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  1. Condorcet's Jury Theorem and the Optimum Number of Voters.Jason Brennan - forthcoming - POLITICS.
    Many political theorists and philosophers use Condorcet's Jury Theorem to defend democracy. This paper illustrates an uncomfortable implication of Condorcet's Jury Theorem. Realistically, when the conditions of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem hold, even in very high stakes elections, having more than 100,000 citizens vote does no significant good in securing good political outcomes. On the Condorcet model, unless voters enjoy voting, or unless they produce some other value by voting, then the cost to most voters of voting exceeds the expected epistemic (...)
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  2. One Standard to Rule Them All?Marc‐Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Ratio 32 (1):12-21.
    It has been argued that an epistemically rational agent’s evidence is subjectively mediated through some rational epistemic standards, and that there are incompatible but equally rational epistemic standards available to agents. This supports Permissiveness, the view according to which one or multiple fully rational agents are permitted to take distinct incompatible doxastic attitudes towards P (relative to a body of evidence). In this paper, I argue that the above claims entail the existence of a unique and more reliable epistemic standard. (...)
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  3. A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Couples.Ingo Althöfer & Raphael Thiele - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (1):1-15.
    The agents of a jury have to decide between a good and a bad option through simple majority voting. In this paper the jury consists of N independent couples. Each couple consists of two correlated agents of the same competence level. Different couples may have different competence levels. In addition, each agent is assumed to be better than completely random guessing. We prove tight lower and upper bounds for the quality of the majority decision. The lower bound is the same (...)
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  4. Is the Equal-Weight View Really Supported by Positive Crowd Effects?Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2015 - In Uskali Mäki, Ioannis Votsis, Stephanie Ruphy & Gerhard Schurz (eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 87-98.
    In the debate of epistemic peer disagreement the equal-weight view suggests to split the difference between one's own and one's peer's opinions. An argument in favour of this view---which is prominently held by Adam Elga---is that by such a difference-splitting one may make some use of a so-called wise-crowd effect. In this paper it is argued that such a view faces two main problems: First, the problem that the standards for making use of a wise-crowd effect are quite low. And (...)
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  5. Condorcet and Progress.Ira O. Wade - 2015 - In The Structure and Form of the French Enlightenment, Volume 2: Esprit Revolutionnaire. Princeton University Press. pp. 363-387.
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  6. On Bernard Bosanquet’s “The Reality of the General Will”.Robert Stern - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):192-195,.
    This article is a discussion of Bernard Bosanquet's paper 'The Reality of the General Will', in which its main arguments and motivations are explained. His position is compared to Rousseau's on the general will.
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  7. Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises.Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (1):87--120.
    The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the ‘wisdom of crowds’. But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises – voter independence – is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility for the theorem's misleading conclusion that ‘large crowds are infallible’. We prove a more useful jury theorem: under defensible premises, ‘large crowds are fallible but better than small groups’. This theorem rehabilitates the importance of deliberation (...)
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  8. Condorcet: Political Writings.Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet (ed.) - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Editors' introduction; Published works by Condorcet; Suggestions for further reading; Principal events in Condorcet's life; Notes on the texts; 1. The Sketch; 2. On slavery; 3. On the emancipation of women; 4. On despotism; 5. On freedom; 6. On revolution; 7. Advice to his daughter and testament; Index.
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  9. A Statistical Approach to Epistemic Democracy.Marcus Pivato - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):115-137.
    We briefly review Condorcet's and Young's epistemic interpretations of preference aggregation rules as maximum likelihood estimators. We then develop a general framework for interpreting epistemic social choice rules as maximum likelihood estimators, maximum a posteriori estimators, or expected utility maximizers. We illustrate this framework with several examples. Finally, we critique this program.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage (...)
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  10. Condorcet Vs. Borda in Light of a Dual Majoritarian Approach.Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (2):151-162.
    Many voting rules and, in particular, the plurality rule and Condorcet-consistent voting rules satisfy the simple-majority decisiveness property. The problem implied by such decisiveness, namely, the universal disregard of the preferences of the minority, can be ameliorated by applying unbiased scoring rules such as the classical Borda rule, but such amelioration has a price; it implies erosion in the implementation of the widely accepted majority principle . Furthermore, the problems of majority decisiveness and of the erosion in the majority principle (...)
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  11. Enfranchising Incompetents: Suretyship and the Joint Authorship of Laws.Robert E. Goodin & Joanne C. Lau - 2011 - Ratio 24 (2):154-166.
