About this topic
Summary A concept's possession conditions give a way of characterizing the difference between those creatures that have the concept and those that don't. Reductive possession conditions explain what it means to have a concept in terms of non-conceptual states and properties; non-reductive accounts explain possession of one concept in terms of possession of other concepts.
Related categories

137 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 137
  1. added 2019-01-16
    What Frege Asked Alex the Parrot: Inferentialism, Number Concepts, and Animal Cognition.Erik Nelson - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    While there has been significant philosophical debate on whether nonlinguistic animals can possess conceptual capabilities, less time has been devoted to considering 'talking' animals, such as parrots. When they are discussed, their capabilities are often downplayed as mere mimicry. The most explicit philosophical example of this can be seen in Brandom's frequent comparisons of parrots and thermostats. Brandom argues that because parrots (like thermostats) cannot grasp the implicit inferential connections between concepts, their vocal articulations do not actually have any conceptual (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2018-12-11
    The Points of Concepts: Their Types, Tensions, and Connections.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    In the literature seeking to explain concepts in terms of their point, talk of ‘the point’ of concepts remains under-theorised. I propose a typology of points which distinguishes practical, evaluative, animating, and inferential points. This allows us to resolve tensions such as that between the ambition of explanations in terms of the points of concepts to be informative and the claim that mastering concepts requires grasping their point; and it allows us to exploit connections between types of points to understand (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2018-09-21
    Coining Terms In The Language of Thought: Innateness, Emergence, and the Lot of Cummins’s Argument Against the Causal Theory of Mental Content.Robert D. Rupert - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (10):499-530.
    Robert Cummins argues that any causal theory of mental content (CT) founders on an established fact of human psychology: that theory mediates sensory detection. He concludes,.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  4. added 2018-08-20
    Relation‐Based Thought, Objectivity and Disagreement.Christopher Peacocke - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (1):35-56.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. added 2017-12-02
    Conceptual Role Semantics and Rationality.Bradley Rives - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (2):271-289.
    Conceptual role semanticists argue that concepts are individuated in terms of their roles in cognition. Some prominent conceptual role semanticists argue for the further claim that concepts are individuated in terms of their rational roles in cognition. This further claim places substantive normative constraints on concept-constitutive roles. I argue that conceptual role semanticists can and should resist the claim that conceptual roles must be specified in inherently normative terms.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2017-09-22
    Thought About Properties: Why the Perceptual Case is Basic.Dominic Alford-Duguid - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):221-242.
    This paper defends a version of the old empiricist claim that to think about unobservable physical properties a subject must be able to think perception-based thoughts about observable properties. The central argument builds upon foundations laid down by G. E. M. Anscombe and P. F. Strawson. It bridges the gap separating these foundations and the target claim by exploiting a neglected connection between thought about properties and our grasp of causation. This way of bridging the gap promises to introduce substantive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2017-09-13
    Mind, Modality, and Meaning: Toward a Rationalist Physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2013 - Dissertation, University of California Los Angeles
    This dissertation contains four independent essays addressing a cluster of related topics in the philosophy of mind. Chapter 1: “Fundamentality Physicalism” argues that physicalism can usefully be conceived of as a thesis about fundamentality. The chapter explores a variety of other potential formulations of physicalism (particularly modal formulations), contrasts fundamentality physicalism with these theses, and offers reasons to prefer fundamentality physicalism over these rivals. Chapter 2:“Modal Rationalism and the Demonstrative Reply to the Master Argument Against Physicalism” introduces the Master Argument (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2017-05-11
    Concepts in Context.Andrea Onofri - 2012 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
    My thesis tackles two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent literature on concepts: • What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a concept C₁ the same concept as a concept C₂? • What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied for a thinker to have a concept C? I will develop a pluralist and contextualist theory of concept individuation and possession: different concepts have different individuation and possession conditions, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2017-05-09
    Concepts, Brains, and Behaviour.Anthony Kenny - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):105-113.
