This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:
Perception* (14,508 | 1,670)
Emotions* (6,626 | 2,639)
Temporal Experience* (560 | 156)
Bodily Experience* (599 | 217)
Inner Speech* (93)
Pleasure* (948)
Pain* (824 | 592)

344 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 344
Consciousness of Action
  1. Eine Rezension von "Philosophie in einem neuen Jahrhundert" (Philosophy in a New Century) von John Searle (2008) (Überprüfung überarbeitet 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Willkommen in der Hölle auf Erden: Babys, Klimawandel, Bitcoin, Kartelle, China, Demokratie, Vielfalt, Dysgenie, Gleichheit, Hacker, Menschenrechte, Islam, Liberalismus, Wohlstand, Internet, Chaos, Hunger, Krankheit, Gewalt, Künstliche Intelligenz, Krieg. Las Vegas, NV, USA: Reality Press. pp. 33-52.
    Bevor ich das Buch kommentiere, möchte ich Kommentare zu Wittgenstein und Searle und der logischen Struktur der Rationalität abgeben. Die Essays hier sind meistens bereits während des letzten Jahrzehnts veröffentlicht (obwohl einige aktualisiert wurden), zusammen mit einem unveröffentlichten Artikel, und nichts hier wird für diejenigen, die mit seiner Arbeit mithalten können, nicht überraschen. Wie W gilt er als der beste Standup-Philosoph seiner Zeit und sein schriftliches Werk ist solide als Fels und bahnbrechender durchweg. SeinVersäumnis, das spätere W so ernst zu (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception.Eric Marcus - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1205-1225.
    Is it impossible for a person to do something intentionally without knowing that she is doing it? The phenomenon of self-deceived agency might seem to show otherwise. Here the agent is not lying, yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action. This disavowal might seem expressive of ignorance. However, I show that the self-deceived agent does know what she's doing. I argue that we should understand the factors that explain self-deception as masking rather than negating the practical knowledge characteristic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Review of Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. By Neil Levy. [REVIEW]Lantz Fleming Miller - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (11-12):201-206.
    One purpose for the field of consciousness studies may be to increase general understanding about consciousness and its place in human life, thereby possibly aiding us in living in better harmony within our societies and with our fellow humans. Neil Levy’s new work is a candidate for this latter purpose for the field. Consciousness studies may help us better understand how we function as conscious agents—or what role consciousness plays in our agency—and aid in our more just construction of laws, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. The Logical Structure of Consciousness.Michael Starks (ed.) - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
  5. Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 5th Edition.Michael Starks (ed.) - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    e first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Self‐Awareness and Self‐Understanding.B. Scot Rousse - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):162-186.
    In this paper, I argue that self-awareness is intertwined with one's awareness of possibilities for action. I show this by critically examining Dan Zahavi's multidimensional account of the self. I argue that the distinction Zahavi makes among 'pre-reflective minimal', 'interpersonal', and 'normative' dimensions of selfhood needs to be refined in order to accommodate what I call 'pre-reflective self-understanding'. The latter is a normative dimension of selfhood manifest not in reflection and deliberation, but in the habits and style of a person’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention.Joshua Shepherd - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):286-305.
  8. Consciousness and Freedom: The Inseparability of Thinking and Doing. [REVIEW]Samuel Murray - 2017 - Review of Metaphysics 71 (4).
  9. Agency and Action. Edited by John Hyman and Helen Steward. [REVIEW]Douglas Porpora - 2005 - Journal of Critical Realism 4 (2):483-487.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Introduction: Toward a Theory of Attention That Includes Effortless Attention.Brian Bruya - 2010 - In Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    In this Introduction, I identify seven discrete aspects of attention brought to the fore by by considering the phenomenon of effortless attention: effort, decision-making, action syntax, agency, automaticity, expertise, and mental training. For each, I provide an overview of recent research, identify challenges to or gaps in current attention theory with respect to it, consider how attention theory can be advanced by including current research, and explain how relevant chapters of this volume offer such advances.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  11. La Mettrie's Objection: Humans Act Like Animals.Gary Comstock - 2016 - In Gary Comstock & Mylan Engel Jr (eds.), The Moral Rights of Animals. Lanham, MD: Lexington. pp. 175-198.
