenance-authentication protocols, open-source AI generators, and support for research and enforcement. Along the way, we consider how the production of AI-generated content relates to ‘free expression’, and discuss the important case of content that is generated jointly by humans and AIs. (shrink)

With its potential to contribute to the ethical governance of AI, eXplainable AI (XAI) research frequently asserts its relevance to ethical considerations. Yet, the substantiation of these claims with rigorous ethical analysis and reflection remains largely unexamined. This contribution endeavors to scrutinize the relationship between XAI and ethical considerations. By systematically reviewing research papers mentioning ethical terms in XAI frameworks and tools, we investigate the extent and depth of ethical discussions in scholarly research. We observe a limited and often superficial (...) engagement with ethical theories, with a tendency to acknowledge the importance of ethics, yet treating it as a monolithic and not contextualized concept. Our findings suggest a pressing need for a more nuanced and comprehensive integration of ethics in XAI research and practice. To support this, we propose to critically reconsider transparency and explainability in regards to ethical considerations during XAI systems design while accounting for ethical complexity in practice. As future research directions, we point to the promotion of interdisciplinary collaborations and education, also for underrepresented ethical perspectives. Such ethical grounding can guide the design of ethically robust XAI systems, aligning technical advancements with ethical considerations. (shrink)

This paper offers an ethical analysis of online steering, the practice of personalizing search results in e-commerce based on data about users. We first outline the parallels and differences between online steering and price discrimination, arguing that online steering is more likely to benefit consumers and enhance social welfare than price discrimination. Next, we argue that while online steering does not violate any plausible specification of the equal-treatment norm, it involves an element of manipulation that is absent in price discrimination (...) and that by itself raises ethical concerns regardless of the welfare effects of online steering. We conclude that in order to address these ethical concerns, online steering needs to satisfy a transparency condition. (shrink)

In the 21st century, transparency and efficiency in municipal management are essential. This study focusses on the GAD Municipal of Latacunga, Ecuador, assessing inefficiency in the Office of Valuation and Cadastres, proposing the use of AI to improve governance. The research reveals deficiencies in digitalization and transparency, identifying the need for effective mechanisms to optimize public services. AI is presented as a potential solution to automate tasks, detect irregularities, and increase administrative efficiency. This analysis, based on regional and local data, (...) highlights the potential of AI to transform public administration and strengthening citizen trust. (shrink)

The ‘smart city’ has been driven by advances in information and communication technologies, with the aim of integrating these technologies with urban infrastructures for improved optimisation, automation and control. Smart cities have emerged as a response to the challenges faced by megacities and are likely to manifest the ‘datafying’ society in the public space. However, the pervasive nature of data collection, continuous analysis and inference, and long-term data storage result in a potentially problematic reconfiguration of society that undermines individual and (...) collective autonomy. This article proposes the concept of ‘data autonomy’ as a guiding principle for the development of smart cities, addressing challenges related to the potential misuse of personal data, sphere transgression, and datafied gentrification. Section II. explores concerns related to data protection law, which can be understood as a proxy for the relationship between the individual and society, highlighting power dynamics and the autonomy of individuals and communities. Section III. discusses the concept of sphere transgression, where tech giants expand their influence in society without adequate expertise or accountability. Section IV. examines the potential impact of datafied gentrification on individual and collective autonomy. Building on the challenges identified throughout these sections, this paper proposes ‘data autonomy’ as a guiding principle for smart city development in section V., promoting a value-based approach centred on human dignity. To make it practicable, increased interdisciplinary collaboration in the development of smart cities is needed, with a particular focus on improved design and impact assessment methodologies. (shrink)