    Concepts are best understood as a particular kind of human ability: a person who has mastered the use of a word for F in some language possesses the concept of F. Abilities are individuated by their possessors and their exercises, though they are not to be identified with either. Typically abilities are associated with vehicles, that is to say underlying actualities which account for their exercises. The mind is the human ability to form concepts, and its principal vehicle is the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10. added 2017-05-09
    New Perspectives on Concepts.Julia Langkau & Christian Nimtz (eds.) - 2010 - Rodopi.
    Much recent work on concepts has been inspired by and developed within the bounds of the representational theory of the mind often taken for granted by philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists, and psychologists alike. The contributions to this volume take a more encompassing perspective on the issue of concepts. Rather than modelling details of our representational architecture in line with the dominant paradigm, they explore three traditional issues concerning concepts. Is mastery of a language necessary for thought? Do concepts reduce (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2017-05-09
    Having a Concept.Petr Kot'átko - 2006 - In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2017-05-09
    On Concepts and Conceptions.Josep Macia - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:175-185.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2017-05-09
    Bealer's Intuitions on Concept Possession.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:303-309.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2017-05-09
    The Two Contexts of Mental Concepts.J. R. Jones - 1958 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:105 - 124.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2017-05-05
    Critical Notice of Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts, by R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye. [REVIEW]Paul Horwich - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):1123-1139.
  16. added 2017-05-05
    6 Skill Learning and Conceptual Thought.Ellen Fridland - 2013 - In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. pp. 13--77.
  17. added 2017-05-05
    A Dynamic Account of the Structure of Concepts.Peter Blouw - unknown
    Concepts are widely agreed to be the basic constituents of thought. Amongst philosophers and psychologists, however, the question of how concepts are structured has been a longstanding problem and a locus of disagreement. I draw on recent work describing how representational content is ascribed to populations of neurons to develop a novel solution to this problem. Because disputes over the structure of concepts often reflect divergent explanatory goals, I begin by arguing for a set of six criteria that a good (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2017-05-05
    Platforms, Patchworks, and Parking Garages: Wilson’s Account of Conceptual Fine‐Structure in Wandering Significance.Robert Brandom - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):183-201.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2017-05-05
    A Cognitivist Approach to Concepts.Hans Johann Glock - 2011 - .
    Th is article explores a cognitivist approach to concepts. Such an approach steers a middle course between the Scylla of subjectivism and the Charybdis of objectivism. While concepts are not mental particulars, they have an ineliminable cognitive dimension. Th e article explores several versions of cognitivism, focusing in particular on Künne’s Neo-Fregean proposal that concepts are modes of presentation. It also tackles a challenge facing all cognitivist accounts, namely the ‘proposition problem’: how can the cognitive dimension of concepts be reconciled (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2017-05-05
    Concepts, Abilities, and Propositions.Hans-Johann Glock - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):115-134.
    This article investigates whether the concept of a concept can be given a fairly uniform explanation through a 'cognitivist' account, one that accepts that concepts exist independently of individual subjects, yet nonetheless invokes mental achievements and capacities. I consider various variants of such an account, which identify a concept, respectively, with a certain kind of abilitiy, rule and way of thinking. All of them are confronted with what I call the 'proposition problem', namely that unlike these explananda concepts are standardly (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. added 2017-05-05
    Concepts: Where Subjectivism Goes Wrong.Hans Johann Glock - 2009 - .
    The debate about concepts has always been shaped by a contrast between subjectivism, which treats them as phenomena in the mind or head of individuals, and objectivism, which insists that they exist independently of individual minds. The most prominent contemporary version of subjectivism is Fodor's RTM. The Fregean charge against subjectivism is that it cannot do justice to the fact that different individuals can share the same concepts. Proponents of RTM have accepted shareability as a ‘non-negotiable constraint’. At the same (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. added 2017-05-05
    Concepts: Where Subjectivism Goes Wrong.Hans-Johann Glock - 2009 - Philosophy 84 (1):5-29.
