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  1. Prediction Versus Accommodation in Economics.Robert Northcott - unknown - Journal of Economic Methodology 26 (1):59-69.
    Should we insist on prediction, i.e. on correctly forecasting the future? Or can we rest content with accommodation, i.e. empirical success only with respect to the past? I apply general considerations about this issue to the case of economics. In particular, I examine various ways in which mere accommodation can be sufficient, in order to see whether those ways apply to economics. Two conclusions result. First, an entanglement thesis: the need for prediction is entangled with the methodological role of orthodox (...)
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  2. Historical Inductions Meet the Material Theory.Elay Shech - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Historical inductions, viz., the pessimistic meta-induction and the problem of unconceived alternatives, are critically analyzed via John D. Norton’s material theory of induction and subsequently rejected as non-cogent arguments. It is suggested that the material theory is amenable to a local version of the pessimistic meta-induction, e.g., in the context of some medical studies.
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  3. Delimiting the Unconceived.Richard Dawid - 2018 - Foundations of Physics 48 (5):492-506.
    It has been argued in Dawid that physicists at times generate substantial trust in an empirically unconfirmed theory based on observations that lie beyond the theory’s intended domain. A crucial role in the reconstruction of this argument of “non-empirical confirmation” is played by limitations to scientific underdetermination. The present paper discusses the question as to how generic the role of limitations to scientific underdetermination really is. It is argued that assessing such limitations is essential for generating trust in any theory’s (...)
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  4. The Qualitative Paradox of Non-Conglomerability.Nicholas DiBella - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1181-1210.
    A probability function is non-conglomerable just in case there is some proposition E and partition \ of the space of possible outcomes such that the probability of E conditional on any member of \ is bounded by two values yet the unconditional probability of E is not bounded by those values. The paradox of non-conglomerability is the counterintuitive—and controversial—claim that a rational agent’s subjective probability function can be non-conglomerable. In this paper, I present a qualitative analogue of the paradox. I (...)
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  5. Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration.Jan Sprenger - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw016.
    According to influential accounts of scientific method, such as critical rationalism, scientific knowledge grows by repeatedly testing our best hypotheses. But despite the popularity of hypothesis tests in statistical inference and science in general, their philosophical foundations remain shaky. In particular, the interpretation of non-significant results—those that do not reject the tested hypothesis—poses a major philosophical challenge. To what extent do they corroborate the tested hypothesis, or provide a reason to accept it? Popper sought for measures of corroboration that could (...)
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  6. The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Requirement of Total Evidence.Peter Fisher Epstein - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):639-658.
    According to the Fine-Tuning Argument, the existence of life in our universe confirms the Multiverse Hypothesis. A standard objection to FTA is that it violates the Requirement of Total Evidence. I argue that RTE should be rejected in favor of the Predesignation Requirement, according to which, in assessing the outcome of a probabilistic process, we should only use evidence characterizable in a manner available before observing the outcome. This produces the right verdicts in some simple cases in which RTE leads (...)
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  7. Regularity and Infinitely Tossed Coins.Colin Howson - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):97-102.
    Timothy Williamson has claimed to prove that regularity must fail even in a nonstandard setting, with a counterexample based on tossing a fair coin infinitely many times. I argue that Williamson’s argument is mistaken, and that a corrected version shows that it is not regularity which fails in the non-standard setting but a fundamental property of shifts in Bernoulli processes.
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  8. Confirmation Via Analogue Simulation: What Dumb Holes Could Tell Us About Gravity.Radin Dardashti, Karim P. Y. Thébault & Eric Winsberg - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1).
    In this article we argue for the existence of ‘analogue simulation’ as a novel form of scientific inference with the potential to be confirmatory. This notion is distinct from the modes of analogical reasoning detailed in the literature, and draws inspiration from fluid dynamical ‘dumb hole’ analogues to gravitational black holes. For that case, which is considered in detail, we defend the claim that the phenomena of gravitational Hawking radiation could be confirmed in the case that its counterpart is detected (...)
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  9. The ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis.’ A Reappraisal of Duhem’s Discovery of the Physics of the Middle Ages.Horia-Roman Patapievici - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):201–218.
    Pierre Duhem is the discoverer of the physics of the Middle Ages. The discovery that there existed a physics of the Middle Ages was a surprise primarily for Duhem himself. This discovery completely changed the way he saw the evolution of physics, bringing him to formulate a complex argument for the growth and continuity of scientific knowledge, which I call the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’ (not to be confused either with what Roger Ariew called the ‘true Duhem thesis’ as opposed to (...)
