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  1. Discrimination-Conduciveness and Observation Selection Effects.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    We conceptualize observation selection effects by considering how a shift from one process of observation to another affects discrimination-conduciveness, by which we mean the degree to which possible observations discriminate between hypotheses, given the observation process at work. OSEs in this sense come in degrees and are causal, where the cause is the shift in process, and the effect is a change in degree of discrimination-conduciveness. We contrast our understanding of OSEs with others that have appeared in the literature. After (...)
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  2. Inference to the Best Explanation and the Screening-Off Challenge.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2019 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 38:121-142.
    We argue in Roche and Sober (2013) that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in that Pr(H | O&EXPL) = Pr(H | O), where H is a hypothesis, O is an observation, and EXPL is the proposition that if H and O were true, then H would explain O. This is a “screening-off” thesis. Here we clarify that thesis, reply to criticisms advanced by Lange (2017), consider alternative formulations of Inference to the Best Explanation, discuss a strengthened screening-off thesis, and consider how (...)
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  3. Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann offer a fresh approach to central topics in philosophy of science, including causation, explanation, evidence, and scientific models. Their Bayesian approach uses the concept of degrees of belief to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning.
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  4. Prediction Versus Accommodation in Economics.Robert Northcott - 2019 - Journal of Economic Methodology 26 (1):59-69.
    Should we insist on prediction, i.e. on correctly forecasting the future? Or can we rest content with accommodation, i.e. empirical success only with respect to the past? I apply general considerations about this issue to the case of economics. In particular, I examine various ways in which mere accommodation can be sufficient, in order to see whether those ways apply to economics. Two conclusions result. First, an entanglement thesis: the need for prediction is entangled with the methodological role of orthodox (...)
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  5. Historical Inductions Meet the Material Theory.Elay Shech - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    Historical inductions, viz., the pessimistic meta-induction and the problem of unconceived alternatives, are critically analyzed via John D. Norton’s material theory of induction and subsequently rejected as non-cogent arguments. It is suggested that the material theory is amenable to a local version of the pessimistic meta-induction, e.g., in the context of some medical studies.
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  6. Delimiting the Unconceived.Richard Dawid - 2018 - Foundations of Physics 48 (5):492-506.
    It has been argued in Dawid that physicists at times generate substantial trust in an empirically unconfirmed theory based on observations that lie beyond the theory’s intended domain. A crucial role in the reconstruction of this argument of “non-empirical confirmation” is played by limitations to scientific underdetermination. The present paper discusses the question as to how generic the role of limitations to scientific underdetermination really is. It is argued that assessing such limitations is essential for generating trust in any theory’s (...)
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  7. The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory. Elisabeth A. Lloyd.Richard M. Burian - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):153-158.
  8. Theory and Evidence. Clark Glymour.Adam Morton - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):498-500.
    review of Glymour's *Theory and Evidence* focusing on the arguments against holism.
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  9. The Qualitative Paradox of Non-Conglomerability.Nicholas DiBella - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1181-1210.
    A probability function is non-conglomerable just in case there is some proposition E and partition \ of the space of possible outcomes such that the probability of E conditional on any member of \ is bounded by two values yet the unconditional probability of E is not bounded by those values. The paradox of non-conglomerability is the counterintuitive—and controversial—claim that a rational agent’s subjective probability function can be non-conglomerable. In this paper, I present a qualitative analogue of the paradox. I (...)
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  10. Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69:139--159.
    According to influential accounts of scientific method, such as critical rationalism, scientific knowledge grows by repeatedly testing our best hypotheses. But despite the popularity of hypothesis tests in statistical inference and science in general, their philosophical foundations remain shaky. In particular, the interpretation of non-significant results—those that do not reject the tested hypothesis—poses a major philosophical challenge. To what extent do they corroborate the tested hypothesis, or provide a reason to accept it? Popper sought for measures of corroboration that could (...)
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  11. The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Requirement of Total Evidence.Peter Fisher Epstein - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):639-658.