    Proposals to lower the age of voting, to 15 for example, are regularly met with worries that people that age are not sufficiently ‘competent’. Notice however that we allow people that age to sign binding legal contracts, provided that those contracts are co-signed by their parents. Notice, further, that in a democracy voters are collectively ‘joint authors’ of the laws that they enact. Enfranchising some less competent voters is no worry, the Condorcet Jury Theorem assures us, so long as the (...)
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  12. The Logical Space of Democracy.Christian List - 2011 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (3):262-297.
    Can we design a perfect democratic decision procedure? Condorcet famously observed that majority rule, our paradigmatic democratic procedure, has some desirable properties, but sometimes produces inconsistent outcomes. Revisiting Condorcet’s insights in light of recent work on the aggregation of judgments, I show that there is a conflict between three initially plausible requirements of democracy: “robustness to pluralism”, “basic majoritarianism”, and “collective rationality”. For all but the simplest collective decision problems, no decision procedure meets these three requirements at once; at most (...)
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  13. Learning Juror Competence: A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem.Jan-Willem Romeijn & David Atkinson - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (3):237-262.
    This article presents a generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. All results to date assume a fixed value for the competence of jurors, or alternatively, a fixed probability distribution over the possible competences of jurors. In this article, we develop the idea that we can learn the competence of the jurors by the jury vote. We assume a uniform prior probability assignment over the competence parameter, and we adapt this assignment in the light of the jury vote. We then compute (...)
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  14. Meta-Analysis as Judgment Aggregation.Berna Kilinc - 2010 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 123--135.
    My goal in this paper is to see the extent to which judgment aggregation methods subsume meta-analytic ones. To this end, I derive a generalized version of the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem, the aggregative implications of which have been widely exploited in the area of rational choice theory, but not yet in philosophy of science. I contend that the generalized CJT that I prove below is useful for modelling at least some meta-analytic procedures.
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  15. The History of Feminism: Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet.Joan Landes - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  16. The Silence of Progress: The Historie Triple-Space Reduction of Condorcet.Hernan Neira - 2010 - Pensamiento 66 (249):771-790.
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  17. Independence and Interdependence in Collective Decision Making: An Agent-Based Model of Nest-Site Choice by Honey Bee Swarms.Christian List, Christian Elsholtz & Thomas Seeley - 2009 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364:755-762.
    Condorcet's classic jury theorem shows that when the members of a group have noisy but independent information about what is best for the group as a whole, majority decisions tend to outperform dictatorial ones. When voting is supplemented by communication, however, the resulting interdependencies between decision-makers can strengthen or undermine this effect: they can facilitate information pooling, but also amplify errors. We consider an intriguing non-human case of independent information pooling combined with communication: the case of nest-site choice by honey (...)
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  18. Condorcet and Communitarianism: Boghossian’s Fallacious Inference.Armin Schulz - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):55 - 68.
    This paper defends the communitarian account of meaning against Boghossian’s (Wittgensteinian) arguments. Boghossian argues that whilst such an account might be able to accommodate the infinitary characteristic of meaning, it cannot account for its normativity: he claims that, since the dispositions of a group must mirror those of its members, the former cannot be used to evaluate the latter. However, as this paper aims to make clear, this reasoning is fallacious. Modelling the issue with four (justifiable) assumptions, it shows that (...)
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  19. The Premises of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justified.Franz Dietrich - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):56-73.
    Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they are competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: whether a premise is justi…ed depends on the notion of probability considered; none of the notions renders both premises simultaneously justi…ed. Under the perhaps most interesting notions, the independence assumption should be weakened.
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  20. Condorcet: Communication/Science/Democracy.György Márkus - 2007 - Critical Horizons 8 (1):18-32.
    Condorcet's arguments concerning the dependence of unhindered scientific development on the presence of democratic conditions still sounds relevant today, because they are based on specific and complex considerations concerning the character of the social enterprise of science that articulates problems that still continue. The implicit dispute between Condorcet and Rousseau is also the first great historical example of the conflict between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, which accompanies the history of modernity, as an unresolved and indeed irresolvable opposition that belongs to (...)
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  21. The Epistemology of Democracy.Elizabeth Anderson - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):8-22.
