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  1. added 2018-09-20
    Higher-Level Knowledge, Rational and Social Levels Constraints of the Common Model of the Mind.Antonio Lieto, William G. Kennedy, Christian Lebiere, Oscar Romero, Niels Taatgen & Robert West - forthcoming - Procedia Computer Science.
    In his famous 1982 paper, Allen Newell [22, 23] introduced the notion of knowledge level to indicate a level of analysis, and prediction, of the rational behavior of a cognitive arti cial agent. This analysis concerns the investigation about the availability of the agent knowledge, in order to pursue its own goals, and is based on the so-called Rationality Principle (an assumption according to which "an agent will use the knowledge it has of its environment to achieve its goals" [22, (...)
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  2. added 2015-07-29
    Knowledge Bases and Neural Network Synthesis.Todd R. Davies - 1991 - In Hozumi Tanaka (ed.), Artificial Intelligence in the Pacific Rim: Proceedings of the Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence. IOS Press. pp. 717-722.
    We describe and try to motivate our project to build systems using both a knowledge based and a neural network approach. These two approaches are used at different stages in the solution of a problem, instead of using knowledge bases exclusively on some problems, and neural nets exclusively on others. The knowledge base (KB) is defined first in a declarative, symbolic language that is easy to use. It is then compiled into an efficient neural network (NN) representation, run, and the (...)
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  3. added 2015-04-16
    Systematicity and Conceptual Pluralism.Fernando Martinez-Manrique - 2014 - In Paco Calvo John Symons (ed.), The Architecture of Cognition: Rethinking Fodor and Pylyshyn's Systematicity Challenge. MIT Press. pp. 305-334.
    The systematicity argument only challenges connectionism if systematicity is a general property of cognition. I examine this thesis in terms of properties of concepts. First, I propose that Evans's Generality Constraint only applies to attributions of belief. Then I defend a variety of conceptual pluralism, arguing that concepts share two fundamental properties related to centrality and belief-attribution, and contending that there are two kinds of concepts that differ in their compositional properties. Finally, I rely on Dual Systems Theory and on (...)
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  4. added 2015-04-14
    Knowledge of Rules, Causal Systematicity, and the Language of Thought.Jürgen Schröder - 1998 - Synthese 117 (3):313 - 330.
    Martin Davies' criterion for the knowledge of implicit rules, viz. the causal systematicity of cognitive processes, is first exposed. Then the inference from causal systematicity of a process to syntactic properties of the input states is examined. It is argued that Davies' notion of a syntactic property is too weak to bear the conclusion that causal systematicity implies a language of thought as far as the input states are concerned. Next, it is shown that Davies' criterion leads to a counterintuitive (...)
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  5. added 2014-08-02
    The Language of Thought Hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A comprehensive introduction to the Language of Though Hypothesis (LOTH) accessible to general audiences. LOTH is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in (...)
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  6. added 2014-04-01
    Two Spurious Varieties of Compositionality.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (2):159-72.
    The paper examines an alleged distinction claimed to exist by Van Gelder between two different, but equally acceptable ways of accounting for the systematicity of cognitive output (two varieties of compositionality): concatenative compositionality vs. functional compositionality. The second is supposed to provide an explanation alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis. I contend that, if the definition of concatenative compositionality is taken in a different way from the official one given by Van Gelder (but one suggested by some of his (...)
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  7. added 2014-04-01
    Generalization and Connectionist Language Learning.M. H. Christiansen & Nick Chater - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (3):273-87.
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  8. added 2014-04-01
    Systematicity in Connectionist Language Learning.Robert F. Hadley - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (3):247-72.
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  9. added 2014-04-01
    Systematicity Revisited.Robert F. Hadley - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (4):431-44.
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  10. added 2014-04-01
    Systematicity, Conceptual Truth, and Evolution.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1992 - Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences 34:217-234.
    Smolensky's (1995) proposal for a connectionist explanation of systematicity doesn't work.
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  11. added 2014-03-31
    Explaining Systematicity: A Reply to Kenneth Aizawa. [REVIEW]Robert F. Hadley - 1997 - Minds and Machines 12 (4):571-79.
    In his discussion of results which I (with Michael Hayward) recently reported in this journal, Kenneth Aizawa takes issue with two of our conclusions, which are: (a) that our connectionist model provides a basis for explaining systematicity within the realm of sentence comprehension, and subject to a limited range of syntax (b) that the model does not employ structure-sensitive processing, and that this is clearly true in the early stages of the network''s training. Ultimately, Aizawa rejects both (a) and (b) (...)