    A common view of nonhuman animals is that they lack rights because they lack conscious control over themselves. Two thoughts put pressure on this view. First, we recognize the rights of radically cognitively limited humans even though they lack conscious control over themselves. So it would seem mere prejudice to deny rights to nonhuman mammals on the grounds that animals lack autonomy. Tom Regan has been the most eloquent, powerful, and resolute defender of this thought. Second, evidence is growing that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. L’antropologia di K. Wojtyla come sintesi del pensiero classico e della modernità.Antonio Malo - 2006 - Acta Philosophica 15 (1):11-28.
    It seems that the subject around which Wojtyla's philosophical always turns is the person, for whom one could speak of his philosophy as a coherent personalism. This consistency does not depend on the continuity of the same subject, but on the convergence between method, object of study and aim or end of the research. In fact, the person who acts is not only the method (the consciousness of the action), but also the object of study (the agent subject), and above (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. The Experience of Acting and the Structure of Consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (8):422-448.
    I offer an account of the experience of acting that demonstrates how agentive aspects of experience associated with the execution of intentions are richly integrated with perceptual aspects associated with parts of action taking place in the publicly observable world. On the view I elucidate, the experience of acting is often both an engagement with the world and a type of intimate acquaintance with it. In conscious action the agent consciously intervenes in the world and consciously experiences the world she (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  14. Der Raum der Gründe.Hans Flohr - 2005 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 53 (5):685-690.
  15. No-Self and the Phenomenology of Agency.Monima Chadha - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):187-205.
    The Buddhists philosophers put forward a revisionary metaphysics which lacks a “self” in order to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world. The first task in the paper is to answer the question: what is the “self” that the Buddhists are denying? To answer this question, I look at the Abhidharma arguments for the No-Self doctrine and then work back to an interpretation of the self that is the target of such a doctrine. I argue that Buddhists (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  16. What Is Self-Consciousness?Bruya Brian - 2012 - In Labirinti della mente: Visioni del mondo. Siena, Italy: Società bibliografica toscana. pp. 223-233.
    In this article, I delineate seven aspects of the process of self-consciousness in order to demonstrate that when any of the aspects is compromised, self-consciousness goes away while consciousness persists. I then suggest that the psychological phenomenon of flow is characterized by a loss of self-consciousness. The seven aspects are: 1) implicit awareness that the person and the self are identical; 2) awareness of an event or circumstance in the world internal or external to the person; 3) awareness that this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Phenomenology of Will and Action.Erwin W. Straus (ed.) - 1967 - Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Mental Action. Edited by Lucy O'Brien and Matthew Soteriou. (Oxford UP, 2009. Pp. X + 286. Price £50.00).Andrei A. Buckareff - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):401-403.
  19. Kriegel on the Phenomenology of Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):264-272.
    : I focus on Uriah Kriegel’s account of conative phenomenology. I agree with Kriegel’s argument that some conative phenomenology is primitive in that some conative phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to another kind of property. I disagree, however, with Kriegel’s specific characterization of the properties in question. Kriegel argues that the experience of deciding-and-then-trying is the core of conative phenomenology. I argue, however, that the experiences of trying and acting better occupy this place. Further, I suggest that the attitudinal component (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20. Precis of The Varieties of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):240-246.
  21. Agentive Phenomenology.Myrto Mylopoulos & Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter we reflect on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology – that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. Our discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 80s (section 1). As we will see, much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. After discussing empirical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. The Sense of Agency: A Philosophical and Empirical Review of the “Who” System.Frédérique De Vignemont & Pierre Fourneret - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19.
    How do I know that I am the person who is moving? According to Wittgenstein, the sense of agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely on any prior perceptual identification and which is immune to error through misidentification. However, the neuroscience of action and the neuropsychology of schizophrenia show the existence of specific cognitive processes underlying the sense of agency—the “Who” system —which is disrupted in delusions of control. Yet, we have to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  23. The Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Utilization Behavior: A Window Onto Agentive Self-Awareness.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - Functional Neurology 22 (4):211 - 217.
    Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, according to which agentive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by lowlevel processes grounded in the very machinery responsible for motor production and control. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; however, the question of whether their combination would yield a full account of agentive self-awareness (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  24. What Do People Think They're Doing? Action Identification and Human Behavior.Robin R. Vallacher & Daniel M. Wegner - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (1):3-15.