The application of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) technologies in the field of propaganda influences information creation, dissemination, and reception, and introduces new ethical challenges. This paper revisits the philosophical discourses of Jacques Ellul on technology and propaganda, placing them within the context of the rise of today’s generative AI technologies. Ellul identified the First Industrial Revolution as the initial juncture in the history of human technology that formed technique as a social phenomenon, which subsequently shaped the nature of propaganda as (...) a technique. Subsequent developments in computer technology in the latter half of the 20th century enabled the formation of a technological system. This raises the question: Could generative AI represent another pivotal moment in the evolution of the technological system, and what are the ethical implications of propaganda technology in this context? This article seeks to illuminate current discussions on GenAI technology and propaganda ethics with Ellul’s insightful theoretical insights. In terms of research methodology, this study relies on textual interpretation and classical hermeneutics, including three processes: syntactic text interpretation, historical background, and situational application. Ellul’s research delves into the intrinsic links and inherent ethical dimensions between propaganda and technology, examining their comprehensive and enduring impacts. This normative perspective is crucial for a deep understanding of contemporary propaganda within the framework of emerging technologies, helping us to transcend the escalating spiral of propaganda technology and counter-propaganda techniques. By incorporating propaganda facilitated by generative AI technologies into the overall development logic of the technological society, this approach explores its ethical implications from a more macroscopic and holistic perspective. (shrink)

The Gamer's Dilemma is a much-discussed issue in video game ethics which probes our seemingly conflicting intuitions about the moral acceptability of virtual murder compared to virtual child molestation. But how we approach this dilemma depends on how we frame it. With this in mind, I identify three ways the dilemma has been conceptualized: the Descriptive Gamer's Investigation, which focuses on empirically explaining the source of our intuitions; the Gamer's Puzzle, which uses the dilemma to explore and test moral or (...) metaphysical theories; and the Applied Gamer's Dilemma, which reconstructs the moral commitments underlying the intuitions to provide action-guidance. Clearly distinguishing these framings allows us to identify the distinct methodologies and criteria of success for each approach. This tripartite framework helps resolve confusions in the debate, highlights the need for experimental philosophy to test proposed resolutions, and opens space for a serious reconsideration of consequentialism. The paper thus provides conceptual clarity to move the discussion forward productively. (shrink)

Projects to integrate digital technologies into the fabric of city life depend upon specific visions of politics and technology. In the process of their realization, they re-constitute the identities, agencies, and relations of human inhabitants, re-defining what it means to be a citizen. This article draws on the idiom of co-production and framework of constitutionalism from Science and Technology Studies (STS) to analyze the coming into being of a form of citizenship with smartphone technologies in Boston in the 2010s. When (...) the Boston Mayor’s Office of New Urban Mechanics (MONUM) used newly available smartphone apps to reconfigure the connection among city residents and government, they brought into being a specific mode of citizenship. I term this mode of citizenship “mechanic” to draw attention to the qualities of passivity, infrastructure, and connectedness that characterized MONUM’s early digital citizenship projects. I argue that recognizing that the constitution of the human, and specifically of citizens, is at stake in smart city projects entails re-thinking ethical analysis in contexts of smart cities. Instead of seeking to perform ethical assessments of technological consequences (“ethics of” approach), scholars might begin with a situated analysis of how humans as citizens are constituted through smart city projects (“ethics in” approach). By identifying the political affordances and commitments of the emergent digital citizenship models, scholars can make visible alternative forms of living and engaging politically in the city. (shrink)

This article explores the question as to whether images generated by Artificial Intelligence such as DALL-E 2 can be considered artworks. After providing a brief primer on how technologies such as DALL-E 2 work in principle, I give an overview of three contemporary accounts of art and then show that there is at least one case where an AI-generated image meets the criteria for art membership under all three accounts. I suggest that our collective hesitancy to call AI-generated images art (...) stems from the lack of a clear author figure. I propose two possible complementary solutions. First, that some AI-generated images as artworks are conjunctively authored by both the developers of the AI and the prompt-giver. Second, that AI image generators can themselves be considered works of art authored by the developers. I conclude by way of suggesting that we might have separate art competitions specifically for AI-generated artworks. (shrink)