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  12. added 2014-03-31
    Directions in Connectionist Research: Tractable Computations Without Syntactically Structured Representations.Jonathan A. Waskan & William P. Bechtel - 1997 - Metaphilosophy 28 (1‐2):31-62.
    Figure 1: A pr ototyp ical exa mple of a three-layer feed forward network, used by Plunkett and M archm an (1 991 ) to simulate learning the past-tense of En glish verbs. The inpu t units encode representations of the three phonemes of the present tense of the artificial words used in this simulation. Th e netwo rk is trained to produce a representation of the phonemes employed in the past tense form and the suffix (/d/, /ed/, or /t/) (...)
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  13. added 2014-03-31
    Language of Thought: The Connectionist Contribution.Murat Aydede - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (1):57-101.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a combinatorial syntax and processes sensitive to syntactic structure. They are not (...)
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  14. added 2014-03-31
    Strong Semantic Systematicity From Hebbian Connectionist Learning.Robert F. Hadley & M. B. Hayward - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (1):1-55.
    Fodor's and Pylyshyn's stand on systematicity in thought and language has been debated and criticized. Van Gelder and Niklasson, among others, have argued that Fodor and Pylyshyn offer no precise definition of systematicity. However, our concern here is with a learning based formulation of that concept. In particular, Hadley has proposed that a network exhibits strong semantic systematicity when, as a result of training, it can assign appropriate meaning representations to novel sentences (both simple and embedded) which contain words in (...)
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  15. added 2014-03-31
    Exhibiting Verses Explaining Systematicity: A Reply to Hadley and Hayward. [REVIEW]Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (1):39-55.
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  16. added 2014-03-31
    Three-Concept Monte: Explanation, Implementation, and Systematicity.Robert J. Matthews - 1994 - Synthese 101 (3):347-63.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), Fodor and McLaughlin (1990) and McLaughlin (1993) challenge connectionists to explain systematicity without simply implementing a classical architecture. In this paper I argue that what makes the challenge difficult for connectionists to meet has less to do with what is to be explained than with what is to count as an explanation. Fodor et al. are prepared to admit as explanatory, accounts of a sort that only classical models can provide. If connectionists are to meet the (...)
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  17. added 2014-03-30
    Connectionism, Systematicity, and the Frame Problem.W. F. G. Haselager & J. F. H. Van Rappard - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (2):161-179.
    This paper investigates connectionism's potential to solve the frame problem. The frame problem arises in the context of modelling the human ability to see the relevant consequences of events in a situation. It has been claimed to be unsolvable for classical cognitive science, but easily manageable for connectionism. We will focus on a representational approach to the frame problem which advocates the use of intrinsic representations. We argue that although connectionism's distributed representations may look promising from this perspective, doubts can (...)
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  18. added 2014-03-30
    Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky's Solution Still Doesn't Work.Jerry A. Fodor - 1997 - Cognition 62 (1):109-19.
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  19. added 2014-03-30
    The Connectionism/Classicism Battle to Win Souls.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (2):163-190.
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  20. added 2014-03-29
    On Clark on Systematicity and Connectionism.Keith Butler - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):37-44.
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  21. added 2014-03-28
    Explaining Systematicity.Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):115-36.
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  22. added 2014-03-28
    Can Connectionists Explain Systematicity?Robert J. Matthews - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):154-77.
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  23. added 2014-03-28
    Cognition, Systematicity, and Nomic Necessity.Robert F. Hadley - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):137-53.
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  24. added 2014-03-28
    Connectionism and the Language of Thought.Mark Rowlands - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):485-503.
    In an influential critique, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn point to the existence of a potentially devastating dilemma for connectionism (Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]). Either connectionist models consist in mere associations of unstructured representations, or they consist in processes involving complex representations. If the former, connectionism is mere associationism, and will not be capable of accounting for very much of cognition. If the latter, then connectionist models concern only the implementation of cognitive processes, and are, therefore, not informative at the (...)
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  25. added 2014-03-27
    Mentalese Not Spoken Here: Computation, Cognition, and Causation.Jay L. Garfield - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):413-35.
    Classical computational modellers of mind urge that the mind is something like a von Neumann computer operating over a system of symbols constituting a language of thought. Such an architecture, they argue, presents us with the best explanation of the compositionality, systematicity and productivity of thought. The language of thought hypothesis is supported by additional independent arguments made popular by Jerry Fodor. Paul Smolensky has developed a connectionist architecture he claims adequately explains compositionality, systematicity and productivity without positing any language (...)
