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Summary Many theories in developmental psychology and anthropology assume that it makes sense to talk about a concept's changing over time. Similar appeals are often made in the history of science. For example, we may speak of changes in a child's concept of living things, a culture's concept of the afterlife, or the concept of energy in physics. Theories of conceptual change aim to explain what it means to speak of changes in a concept, to specify the sorts of processes by which concepts change, and to elucidate the ways in which the same concept can persist through change.
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  1. Fodor and the Impossibility of Learning.Majid Amini - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  2. 9 Scientific Concepts and Conceptual Change.Hanne Andersen - 2012 - In Vasō Kintē & Theodore Arabatzis (eds.), Kuhn's the Structure of Scientific Revolutions Revisited. Routledge. pp. 179.
  3. Problem: The Place of Generic Concepts in Learning.M. Annice - 1953 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 27:85.
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  4. Learning Hypothesis Spaces and Dimensions Through Concept Learning.Joseph L. Austerweil & Thomas L. Griffiths - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 73--78.
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  5. Complex Instructional Analogies and Theoretical Concept Acquisition in College Genetics.William P. Baker & Anton E. Lawson - 2001 - Science Education 85 (6):665-683.
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  6. Can Bootstrapping Explain Concept Learning?Jacob Beck - 2017 - Cognition 158:110–121.
    Susan Carey's account of Quinean bootstrapping has been heavily criticized. While it purports to explain how important new concepts are learned, many commentators complain that it is unclear just what bootstrapping is supposed to be or how it is supposed to work. Others allege that bootstrapping falls prey to the circularity challenge: it cannot explain how new concepts are learned without presupposing that learners already have those very concepts. Drawing on discussions of concept learning from the philosophical literature, this article (...)
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  7. Pearce, Glenn and Patrick Maynard / "Conceptual Change".Radu J. Bogdan - 1975 - Theory and Decision 6 (1/4):107.
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  8. Novelty Effects in Cue Acquisition and Utilization.Loy S. Braley & Donald Michael Johnson - 1963 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 66 (4):421.
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  9. Reference Determination and Conceptual Change.Ingo Brigandt - manuscript -
    The paper discusses reference determination from the point of view of conceptual change in science. The first part of the discussion uses the homology concept, a natural kind term from biology, as an example. It is argued that the causal theory of reference gives an incomplete account of reference determination even in the case of natural kind terms. Moreover, even if descriptions of the referent are taken into account, this does not yield a satisfactory account of reference in the case (...)
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  10. An Alternative to Kitcher's Theory of Conceptual Progress and His Account of the Change of the Gene Concept.Ingo Brigandt - manuscript -
    The present paper discusses Kitcher’s framework for studying conceptual change and progress. Kitcher’s core notion of reference potential is hard to apply to concrete cases. In addition, an account of conceptual change as change in reference potential misses some important aspects of conceptual change and conceptual progress. I propose an alternative framework that focuses on the inferences and explanations supported by scientific concepts. The application of my approach to the history of the gene concept offers a better account of the (...)
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  11. Scientific Practice, Conceptual Change, and the Nature of Concepts.Ingo Brigandt - manuscript -
    The theory of concepts advanced in the present discussion aims at accounting for a) how a concept makes successful practice possible, and b) how a scientific concept can be subject to rational change in the course of history. To this end, I suggest that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) the concept.
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  12. The Role a Concept Plays in Science: The Case of Homology.Ingo Brigandt - manuscript -
    The present paper gives a philosophical analysis of the conceptual variation in the homology concept. It is argued that different homology concepts are used in evolutionary and comparative biology, in evolutionary developmental biology, and in molecular biology. The study uses conceptual role semantics, focusing on the inferences and explanations supported by concepts, as a heuristic tool to explain conceptual change. The differences between homology concepts are due to the fact that these concepts play different theoretical roles for different biological fields. (...)
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  13. A Critique of David Chalmers' and Frank Jackson's Account of Concepts.Ingo Brigandt - 2013 - ProtoSociology 30:63–88.
    David Chalmers and Frank Jackson have promoted a strong program of conceptual analysis, which accords a significant philosophical role to the a priori analysis of concepts. They found this methodological program on an account of concepts using two-dimensional semantics. This paper argues that Chalmers and Jackson’s account of concepts, and the related approach by David Braddon-Mitchell, is inadequate for natural kind concepts as found in biology. Two-dimensional semantics is metaphysically faulty as an account of the nature of concepts and concept (...)
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  14. The Dynamics of Scientific Concepts: The Relevance of Epistemic Aims and Values.Ingo Brigandt - 2012 - In Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice. Berlin: de Gruyter. pp. 75–103.