    The debate about concepts has always been shaped by a contrast between subjectivism, which treats them as phenomena in the mind or head of individuals, and objectivism, which insists that they exist independently of individual minds. The most prominent contemporary version of subjectivism is Fodor's RTM. The Fregean charge against subjectivism is that it cannot do justice to the fact that different individuals can share the same concepts. Proponents of RTM have accepted shareability as a 'non-negotiable constraint'. At the same (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  23. added 2017-05-05
    Concepts: Foundational Issues.Malte Dahlgrün - unknown
    This dissertation has three parts. Part I, comprising chapters 1 and 2, addresses some basic commitments which must be presupposed in theorizing about concepts. Concepts, to a first approximation, are mental representations that are constituents of thoughts. Chapter 1 attempts to clarify the notion of representing. Chapter 2 reconstructs arguments in the work of Frege against the mental nature of thoughts and (by the same token) of concepts, arguing that they are confused and leave the notion of concepts as mental (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2017-05-05
    Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Kent Bach & Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):627.
  25. added 2017-05-05
    Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession.Terry Horgan - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:27 - 33.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. added 2017-05-05
    Conceptual Competence and Inadequate Conceptions.Pierre Jacob - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:169-174.
    I discuss a proposal by Jim Higginbotham for distinguishing mastery of a concept and knowing a conception.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2017-05-05
    Animal Concepts.Colin Allen - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):66-66.
    Millikan's account of concepts is applicable to questions about concepts in nonhuman animals. I raise three questions in this context: (1) Does classical conditioning entail the possession of simple concepts? (2) Are movement property concepts more basic than substance concepts? (3) What is the empirical content of claiming that concept meanings do not necessarily change as dispositions change?
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2017-05-05
    On the Concept of Concept in the Context of Autonomous Agents.Paul Davidsson - unknown
    This paper deals with some fundamental questions regarding the concept of concept in the context of autonomous agents. The most basic of these is defining what it actually means for someone to have a concept. Rather than trying to state a number of conditions that should be satisfied in order to have the concept, it is concluded that having a concept is a matter of degree, which can be defined in terms of the functions the concept can serve. The more (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2017-05-05
    Some Elements of Conceptual Structure.Ray Jackendoff - 1993 - In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2017-05-05
    What is a Concept?Ray Jackendoff - 1992 - In E. Kittay & A. Lehrer (eds.), Frames, Fields, and Contrasts: New Essays in Semantic and Lexical Organization. Erlbaum. pp. 191-208.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2017-05-05
    Concepts and Language.B. O. G. - 1976 - Review of Metaphysics 29 (3):556-557.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2017-05-05
    Grammar and the Possession of Concepts.David E. Cooper - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 7 (2):204–222.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2017-04-27
    Intentionality as Partial Identity.Christopher M. P. Tomaszewski - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):15-23.
    One of the greatest challenges facing materialist theories of the human mind is the problem of intentionality. As many non-materialists of various stripes have pointed out, it is very difficult to say, if the human mind is a purely material thing, how this material thing can be about or represent another thing wholly distinct from itself. However, for their part, these same non-materialists have relied heavily or exclusively on this intuition that one material thing cannot be about another. In this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2017-03-09
    Pensamientos de primer orden.Mariela Aguilera - 2013 - Critica 45 (133):55-81.
    Uno de los argumentos en favor de la dependencia entre lenguaje y conceptos descansa en la premisa de que la posesión de conceptos involucra pensamientos de segundo orden y éstos, a su vez, requieren lenguaje. Este trabajo se centra en una variante de este argumento formulada por José Luis Bermúdez. Sostendré que aun cuando el pensamiento de segundo orden suponga competencia lingüística, no es necesario aceptar esa premisa. Propondré, en cambio, dos condiciones alternativas para la posesión de conceptos, la identificación (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2017-02-15
    Concepts and Possession Conditions.Christopher Peacocke - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. added 2017-02-08
    Posséder Un Concept Selon Peacocke.Martin Montminy - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (2):219-.
  37. added 2017-02-03
    Peacocke's Thoughts.Richard E. Aquila - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (1 & 2):195 – 205.
  38. added 2017-01-24
    Naturalism and the Metasemantic Account of Concepts.Sílvio Pinto - 2006 - Abstracta 3 (1):29-45.