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  10. Hempel's Paradox, Law-Likeness and Causal Relations.Severin Schroeder - unknown
  11. Duhem and Quine.Paul Needham - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (2):109-132.
    The rejection of the idea that the so‐called Duhem‐Quine thesis in fact expresses a thesis upheld by either Duhem or Quine invites a more detailed comparison of their views. It is suggested that the arguments of each have a certain impact on the positions maintained by the other. In particular, Quine's development of his notion of ontological commitment is enlisted in the interpretation of Duhem's position. It is argued that this counts against the instrumentalist construal usually put on what Duhem (...)
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  12. Emergent Spacetime and Empirical (in)Coherence.Nick Huggett & Christian Wüthrich - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (3):276-285.
    Numerous approaches to a quantum theory of gravity posit fundamental ontologies that exclude spacetime, either partially or wholly. This situation raises deep questions about how such theories could relate to the empirical realm, since arguably only entities localized in spacetime can ever be observed. Are such entities even possible in a theory without fundamental spacetime? How might they be derived, formally speaking? Moreover, since by assumption the fundamental entities cannot be smaller than the derived and so cannot ‘compose’ them in (...)
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  13. Theory Assessment and Coherence.Peter Brössel - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (1):57-71.
    One of the most important questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science is: what is a good theory and when is a theory better than another theory, given some observational data? The coherentist‟s answer would be the following twofold conjecture: A theory is a good theory given some observational data iff that theory coheres with the observational data and a theory is better than another theory given some observational data iff the first theory coheres more with the observational data (...)
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  14. The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses.John Earman - 1992 - In .
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  15. 2. Logic and Probability.Richard Johns - 2002 - In A Theory of Physical Probability. University of Toronto Press. pp. 9-52.
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  16. Herapel and Instantial Confirmation.P. H. Wiebe - 1976 - Philosophy Research Archives 2:59-70.
    The concept of a positive instance has figured significantly in Hempel's study of confirmation. In fact, Hempel's study has been interpreted as an attempt to explicate the concept of a positive instance. In this paper I examine the concept of an instance and discuss its role in Hempel's study. I show that Hempel's notion of direct confirmation is closely related to that of a positive instance. This fact, however,does not warrant an uncritical identification of Hempel's explicandum with the concept of (...)
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  17. Confirmation, Explanation and the Paradoxes of Transitivity.Raimo Tuomela - 1975 - Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy 5:121-125.
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  18. The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory. [REVIEW]David L. Hull - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):431.
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  19. Induction and Hypothesis, A Study in the Logic of Confirmation.Wesley C. Salmon & S. F. Barker - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (2):247.
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  20. Model-Selection Theory: The Need for a More Nuanced Picture of Use-Novelty and Double-Counting.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw024.
    This article argues that common intuitions regarding (a) the specialness of ‘use-novel’ data for confirmation and (b) that this specialness implies the ‘no-double-counting rule’, which says that data used in ‘constructing’ (calibrating) a model cannot also play a role in confirming the model’s predictions, are too crude. The intuitions in question are pertinent in all the sciences, but we appeal to a climate science case study to illustrate what is at stake. Our strategy is to analyse the intuitive claims in (...)
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  21. Bayes Factors All the Way: Toward a New View of Coherence and Truth.Lydia McGrew - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):329-350.
    A focus on the conjunction of the contents of witness reports and on the coherence of their contents has had negative effects on the epistemic clarity of the Bayesian coherence literature. Whether or not increased coherence of witness reports is correlated with higher confirmation for some H depends upon the hypothesis in question and upon factors concerning the confirmation and independence of the reports, not directly on the positive relevance of the contents to each other. I suggest that Bayesians should (...)
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  22. Computer Models and the Evidence of Anthropogenic Climate Change: An Epistemology of Variety-of-Evidence Inferences and Robustness Analysis.Martin Vezer - 2016 - Computer Models and the Evidence of Anthropogenic Climate Change: An Epistemology of Variety-of-Evidence Inferences and Robustness Analysis MA Vezér Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 56:95-102.
    To study climate change, scientists employ computer models, which approximate target systems with various levels of skill. Given the imperfection of climate models, how do scientists use simulations to generate knowledge about the causes of observed climate change? Addressing a similar question in the context of biological modelling, Levins (1966) proposed an account grounded in robustness analysis. Recent philosophical discussions dispute the confirmatory power of robustness, raising the question of how the results of computer modelling studies contribute to the body (...)
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  23. Experimental Tests of Isometry Hypotheses.Roberto de A. Martins - 1982 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (3):296-304.
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  24. Reasoning with Vectors: A Continuous Model for Fast Robust Inference.D. Widdows & T. Cohen - 2015 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 23 (2):141-173.
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  25. II—Wendy S. Parker: Confirmation and Adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling.Wendy S. Parker - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):233-249.
