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  1. added 2019-01-10
    Quine and the Incoherence of the Indispensability Argument.Michael Shaffer - forthcoming - Logos and Episteme.
    It is an under-appreciated fact that Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, when coupled with some other plausible and related views, implies that there are serious difficulties in demarcating empirical theories from pure mathematical theories within the Quinean framework. This is a serious problem because there seems to be a principled difference between the two disciplines that cannot apparently be captured in the orthodox Quienan framework. For the purpose of simplicity let us call this Quine's problem of demarcation. In this (...)
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  2. added 2018-08-02
    Counterfactuals and the 'Grue-Speaker'.Alfred Schramm - manuscript
    Freitag (2015) and Schramm (2014) have proposed different, although converging, solutions of Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. Answering their proposals, Dorst (2016 and 2018) has used the fictitious character of a ‘grue-speaker’ as his principal device for criticizing counterfactual-based treatments of the Riddle. In this paper, I argue that Dorst’s arguments fail: On the observation of no other than green emeralds, the ‘grue-speaker’ cannot use the symmetry between the ‘green’- and ‘grue’-languages for claiming ‘grue’- instead of ‘green’-evidence, and the counterfactuals (...)
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  3. added 2018-08-02
    Why Experiments Matter.Adrian Currie & Arnon Levy - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-25.
    Traditionally, experimentation is considered a privileged means of confirmation. However, how experiments are a better confirmatory source than other strategies is unclear, and recent discussions have identified experiments with various modeling strategies on the one hand, and with ‘natural’ experiments on the other hand. We argue that experiments aiming to test theories are best understood as controlled investigations of specimens. ‘Control’ involves repeated, fine-grained causal manipulation of focal properties. This capacity generates rich knowledge of the object investigated. ‘Specimenhood’ involves possessing (...)
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  4. added 2018-07-04
    Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures.Jan Sprenger & Jacob Stegenga - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):840-852.
    Data from medical research are typically summarized with various types of outcome measures. We present three arguments in favor of absolute over relative outcome measures. The first argument is from cognitive bias: relative measures promote the reference class fallacy and the overestimation of treatment effectiveness. The second argument is decision-theoretic: absolute measures are superior to relative measures for making a decision between interventions. The third argument is causal: interpreted as measures of causal strength, absolute measures satisfy a set of desirable (...)
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  5. added 2018-02-17
    Watkins and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction.Greg Bamford - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):203-205.
    Watkins proposes a neo-Popperian solution to the pragmatic problem of induction. He asserts that evidence can be used non-inductively to prefer the principle that corroboration is more successful over all human history than that, say, counter-corroboration is more successful either over this same period or in the future. Watkins's argument for rejecting the first counter-corroborationist alternative is beside the point. However, as whatever is the best strategy over all human history is irrelevant to the pragmatic problem of induction since we (...)
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  6. added 2018-02-10
    6. Confirmation and Verisimilitude.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - In Aboutness. Princeton University Press. pp. 95-111.
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  7. added 2018-02-10
    Truth, Verification, Confirmation, Verisimilitude.Graham Oddie - 2001 - In Smelser Niel J. (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Elsevier. pp. 12857-64.
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  8. added 2017-12-13
    Model Tuning in Engineering: Uncovering the Logic.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - 2015 - Journal of Strain Analysis for Engineering Design 51 (1):63-71.
    In engineering, as in other scientific fields, researchers seek to confirm their models with real-world data. It is common practice to assess models in terms of the distance between the model outputs and the corresponding experimental observations. An important question that arises is whether the model should then be ‘tuned’, in the sense of estimating the values of free parameters to get a better fit with the data, and furthermore whether the tuned model can be confirmed with the same data (...)
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  9. added 2017-12-04
    Inductive Explanation and Garber–Style Solutions to the Problem of Old Evidence.David Kinney - 2017 - Synthese:1-15.