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  26. added 2014-03-27
    Compositionality in Cognitive Models: The Real Issue. [REVIEW]Keith Butler - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 78 (2):153-62.
  27. added 2014-03-26
    Tensor Products and Split-Level Architecture: Foundational Issues in the Classicism-Connectionism Debate.Marcello Guarini - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S239-S247.
    This paper responds to criticisms levelled by Fodor, Pylyshyn, and McLaughlin against connectionism. Specifically, I will rebut the charge that connectionists cannot account for representational systematicity without implementing a classical architecture. This will be accomplished by drawing on Paul Smolensky's Tensor Product model of representation and on his insights about split-level architectures.
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  28. added 2014-03-24
    Does Classicism Explain Universality?Stephen H. Phillips - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (3):423-434.
    One of the hallmarks of human cognition is the capacity to generalize over arbitrary constituents. Recently, Marcus (1998, 1998a, b; Cognition 66, p. 153; Cognitive Psychology 37, p. 243) argued that this capacity, called universal generalization (universality), is not supported by Connectionist models. Instead, universality is best explained by Classical symbol systems, with Connectionism as its implementation. Here it is argued that universality is also a problem for Classicism in that the syntax-sensitive rules that are supposed to provide causal explanations (...)
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  29. added 2014-03-20
    On Begging the Systematicity Question.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:399-404.
    Robert Cummins has argued that Jerry Fodor’s well-known systematicity argument begs the question. I show that the systematicity argument for thought structure does not beg the question, nor run in either explanatory nor inferential circles, nor illegitimately project sentence structure onto thoughts. Because the evidence does not presuppose that thought has structure, connectionist explanations of the same interconnections between thoughts are at least possibilities. Butthey are likely to be ad hoc.
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  30. added 2014-03-09
    Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation.Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.) - 1995 - Blackwell.
    This volume provides an introduction to and review of key contemporary debates concerning connectionism, and the nature of explanation and methodology in cognitive psychology. The first debate centers on the question of whether human cognition is best modeled by classical or by connectionist architectures. The second centres on the question of the compatibility between folk, or commonsense, psychological explanation and explanations based on connectionist models of cognition. Each of the two sections includes a classic reading along with important responses, and (...)
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  31. added 2012-10-26
    The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality.Markus Werning, Wolfram Hinzen & Edouard Machery (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Leading linguists and philosophers report on all aspects of compositionality, the notion that the meaning of an expression can be derived from its parts. This book explores every dimension of this field, reporting critically on different lines of research, revealing connections between them, and highlighting current problems and opportunities.
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  32. added 2012-07-30
    Wherein is Human Cognition Systematic?Antoni Gomila, David Travieso & Lorena Lobo - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):101-115.
    The “systematicity argument” has been used to argue for a classical cognitive architecture (Fodor in The Language of Thought. Harvester Press, London, 1975, Why there still has to be a language of thought? In Psychosemantics, appendix. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 135–154, 1987; Fodor and Pylyshyn in Cognition 28:3–71, 1988; Aizawa in The systematicity arguments. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht, 2003). From the premises that cognition is systematic and that the best/only explanation of systematicity is compositional structure, it concludes that cognition is (...)
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  33. added 2011-12-16
    Hayek in Mind: Hayek's Philosophical Psychology.Leslie Marsh (ed.) - 2011 - Emerald.
    Hayek s philosophical psychology as set out in his The Sensory Order (1952) has, for the most part, been neglected. Despite being lauded by computer scientist grandee Frank Rosenblatt and by Nobel prize-winning biologist Gerald Edelman, cognitive scientists -- with a few exceptions -- have yet to discover Hayek s philosophical psychology. On the other hand, social theorists, Hayek s traditional disciplinary constituency, have only recently begun to take note and examine the importance of psychology in the complete Hayek corpus. (...)
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  34. added 2011-11-13
    “Machine” Consciousness and “Artificial” Thought: An Operational Architectonics Model Guided Approach.Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves - 2012 - Brain Research 1428:80-92.
    Instead of using low-level neurophysiology mimicking and exploratory programming methods commonly used in the machine consciousness field, the hierarchical Operational Architectonics (OA) framework of brain and mind functioning proposes an alternative conceptual-theoretical framework as a new direction in the area of model-driven machine (robot) consciousness engineering. The unified brain-mind theoretical OA model explicitly captures (though in an informal way) the basic essence of brain functional architecture, which indeed constitutes a theory of consciousness. The OA describes the neurophysiological basis of the (...)