    Th is paper investigates the epistemic powers of democratic institutions through an assessment of three epistemic models of democracy : the Condorcet Jury Th eorem, the Diversity Trumps Ability Th eorem, and Dewey's experimentalist model. Dewey's model is superior to the others in its ability to model the epistemic functions of three constitutive features of democracy : the epistemic diversity of participants, the interaction of voting with discussion, and feedback mechanisms such as periodic elections and protests. It views democracy as (...)
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  22. Democratic Answers to Complex Questions – An Epistemic Perspective.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2006 - Synthese 150 (1):131-153.
    This paper addresses a problem for theories of epistemic democracy. In a decision on a complex issue which can be decomposed into several parts, a collective can use different voting procedures: Either its members vote on each sub-question and the answers that gain majority support are used as premises for the conclusion on the main issue, or the vote is conducted on the main issue itself. The two procedures can lead to different results. We investigate which of these procedures is (...)
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  23. No Testimonial Route to Consensus.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Episteme 3 (3):156-165.
    The standard image of how consensus can be achieved is by pooling evidence and reducing if not eliminating disagreements. But rather than just pooling substantive evidence on a certain question, why not also take into account the formal, testimonial evidence provided by the fact that a majority of the group adopt a particular answer? Shouldn't we be reinforced by the discovery that we are on that majority side, and undermined by the discovery that we are not? Shouldn't this be so, (...)
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  24. Death in Condorcet's Eloges des Académiciens de l'Académie Royale des Sciences.Timothy Reeve - 2006 - In G. J. Mallinson (ed.), Interdisciplinarity: Qu'est-Ce Que les Lumières: La Reconnaissance au Dix-Huitième Siècle. Voltaire Foundation.
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  25. De doctrinale paradox.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2005 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 97 (1):XX.
    Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her (...)
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  26. Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency Under Iac?Davide P. Cervone, William V. Gehrlein & William S. Zwicker - 2005 - Theory and Decision 58 (2):145-185.
    Consider an election in which each of the n voters casts a vote consisting of a strict preference ranking of the three candidates A, B, and C. In the limit as n→∞, which scoring rule maximizes, under the assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (uniform probability distribution over profiles), the probability that the Condorcet candidate wins the election, given that a Condorcet candidate exists? We produce an analytic solution, which is not the Borda Count. Our result agrees with recent numerical results (...)
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  27. A Simple Proof of Sen's Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions.Christian Elsholtz & Christian List - 2005 - Elemente der Mathematik 60:45-56.
    Condorcet’s voting paradox shows that pairwise majority voting may lead to cyclical majority preferences. In a famous paper, Sen identified a general condition on a profile of individual preference orderings, called triplewise value-restriction, which is sufficient for the avoidance of such cycles. This note aims to make Sen’s result easily accessible. We provide an elementary proof of Sen's possibility theorem and a simple reformulation of Sen’s condition. We discuss how Sen’s condition is logically related to a number of precursors. Finally, (...)
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  28. The Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex Collective Decisions.Christian List - 2005 - Social Choice and Welfare 24 (1):3-32.
    Many groups make decisions over multiple interconnected propositions. The “doctrinal paradox” or “discursive dilemma” shows that propositionwise majority voting can generate inconsistent collective sets of judgments, even when individual sets of judgments are all consistent. I develop a simple model for determining the probability of the paradox, given various assumptions about the probability distribution of individual sets of judgments, including impartial culture and impartial anonymous culture assumptions. I prove several convergence results, identifying when the probability of the paradox converges to (...)
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  29. Complex Collective Decisions: An Epistemic Perspective.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2004 - Associations: Journal for Social and Legal Theory 7 (X).
    Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her (...)
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  30. Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decisions. An Epistemic Perspective.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2004 - Ratio Juris 17 (2):241-258.
    Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her (...)
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  31. A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2004 - Synthese 142 (2):175 - 202.
    Under the independence and competence assumptions of Condorcet’s classical jury model, the probability of a correct majority decision converges to certainty as the jury size increases, a seemingly unrealistic result. Using Bayesian networks, we argue that the model’s independence assumption requires that the state of the world (guilty or not guilty) is the latest common cause of all jurors’ votes. But often – arguably in all courtroom cases and in many expert panels – the latest such common cause is a (...)
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  32. The Persuasiveness of Democratic Majorities.Robert E. Goodin & David Estlund - 2004 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (2):131-142.