    The Problem of Old Evidence is a perennial issue for Bayesian confirmation theory. Garber famously argues that the problem can be solved by conditionalizing on the proposition that a hypothesis deductively implies the existence of the old evidence. In recent work, Hartmann and Fitelson :712–717, 2015) and Sprenger :383–401, 2015) aim for similar, but more general, solutions to the Problem of Old Evidence. These solutions are more general because they allow the explanatory relationship between a new hypothesis and old evidence (...)
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  10. added 2017-10-06
    On the Confirmation of the Law of Demand.Philippe Mongin - manuscript
    The paper applies confirmation theory to a famous statement of economics, the law of demand, which says that ceteris paribus, prices and quantities demanded change in opposite directions. Today's economists do not accept the law unless definite restrictions hold, and have shown little interest in deciding whether or not these restrictions were satisfied empirically. However, Hildenbrand (1994) has provided a new derivation of the law of aggregate demand and used this theoretical advance to devise a test that may be the (...)
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  11. added 2017-06-05
    Generalized Confirmation and Relevance Measures.Vincenzo Crupi - 2017 - In M. Massimi, Jan-Willem Romeijn & G. Schurz (eds.), EPSA15 Selected Papers. European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol 5. Springer. pp. 285-295.
    The main point of the paper is to show how popular probabilistic measures of incremental confirmation and statistical relevance with qualitatively different features can be embedded smoothly in generalized parametric families. In particular, I will show that the probability difference, log probability ratio, log likelihood ratio, odds difference, so-called improbability difference, and Gaifman’s measures of confirmation can all be subsumed within a convenient biparametric continuum. One intermediate step of this project may have interest on its own, as it provides a (...)
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  12. added 2017-05-25
    Novelty Versus Replicability: Virtues and Vices in the Reward System of Science.Felipe Romero - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):1031-1043.
    The reward system of science is the priority rule. The first scientist making a new discovery is rewarded with prestige, while second runners get little or nothing. Michael Strevens, following Philip Kitcher, defends this reward system, arguing that it incentivizes an efficient division of cognitive labor. I argue that this assessment depends on strong implicit assumptions about the replicability of findings. I question these assumptions on the basis of metascientific evidence and argue that the priority rule systematically discourages replication. My (...)
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  13. added 2017-03-13
    Confirmation, Increase in Probability, and the Likelihood Ratio Measure: A Reply to Glass and McCartney.William Roche - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (4):491-513.
    Bayesian confirmation theory is rife with confirmation measures. Zalabardo focuses on the probability difference measure, the probability ratio measure, the likelihood difference measure, and the likelihood ratio measure. He argues that the likelihood ratio measure is adequate, but each of the other three measures is not. He argues for this by setting out three adequacy conditions on confirmation measures and arguing in effect that all of them are met by the likelihood ratio measure but not by any of the other (...)
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  14. added 2017-03-12
    Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence? Screening-Off Vs. No-Defeaters.Roche William - 2018 - Episteme 15 (4):451-462.
    I argue elsewhere (Roche 2014) that evidence of evidence is evidence under screening-off. Tal and Comesaña (2017) argue that my appeal to screening-off is subject to two objections. They then propose an evidence of evidence thesis involving the notion of a defeater. There is much to learn from their very careful discussion. I argue, though, that their objections fail and that their evidence of evidence thesis is open to counterexample.
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  15. added 2017-03-02
    Is There a Place in Bayesian Confirmation Theory for the Reverse Matthew Effect?William Roche - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1631-1648.
    Bayesian confirmation theory is rife with confirmation measures. Many of them differ from each other in important respects. It turns out, though, that all the standard confirmation measures in the literature run counter to the so-called “Reverse Matthew Effect” (“RME” for short). Suppose, to illustrate, that H1 and H2 are equally successful in predicting E in that p(E | H1)/p(E) = p(E | H2)/p(E) > 1. Suppose, further, that initially H1 is less probable than H2 in that p(H1) < p(H2). (...)
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  16. added 2017-03-02
    A Condition for Transitivity in High Probability.William Roche - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (3):435-444.
