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  1. La théorie poppérienne de la confirmation scientifique.Youri Cabot - forthcoming - Philosophia Scientiae:133-153.
    Le problème épistémologique de la confirmation scientifique consiste à déterminer ou comparer le degré de confirmation des hypothèses scientifiques (c’est-à-dire le niveau d’avantage épistémique que nous devons leur accorder) au regard des données empiriques. Ce problème est la plupart du temps traité dans le cadre d’une interprétation probabiliste du raisonnement inductif, notamment au moyen du calcul bayésien, de telle sorte que l’on parle de théorie bayésienne de la confirmation. Nous proposerons ici de considérer la théorie poppérienne de la corroboration comme (...)
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  2. The paradoxes of confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
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  3. Contrast Classes and Agreement in Climate Modeling.Corey Dethier - 2024 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 14 (14):1-19.
    In an influential paper, Wendy Parker argues that agreement across climate models isn’t a reliable marker of confirmation in the context of cutting-edge climate science. In this paper, I argue that while Parker’s conclusion is generally correct, there is an important class of exceptions. Broadly speaking, agreement is not a reliable marker of confirmation when the hypotheses under consideration are mutually consistent—when, e.g., we’re concerned with overlapping ranges. Since many cutting-edge questions in climate modeling require making distinctions between mutually consistent (...)
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  4. Confirmation.Sudhir Kumar Kujur - 2023 - In John Chathanatt (ed.), Christianity. Springer Verlag. pp. 373-374.
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  5. An embodied theorisation: Arend Heyting's hypothesis about how the self separates from the outer world finds confirmation.Miriam Franchella - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):660-670.
    At the beginning of the twentieth century, among the foundational schools of mathematics appeared ‘intuitionism’ by Dutchman L. E. J. Brouwer, who based arithmetic on the intuition of time and all mental constructions that could be made out of it. His pupil Arend Heyting was the first populariser of intuitionism, and he repeatedly emphasised that no philosophy was required to practise intuitionism so that such mathematics could be shared by anyone. Still, stimulated by invitations to humanistic conferences, he wrote a (...)
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  6. Is Confirmation Bias a Double-Edged Sword? Reevaluating its Role in the Argumentative Theory of Reasoning.Maarten Doorn van - manuscript
    I present arguments giving us reason to reconsider whether confirmation bias is really such a significant explanandum theories of reasoning need to make sense of and, by extension, whether any advantage the argumentative theory has over its rivals here, is the weightily explanatory virtue it has often been supposed to be. More generally, the extent to which accounting for ‘confirmation bias’ is an important desideratum for theories of reasoning has been overstated. Theory choice between them should (to say the least) (...)
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  7. Reply to Sprenger’s “A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence”.Fabian Pregel - 2024 - Philosophy of Science 91 (1):243-252.
    I discuss a contemporary solution to the dynamic problem of old evidence (POE), as proposed by Sprenger. Sprenger’s solution combines the Garber–Jeffrey–Niiniluoto (GJN) approach with Howson’s suggestion of counterfactually removing the old evidence from scientists’ belief systems. I argue that in the dynamic POE, the challenge is to explain how an insight under beliefs in which the old evidence E is known increased the credence of a scientific hypothesis. Therefore, Sprenger’s counterfactual solution, in which E has been artificially removed, does (...)
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  8. The Confirmation of Common Component Causes.Malcolm R. Forster - 1988 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988 (1):2-9.
    There is an interesting problem concerning component causes posed by Cartwright (1983) in her book How the Laws of Physics Lie, which is easily explained in terms of a simple example. Consider a cup sitting on the table. Why doesn’t it move? The explanation given by Newtonian mechanics is that the cup is experiencing two forces-the downward force of gravity and the upward ‘elastic’ force of the table-and these two forces exactly cancel to produce a zero resultant force. This zero (...)
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  9. Studying communication, confirmation, and dialogue : in dialogue with Maurice Friedman.Kenneth N. Cissna - 2011 - In Kenneth Kramer (ed.), Dialogically speaking: Maurice Friedman's interdisciplinary humanism. Eugene, Or.: Pickwick Publications.
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  10. Theory-confirmation and history.Colin Cheyne & John Worrall - 2005 - In Colin Cheyne & John Worrall (eds.), Rationality and Reality: Conversations With Alan Musgrave. pp. 31-62.
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  11. Belief expansion, contextual fit and the reliability of information sources.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2001 - In Varol Akman (ed.), Modeling and Using Context. pp. 421-424.
