This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

105 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 105
  1. added 2020-05-22
    Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  2. added 2020-05-05
    Improving Bayesian Statistics Understanding in the Age of Big Data with the Bayesvl R Package.Quan-Hoang Vuong, Viet-Phuong La, Minh-Hoang Nguyen, Manh-Toan Ho, Manh-Tung Ho & Peter Mantello - 2020 - Software Impacts 4 (1):100016.
    The exponential growth of social data both in volume and complexity has increasingly exposed many of the shortcomings of the conventional frequentist approach to statistics. The scientific community has called for careful usage of the approach and its inference. Meanwhile, the alternative method, Bayesian statistics, still faces considerable barriers toward a more widespread application. The bayesvl R package is an open program, designed for implementing Bayesian modeling and analysis using the Stan language’s no-U-turn (NUTS) sampler. The package combines the ability (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2020-02-28
    Tiến triển của bayesvl kể từ sau khi xuất bản trên CRAN.Vương Quân Hoàng & Lã Việt Phương - manuscript
  4. added 2020-02-01
    Papineau's Philosophical Devices [Review]. [REVIEW]Matheus Silva - 2012 - Fundamento 5:147-150.
  5. added 2020-01-30
    The Triviality Result is Not Counter-Intuitive.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The Equation (TE) states that the probability of A → B is the probability of B given A (Jeffrey, 1964: 702–703). Lewis has shown that the acceptance of TE implies that the probability of A → B is the probability of B, which is implausible: the probability of a conditional cannot plausibly be the same as the probability of its consequent, e.g., the probability that the match will light given that is struck is not intuitively the same as the probability (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2019-12-13
    The Structure of Epistemic Probabilities.Nevin Climenhaga - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-30.
    The epistemic probability of A given B is the degree to which B evidentially supports A, or makes A plausible. This paper is a first step in answering the question of what determines the values of epistemic probabilities. I break this question into two parts: the structural question and the substantive question. Just as an object’s weight is determined by its mass and gravitational acceleration, some probabilities are determined by other, more basic ones. The structural question asks what probabilities are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. added 2019-06-28
    Counterexamples to Some Characterizations of Dilation.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2019 - Erkenntnis:1-12.
    Pedersen and Wheeler (2014) and Pedersen and Wheeler (2015) offer a wide-ranging and in-depth exploration of the phenomenon of dilation. We find that these studies raise many interesting and important points. However, purportedly general characterizations of dilation are reported in them that, unfortunately, admit counterexamples. The purpose of this note is to show in some detail that these characterization results are false.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2019-06-06
    What is 'Conditional Probability'?E. J. Lowe - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):218-223.
    No categories
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. added 2018-10-21
    Review: Counterfactuals and Probability by Moritz Schulz. [REVIEW]Charles B. Cross - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
    This is a review of Moritz Schulz, COUNTERFACTUALS AND PROBABIITY (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2018-07-09
    Influence of Conditionals on Belief Updating.Borut Trpin - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Ljubljana
    This doctoral dissertation investigates what influence indicative conditionals have on belief updating and how learning from conditionals may be modelled in a probabilistic framework. Because the problem is related to the interpretation of conditionals, we first assess different semantics of indicative conditionals. We propose that conditionals should be taken as primary concepts. This allows us to defend a claim that learning a conditional is equivalent to learning that the relevant conditional probability is 1. This implies that learning a conditional can (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. added 2018-07-03
    Self-Locating Belief and Updating on Learning.Darren Bradley - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):579-584.
    Self-locating beliefs cause a problem for conditionalization. Miriam Schoenfield offers a solution: that on learning E, agents should update on the fact that they learned E. However, Schoenfield is not explicit about whether the fact that they learned E is self-locating. I will argue that if the fact that they learned E is self-locating then the original problem has not been addressed, and if the fact that they learned E is not self-locating then the theory generates implausible verdicts which Schoenfield (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2018-06-01
    Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2018 - Philosophy of Science (2):236-254.