    According to the Fine-Tuning Argument, the existence of life in our universe confirms the Multiverse Hypothesis. A standard objection to FTA is that it violates the Requirement of Total Evidence. I argue that RTE should be rejected in favor of the Predesignation Requirement, according to which, in assessing the outcome of a probabilistic process, we should only use evidence characterizable in a manner available before observing the outcome. This produces the right verdicts in some simple cases in which RTE leads (...)
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  12. Locke on the Epistemological Status of Scientific Laws.Silvio Seno Chibeni - 2005 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (1-2):19-41.
    This article aims to defend Locke against Quine’s charge, made in his famous “two dogmas” paper, that Locke’s theory of knowledge is badly flawed, not only for assuming the dogmas, but also for adopting an “in-tolerably restrictive” version of the dogma of reductionism. It is shown here that, in his analysis of the epistemological status of scientific laws, Locke has effectively transcended the narrow idea-empiricism which un-derlies this version of reductionism. First, in order to escape idealism, he introduced the notion (...)
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  13. Regularity and Infinitely Tossed Coins.Colin Howson - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):97-102.
    Timothy Williamson has claimed to prove that regularity must fail even in a nonstandard setting, with a counterexample based on tossing a fair coin infinitely many times. I argue that Williamson’s argument is mistaken, and that a corrected version shows that it is not regularity which fails in the non-standard setting but a fundamental property of shifts in Bernoulli processes.
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  14. Confirmation Via Analogue Simulation: What Dumb Holes Could Tell Us About Gravity.Radin Dardashti, Karim P. Y. Thébault & Eric Winsberg - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1).
    In this article we argue for the existence of ‘analogue simulation’ as a novel form of scientific inference with the potential to be confirmatory. This notion is distinct from the modes of analogical reasoning detailed in the literature, and draws inspiration from fluid dynamical ‘dumb hole’ analogues to gravitational black holes. For that case, which is considered in detail, we defend the claim that the phenomena of gravitational Hawking radiation could be confirmed in the case that its counterpart is detected (...)
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  15. The ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis.’ A Reappraisal of Duhem’s Discovery of the Physics of the Middle Ages.Horia-Roman Patapievici - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):201–218.
    Pierre Duhem is the discoverer of the physics of the Middle Ages. The discovery that there existed a physics of the Middle Ages was a surprise primarily for Duhem himself. This discovery completely changed the way he saw the evolution of physics, bringing him to formulate a complex argument for the growth and continuity of scientific knowledge, which I call the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’ (not to be confused either with what Roger Ariew called the ‘true Duhem thesis’ as opposed to (...)
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  16. A Third Note on Degree of Corroboration or Confirmation.K. R. Popper - 1957 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8 (29):294.
  17. Duhem and Quine.Paul Needham - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (2):109-132.
    The rejection of the idea that the so‐called Duhem‐Quine thesis in fact expresses a thesis upheld by either Duhem or Quine invites a more detailed comparison of their views. It is suggested that the arguments of each have a certain impact on the positions maintained by the other. In particular, Quine's development of his notion of ontological commitment is enlisted in the interpretation of Duhem's position. It is argued that this counts against the instrumentalist construal usually put on what Duhem (...)
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  18. Emergent Spacetime and Empirical (in) Coherence.Nick Huggett & Christian Wüthrich - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (3):276-285.
    Numerous approaches to a quantum theory of gravity posit fundamental ontologies that exclude spacetime, either partially or wholly. This situation raises deep questions about how such theories could relate to the empirical realm, since arguably only entities localized in spacetime can ever be observed. Are such entities even possible in a theory without fundamental spacetime? How might they be derived, formally speaking? Moreover, since by assumption the fundamental entities cannot be smaller than the derived and so cannot ‘compose’ them in (...)
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  19. The Hempel and Goodman Paradoxes: A Reply to Adler.Nathan Stemmer - 1987 - Behavior and Philosophy 15 (2):165.
  20. Matti Sintonen, Review of Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge by Deborah Mayo. [REVIEW]Matti Sintonen - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (2):370-372.
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  21. The Confirmation of Quantitative Laws.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (1):1-22.