    We develop a probabilistic criterion for belief expansion that is sensitive to the degree of contextual fit of the new information to our belief set as well as to the reliability of our information source. We contrast our approach with the success postulate in AGM-style belief revision and show how the idealizations in our approach can be relaxed by invoking Bayesian-Network models.
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  12. Error, tests and theory confirmation.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2010 - In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. pp. 125-154.
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  13. How to Think about Indirect Confirmation.Brian McLoone - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-15.
    Suppose a theory T entails hypotheses H and $$H'$$, neither of which entails the other. A number of authors have argued that a piece of evidence E “indirectly confirms” H when E confirms either T or $$H'$$. But there has been a protracted and unsettled debate about whether indirect confirmation is a sound inference procedure. Skeptics argue that the procedure employs conditions of confirmation that jointly lead to absurdity. Proponents argue that this criticism is unfounded or that its import is (...)
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  14. Basic Beliefs, Coherence, and Bootstrap Confirmation.Igor Douven - 2005 - In René Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser & Ron Rood (eds.), Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge: Papers in Epistemology. De Gruyter. pp. 57-76.
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  15. Does the Dome Defeat the Material Theory of Induction?William Peden - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):2171-2190.
    According to John D. Norton's Material Theory of Induction, all inductive inferences are justified by local facts, rather than their formal features or some grand principles of nature's uniformity. Recently, Richard Dawid (Found Phys 45(9):1101–1109, 2015) has offered a challenge to this theory: in an adaptation of Norton's own celebrated "Dome" thought experiment, it seems that there are certain inductions that are intuitively reasonable, but which do not have any local facts that could serve to justify them in accordance with (...)
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  16. Confirmation, or pursuit-worthiness? Lessons from J. J. Sakurai's 1960 theory of the strong force for the debate on non-empirical physics.Pablo Ruiz de Olano - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 99 (C):77-88.
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  17. Confirmation, or Pursuit-Worthiness? Lessons from J. J. Sakurai's 1960 Theory of the Strong Force for the Debate on Non-Empirical Physics.Pablo Ruiz de Olano - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 99:77-88.
    Over the last few decades, our theories of fundamental physics have become increasingly detached from empirical data. Recently, Richard Dawid has argued that the progressive separation of theory from experiment is concomitant with a number of changes in the methodology of the discipline. More precisely, Dawid has argued that the new methods of fundamental physics amount to a form of non-empirical confirmation, and that physical theories may therefore be confirmed even in the absence of empirical data. In this paper, I (...)
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  18. The Conjunction Fallacy: Confirmation or Relevance?WooJin Chung, Kevin Dorst, Matthew Mandelkern & Salvador Mascarenhas - manuscript
    The conjunction fallacy is the well-documented empirical finding that subjects sometimes rate a conjunction A&B as more probable than one of its conjuncts, A. Most explanations appeal in some way to the fact that B has a high probability. But Tentori et al. (2013) have recently challenged such approaches, reporting experiments which find that (1) when B is confirmed by relevant evidence despite having low probability, the fallacy is common, and (2) when B has a high probability but has not (...)
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  19. Probability and Inductive Logic.Antony Eagle - manuscript
    Reasoning from inconclusive evidence, or ‘induction’, is central to science and any applications we make of it. For that reason alone it demands the attention of philosophers of science. This Element explores the prospects of using probability theory to provide an inductive logic, a framework for representing evidential support. Constraints on the ideal evaluation of hypotheses suggest that overall support for a hypothesis is represented by its probability in light of the total evidence, and incremental support, or confirmation, indicated by (...)
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  20. Conditionals, Support and Connexivity.Hans Rott - manuscript
    In natural language, conditionals are frequently used for giving explanations. Thus the antecedent of a conditional is typically understood as being connected to, being relevant for, or providing evidential support for the conditional's consequent. This aspect has not been adequately mirrored by the logics that are usually offered for the reasoning with conditionals: neither in the logic of the material conditional or the strict conditional, nor in the plethora of logics for suppositional conditionals that have been produced over the past (...)
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  21. From the indirect confirmation of theories to theory unification.Luca Moretti - 2004 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):10-14.
    Theory unification is a central aim of scientific investigation. In this paper, I lay down the sketch of a Bayesian analysis of the virtue of unification that entails that the unification of a theory has direct implications for the confirmation of the theory’s logical consequences and for its prior probability. This shows that scientists do have epistemic, and not just pragmatic, reasons to prefer unified theories to non-unified ones.
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  22. Scientific reasoning : explanation, confirmation bias, and scientific practice.Barabara Koslowski - 2013 - In Gregory J. Feist & Michael E. Gorman (eds.), Handbook of the psychology of science. New York: Springer Pub. Company, LLC.