    Under the assumptions of the standard Condorcet Jury Theorem, majority verdicts are virtually certain to be correct if the competence of voters is greater than one-half, and virtually certain to be incorrect if voter competence is less than one-half. But which is the case? Here we turn the Jury Theorem on its head, to provide one way of addressing that question. The same logic implies that, if the outcome saw 60 percent of voters supporting one proposition and 40 percent the (...)
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  33. On the Significance of the Absolute Margin.Christian List - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):521-544.
    Consider the hypothesis H that a defendant is guilty, and the evidence E that a majority of h out of n independent jurors have voted for H and a minority of k:=n-h against H. How likely is the majority verdict to be correct? By a formula of Condorcet, the probability that H is true given E depends only on each juror's competence and on the absolute margin between the majority and the minority h-k, but neither on the number n, nor (...)
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  34. Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):207 - 235.
    The ``doctrinal paradox'' or ``discursive dilemma'' shows that propositionwise majority voting over the judgments held by multiple individuals on some interconnected propositions can lead to inconsistent collective judgments on these propositions. List and Pettit (2002) have proved that this paradox illustrates a more general impossibility theorem showing that there exists no aggregation procedure that generally produces consistent collective judgments and satisfies certain minimal conditions. Although the paradox and the theorem concern the aggregation of judgments rather than preferences, they invite comparison (...)
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  35. An Epistemic Free-Riding Problem?Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2004 - In Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals. Routledge. pp. 128-158.
    One of the hallmark themes of Karl Popper’s approach to the social sciences was the insistence that when social scientists are members of the society they study, then they are liable to affect that society. In particular, they are liable to affect it in such a way that the claims they make lose their validity. “The interaction between the scientist’s pronouncements and social life almost invariably creates situations in which we have not only to consider the truth of such pronouncements, (...)
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  36. Condorcet and Modernity.David Williams - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
    David Williams explores the complex links between Condorcet as visionary ideologist and pragmatic legislator, and between his concept of modernity and the management of change. The Marquis de Condorcet was one of the few Enlightenment thinkers to witness and participate in the French Revolution. Based on an extensive array of printed and original manuscript sources, Williams' analysis of Condorcet's politics will be a major contribution to Enlightenment studies.
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  37. Democracy and Argument: Tracking Truth in Complex Social Decisions.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2003 - In Anne van Aaken, Christian List & Christoph Luetge (eds.), Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory, and Deliberative Democracy. Law, ethics and economics. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. pp. 143-157.
    Suppose a committee has to take a stand on a complex issue, where the decision presupposes answering a number of sub-questions. There is an agreement within the committee which sub-questions should be posed. All questions are of the ”yes or no?”-type and the main question is to be given the yes-answer if and only if each sub-question is answered with “yes”. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one procedure, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting (...)
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  38. Rational Aggregation.Bruce Chapman - 2002 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 1 (3):337-354.
    In two recent papers, Christian List and Philip Pettit have argued that there is a problem in the aggregation of reasoned judgements that is akin to the aggregation of the preference problem in social choice theory. 1 Indeed, List and Pettit prove a new general impossibility theorem for the aggregation of judgements, and provide a propositional interpretation of the social choice problem that suggests it is a special case of their impossibility result. 2 Specifically, they show that no judgement aggregation (...)
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  39. Condorcet's Paradox and the Likelihood of its Occurrence: Different Perspectives on Balanced Preferences.William V. Gehrlein - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (2):171-199.
    Many studies have considered the probability that a pairwise majority rule (PMR) winner exists for three candidate elections. The absence of a PMR winner indicates an occurrence of Condorcet's Paradox for three candidate elections. This paper summarizes work that has been done in this area with the assumptions of: Impartial Culture, Impartial Anonymous Culture, Maximal Culture, Dual Culture and Uniform Culture. Results are included for the likelihood that there is a strong winner by PMR, a weak winner by PMR, and (...)
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  40. On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An Alternative View of Majority Cycles and Social Homogeneity.Michel Regenwetter, James Adams & Bernard Grofman - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (2):153-186.
    The Condorcet efficiency of a social choice procedure is usually defined as the probability that this procedure coincides with the majority winner (or majority ordering) in random samples, given a majority winner exists (or given the majority ordering is transitive). Consequently, it is in effect a conditional probability that two sample statistics coincide, given certain side conditions. We raise a different issue of Condorcet efficiencies: What is the probability that a social choice procedure applied to a sample matches with the (...)