    Quantitative laws are more typical of science than are generalizations involving observational predicates, yet much discussion of scientific inference takes the confirmation of a universal generalization by its instances to be typical and paradigmatic. The important difference is that measurement necessarily involves error. It is argued that because of error laws can no more be refuted by observation than they can be verified by observation. Without much background knowledge, tests of a law mainly provide evidence for the distribution of errors (...)
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  22. Theory Assessment and Coherence.Peter Brössel - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (1):57-71.
    One of the most important questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science is: what is a good theory and when is a theory better than another theory, given some observational data? The coherentist‟s answer would be the following twofold conjecture: A theory is a good theory given some observational data iff that theory coheres with the observational data and a theory is better than another theory given some observational data iff the first theory coheres more with the observational data (...)
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  23. A Strong Confirmation Of The Experimenters' Regress.H. M. Collins - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (3):493-503.
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  24. Pierre Duhem’s Epistemic Aims and the Intellectual Virtue of Humility: A Reply to Ivanova.Ian James Kidd - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):185-189.
    David Stump has recently argued that Pierre Duhem can be interpreted as a virtue epistemologist. Stump’s claims have been challenged by Milena Ivanova on the grounds that Duhem’s ‘epistemic aims’ are more modest than those of virtue epistemologists. I challenge Ivanova’s criticism of Stump by arguing that she not distinguish between ‘reliabilist’ and ‘responsibilist’ virtue epistemologies. Once this distinction is drawn, Duhem clearly emerges as a ‘virtue-responsibilist’ in a way that complements Ivanova’s positive proposal that Duhem’s ‘good sense’ reflects a (...)
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  25. Diverse Tests on an Independent World.J. D. Trout - 1995 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):407-429.
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  26. The Confirmation of Black's Theory of Lime.Patrick Maher - 1999 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30 (2):335-353.
    In 1756 Joseph Black published a new theory of the nature of lime, one that is now viewed as essentially correct. Black's theory was not immediately accepted, and a competing theory, published in 1764 by Johann Meyer, was widely preferred to Black's for some years. In this paper, probability theory is used to show that, and why, some of Black's evidence made his theory more probable than Meyer's.
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  27. Confirmation as Competition: The Necessity for Dummy Rival Hypotheses.Jonathan Treitel - 1986 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 18 (4):517.
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  28. The Confirmation of the Superposition Principle: On the Role of a Constructive Thought Experiment in Galileo's "Discorsi".Gad Prudovsky - 1989 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 20 (4):453.
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  29. Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation, and Reality in the Natural and Social Sciences.Richmond Campbell - 1987 - Ethics 100 (4):897-898.
  30. Measuring Confirmation and Evidence.Ellery Elles & Branden Fitelson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.
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  31. The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses.John Earman - 1992 - In .
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  32. 2. Logic and Probability.Richard Johns - 2002 - In A Theory of Physical Probability. University of Toronto Press. pp. 9-52.
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  33. Herapel and Instantial Confirmation.P. H. Wiebe - 1976 - Philosophy Research Archives 2:59-70.
    The concept of a positive instance has figured significantly in Hempel's study of confirmation. In fact, Hempel's study has been interpreted as an attempt to explicate the concept of a positive instance. In this paper I examine the concept of an instance and discuss its role in Hempel's study. I show that Hempel's notion of direct confirmation is closely related to that of a positive instance. This fact, however,does not warrant an uncritical identification of Hempel's explicandum with the concept of (...)
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  34. Confirmation, Explanation and the Paradoxes of Transitivity.Raimo Tuomela - 1975 - Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy 5:121-125.
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  35. The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory. [REVIEW]David L. Hull - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):431.
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  36. Induction and Hypothesis, A Study in the Logic of Confirmation.Wesley C. Salmon & S. F. Barker - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (2):247.
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  37. Model-Selection Theory: The Need for a More Nuanced Picture of Use-Novelty and Double-Counting.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw024.
    This article argues that common intuitions regarding (a) the specialness of ‘use-novel’ data for confirmation and (b) that this specialness implies the ‘no-double-counting rule’, which says that data used in ‘constructing’ (calibrating) a model cannot also play a role in confirming the model’s predictions, are too crude. The intuitions in question are pertinent in all the sciences, but we appeal to a climate science case study to illustrate what is at stake. Our strategy is to analyse the intuitive claims in (...)