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  23. Does science need intersubjectivity? The problem of confirmation in orthodox interpretations of quantum mechanics.Emily Adlam - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1–39.
    Any successful interpretation of quantum mechanics must explain how our empirical evidence allows us to come to know about quantum mechanics. In this article, we argue that this vital criterion is not met by the class of ‘orthodox interpretations,’ which includes QBism, neo-Copenhagen interpretations, and some versions of relational quantum mechanics. We demonstrate that intersubjectivity fails in radical ways in these approaches, and we explain why intersubjectivity matters for empirical confirmation. We take a detailed look at the way in which (...)
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  24. Knowing the unobservable: confirmation and theoretical virtue.Stathis Psillos - 2018 - In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing.
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  25. Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation and Reality in the Natural and the Social Sciences.Richard W. Miller - 1988 - Princeton University Press.
    In this bold work, of broad scope and rich erudition, Richard Miller sets out to reorient the philosophy of science. By questioning both positivism and its leading critics, he develops new solutions to the most urgent problems about justification, explanation, and truth. Using a wealth of examples from both the natural and the social sciences, Fact and Method applies the new account of scientific reason to specific questions of method in virtually every field of inquiry, including biology, physics, history, sociology, (...)
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  26. Heritability and Etiology: Heritability estimates can provide causally relevant information.Jonathan Egeland - forthcoming - Personality and Individual Differences.
    Can heritability estimates provide causal information? This paper argues for an affirmative answer: since a non-nil heritability estimate satisfies certain characteristic properties of causation (i.e., association, manipulability, and counterfactual dependence), it increases the probability that the relation between genotypic variance and phenotypic variance is (at least partly) causal. Contrary to earlier proposals in the literature, the argument does not assume the correctness of any particular conception of the nature of causation, rather focusing on properties that are characteristic of causal relationships. (...)
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  27. The Evolution of Reason Giving and Confirmation Bias.Ladislav Koreň - 2022 - Philosophical Topics 50 (1):213-234.
    In their own way, inferentialists and interactionists both trace the roots of reflective reasoning to practices and skills for making, assessing, and responding to public performances in communicative practices of giving and asking for reasons. Inferentialists have developed the idea mostly on conceptual grounds. Interactionists ask, in a more empirical spirit, why and how such practices and skills might have evolved. Thus they promise complementary “anthropological” insights of foremost interest to inferentialists. But interactionist theories advance a number of controversial claims (...)
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  28. ‘Oumuamua and meta-empirical confirmation.Vera Matarese - 2022 - Foundations of Physics 52 (4):1-21.
    Astrophysicist Abraham Loeb suggests that the interstellar interloper 1I/2017 ‘Oumuamua, detected in our solar system in 2017, is alien space debris or even an alien operational probe. Does this conjecture have significant epistemic support, such that it can be justified as a viable hypothesis? In this paper, I propose that the meta-empirical confirmation approach, developed and defended by philosopher and physicist Dawid, provides an appropriate framework to answer this question. I defend this proposal by elucidating how meta-empirical confirmation applies to (...)
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  29. Tacking by conjunction, genuine confirmation and convergence to certainty.Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (3):1-18.
    Tacking by conjunction is a well-known problem for Bayesian confirmation theory. In the first section, disadvantages of existing Bayesian solution proposals to this problem are pointed out and an alternative solution proposal is presented: that of genuine confirmation. In the second section, the notion of GC is briefly recapitulated and three versions of GC are distinguished: full GC, partial GC and quantitative GC. In the third section, the application of partial GC to pure post-facto speculations is explained. In the fourth (...)
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  30. Can Confirmation Bias Improve Group Learning?Nathan Gabriel & Cailin O'Connor - unknown
    Confirmation bias has been widely studied for its role in failures of reasoning. Individuals exhibiting confirmation bias fail to engage with information that contradicts their current beliefs, and, as a result, can fail to abandon inaccurate beliefs. But although most investigations of confirmation bias focus on individual learning, human knowledge is typically developed within a social structure. We use network models to show that moderate confirmation bias often improves group learning. However, a downside is that a stronger form of confirmation (...)
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  31. Dignity at stake in educational relations - The significance of confirmation.Tone Stikholmen, Dagfinn Nåden & Herdis Alvsvåg - 2022 - Nursing Ethics 29 (7-8):1600-1614.