    There are many scientific and everyday cases where each of Pr and Pr is high and it seems that Pr is high. But high probability is not transitive and so it might be in such cases that each of Pr and Pr is high and in fact Pr is not high. There is no issue in the special case where the following condition, which I call “C1”, holds: H 1 entails H 2. This condition is sufficient for transitivity in high (...)
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  17. added 2017-03-02
    Is Explanatoriness a Guide to Confirmation? A Reply to Climenhaga.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (4):581-590.
    We argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr = Pr. We defended this screening-off thesis by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called (...)
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  18. added 2017-03-02
    A Note on Confirmation and Matthew Properties.Roche William - 2014 - Logic and Philosophy of Science 12:91-101.
    There are numerous (Bayesian) confirmation measures in the literature. Festa provides a formal characterization of a certain class of such measures. He calls the members of this class “incremental measures”. Festa then introduces six rather interesting properties called “Matthew properties” and puts forward two theses, hereafter “T1” and “T2”, concerning which of the various extant incremental measures have which of the various Matthew properties. Festa’s discussion is potentially helpful with the problem of measure sensitivity. I argue, that, while Festa’s discussion (...)
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  19. added 2017-01-28
    Is Explanatoriness a Guide to Confirmation? A Reply to Climenhaga.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (4):581-590.
    We argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr = Pr. We defended this screening-off thesis by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called (...)
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  20. added 2016-12-08
    Montague Reduction, Confirmation, and the Syntax-Semantics Relation.Stephan Hartmann & Kristina Liefke - manuscript
    Intertheoretic relations are an important topic in the philosophy of science. However, since their classical discussion by Ernest Nagel, such relations have mostly been restricted to relations between pairs of theories in the natural sciences. In this paper, we present a model of a new type of intertheoretic relation, called 'Montague Reduction', which is assumed in Montague's framework for the analysis and interpretation of natural language syntax. To motivate the adoption of our new model, we show that this model extends (...)
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  21. added 2016-12-08
    Sober as a Judge.Gordon Belot - 2016 - Metascience 25 (3):387-392.
    In Ockham's Razors: A User's Guide, Elliott Sober argues that parsimony considerations are epistemically relevant on the grounds that certain methods of model selection, such as the Akaike Information Criterion, exhibit good asymptotic behaviour and take the number of adjustable parameters in a model into account. I raise some worries about this form of argument.
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  22. added 2016-12-08
    Coherence and Confirmation Through Causation.Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):135-170.
    Coherentism maintains that coherent beliefs are more likely to be true than incoherent beliefs, and that coherent evidence provides more confirmation of a hypothesis when the evidence is made coherent by the explanation provided by that hypothesis. Although probabilistic models of credence ought to be well-suited to justifying such claims, negative results from Bayesian epistemology have suggested otherwise. In this essay we argue that the connection between coherence and confirmation should be understood as a relation mediated by the causal relationships (...)
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  23. added 2016-11-11
    Can the Behavioral Sciences Self-Correct? A Social Epistemic Study.Felipe Romero - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 60:55-69.
    Advocates of the self-corrective thesis argue that scientific method will refute false theories and find closer approximations to the truth in the long run. I discuss a contemporary interpretation of this thesis in terms of frequentist statistics in the context of the behavioral sciences. First, I identify experimental replications and systematic aggregation of evidence (meta-analysis) as the self-corrective mechanism. Then, I present a computer simulation study of scientific communities that implement this mechanism to argue that frequentist statistics may converge upon (...)
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  24. added 2016-10-13
    The Undetectable Difference: An Experimental Look at the ‘Problem’ of P-Values.William M. Goodman - 2010 - Statistical Literacy Website/Papers: Www.Statlit.Org/Pdf/2010GoodmanASA.Pdf.
    In the face of continuing assumptions by many scientists and journal editors that p-values provide a gold standard for inference, counter warnings are published periodically. But the core problem is not with p-values, per se. A finding that “p-value is less than α” could merely signal that a critical value has been exceeded. The question is why, when estimating a parameter, we provide a range (a confidence interval), but when testing a hypothesis about a parameter (e.g. µ = x) we (...)