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  38. Bayes Factors All the Way: Toward a New View of Coherence and Truth.Lydia McGrew - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):329-350.
    A focus on the conjunction of the contents of witness reports and on the coherence of their contents has had negative effects on the epistemic clarity of the Bayesian coherence literature. Whether or not increased coherence of witness reports is correlated with higher confirmation for some H depends upon the hypothesis in question and upon factors concerning the confirmation and independence of the reports, not directly on the positive relevance of the contents to each other. I suggest that Bayesians should (...)
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  39. Computer Models and the Evidence of Anthropogenic Climate Change: An Epistemology of Variety-of-Evidence Inferences and Robustness Analysis.Martin Vezer - 2016 - Computer Models and the Evidence of Anthropogenic Climate Change: An Epistemology of Variety-of-Evidence Inferences and Robustness Analysis MA Vezér Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 56:95-102.
    To study climate change, scientists employ computer models, which approximate target systems with various levels of skill. Given the imperfection of climate models, how do scientists use simulations to generate knowledge about the causes of observed climate change? Addressing a similar question in the context of biological modelling, Levins (1966) proposed an account grounded in robustness analysis. Recent philosophical discussions dispute the confirmatory power of robustness, raising the question of how the results of computer modelling studies contribute to the body (...)
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  40. Experimental Tests of Isometry Hypotheses.Roberto de A. Martins - 1982 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (3):296-304.
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  41. Reasoning with Vectors: A Continuous Model for Fast Robust Inference.D. Widdows & T. Cohen - 2015 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 23 (2):141-173.
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  42. Probability and Paradox.F. Granger - 1929 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 9 (1):1-18.
  43. II—Wendy S. Parker: Confirmation and Adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling.Wendy S. Parker - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):233-249.
    Lloyd (2009) contends that climate models are confirmed by various instances of fit between their output and observational data. The present paper argues that what these instances of fit might confirm are not climate models themselves, but rather hypotheses about the adequacy of climate models for particular purposes. This required shift in thinking—from confirming climate models to confirming their adequacy-for-purpose—may sound trivial, but it is shown to complicate the evaluation of climate models considerably, both in principle and in practice.
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  44. Theory and Evidence. Clark Glymour.Mary Hesse - 1981 - Isis 72 (2):290-291.
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  45. Can Theories Be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine ThesisSandra G. Harding.John F. Post - 1978 - Isis 69 (1):148-149.
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  46. Confirmation of Theories in Psychology.F. J. McGuigan - 1956 - Psychological Review 63 (2):98-104.
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  47. Criterion Analysis--An Application of the Hypothetico-Deductive Method to Factor Analysis.H. J. Eysenck - 1950 - Psychological Review 57 (1):38-53.
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  48. Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses: Duhem’s Thesis Revisited.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):139-149.
    This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology, but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.
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  49. Epistemic Inconsistency and Categorical Coherence: A Study of Probabilistic Measures of Coherence.Michael Hughes - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3153-3185.
    Is logical consistency required for a set of beliefs or propositions to be categorically coherent? An affirmative answer is often assumed by mainstream epistemologists, and yet it is unclear why. Cases like the lottery and the preface call into question the assumption that beliefs must be consistent in order to be epistemically rational. And thus it is natural to wonder why all inconsistent sets of propositions are incoherent. On the other hand, Easwaran and Fitelson have shown that particular kinds of (...)
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  50. Pragmatic Warrant for Frequentist Statistical Practice: The Case of High Energy Physics.Kent Staley - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2).
    Amidst long-running debates within the field, high energy physics has adopted a statistical methodology that primarily employs standard frequentist techniques such as significance testing and confidence interval estimation, but incorporates Bayesian methods for limited purposes. The discovery of the Higgs boson has drawn increased attention to the statistical methods employed within HEP. Here I argue that the warrant for the practice in HEP of relying primarily on frequentist methods can best be understood as pragmatic, in the sense that statistical methods (...)
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