    Merging of opinions results underwrite Bayesian rejoinders to complaints about the subjective nature of personal probability. Such results establish that sufficiently similar priors achieve consensus in the long run when fed the same increasing stream of evidence. Initial subjectivity, the line goes, is of mere transient significance, giving way to intersubjective agreement eventually. Here, we establish a merging result for sets of probability measures that are updated by Jeffrey conditioning. This generalizes a number of different merging results in the literature. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13. added 2017-06-28
    Towards a Probabilistic Analysis for Conditionals and Unconditionals.Stefan Kaufmann - 2017 - In Mihoko Otake, Setsuya Kurahashi, Yuiko OtaKen Satoh & Daisuke Bekki (eds.), New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 3-14.
    The thesis that the probability of a conditional`if A, C' is the corresponding conditional probability of C, given A, enjoys wide currency among philosophers and growing empirical support in psychology. In this paper I ask how a probabilisitic account of conditionals along these lines could be extended to unconditional sentences, i.e., conditionals with interrogative antecedents. Such sentences are typically interpreted as equivalent to conjunctions of conditionals. This raises a number of challenges for a probabilistic account, chief among them the question (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2017-03-06
    Reward Versus Risk in Uncertain Inference: Theorems and Simulations.Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):574-612.
    Systems of logico-probabilistic reasoning characterize inference from conditional assertions that express high conditional probabilities. In this paper we investigate four prominent LP systems, the systems _O, P_, _Z_, and _QC_. These systems differ in the number of inferences they licence _. LP systems that license more inferences enjoy the possible reward of deriving more true and informative conclusions, but with this possible reward comes the risk of drawing more false or uninformative conclusions. In the first part of the paper, we (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  15. added 2017-02-10
    Probability and Random Processes.Geoffrey Grimmett & David Stirzaker - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    A Markov chain is a random process with the property that, conditional on its present value, the future is independent of the past. The Chapman- Kolmogorov equations are derived, and used to explore the persistence and transience of states.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  16. added 2017-02-01
    Conditional Intention.J. P. W. Cartwright - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 60 (3):233 - 255.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17. added 2017-01-30
    Non-Conglomerability for Countably Additive Measures That Are Not Κ-Additive.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (2):284-300.
    Let κ be an uncountable cardinal. Using the theory of conditional probability associated with de Finetti and Dubins, subject to several structural assumptions for creating sufficiently many measurable sets, and assuming that κ is not a weakly inaccessible cardinal, we show that each probability that is not κ-­additive has conditional probabilities that fail to be conglomerable in a partition of cardinality no greater than κ. This generalizes our result, where we established that each finite but not countably additive probability has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  18. added 2017-01-30
    On Quantum Conditional Probability.Isabel Guerra Bobo - 2013 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (1):115-137.
    We argue that quantum theory does not allow for a generalization of the notion of classical conditional probability by showing that the probability defined by the Lüders rule, standardly interpreted in the literature as the quantum-mechanical conditionalization rule, cannot be interpreted as such.Argumentamos que la teoría cuántica no admite una generalización de la noción clásica de probabilidad condicionada. Mostramos que la probabilidad definida por la regla de Lüders, interpretada generalmente como la regla de condicionalización mecánico-cuántica, no puede ser interpretada como (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2017-01-28
    A First-Order Conditional Probability Logic.Miloš Milošević & Zoran Ognjanović - 2012 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 20 (1):235-253.
    In this article, we present the probability logic LFOCP which is suitable to formalize statements about conditional probabilities of first order formulas. The logical language contains formulas such as CP≥s and CP≤s with the intended meaning ‘the conditional probability of ϕ given θ is at least s’ and ‘at most s’, respectively, where ϕ and θ are first-order formulas. We introduce a class of first order Kripke-like models that combine properties of the usual Kripke models and finitely additive probabilities. We (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. added 2017-01-28
    The Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability.Alan Roy Hajek - 1993 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    Very roughly, the conditional construal of conditional probability is the hypothesis that the conditional probability P equals the probability of the conditional 'if A, then B'. My main purposes are to hone this rough statement down to various precise versions of the Hypothesis, as I call it, and to argue that virtually none of them is tenable. ;In S 1, I distinguish four versions of the Hypothesis. The subsequent four sections are largely an opinionated historical survey, tracing the motivations for (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. added 2017-01-27
    You Can’T Always Get What You Want: Some Considerations Regarding Conditional Probabilities.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):573-603.
