About this topic
Summary There are two main questions regarding the relation between consciousness and intentional content: does consciousness play a role in intentionality, and does intentionality play a role in consciousness? Phenomenal intentionality theories hold that consciousness plays a role in intentionality, whereas representational theories of consciousness (which go by the labels "representationalism" and "intentionalism") hold that intentionality plays a role in consciousness. Some views bring together these two positions.  
Key works Key statements of phenomenal intentionality theories include Searle 1992Searle 1993Strawson 1994, Horgan & Tienson 2002 and Pitt 2004. Key statements of representationalism include Harman 1990, Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, Lycan 1996, Byrne 2001, and Chalmers 2004.
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  1. Transparency and Teaching.G. Allen - 2006 - Theory, Culture and Society 23 (2-3):568-570.
  2. Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge.Torin Alter - manuscript
  3. Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience.Torin Alter - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The case for qualia. MIT Press. pp. 247.
  4. Content, Object, and Phenomenal Character.Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3).
  5. On the Transparency of Begin: Some Uses of Semantic Theory.Tommy R. Anderson - 1968 - Foundations of Language 4 (4):394-421.
  6. Transparency and the Particular.Zenon Bankowski - 1999 - Cultural Values 3 (4):427-444.
  7. Intentionality and Art.David Best - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):349 - 363.
    A work of art is something which is unlike anything else. It is art which, best of all, gives us the idea of what is particular.
  8. The Knowledge Argument Can Be Introduced Through a Variety of Differ-Ent Illustrations. Here Are Three.(I) Consider a Complete Physical Theory of the Light Spectrum, Including the Effects Different Wavelengths of Light Have on the Neural Systems of Humans. There Are Also the Phenomenal Properties We Experience When We. [REVIEW]John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 179.
  9. A Topological Model of Epistemic Intentionality.Joël Bradmetz - 2002 - Axiomathes 13 (2):127-146.
    Beyond their linguistic and rhetorical uses, the mental epistemic verbs to knowand to believe reveal a basic conceptual system for human intentionality and the theory of representational mind. Numerous studies, particularly in the field of child development, have been devoted to the conditions under which knowledge and belief are acquired. Upstream of this empirical approach, this paper proposes a topological model of the conceptual structure underlying the linguistic use of to know and to believe. A cusp model of catastrophe theory (...)
  10. The Nature of Some of Our Physical Concepts. I.P. W. Bridgman - 1951 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):257-272.
  11. The Nature of Some of Our Physical Concepts--II.P. W. Bridgman - 1951 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (5):25-44.
  12. The Nature of Some of Our Physical Concepts. III.P. W. Bridgman - 1951 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (6):142-160.
  13. Comment on Radical Externalism.Harold Brown - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):14-27.
  14. Consciousness: Creative and Self-Creating.C. R. Bukala - 1991 - Philosophy Today 14 (1):14-25.
  15. Phenomenal Character.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.) - 1997 - MIT Press.
  16. Transparency? What Transparency?John Chapman - 1995 - Business Ethics 4 (3):139–142.
  17. The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities.Nino Cocchiarella - 1977 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 3:219-230.
  18. Pain: Making the Private Experience Public.Robert C. Coghill - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
  19. The Phenomenal Sanctions of the Moral Life.F. C. Doan - 1907 - Mind 16 (62):197-208.
  20. Intentionality.Richard Double - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 31:481-482.
  21. On the Nature and Cognitive Function of Phenomenal Content - Part One.Ivan Fox - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):81-117.
  22. On the Nature and Cognitive Function of Phenomenal Content-Part One in Philosophy of Mind.Ivan Fox - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):81-117.
  23. Phenomenal Depth A Common Phenomenological Dimension in Depression and Depersonalization.Michael Gaebler & Jan-Peter Lamke - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (7-8):7-8.