  25. On the Self-Organizing Origins of Agency.J. A. Scott Kelso - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (7):490-499.
  26. Time and the Philosophy of Action.Roman Altshuler Michael J. Sigrist (ed.) - 2015 - Routledge.
    Although scholarship in philosophy of action has grown in recent years, there has been little work explicitly dealing with the role of time in agency—a role with great significance for the study of action theory. As the articles in this collection demonstrate, virtually every fundamental issue in the philosophy of action involves considerations of time. The four sections of this volume address the metaphysics of action, diachronic practical rationality, the relation between deliberation and action, and the phenomenology of agency, providing (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Philosophy of Action From Suarez to Davidson.Constantine Sandis (ed.) - forthcoming
  28. Dissociation During Trauma: The Ownership-Agency Tradeoff Model.Yochai Ataria - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):1037-1053.
    Dissociation during trauma lacks an adequate definition. Using data obtained from interviews with 36 posttraumatic individuals conducted according to the phenomenological approach, this paper seeks to improve our understanding of this phenomenon. In particular, it suggesting a trade off model depicting the balance between the sense of agency and the sense of ownership : a reciprocal relationship appears to exist between these two, and in order to enable control of the body during trauma the sense of ownership must decrease. When (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  29. The Sense of Agency.Patrick Haggard & Baruch Eitam (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. The Feeling of Agency Hypothesis: A Critique.Thor Grünbaum - 2015 - Synthese 192 (10):3313-3337.
    A dominant view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience is that low-level, comparator-based mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive experience often called the feeling of agency . An opposing view is that comparator-based motor control is largely non-conscious and not associated with any particular type of distinctive phenomenology . In this paper, I critically evaluate the nature of the empirical evidence researchers commonly take to support FoA-hypothesis. The aim of this paper is not only to scrutinize the FoA-hypothesis and data supposed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  31. Conscious Control Over Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (3):320-344.
    The extensive involvement of nonconscious processes in human behaviour has led some to suggest that consciousness is much less important for the control of action than we might think. In this article I push against this trend, developing an understanding of conscious control that is sensitive to our best models of overt action control. Further, I assess the cogency of various zombie challenges—challenges that seek to demote the importance of conscious control for human agency. I argue that though nonconscious contributions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  32. The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness. [REVIEW]Kourken Michaelian - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):349-351.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. The Varieties of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Recent work on consciousness has featured a number of debates on the existence and character of controversial types of phenomenal experience. Perhaps the best-known is the debate over the existence of a sui generis, irreducible cognitive phenomenology – a phenomenology proper to thought. Another concerns the existence of a sui generis phenomenology of agency. Such debates bring up a more general question: how many types of sui generis, irreducible, basic, primitive phenomenology do we have to posit to just be able (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  34. Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness Potentials with Non-Conscious Volition.Alexander Schlegel, Prescott Alexander, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Peter Ulric Tse & Thalia Wheatley - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:196-203.
    The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both volitional movement and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. Agentive Awareness is Not Sensory Awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.
    In this paper, I argue that the conscious awareness one has of oneself as acting, i.e., agentive awareness, is not a type of sensory awareness. After providing some set up in Sect. 1, I move on in Sect. 2 to sketch a profile of sensory agentive experiences as representational states with sensory qualities by which we come to be aware of ourselves as performing actions. In Sect. 3, I critique two leading arguments in favor of positing such sensory experiences: the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  36. Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism?Oisín Deery - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):2-19.
    Many philosophers think not only that we are free to act otherwise than we do, but also that we experience being free in this way. Terry Horgan argues that such experience is compatibilist: it is accurate even if determinism is true. According to Horgan, when people judge their experience as incompatibilist, they misinterpret it. While Horgan's position is attractive, it incurs significant theoretical costs. I sketch an alternative way to be a compatibilist about experiences of free agency that avoids these (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Conscious Action/Zombie Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):419-444.