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  25. added 2016-09-10
    Book Review, Earman "Bayes or Bust" 1993. [REVIEW]Ludwig Fahrbach - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (1):127-131.
  26. added 2016-08-02
    How Explanation Guides Confirmation.Nevin Climenhaga - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):359-68.
    Where E is the proposition that [If H and O were true, H would explain O], William Roche and Elliot Sober have argued that P(H|O&E) = P(H|O). In this paper I argue that not only is this equality not generally true, it is false in the very kinds of cases that Roche and Sober focus on, involving frequency data. In fact, in such cases O raises the probability of H only given that there is an explanatory connection between them.
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  27. added 2016-07-28
    Understanding (With) Toy Models.Alexander Reutlinger, Dominik Hangleiter & Stephan Hartmann - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx005.
    Toy models are highly idealized and extremely simple models. Although they are omnipresent across scientific disciplines, toy models are a surprisingly under-appreciated subject in the philosophy of science. The main philosophical puzzle regarding toy models is that it is an unsettled question what the epistemic goal of toy modeling is. One promising proposal for answering this question is the claim that the epistemic goal of toy models is to provide individual scientists with understanding. The aim of this paper is to (...)
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  28. added 2016-06-30
    Confirmation Versus Falsificationism.Ray Scott Percival - 2015 - In Robin L. Cautin & Scott O. Lilienfeld (eds.), Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology.
    Confirmation and falsification are different strategies for testing theories and characterizing the outcomes of those tests. Roughly speaking, confirmation is the act of using evidence or reason to verify or certify that a statement is true, definite, or approximately true, whereas falsification is the act of classifying a statement as false in the light of observation reports. After expounding the intellectual history behind confirmation and falsificationism, reaching back to Plato and Aristotle, I survey some of the main controversial issues and (...)
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  29. added 2016-03-31
    Objective Evidence and Absence: Comment on Sober.Michael Strevens - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (1):91 - 100.
    Elliott Sober argues that the statistical slogan “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” cannot be taken literally: it must be interpreted charitably as claiming that the absence of evidence is (typically) not very much evidence of absence. I offer an alternative interpretation, on which the slogan claims that absence of evidence is (typically) not objective evidence of absence. I sketch a definition of objective evidence, founded in the notion of an epistemically objective likelihood, and I show that in (...)
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  30. added 2016-03-31
    Reply to Crupi Et Al.'s ‘Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence’.Franz Huber - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):213-215.
    Crupi et al. propose a generalization of Bayesian confirmation theory that they claim to adequately deal with confirmation by uncertain evidence. Consider a series of points of time t0, . . . , ti, . . . , tn such that the agent’s subjective probability for an atomic proposition E changes from Pr0 at t0 to . . . to Pri at ti to . . . to Prn at tn. It is understood that the agent’s subjective probabilities change for (...)
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  31. added 2016-03-31
    Assessing Theories, Bayes Style.Franz Huber - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):89-118.
    The problem addressed in this paper is “the main epistemic problem concerning science”, viz. “the explication of how we compare and evaluate theories [...] in the light of the available evidence” (van Fraassen, BC, 1983, Theory comparison and relevant Evidence. In J. Earman (Ed.), Testing scientific theories (pp. 27–42). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Sections 1– 3 contain the general plausibility-informativeness theory of theory assessment. In a nutshell, the message is (1) that there are two values a theory should exhibit: (...)
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  32. added 2016-03-31
    The Logic of Confirmation.Franz Huber - 2005 - In O. Neumaier, C. Sedmak & M. Zichy (eds.), Philosophische Perspektiven. Beiträge zum VII. Internationalen Kongress der ÖGP. Ontos.
    The paper presents a new analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy, differing from the one in Carnap. Hempel, so it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true theories, and another aiming at informative theories. However, so the analysis continues, he also realized that these two concepts were conflicting, and so he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. It is then shown that one can have the cake and eat it: (...)