    In chapter 5 of his 1992 book A Study of Concepts, Christopher Peacocke claims that his account of concepts can be reconciled with naturalism. Nonetheless, despite Peacocke’s greatest efforts to convince the skeptics that the mentioned accommodation is viable if one accepts his approach to concepts, some suspicion survives. In a recent paper on this very topic, Jose Luis Bermudez raises questions about Peacocke’s supposed naturalization by arguing that the approach in question is not able to make sense of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2017-01-19
    Can Concepts Ground Apriori Knowledge? Peacocke's Referential Turn and its Challenges.Nenad Miščević - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (3):233-256.
    The paper is a critical examination of Peacocke’s pioneering work on concepts as grounding the possibility of a priori knowledge. It focuses upon his more recent turn to reference and referential domain, and the two enlargements of the purely conceptual bases for apriority, namely appeal to conceptions and to direct referential sensitivity. I argue that the two are needed, but they produce more problem for the strategy as a whole than they solve. I conclude by suggesting that they point to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. added 2017-01-18
    Some Critical Remarks on an Explanation of Concept Possession.Eleonora Orlando - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:323-330.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. added 2017-01-18
    Truth, Activation Vectors and Possession Conditions for Concepts.Hilary Putnam - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):431-447.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. added 2017-01-18
    Peacocke on Red and Red.Michael A. Smith - 1986 - Synthese 68 (September):559-576.
    How are we to define red? We seem to face a dilemma. For it seems that we must define red in terms of looks red. But looks red is semantically complex. We must therefore define looks red in terms of red. Can we avoid this dilemma? Christopher Peacocke thinks we can. He claims that we can define the concept of being red in terms of the concept of being red; the concept of a sensational property of visual experience. Peacocke agrees (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. added 2017-01-18
    Innate Powers, Concepts and Knowledge: A Critique of D. W. Hamlyn's Account of Concept Possession.Malcolm Jones - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 15 (1):139–145.
  44. added 2016-12-12
    On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    Written by one of today's most creative and innovative philosophers, Ruth Garrett Millikan, this book examines basic empirical concepts; how they are acquired, how they function, and how they have been misrepresented in the traditional philosophical literature. Millikan places cognitive psychology in an evolutionary context where human cognition is assumed to be an outgrowth of primitive forms of mentality, and assumed to have 'functions' in the biological sense. Of particular interest are her discussions of the nature of abilities as different (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  45. added 2016-12-08
    Concepts and Analytic Intuitions.Bradley Rives - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):285-314.
    In this paper I defend the view that positing analytic, constitutive connections among concepts best explains certain semantic-cum-conceptual intuitions. Jerry Fodor and Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence offer alternative explanations according to which such intuitions can be explained without positing analyticities. I argue that these alternative explanations fail. As a partial diagnosis of their failure, I suggest that critics have failed to recognize the extent to which a psychologized notion of analyticity must depart from the traditional notion of ‘truth in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2016-12-08
    Contenido conceptual - contenido no conceptual: una distinción de tipo.Dany Mauricio González Parra - 2014 - Escritos 22 (49):369-397.
    La distinción entre contenidos conceptuales y no-conceptuales tiene claras repercusiones en el modo en que el hombre configura su mundo, así como en la posibilidad de atribuir pensamiento, en sentido estricto, a sistemas y organismos no humanos. Con el fin de clarificar dicha distinción, en el presente trabajo se plantea una noción básica de estado mental y, especialmente, una definición clara de lo que es un concepto y las características esenciales de los estados en que estos aparecen. Lo que se (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2016-12-08
    On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.
    Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept *Q* (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  48. added 2016-12-08
    Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211-238.
    This paper concerns the dialectal role of Frege Cases in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept Pragmatists. I take as a starting point Christopher Peacocke’s argument that, unlike Cartesianism, his ‘Fregean’ Pragmatism can account for facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain judgments. I argue that since this argument presupposes that the rationality of thoughts turn on their content, it is thus question-begging against Cartesians, who claim that issues about rationality turn on the form, not the content, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  49. added 2016-12-08
    Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
    We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  50. added 2016-12-05
    Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature?Gurpreet Rattan & Åsa Wikforss - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 137