    I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying . I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, conscious visual experience plays a causal role for action control in some circumstances. Second, I propose a multimodal account of the experience (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  38. Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will. [REVIEW]Christian Perring - 2003 - Philosophy in Review 23:299-301.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Affects and Agency: An Interdisciplinary, Psychoanalytic Study.Elliot L. Jurist - 1997 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    There is currently a burgeoning interest in affects across a number of disciplines--philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and psychoanalysis. Yet, it remains unclear to what extent one can infer that a common set of problems and concerns exists. In this project, therefore, I undertake an interdisciplinary inquiry with the aim of providing conceptual clarity about the meaning and function of affects. In particular, I begin with the history of philosophy; then I turn to focus upon psychology--exploring the notion of "basic emotions" as (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Is Mental Life Possible Without the Will? A Review of Daniel M. Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will. [REVIEW]Bruce Bridgeman - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    Though we share an irresistible introspection that we possess a will governing our behavior and not controlled by outside forces or previous states, empirical research shows that such a will does not exist. Rather, actions are triggered unconsciously, and a memory-related part of the brain produces a narrative to explain the behavior after the fact.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. The Awareness of Persons and Moral Action.David Tredway Carr - 1966 - Dissertation, Yale University
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. The Illusion of Conscious Will - Daniel M. Wegner. [REVIEW]Roberto Di Letizia - 2011 - Humana Mente 4 (15).
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Doing Things in Your Head: A Philosophical Essay on Mental Action.Niko Eugenia Scharer - 1997 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
    John B. Watson distinguished between the objective study of human behavior and the subjective study of consciousness. Like Watson I hold that human behavior is the subject of psychology; but there are problems with Watson's distinction. First, most observable human behavior is itself conscious; and second, some conscious behavior does not involve overt movement at all. Many behaviors, indeed many actions, are performed 'in the head'. ;I advance a theory in which behavior is a single general kind; mental and overt (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. The Degrees of Being From the Point of View of the Phenomenology of Action.Cardinal Karol Wojtyla - 1981 - Analecta Husserliana 11:125.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Phenomenology of Will and Action the Second Lexington Conference. Edited by Erwin W. Straus and Richard M. Griffith.Erwin W. Straus, Richard Marion Griffith & United States - 1967 - Duquesne University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Will, Action, and Normativity (Husserl and Kant). / Volonte, Action Et Normativite (Husserl Et Kant).Ion Copoeru - 2005 - Studia Philosophica 1.
    The unitary description both of the thing and of the other allowed to the Husserlian phenomenology to overcome the classical distinction between representation and will and to treat the volition and action as specific objects. In the following paper we shall investigate the basic concepts of a phenomenology of will and action comparing it with Kant's position in this respect. Our research will focus on the phenomenological description of the passage from the inchoative moment of the action to the action (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Evaluating the Case for the Low-Level Approach to Agentive Awareness.Myrto Mylopoulos - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):103-127.
    Agentive awareness is the awareness one has of oneself as acting, or as performing a particular action. Theorists distinguish between high-level , low-level , and integrative approaches to explaining this brand of subjective awareness. In this paper, I evaluate the commitment of both low-level and integrative approaches to the claim that the representations involved in sensorimotor control, specifically as described by the comparator model , contribute in some significant way to agentive awareness. I examine the main empirical data offered in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  48. Conscious Intending as Self-Programming.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):94-113.
    Despite the fact that there is considerable evidence against the causal efficacy of proximal (short-term) conscious intentions, many studies confirm our commonsensical belief in the efficacy of more distal (longer-term) conscious intentions. In this paper, I address two questions: (i) What, if any, is the difference between the role of consciousness in effective and in non-effective conscious intentions? (ii) How do effective conscious distal intentions interact with unconscious processes in producing actions, and how do non-effective proximal intentions fit into this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  49. Improvisational Artistry in Live Dance Performance as Embodied and Extended Agency.Aili Bresnahan - 2014 - Dance Research Journal 46 (1):84-94.
    This paper provides an account of improvisational artistry in live dance performance that construes the contribution of the dance performer as a kind of agency. Andy Clark’s theory of the embodied and extended mind is used in order to consider how this account is supported by research on how a thinking-while-doing person navigates the world. I claim here that while a dance performer’s improvisational artistry does include embodied and extended features that occur outside of the brain and nervous system that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50. The Space of Agency.Jeffrey Malpas - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 344