    The standard treatment of conditional probability leaves conditional probability undefined when the conditioning proposition has zero probability. Nonetheless, some find the option of extending the scope of conditional probability to include zero-probability conditions attractive or even compelling. This article reviews some of the pitfalls associated with this move, and concludes that, for the most part, probabilities conditional on zero-probability propositions are more trouble than they are worth.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  22. added 2017-01-27
    The Conditional in Mental Probability Logic.Niki Pfeifer & Kleiter & Gernot - 2010 - In Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thinking. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2017-01-27
    Conditional Fallacies in Probability Judgment.J. M. Miyamoto, J. W. Lundell & Sf Tu - 1988 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 26 (6):516-516.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2017-01-26
    The Hypothesis of the Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability.Alan Hájek & N. Hall - 1994 - In Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.), Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press. pp. 75.
  25. added 2017-01-26
    Choice and the Conditional Probability of Alternation: Some New Data.J. Gregor Fetterman & Stanley S. Pliskoff - 1981 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 18 (2):95-98.
  26. added 2017-01-24
    Dynamic Inference and Everyday Conditional Reasoning in the New Paradigm.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):346-379.
  27. added 2017-01-24
    NP-Containment for the Coherence Test of Assessments of Conditional Probability: A Fuzzy Logical Approach. [REVIEW]Tommaso Flaminio - 2007 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 46 (3-4):301-319.
    In this paper we investigate the problem of testing the coherence of an assessment of conditional probability following a purely logical setting. In particular we will prove that the coherence of an assessment of conditional probability χ can be characterized by means of the logical consistency of a suitable theory T χ defined on the modal-fuzzy logic FP k (RŁΔ) built up over the many-valued logic RŁΔ. Such modal-fuzzy logic was previously introduced in Flaminio (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. added 2017-01-24
    A Logical and Algebraic Treatment of Conditional Probability.Tommaso Flaminio & Franco Montagna - 2004 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 44 (2):245-262.
    .This paper is devoted to a logical and algebraic treatment of conditional probability. The main ideas are the use of non-standard probabilities and of some kind of standard part function in order to deal with the case where the conditioning event has probability zero, and the use of a many-valued modal logic in order to deal probability of an event φ as the truth value of the sentence φ is probable, along the lines of Hájek’s book [H98] and of [EGH96]. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29. added 2017-01-24
    Probability Logic with Conditional Expectation.Sergio Fajardo - 1983 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 28 (2):137-161.
  30. added 2017-01-24
    Conditional Response Distributions in a Multiple-Choice Probability-Learning Situtation.James R. Erickson & Karen K. Block - 1970 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 86 (2):328.
  31. added 2017-01-24
    Run Structure and Probability Learning: Disproof of Restle's Model.Frank Restle - 1966 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 72 (3):382.
  32. added 2017-01-24
    The Spacing of Sequentially Dependent Trials in Probability Learning.Jean P. Chapman - 1961 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (6):545.
  33. added 2017-01-24
    Conditional Response Probability in a T Maze.Robert S. Witte - 1961 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (5):439.
  34. added 2017-01-23
    Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals.Richard Bradley - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):539-571.
    Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  35. added 2017-01-23
    Comparative Probability for Conditional Events: A New Look Through Coherence.Giulianella Coletti, Angelo Gilio & Romano Scozzafava - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (3):237-258.
  36. added 2017-01-23
    Coherence, Regularity and Conditional Probability.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Theory and Decision 9 (1):1-15.
  37. added 2017-01-21
    And.T. Seidenfeld - unknown
    SUMMARY. We consider how an unconditional, finite-valued, finitely additive probability P on a countable set may localize its non-conglomerability (non-disintegrability). Nonconglomerability, a characteristic of merely finitely additive probability, occurs when the unconditional probability of an event P(E) lies outside the closed interval of conditional probability..
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2017-01-21
    Betting on Conditionals.Jean Baratgin, David E. Over & Guy Politzer - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (3):172-197.
    A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B , and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B . The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional— true , false , or void for indicative conditionals and win , lose (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  39. added 2017-01-21
    Conditional Epistemic Probability.Robert Pargetter - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):555-571.
  40. added 2017-01-20
    Rationality and the Wason Selection Task: A Logical Account.Simone Duca - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1):109-131.
    The main goal of the paper is to investigate the relation between indicative conditionals and rationality. We wil l do this by consider- ing several interpretations of a very wel l-known example of reasoning involving conditionals, that is the Wason selection task, and showing how those interpretations have different bearings on the notion of ra- tionality. In particular, in the first part of the paper, after having briefly presented the selection task, we wil l take a look at two prag- (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. added 2017-01-16
    Conditional Probability and Defeat.Trenton Merricks - 2002 - In James Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Cornell University Press. pp. 165-175.