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  41. Public Discourse: Creating the Conditions for Dialogue Concerning the Common Good in a Postmodern Heterogeneous Democracy.Peggy Ruth Geren - 2001 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 20 (3):191-199.
    This paper offers a philosophical `history' of the nature of`public discourse' – a basic element of human rights. It beginswith Enlightenment views from Condorcet and Jefferson, turns to Dewey,and then to Habermas. Over a couple of centuries not only does thecentral character of discourse change but so too does the definition ofa public person.
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  42. The Set Theoretic Ambit Of Arrow's Theorem.Louis M. Guenin - 2001 - Synthese 126 (3):443-472.
    Set theoretic formulation of Arrow's theorem, viewed in light of a taxonomy of transitive relations, serves to unmask the theorem's understated generality. Under the impress of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, the antipode of ceteris paribus reasoning, a purported compiler function either breaches some other rationality premise or produces the "effet Condorcet". Types of cycles, each the seeming handiwork of a virtual voter disdaining transitivity, are rigorously defined. Arrow's theorem erects a dilemma between cyclic indecision and dictatorship. Maneuvers responsive thereto (...)
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  43. Some Remarks on the Probability of Cycles - Appendix 3 to 'Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem'.Christian List - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277-306.
    This item was published as 'Appendix 3: An Implication of the k-option Condorcet jury mechanism for the probability of cycles' in List and Goodin (2001) http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/705/. Standard results suggest that the probability of cycles should increase as the number of options increases and also as the number of individuals increases. These results are, however, premised on a so-called "impartial culture" assumption: any logically possible preference ordering is assumed to be as likely to be held by an individual as any other. (...)
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  44. Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem.Christian List & Robert E. Goodin - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.
    This paper generalises the classical Condorcet jury theorem from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over multiple options. The paper further discusses the debate between epistemic and procedural democracy and situates its formal results in that debate. The paper finally compares a number of different social choice procedures for many-option choices in terms of their epistemic merits. An appendix explores the implications of some of the present mathematical results for the question of how probable majority cycles (as in (...)
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  45. Scoring Rules, Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity.Dominique Lepelley, Patrick Pierron & Fabrice Valognes - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (2):175-196.
    In a three-candidate election, a scoring rule s (s in [0,1]) assigns 1, s, and 0 points (respectively) to each first, second and third place in the individual preference rankings. The Condorcet efficiency of a scoring rule is defined as the conditional probability that this rule selects the winner in accordance with Condorcet criteria (three Condorcet criteria are considered in the paper). We are interested in the following question: What rule s has the greatest Condorcet efficiency? After recalling the known (...)
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  46. “Instruction Publique” in the French Eighteenth-Century Discourse of Modernisation.Ursula Hofer - 1999 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 18 (1):15-24.
    Towards the end of eighteenth century in France, the newly acquired rights of people as citizens needed assuring. This article traces the principles through which Condorcet tried to realise this on an institutional level. Condorcet did not view the Enlightenment ideas of progress as primarily referring to the state. Rather, he focused on the rights of individuals, particularly on their right to develop their own potential. He bound this perception with the unconditional demand for recognition of the rights of all (...)
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  47. Condorcet Et la Question de L’Égalité.Charles Coutel - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (4):681-.
    This paper intends to focus on Condorcet's approach to the Principle of Equality. Condorcet, in effect, strenuously strives to counter the risks of equalitarianism, such as élitism. According to him, it is in the interest of the Republic and of public instruction to favour the diversity of talents and the spreading of enlightenment, since, in the end, it will benefit all citizens.
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  48. Opinion Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet's Jury Theorem.David M. Estlund - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (2):131-162.
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  49. Intellectual Subversion in Eighteenth Century Political Thought: Condorcet's Philosophy of History.Jennifer Paige Montana - 1994 - Dissertation, Harvard University
    Through a careful reconstruction of Condorcet's highly fragmented historical thought I analyze the political implications of his philosophy of history. I argue that the specific historical tendency developed in Condorcet's philosophy of history links progress with collective self-interpretation rather than material productivity. I contend that Condorcet's philosophy of history does not represent a symbolic glorification of the domination of nature by reason. His philosophy of history does not purport to offer a science of futurology that can quantify the conquest of (...)
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  50. Progress and the Empirical Tradition in Condorcet.David Williams - 1992 - Bulletin de la Société Américaine de Philosophie de Langue Française 4 (1):67-77.
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