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  35. added 2010-10-20
    Compositionality and Biologically Plausible Models.Terry Stewart & Chris Eliasmith - 2009 - In W. Hinzen, E. Machery & M. Werning (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Compositionality. Oxford University Press.
  36. added 2010-06-22
    Frontiers of Life, Vol III: The Intelligent Systems, Part One: The Brain of Homo Sapiens.E. Bizzi, P. Calissano & V. Volterra (eds.) - 2001 - Academic Press.
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  37. added 2010-06-22
    Two Sciences of Mind.S. O'Nuillain, Paul McKevitt & E. MacAogain (eds.) - 1997 - John Benjamins.
  38. added 2010-06-22
    Connectionism in Context.A. Clark & Ronald Lutz (eds.) - 1992 - Springer Verlag.
  39. added 2010-06-22
    Connectionism: Theorye and Practice.Steven Davis (ed.) - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
  40. added 2008-12-31
    The Systematicity Arguments.Kenneth Aizawa - 2003 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    The Systematicity Arguments is the only book-length treatment of the systematicity and productivity arguments.
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  41. added 2008-12-31
    Holographic Reduced Representation: Distributed Representation for Cognitive Structures.Tony A. Plate - 2003 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
  42. added 2008-12-31
    Visualizing Human Brain Function.Steven E. Petersen & Adina L. Roskies - 2001 - In E. Bizzi, P. Calissano & V. Volterra (eds.), Frontiers of Life, Vol Iii: The Intelligent Systems, Part One: The Brain of Homo Sapiens. Academic Press.
    Running head: Functional neuroimaging Abstract Several recently developed techniques enable the investigation of the neural basis of cognitive function in the human brain. Two of these, PET and fMRI, yield whole-brain images reflecting regional neural activity associated with the performance of specific tasks. This article explores the spatial and temporal capabilities and limitations of these techniques, and discusses technical, biological, and cognitive issues relevant to understanding the goals and methods of neuroimaging studies. The types of advances in understanding cognitive and (...)
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  43. added 2008-12-31
    The Role of the Systematicity Argument in Classicism and Connectionism.Kenneth Aizawa - 1997 - In S. O'Nuallain (ed.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins.
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  44. added 2008-12-31
    Systematicity.Robert C. Cummins - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (12):591-614.
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  45. added 2008-12-31
    Classicism Vs. Connectionism.Cynthia Macdonald - 1995 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
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  46. added 2008-12-31
    Constituent Structure and Explanation in an Integrated Connectionist/Symbolic Cognitive Architecture.Paul Smolensky - 1995 - In C. Macdonald (ed.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.
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  47. added 2008-12-31
    Can Connectionist Models Exhibit Non-Classical Structure Sensitivity?Tim van Gelder - manuscript
    Department of Computer Science Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences University of Skövde, S-54128, SWEDEN Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200.
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  48. added 2008-12-31
    On Being Systematically Connectionist.L. F. Niklasson & Tim van Gelder - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (3):288-30.
    In 1988 Fodor and Pylyshyn issued a challenge to the newly-popular connectionism: explain the systematicity of cognition without merely implementing a so-called classical architecture. Since that time quite a number of connectionist models have been put forward, either by their designers or by others, as in some measure demonstrating that the challenge can be met (e.g., Pollack, 1988, 1990; Smolensky, 1990; Chalmers, 1990; Niklasson and Sharkey, 1992; Brousse, 1993). Unfortu- nately, it has generally been unclear whether these models actually do (...)
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  49. added 2008-12-31
    Connectionism, Classical Cognitivism, and the Relation Between Cognitive and Implementational Levels of Analysis.Keith Butler - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):321-33.
    This paper discusses the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis. Chalmers (1990, 1993) argues that a connectionist implementation of a classical cognitive architecture possesses a compositional semantics, and therefore undercuts Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) argument that connectionist networks cannot possess a compositional semantics. I argue that Chalmers argument misconstrues the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis. This paper clarifies the distinction, and shows that while Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument survives Chalmers' critique, it cannot be used to (...)
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  50. added 2008-12-31
    Connectionism and Compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Were Wrong.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):305-319.
    This paper offers both a theoretical and an experimental perspective on the relationship between connectionist and Classical (symbol-processing) models. Firstly, a serious flaw in Fodor and Pylyshyn’s argument against connectionism is pointed out: if, in fact, a part of their argument is valid, then it establishes a conclusion quite different from that which they intend, a conclusion which is demonstrably false. The source of this flaw is traced to an underestimation of the differences between localist and distributed representation. It has (...)
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