    No categories
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. added 2017-01-15
    Weak Conditional Comparative Probability as a Formal Semantic Theory.Charles G. Morgan - 1984 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 30 (13-16):199-212.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. added 2016-12-12
    Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision.Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms (eds.) - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays is on the relation between probabilities, especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results which will open up areas of research. The collection is intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and applying Adams's work the contributions extend his ideas in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  44. added 2016-12-08
    The Quantitative/Qualitative Watershed for Rules of Uncertain Inference.James Hawthorne & David Makinson - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):247-297.
    We chart the ways in which closure properties of consequence relations for uncertain inference take on different forms according to whether the relations are generated in a quantitative or a qualitative manner. Among the main themes are: the identification of watershed conditions between probabilistically and qualitatively sound rules; failsafe and classicality transforms of qualitatively sound rules; non-Horn conditions satisfied by probabilistic consequence; representation and completeness problems; and threshold-sensitive conditions such as `preface' and `lottery' rules.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  45. added 2016-12-08
    Probabilistic Logic Under Coherence, Conditional Interpretations, and Default Reasoning.Angelo Gilio - 2005 - Synthese 146 (1-2):139-152.
    We study a probabilistic logic based on the coherence principle of de Finetti and a related notion of generalized coherence (g-coherence). We examine probabilistic conditional knowledge bases associated with imprecise probability assessments defined on arbitrary families of conditional events. We introduce a notion of conditional interpretation defined directly in terms of precise probability assessments. We also examine a property of strong satisfiability which is related to the notion of toleration well known in default reasoning. In our framework we give more (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. added 2016-12-01
    A Theory of Bayesian Groups.Franz Dietrich - 2019 - Noûs 3 (53):708-736.
    A group is often construed as a single agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (credences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated contribution “Groupthink”, Russell et al. (2015) apply the Bayesian paradigm to groups by requiring group credences to undergo a Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever the individual credences undergo a Bayesian revision based on this information. Bayesians should often strengthen this requirement by extending it to non-public (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. added 2016-05-17
    Qualitative Probabilistic Inference Under Varied Entropy Levels.Paul D. Thorn & Gerhard Schurz - 2016 - Journal of Applied Logic 19 (2):87-101.
    In previous work, we studied four well known systems of qualitative probabilistic inference, and presented data from computer simulations in an attempt to illustrate the performance of the systems. These simulations evaluated the four systems in terms of their tendency to license inference to accurate and informative conclusions, given incomplete information about a randomly selected probability distribution. In our earlier work, the procedure used in generating the unknown probability distribution (representing the true stochastic state of the world) tended to yield (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  48. added 2016-02-17
    The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.James M. Joyce - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   225 citations  
  49. added 2015-10-13
    Transitivity in Coherence-Based Probability Logic.Angelo Gilio, Niki Pfeifer & Giuseppe Sanfilippo - 2016 - Journal of Applied Logic 14:46-64.
    We study probabilistically informative (weak) versions of transitivity by using suitable definitions of defaults and negated defaults in the setting of coherence and imprecise probabilities. We represent p-consistent sequences of defaults and/or negated defaults by g-coherent imprecise probability assessments on the respective sequences of conditional events. Moreover, we prove the coherent probability propagation rules for Weak Transitivity and the validity of selected inference patterns by proving p-entailment of the associated knowledge bases. Finally, we apply our results to study selected probabilistic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50. added 2015-10-13
    Transitive Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities.Angelo Gilio, Niki Pfeifer & Giuseppe Sanfilippo - 2015 - In S. Destercke & T. Denoeux (eds.), Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty (ECSQARU 2015). Springer LNAI 9161. pp. 95-105.
    We study probabilistically informative (weak) versions of transitivity by using suitable definitions of defaults and negated defaults in the setting of coherence and imprecise probabilities. We represent p-consistent sequences of defaults and/or negated defaults by g-coherent imprecise probability assessments on the respective sequences of conditional events. Finally, we present the coherent probability propagation rules for Weak Transitivity and the validity of selected inference patterns by proving p-entailment of the associated knowledge bases.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 105