    Introduction It is a goal in nursing education to promote students’ dignity and facilitate this core value. Students’ experience of dignity is shaped by the student–supervisor relationship. Literature shows limited knowledge about how nursing students experience their own dignity during education. Research aim The aim of the study is to develop an understanding of how nursing students experience their own dignity in relation to supervisors, and what significance these experiences have in education. Research design Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics was chosen as (...)
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  32. Astrobiology in philosophy or philosophy in astrobiology?Kristina Šekrst - manuscript
    The central aim of astrobiology is to study origins, evolution and distribution of life in the universe, combining data from various disciplines. However, I will argue that from a philosophical standpoint, astrobiology requires the affirmation of astrophilosophy. Fry (2015) claims that philosophical presuppositions guiding science are general, for example, we hold the notion that natural laws necessarily hold at the whole universe at large, and on the basis of the universal applicability of natural laws, the astrobiological research is conducted. Jakosky (...)
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  33. Prospects for Analogue Confirmation.Paul Bartha - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (5):928-938.
    In analogical reasoning, observations about one or more source domains provide varying degrees of support for a conjecture about a target domain. Norton (2021) challenges the usefulness of formal models of analogical inference. Other philosophers (Dardashti et al. 2019) develop just such formal models in order to show how analogue experiments can confirm a hypothesis, even when the target domain is inaccessible. This paper defends the value of quasi-formal models of analogical reasoning. Such models are broadly compatible with Norton’s position, (...)
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  34. Confirmation by Robustness Analysis: A Bayesian Account.Lorenzo Casini & Jürgen Landes - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-43.
    Some authors claim that minimal models have limited epistemic value (Fumagalli, 2016; Grüne-Yanoff, 2009a). Others defend the epistemic benefits of modelling by invoking the role of robustness analysis for hypothesis confirmation (see, e.g., Levins, 1966; Kuorikoski et al., 2010) but such arguments find much resistance (see, e.g., Odenbaugh & Alexandrova, 2011). In this paper, we offer a Bayesian rationalization and defence of the view that robustness analysis can play a confirmatory role, and thereby shed light on the potential of minimal (...)
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  35. Confirmation bias in information search, interpretation, and memory recall: evidence from reasoning about four controversial topics.Dáša Vedejová & Vladimíra Čavojová - 2022 - Thinking and Reasoning 28 (1):1-28.
    Confirmation bias is often used as an umbrella term for many related phenomena. Information searches, evidence interpretation, and memory recall are the three main components of the thinking proces...
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  36. Meta-empirical confirmation: Addressing three points of criticism.Richard Dawid - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 93 (C):66-71.
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  37. Bayes et les biais. Le « biais de confirmation » en question.Marion Vorms - 2021 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 112 (4):567-590.
    On appelle « biais de confirmation » la tendance supposée des humains à sélectionner les informations qui vont dans le sens de ce qu’ils croient (ou veulent croire) et à interpréter celles dont ils disposent en faveur de leurs hypothèses favorites. Cet article vise à porter un regard critique sur certains usages de cette notion, et plus généralement sur le recours aux « biais cognitifs » pour expliquer tout un ensemble de phénomènes sociaux interprétés comme les marques d’une forme d’irrationalité. (...)
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  38. Historical Inductions Meet the Material Theory.Elay Shech - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):918-929.
    Historical inductions, that is, the pessimistic metainduction and the problem of unconceived alternatives, are critically analyzed via John D. Norton’s material theory of induction and subsequently rejected as noncogent arguments. It is suggested that the material theory is amenable to a local version of the pessimistic metainduction, for example, in the context of some medical studies.
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  39. The Bayes' factor: the coherent measure for hypothesis confirmation.Franco Taroni, Paolo Garbolino, Silvia Bozza & Colin Aitken - forthcoming - Law, Probability and Risk 20:15-36.
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  40. Confirmation by analogy.Francesco Nappo - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-26.
    This paper proposes a framework for representing in Bayesian terms the idea that analogical arguments of various degrees of strength may provide inductive support to yet untested scientific hypotheses. On this account, contextual information plays a crucial role in determining whether, and to what extent, a given similarity or dissimilarity between source and target may confirm an empirical hypothesis over a rival one. In addition to showing confirmation by analogy compatible with the adoption of a Bayesian standpoint, the proposal outlined (...)
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  41. The Role of Meta-Empirical Theory Confirmation in the Acceptance of Atomism.Richard Dawid - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 90:50-60.
    The universal acceptance of atomism in physics and chemistry in the early 20th century went along with an altered view on the epistemic status of microphysical conjectures. Contrary to the prevalent understanding during the 19th century, on the new view unobservable objects could be ‘discovered’. It is argued in the present paper that this shift can be connected to the implicit integration of elements of meta-empirical theory assessment into the concept of theory confirmation.