    The philosophy of science that grew out of logical positivism construed scientific knowledge in terms of set of interconnected beliefs about the world, such as theories and observation statements. Nowadays science is also conceived of as a dynamic process based on the various practices of individual scientists and the institutional settings of science. Two features particularly influence the dynamics of scientific knowledge: epistemic standards and aims (e.g., assumptions about what issues are currently in need of scientific study and explanation). While (...)
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  15. Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, Discovery, and Explanation.Ingo Brigandt - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):31-43.
    Whereas an inference (deductive as well as inductive) is usually viewed as being valid in virtue of its argument form, the present paper argues that scientific reasoning is material inference, i.e., justified in virtue of its content. A material inference is licensed by the empirical content embodied in the concepts contained in the premises and conclusion. Understanding scientific reasoning as material inference has the advantage of combining different aspects of scientific reasoning, such as confirmation, discovery, and explanation. This approach explains (...)
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  16. The Epistemic Goal of a Concept: Accounting for the Rationality of Semantic Change and Variation.Ingo Brigandt - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):19-40.
    The discussion presents a framework of concepts that is intended to account for the rationality of semantic change and variation, suggesting that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) reference, 2) inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept’s use. I argue that in the course of history a concept can change in any of these components, and that change in the concept’s inferential role and reference can be accounted for as being rational relative (...)
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  17. A Theory of Conceptual Advance: Explaining Conceptual Change in Evolutionary, Molecular, and Evolutionary Developmental Biology.Ingo Brigandt - 2006 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    The theory of concepts advanced in the dissertation aims at accounting for a) how a concept makes successful practice possible, and b) how a scientific concept can be subject to rational change in the course of history. Traditional accounts in the philosophy of science have usually studied concepts in terms only of their reference; their concern is to establish a stability of reference in order to address the incommensurability problem. My discussion, in contrast, suggests that each scientific concept consists of (...)
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  18. Philosophical Issues in Experimental Biology.Ingo Brigandt - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 21 (3):423–435.
    Review essay of The Philosophy of Experimental Biology by Marcel Weber (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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  19. Biological Kinds and the Causal Theory of Reference.Ingo Brigandt - 2004 - In J. C. Marek & M. E. Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 58–60.
    This paper uses an example from biology, the homology concept, to argue that current versions of the causal theory of reference give an incomplete account of reference determination. It is suggested that in addition to samples and stereotypical properties, the scientific use of concepts and the epistemic interests pursued with concepts are important factors in determining the reference of natural kind terms.
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  20. Conceptual Role Semantics, the Theory Theory, and Conceptual Change.Ingo Brigandt - 2004 - In Proceedings First Joint Conference of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology and the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Barcelona, Spain. Murcia: Universidad de Murcia. pp. 30–34.
    The purpose of the paper is twofold. I first outline a philosophical theory of concepts based on conceptual role semantics. This approach is explicitly intended as a framework for the study and explanation of conceptual change in science. Then I point to the close similarities between this philosophical framework and the theory theory of concepts, suggesting that a convergence between psychological and philosophical approaches to concepts is possible. An underlying theme is to stress that using a non-atomist account of concepts (...)
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  21. Holism, Concept Individuation, and Conceptual Change.Ingo Brigandt - 2004 - In M. Hernandez Iglesias (ed.), Proceedings of the 4th Congress of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy.
    The paper discusses concept individuation in the context of scientific concepts and conceptual change in science. It is argued that some concepts can be individuated in different ways. A particular term may be viewed as corresponding to a single concept. But at the same time, we can legitimately individuate in a more fine grained manner, i.e., this term can also be considered as corresponding to two or several concepts. The reason is that there are different philosophical and explanatory interests that (...)
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  22. Homology in Comparative, Molecular, and Evolutionary Developmental Biology: The Radiation of a Concept.Ingo Brigandt - 2003 - Journal of Experimental Zoology (Molecular and Developmental Evolution) 299:9-17.
    The present paper analyzes the use and understanding of the homology concept across different biological disciplines. It is argued that in its history, the homology concept underwent a sort of adaptive radiation. Once it migrated from comparative anatomy into new biological fields, the homology concept changed in accordance with the theoretical aims and interests of these disciplines. The paper gives a case study of the theoretical role that homology plays in comparative and evolutionary biology, in molecular biology, and in evolutionary (...)
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  23. Conceptual Comparison and Conceptual Innovation.Harold I. Brown - manuscript -
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  24. Sellars, Concepts, and Conceptual Change.Harold I. Brown - 1986 - Synthese 68 (August):275-307.
    A major theme of recent philosophy of science has been the rejection of the empiricist thesis that, with the exception of terms which play a purely formal role, the language of science derives its meaning from some, possibly quite indirect, correlation with experience. The alternative that has been proposed is that meaning is internal to each conceptual system, that terms derive their meaning from the role they play in a language, and that something akin to "meaning" flows from conceptual framework (...)
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  25. Learning, Concept Acquisition and Psychological Essentialism.M. J. Cain - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):577-598.