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  33. added 2016-03-29
    Hempel’s Logic of Confirmation.Franz Huber - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):181-189.
    This paper presents a new analysis of C.G. Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation [Hempel C. G. (1945). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press, pp. 3–51.], differing from the one Carnap gave in §87 of his [1962. Logical foundations of probability (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]. Hempel, it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true hypotheses and another (...)
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  34. added 2016-03-11
    Mystery and the Evidential Impact of Unexplainables.Matteo Colombo & Dominik Klein - 2018 - Episteme 15 (4):463-475.
    How should the information that a proposition p is a mystery impact your credence in p? To answer this question, we first provide a taxonomy of mysteries; then, we develop a test to distinguish two types of mysteries. When faced with mysteries of the first type, rational epistemic agents should lower their credence in p upon learning that p is a mystery. The same information should not impact agents’ credence in p, when they face mysteries of the second type. Our (...)
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  35. added 2016-03-04
    Model Robustness as a Confirmatory Virtue: The Case of Climate Science.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:58-68.
    I propose a distinct type of robustness, which I suggest can support a confirmatory role in scientific reasoning, contrary to the usual philosophical claims. In model robustness, repeated production of the empirically successful model prediction or retrodiction against a background of independentlysupported and varying model constructions, within a group of models containing a shared causal factor, may suggest how confident we can be in the causal factor and predictions/retrodictions, especially once supported by a variety of evidence framework. I present climate (...)
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  36. added 2016-02-29
    Reference Models: Using Models to Turn Data Into Evidence.Teru Miyake - unknown
    Reference models of the earth’s interior play an important role in the acquisition of knowledge about the earth’s interior and the earth as a whole. Such models are used as a sort of standard reference against which data are compared. I argue that the use of reference models merits more attention than it has gotten so far in the literature on models, for it is an example of a method of doing science that has a long and significant history, and (...)
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  37. added 2015-09-21
    Warum erfolgreiche Prognosen neuartiger Phänomene methodologisch wertvoll sind.Gregor Betz - 2010 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (2):329-332.
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  38. added 2015-09-06
    Bootstrapping in Un-Natural Sciences: Archaeological Theory Testing.Alison Wylie - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:314 - 321.
    Several difficulties have been raised concerning applicability of Glymour's model to developing and "un-natural" sciences, those contexts in which he claims it should be most clearly instantiated. An analysis of testing in such a field, archaeology, indicates that while bootstrapping may be realized in general outline, practice necessarily departs from the ideal in at least three important respects 1) it is not strictly theory contained, 2) the theory-mediated inference from evidence to test hypothesis is not exclusively deductive and, 3) structural (...)
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  39. added 2015-09-01
    A More Fulfilling (and Frustrating) Take on Reflexive Predictions.Matthew Kopec - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1249-1259.
    Even though social scientists continue to discuss the problems posed by self-fulfilling and self-frustrating predictions, philosophers of science have ignored the topic since the 1970s. Back then, the prevailing view was that the methodological problems posed by reflexive predictions are either minor or easily avoided. I believe that this consensus was premature, ultimately relying on an overly narrow understanding of the phenomenon. I present an improved way to understand reflexive predictions (framed in probabilistic terms) and show that, once such predictions (...)
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  40. added 2015-08-13
    Failure of Calibration is Typical.Gordon Belot - 2013 - Statistics and Probability Letters 83:2316--2318.
    Schervish (1985b) showed that every forecasting system is noncalibrated for uncountably many data sequences that it might see. This result is strengthened here: from a topological point of view, failure of calibration is typical and calibration rare. Meanwhile, Bayesian forecasters are certain that they are calibrated---this invites worries about the connection between Bayesianism and rationality.
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  41. added 2015-07-09
    On the Correct Interpretation of P Values and the Importance of Random Variables.Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1777-1793.