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  42. Scientific Realism and Empirical Confirmation: a Puzzle.Simon Allzén - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 90:153-159.
    Scientific realism driven by inference to the best explanation (IBE) takes empirically confirmed objects to exist, independent, pace empiricism, of whether those objects are observable or not. This kind of realism, it has been claimed, does not need probabilistic reasoning to justify the claim that these objects exist. But I show that there are scientific contexts in which a non-probabilistic IBE-driven realism leads to a puzzle. Since IBE can be applied in scientific contexts in which empirical confirmation has not yet (...)
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  43. Are Scientific Models of life Testable? A lesson from Simpson's Paradox.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Don Dcruz, Nolan Grunska & Mark Greenwood - 2020 - Sci 1 (3).
    We address the need for a model by considering two competing theories regarding the origin of life: (i) the Metabolism First theory, and (ii) the RNA World theory. We discuss two interrelated points, namely: (i) Models are valuable tools for understanding both the processes and intricacies of origin-of-life issues, and (ii) Insights from models also help us to evaluate the core objection to origin-of-life theories, called “the inefficiency objection”, which is commonly raised by proponents of both the Metabolism First theory (...)
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  44. A Problem for Confirmation Measure Z.Branden Fitelson - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (4):726-730.
    In this article, I present a serious problem for confirmation measure Z.
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  45. “Adding Up” Reasons: Lessons for Reductive and Nonreductive Approaches.Shyam Nair - 2021 - Ethics 132 (1):38-88.
    How do multiple reasons combine to support a conclusion about what to do or believe? This question raises two challenges: How can we represent the strength of a reason? How do the strengths of multiple reasons combine? Analogous challenges about confirmation have been answered using probabilistic tools. Can reductive and nonreductive theories of reasons use these tools to answer their challenges? Yes, or more exactly: reductive theories can answer both challenges. Nonreductive theories, with the help of a result in confirmation (...)
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  46. Meta-Empirical Support for Eliminative Reasoning.C. D. McCoy - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 90:15-29.
    Eliminative reasoning is a method that has been employed in many significant episodes in the history of science. It has also been advocated by some philosophers as an important means for justifying well-established scientific theories. Arguments for how eliminative reasoning is able to do so, however, have generally relied on a too narrow conception of evidence, and have therefore tended to lapse into merely heuristic or pragmatic justifications for their conclusions. This paper shows how a broader conception of evidence not (...)
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  47. Testability and Viability: Is Inflationary Cosmology “Scientific”?Richard Dawid & Casey McCoy - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (4):51.
    We provide a philosophical reconstruction and analysis of the debate on the scientific status of cosmic inflation that has played out in recent years. In a series of critical papers, Ijjas et al. have questioned the scientificality of the current views on cosmic inflation. Proponents of cosmic inflation have in turn defended the scientific credentials of their approach. We argue that, while this defense, narrowly construed, is successful against Ijjas et al., the latter's reasoning does point to a significant epistemic (...)
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  48. Tracking Confirmation.Igor Douven - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (3):398-414.
    Confirmation is a graded notion: evidence can confirm a hypothesis to a greater or lesser degree. There has been debate about how to measure degree of confirmation. Starting from the observation that we would like evidence to be a discriminating indicator of truth, we conduct computer simulations to determine how well the various known measures of confirmation predict the extent to which a given piece of evidence fulfills that role, given a hypothesis of interest. The outcomes show that some measures (...)
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  49. Inquiry and Confirmation.Arianna Falbo - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):622–631.
    A puzzle arises when combining two individually plausible, yet jointly incompatible, norms of inquiry. On the one hand, it seems that one shouldn’t inquire into a question while believing an answer to that question. But, on the other hand, it seems rational to inquire into a question while believing its answer, if one is seeking confirmation. Millson (2021), who has recently identified this puzzle, suggests a possible solution, though he notes that it comes with significant costs. I offer an alternative (...)
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  50. The epistemic consequences of pragmatic value-laden scientific inference.Adam P. Kubiak & Paweł Kawalec - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-26.
    In this work, we explore the epistemic import of the value-ladenness of Neyman-Pearson’s Theory of Testing Hypotheses by reconstructing and extending Daniel Steel’s argument for the legitimate influence of pragmatic values on scientific inference. We focus on how to properly understand N-P’s pragmatic value-ladenness and the epistemic reliability of N-P. We develop an account of the twofold influence of pragmatic values on N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability. We refer to these two distinguished aspects as “direct” and “indirect”. We discuss the (...)
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