    In this article I will evaluate the popular view that we acquire most of our concepts by means of learning. I will do this through an examination of Jerry Fodor’s dissenting views and those of some of his most persistent and significant critics. Although I will be critical of Fodor’s central claim that it is impossible to learn a concept, I will ultimately conclude that we should be more sceptical than is normal about the power of learning when it comes (...)
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  26. The Origin of Concepts, Chapter.Susan Carey - manuscript -
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  27. On Learning New Primitives in the Language of Thought: Reply to Rey.Susan Carey - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):133-166.
    A theory of conceptual development must provide an account of the innate representational repertoire, must characterize how these initial representations differ from the adult state, and must provide an account of the processes that transform the initial into mature representations. In Carey, 2009 (The Origin of Concepts), I defend three theses: 1) the initial state includes rich conceptual representations, 2) nonetheless, there are radical discontinuities between early and later developing conceptual systems, 3) Quinean bootstrapping is one learning mechanism that underlies (...)
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  28. The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Only human beings have a rich conceptual repertoire with concepts like tort, entropy, Abelian group, mannerism, icon and deconstruction. How have humans constructed these concepts? And once they have been constructed by adults, how do children acquire them? While primarily focusing on the second question, in The Origin of Concepts , Susan Carey shows that the answers to both overlap substantially. Carey begins by characterizing the innate starting point for conceptual development, namely systems of core cognition. Representations of core cognition (...)
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  29. Where Our Number Concepts Come From.Susan Carey - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (4):220-254.
  30. Religious Concepts and Conceptual Change.Herbert William Cassel - 1973 - Dissertation, Temple University
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  31. Verbal Concept Learning as a Function of Instructions and Dominance Level.E. B. Coleman - 1964 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 68 (2):213.
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  32. Wandering Significance: An Essay on Conceptual Behaviour. – Mark Wilson.Chris Daly - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):498–501.
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  33. Analogical Insight: Toward Unifying Categorization and Analogy.Eric Dietrich - 2010 - Cognitive Processing 11 (4):331-.
    The purpose of this paper is to present two kinds of analogical representational change, both occurring early in the analogy-making process, and then, using these two kinds of change, to present a model unifying one sort of analogy-making and categorization. The proposed unification rests on three key claims: (1) a certain type of rapid representational abstraction is crucial to making the relevant analogies (this is the first kind of representational change; a computer model is presented that demonstrates this kind of (...)
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  34. The Prepared Mind: The Role of Representational Change in Chance Discovery.Eric Dietrich, Arthur B. Markman & Michael Winkley - 2003 - In Yukio Ohsawa Peter McBurney (ed.), Chance Discovery by Machines. Springer-Verlag, pp. 208-230..
    Analogical reminding in humans and machines is a great source for chance discoveries because analogical reminding can produce representational change and thereby produce insights. Here, we present a new kind of representational change associated with analogical reminding called packing. We derived the algorithm in part from human data we have on packing. Here, we explain packing and its role in analogy making, and then present a computer model of packing in a micro-domain. We conclude that packing is likely used in (...)
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  35. The Diviner and the Scientist: Revisiting the Question of Alternative Standards of Rationality.Brian Epstein - 2010 - Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78 (4):1048-1086.
    Are the standards of reasoning and rationality in divination, religious practice, and textual exegesis different from those in the sciences? Can there be different standards of reasoning and rationality at all? The intense “rationality debate” of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s focused on these questions and the related problems of relativism across cultures and systems of practice. Although philosophers were at the center of these debates at the time, they may appear to have abandoned the question in recent years. On (...)
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  36. Learning Matters: The Role of Learning in Concept Acquisition.Stephen Laurence Eric Margolis - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):507-539.
    In LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Jerry Fodor argues that concept learning of any kind—even for complex concepts—is simply impossible. In order to avoid the conclusion that all concepts, primitive and complex, are innate, he argues that concept acquisition depends on purely noncognitive biological processes. In this paper, we show that Fodor fails to establish that concept learning is impossible, that his own biological account of concept acquisition is unworkable, and that there are in fact many promising general (...)
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  37. Decision Making in the Practical Domain: A Model of Practical Conceptual Change.Allan Feldman - 2000 - Science Education 84 (5):606-623.
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  38. Fixation of Belief and Concept Acquisition.Jerry A. Fodor - 1980 - In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press. pp. 142--149.
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  39. 6 Skill Learning and Conceptual Thought.Ellen Fridland - 2013 - In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. pp. 13--77.
  40. Concept Learning: A Geometrical Model.Peter G.?Rdenfors - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (2):163 - 183.