    The p value is the probability under the null hypothesis of obtaining an experimental result that is at least as extreme as the one that we have actually obtained. That probability plays a crucial role in frequentist statistical inferences. But if we take the word ‘extreme’ to mean ‘improbable’, then we can show that this type of inference can be very problematic. In this paper, I argue that it is a mistake to make such an interpretation. Under minimal assumptions about (...)
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  42. added 2014-11-11
    Essay Review: Isaac Newton's Scientific Method by William Harper. [REVIEW]Teru Miyake - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):310-316.
  43. added 2014-10-22
    Bayesian Confirmation.Roberto Festa - 1999 - In M. C. Galavotti & A. Pagnini (eds.), Experience, Reality, and Scientific Explanation. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 55–87.
  44. added 2014-09-04
    Probabilistic Measures of Coherence: From Adequacy Constraints Towards Pluralism.Michael Schippers - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3821-3845.
    The debate on probabilistic measures of coherence flourishes for about 15 years now. Initiated by papers that have been published around the turn of the millennium, many different proposals have since then been put forward. This contribution is partly devoted to a reassessment of extant coherence measures. Focusing on a small number of reasonable adequacy constraints I show that (i) there can be no coherence measure that satisfies all constraints, and that (ii) subsets of these adequacy constraints motivate two different (...)
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  45. added 2014-08-18
    Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited.Peter Brössel - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):521-553.
    Probabilistic dependence and independence are among the key concepts of Bayesian epistemology. This paper focuses on the study of one specific quantitative notion of probabilistic dependence. More specifically, section 1 introduces Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and shows how it is related to pivotal aspects of scientific reasoning such as confirmation, coherence, the explanatory and unificatory power of theories, and the diversity of evidence. The intimate connection between Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and scientific reasoning raises the question of how Keynes’s coefficient (...)
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  46. added 2014-07-03
    Confirmation Measures and Collaborative Belief Updating.Ilho Park - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3955-3975.
    There are some candidates that have been thought to measure the degree to which evidence incrementally confirms a hypothesis. This paper provides an argument for one candidate—the log-likelihood ratio measure. For this purpose, I will suggest a plausible requirement that I call the Requirement of Collaboration. And then, it will be shown that, of various candidates, only the log-likelihood ratio measure \(l\) satisfies this requirement. Using this result, Jeffrey conditionalization will be reformulated so as to disclose explicitly what determines new (...)
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  47. added 2014-04-02
    Popper's Measure of Corroboration and P(H|B).Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs029.
    This article shows that Popper’s measure of corroboration is inapplicable if, as Popper argued, the logical probability of synthetic universal statements is zero relative to any evidence that we might possess. It goes on to show that Popper’s definition of degree of testability, in terms of degree of logical content, suffers from a similar problem. 1 The Corroboration Function and P(h|b) 2 Degrees of Testability and P(h|b).
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  48. added 2014-04-02
    The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping.David Christensen - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.
    The main appeal of the currently popular "bootstrap" account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisions which involve jettisoning bootstrapping's basic approach to (...)
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  49. added 2014-04-01
    Bayesian Induction IS Eliminative Induction.James Hawthorne - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):99-138.
    Eliminative induction is a method for finding the truth by using evidence to eliminate false competitors. It is often characterized as "induction by means of deduction"; the accumulating evidence eliminates false hypotheses by logically contradicting them, while the true hypothesis logically entails the evidence, or at least remains logically consistent with it. If enough evidence is available to eliminate all but the most implausible competitors of a hypothesis, then (and only then) will the hypothesis become highly confirmed. I will argue (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-25
    Why the Converse Consequence Condition Cannot Be Accepted.Luca Moretti - 2003 - Analysis 63 (4):297–300.
    Three confirmation principles discussed by Hempel are the Converse Consequence Condition, the Special Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition. Le Morvan (1999) has argued that, when the choice among confirmation principles is just about them, it is the Converse Consequence Condition that must be rejected. In this paper, I make this argument definitive. In doing that, I will provide an indisputable proof that the simple conjunction of the Converse Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition yields a disastrous consequence.
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