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  26. Theory and Evidence. Clark Glymour.Mary Hesse - 1981 - Isis 72 (2):290-291.
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  27. Can Theories Be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine ThesisSandra G. Harding.John F. Post - 1978 - Isis 69 (1):148-149.
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  28. Confirmation of Theories in Psychology.F. J. McGuigan - 1956 - Psychological Review 63 (2):98-104.
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  29. Criterion Analysis--An Application of the Hypothetico-Deductive Method to Factor Analysis.H. J. Eysenck - 1950 - Psychological Review 57 (1):38-53.
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  30. Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses : Duhem's Thesis Revisited.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - unknown
    This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology, but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.
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  31. Epistemic Inconsistency and Categorical Coherence: A Study of Probabilistic Measures of Coherence.Michael Hughes - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3153-3185.
    Is logical consistency required for a set of beliefs or propositions to be categorically coherent? An affirmative answer is often assumed by mainstream epistemologists, and yet it is unclear why. Cases like the lottery and the preface call into question the assumption that beliefs must be consistent in order to be epistemically rational. And thus it is natural to wonder why all inconsistent sets of propositions are incoherent. On the other hand, Easwaran and Fitelson have shown that particular kinds of (...)
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  32. Pragmatic Warrant for Frequentist Statistical Practice: The Case of High Energy Physics.Kent Staley - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2).
    Amidst long-running debates within the field, high energy physics has adopted a statistical methodology that primarily employs standard frequentist techniques such as significance testing and confidence interval estimation, but incorporates Bayesian methods for limited purposes. The discovery of the Higgs boson has drawn increased attention to the statistical methods employed within HEP. Here I argue that the warrant for the practice in HEP of relying primarily on frequentist methods can best be understood as pragmatic, in the sense that statistical methods (...)
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  33. On Duhem's and Quine's Theses.Jules Vuillemin - 1979 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 9:69-96.
    The "Duhem-Quine thesis" says that isolated hypotheses are not singularly verifiable by experience, only the whole body of a theory being able to be subjected to the test of experience. I first examine the rather divergent meanings this thesis takes when it is replaced in the different contexts of Duhem's and Quine'sphilosophies. Secondly, questions are asked about the acceptability of the thesis, its logical strength and its historical soundness. Finally, the consequences of some doubts raised by this inquiry are examined (...)
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  34. Resolving Hempel's Raven Paradox.Fred Leavitt - 1996 - Philosophical Inquiry 18 (3):116-116.
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  35. Contradiction and Confirmation.Tanya Ditommaso - 2002 - Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale 6 (1):23-35.
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  36. Shogenji's Probabilistic Measure of Coherence is Incoherent.K. Akiba - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):356-359.
  37. Lakatos’s Challenge? Auxiliary Hypotheses and Non-Monotonous Inference.Frank Zenker - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):405-415.
    Gerhard Schurz [2001, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 32, 65-107] has proposed to reconstruct auxiliary hypothesis addition, e.g., postulation of Neptune to immunize Newtonian mechanics, with concepts from non-monotonous inference to avoid the retention of false predictions that are among the consequence-set of the deductive model. However, the non-monotonous reconstruction retains the observational premise that is indeed rejected in the deductive model. Hence, his proposal fails to do justice to Lakatos' core-belt model, therefore fails to meet what Schurz coined (...)
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  38. Inconsistency as a Touchstone for Coherence Measures.Mark Siebel & Michael Schippers - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (1):11.
    The debate on probabilistic measures of coherence has focused on evaluating sets of consistent propositions. In this paper we draw attention to the largely neglected question of whether such measures concur with intuitions on test cases with inconsistent propositions and whether they satisfy general adequacy constraints on coherence and inconsistency. While it turns out that, for the vast majority of proposals in their original shape, this question must be answered in the negative, we show that it is possible to adapt (...)
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  39. The Epistemic Status of Auxiliary Hypotheses: A Reply to Douven.Jarrett Leplin - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):376-380.
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  40. Confirming Power of Observations Metricized for Decisions Among Hypotheses.Henry A. Finch - 1960 - Philosophy of Science 27 (3):293-307.
    Experimental observations are often taken in order to assist in making a choice between relevant hypotheses ∼ H and H. The power of observations in this decision is here metrically defined by information-theoretic concepts and Bayes' theorem. The exact of a new observation to increase or decrease Pr the prior probability that H is true; the power of that observation to modify the total amount of uncertainty involved in the choice between ∼ H and H: the power of a new (...)
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  41. Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine-Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):333-338.
    By and large, we think is a useful reply to our original critique of his article on the Quine–Duhem problem. But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply. Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD.