    In contrast to symbolic or associationist representations, I advocate a third form of representing information that employs geometrical structures. I argue that this form is appropriate for modelling concept learning. By using the geometrical structures of what I call conceptual spaces, I define properties and concepts. A learning model that shows how properties and concepts can be learned in a simple but naturalistic way is then presented. I also discuss the advantages of the geometric approach over the symbolic and associationist (...)
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  41. Concept Learning: A Geometrical Model.Peter Gärdenfors - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (2):163–183.
    In contrast to symbolic or associationist representations, I advocate a third form of representing information that employs geometrical structures. I argue that this form is appropriate for modelling concept learning. By using the geometrical structures of what I call conceptual spaces, I define properties and concepts. A learning model that shows how properties and concepts can be learned in a simple but naturalistic way is then presented. I also discuss the advantages of the geometric approach over the symbolic and associationist (...)
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  42. Conceptual Equivocation and Epistemic Relevance.Mikkel Gerken - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):117-132.
    Much debate has surrounded "switching" scenarios in which a subject's reasoning is said to exhibit the fallacy of equivocation ( Burge 1988 ; Boghossian 1992, 1994 ). Peter Ludlow has argued that such scenarios are "epistemically prevalent" and, therefore, epistemically relevant alternatives ( Ludlow 1995a ). Since a distinctive feature of the cases in question is that the subject blamelessly engages in conceptual equivocation, we may label them 'equivocational switching cases'. Ludlow's influential argument occurs in a discussion about compatibilism with (...)
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  43. Transitions in Concept Acquisition: Using the Hand to Read the Mind.Susan Goldin-Meadow, Martha W. Alibali & R. Breckinridge Church - 1993 - Psychological Review 100 (2):279-297.
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  44. Experimental Philosophy of Science.Paul E. Griffiths & Karola Stotz - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):507–521.
    Experimental philosophy of science gathers empirical data on how key scientific concepts are understood by particular scientific communities. In this paper we briefly describe two recent studies in experimental philosophy of biology, one investigating the concept of the gene, the other the concept of innateness. The use of experimental methods reveals facts about these concepts that would not be accessible using the traditional method of intuitions about possible cases. It also contributes to the study of conceptual change in science, which (...)
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  45. Representation and Conceptual Change.Andrew Harrison - 1972 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 6:106-131.
    This paper suffers from a disconcerting generality. I need an excuse for wandering from Wittgenstein's Tractatus to Picasso's drawing of a Weeping Woman, via the philosophy of science and the theory of sense data. The thesis of the paper is that I have such an excuse. These are all areas where the concept of representation either exists in its own right, or has been found to be illuminating by philosophers. An important question is whether it could be the same concept (...)
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  46. Instance Contiguity in Disjunctive Concept Learning.Robert C. Haygood, Jean Sandlin, Delmar J. Yoder & David H. Dodd - 1969 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 81 (3):605.
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  47. Hypothesis Formation and Testing in the Acquisition of Representationally Simple Concepts.Allan Hazlett - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):227-247.
    Observations from philosophy and psychology heavily favor the Empiricist tenet that many lexical concepts are learned. However, many observations also heavily favor the Nativist tenet that such concepts are representationally atomic. Fodor Representations: Philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science, 1981, LOT2: The language of thought revisited, 2008) has famously argued that representationally atomic concepts cannot be learned, at least not learned by hypothesis formation and testing. Concept theorists who want to preserve observations about concept learning have developed acquisition (...)
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  48. The Logic of Enlightenment.Dave S. Henley - 2015 - Iff Books.
    This work proposes a logical analysis for the kind of knowledge or insight provided by Buddhist enlightenment, which is often presented only in the form of contradictions and riddles. The comprehension of contradictions is perplexing to most western logic, and yet developed here is a theory demonstrating how a non truth-functional interpretation can be attached to certain naturalistic contradictions. In this way, the logical and psychological status of Enlightenment can be analysed in a manner consistent with the claims of much (...)
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  49. The Content and Acquisition of Lexical Concepts.Richard Horsey - manuscript -
    This thesis aims to develop a psychologically plausible account of concepts by integrating key insights from philosophy (on the metaphysical basis for concept possession) and psychology (on the mechanisms underlying concept acquisition). I adopt an approach known as informational atomism, developed by Jerry Fodor. Informational atomism is the conjunction of two theses: (i) informational semantics, according to which conceptual content is constituted exhaustively by nomological mind–world relations; and (ii) conceptual atomism, according to which (lexical) concepts have no internal structure. I (...)
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  50. How (Not) to Give a Theory of Concepts.Steven Horst - manuscript -
    This paper presents the lineaments of a new account of concepts. The foundations of the account are four ideas taken from recent cognitive science, though most of them have important philosophical precursors. The first is the idea that human conceptuality shares important continuities with psychological faculties of other animals, and indeed that there is a well-distinguished hierarchy of such faculties that extend up and down the phylogenetic scale. While it would very likely be a mistake to look at some conglomeration (...)
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