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  42. Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):473-489.
    Likelihoodists and Bayesians seem to have a fundamental disagreement about the proper probabilistic explication of relational (or contrastive) conceptions of evidential support (or confirmation). In this paper, I will survey some recent arguments and results in this area, with an eye toward pinpointing the nexus of the dispute. This will lead, first, to an important shift in the way the debate has been couched, and, second, to an alternative explication of relational support, which is in some sense a "middle way" (...)
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  43. Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative.Igor Douven & Wouter Meijs - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):97-132.
    Glymour’s theory of bootstrap confirmation is a purely qualitative account of confirmation; it allows us to say that the evidence confirms a given theory, but not that it confirms the theory to a certain degree. The present paper extends Glymour’s theory to a quantitative account and investigates the resulting theory in some detail. It also considers the question how bootstrap confirmation relates to justification.
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  44. Acceptibility, Evidence, and Severity.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon G. Brittan - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):259-293.
    The notion of a severe test has played an important methodological role in the history of science. But it has not until recently been analyzed in any detail. We develop a generally Bayesian analysis of the notion, compare it with Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical approach by way of sample diagnostic tests in the medical sciences, and consider various objections to both. At the core of our analysis is a distinction between evidence and confirmation or belief. These notions must be kept separate (...)
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  45. Bootstrapping and Content Parts.Ken Gemes - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):345-370.
    Christensen [Philosophy of Science, 50: 471–481, 1983] and [Philosophy of Science, 57: 644–662, 1990] provides two sets of counter-examples to the versions of bootstrap confirmation for standard first-order languages presented in Glymour [Theory and Evidence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980] and [Philosophy of Science, 50: 626–629, 1983]. This paper responds to the counter-examples of Christensen [Philosophy of Science, 50: 471–481, 1983] by utilizing a new notion of content introduced in Gemes [Journal of Philosophical Logic, 26, 449–476, 1997]. It is claimed (...)
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  46. Against Probabilistic Measures of Coherence.Mark Siebel - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (3):335-360.
    It is shown that the probabilistic theories of coherence proposed up to now produce a number of counter-intuitive results. The last section provides some reasons for believing that no probabilistic measure will ever be able to adequately capture coherence. First, there can be no function whose arguments are nothing but tuples of probabilities, and which assigns different values to pairs of propositions {A, B} and {A, C} if A implies both B and C, or their negations, and if P(B)=P(C). But (...)
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  47. The Role of Coherence of Evidence in the Non-Dynamic Model of Confirmation.Tomoji Shogenji - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (3):317-333.
    This paper examines the role of coherence of evidence in what I call the non-dynamic model of confirmation. It appears that other things being equal, a higher degree of coherence among pieces of evidence raises to a higher degree the probability of the proposition they support. I argue against this view on the basis of three related observations. First, we should be able to assess the impact of coherence on any hypothesis of interest the evidence supports. Second, the impact of (...)
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  48. Hypothetico-Deductivism: Incomplete But Not Hopeless.Ken Gemes - 2004 - Erkenntnis 63 (1):139-147.
    Alleged counter-examples deployed in Park [Erkenntnis 60: 229–240] against the account of selective hypothetico-deductive confirmation offered in Gemes [Erkenntnis 49: 1–20] are shown to be ineffective. Furthermore, the reservations expressed in Gemes [ibid] and [Philosophy of Science 62: 477–487] about hypothetico-deductivism are retracted and replaced with the conclusion that H-D is a viable account of confirmation that captures much of the practice of working scientists. However, because it cannot capture cases of inference to the best explanation and cases of the (...)
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  49. Probabilistic Coherence Measures: A Psychological Study of Coherence Assessment.Jakob Koscholke & Marc Jekel - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4).
    Over the years several non-equivalent probabilistic measures of coherence have been discussed in the philosophical literature. In this paper we examine these measures with respect to their empirical adequacy. Using test cases from the coherence literature as vignettes for psychological experiments we investigate whether the measures can predict the subjective coherence assessments of the participants. It turns out that the participants’ coherence assessments are best described by Roche’s coherence measure based on Douven and Meijs’ average mutual support approach and the (...)
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  50. The Diversity of Model Tuning Practices in Climate Science.Charlotte Werndl & Katie Steele - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):113-114.
    Many examples of calibration in climate science raise no alarms regarding model reliability. We examine one example and show that, in employing Classical Hypothesis-testing, it involves calibrating a base model against data that is also used to confirm the model. This is counter to the "intuitive position". We argue, however, that aspects of the intuitive position are upheld by some methods, in particular, the general Cross-validation method. How Cross-validation relates to other prominent Classical methods such as the Akaike Information Criterion (...)
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