    Describing, understanding, and explaining subjective experience in depression is a great challenge for psychopathology. Attempts to uncover neurobiological mechanisms of those experiences are in need of theoretical concepts that are able to bridge phenomenological descriptions and neurocognitive approaches, which allow us to measure indicators of those experiences in quantitative terms. Based on our own on going work with patients who suffer from depersonalization disorder and describe their experience as flat and detached from self, body, and world, we introduce the idea (...)
  24. Transparency Tricks.Garsten Christina & Lindh de Montoya Monica - 2009 - In Christina Garsten & Tor Hernes (eds.), Ethical Dilemmas in Management. Routledge.
  25. Consciousness and Absence.James Garvey - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):44-60.
  26. Phenomenal Characters of Mental States and Emerging Issues in African Philosophy of Mind.F. Gbenga & O. R. Taye - 2011 - Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 3 (1):131-143.
    There is a prevalent assumption that the phenomenal character of a mental experience is an ontological property existing as part of the fabric of the world. This implies that the problem of explaining the phenomenal property of a mental experience is a metaphysical one. Contrary to this assumption, the present paper argues that phenomenal properties of mental experiences are the results of our epistemological perspectives of the world. Consequently, the paper contends that in developing issues for African Philosophy of Mind, (...)
  27. Introspecting Phenomenal States.Brie Gertler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.
    This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention alone. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non-causal. DA nicely explains key intuitions (...)
  28. An Introspectivist View of the Mental.Brie Gertler - 1997 - Dissertation, Brown University
    My dissertation has three interrelated aims: to defend introspectivism, the view that the deliverances of introspection should be basic data for philosophical theories of the mind, from pivotal objections which inspire the currently prevailing anti-introspectivist approach to mentality; to advance a substantive account of introspection; and to lay the groundwork for a more general theory about the mental. ;I begin by analyzing a host of philosophical problems about the mind; in each, I isolate the source of perplexity in an epistemic (...)
  29. Qualia Realism, Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents.George Graham & Terence Horgan - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 89--107.
  30. Transparency and Modality.Herbert Heidelberger & G. Lynn Stephens - 1978 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (4):549.
  31. Factive Phenomenal Characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
    This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does (...)
  32. Presence to the Mind: Issues in the Intentional Theory of Consciousness.Benjamin Edward Hellie - 2001 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    Consciousness is often thought to be a counterexample to Brentano's conjecture that intentionality is the mark of the mental. This thought is denied by the thesis of intentionalism, according to which the phenomenal character of an experience is determined by which sort of propositional-attitude state the experience is. This thesis treats two objections to intentionalism: first, that experience is not a propositional-attitude state, but rather a relation of acquaintance or presentation between a subject and an experienced object; and second, that (...)
  33. On Consciousness.Ted Honderich - 2004 - Edinburgh University Press.
    This is not just another book about consciousness: it takes the subject of consciousness forward, out of the impasse into which it has come.
  34. The Non-Necessity of Qualitative Content.C. A. Hooker - 1973 - Dialogue 12 (3):447-453.
  35. Agentive Phenomenal Intentionality and the Limits of Introspection.Terry Horgan - 2007 - Psyche 13.
    I explore the prospects for overcoming the prima facie tension in the following four claims, all of which I accept: the phenomenal character of experience is narrow; virtually all aspects of the phenomenal character of experience are intentional; the most fundamental kind of mental intentionality is fully constituted by phenomenal character; and yet introspection does not by itself reliably generate answers to certain philosophically important questions about the phenomenally constituted intentional content of experience. The apparent tension results from the following (...)
  36. State Consciousness Revisited.Pierre Jacob - 1996 - Acta Analytica 11 (16):29-54.
    I try to reconcile Dretske's representational theory of conscious mental states with Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory of conscious mental states by arguing that Rosenthal's HOT can make room for the notion of a state of consciousness whereby an invidual may be conscious of an object or property without thereby being conscious of being in such a state.
  37. Consciousness, Intentionality and Function.Pierre Jacob - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):195-200.
    I examine and criticize John Searle's view of the relationships between consciousness, intentionality and function.
  38. Art and Intentionality.Daniel Kolak - 1990 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48 (2):158-162.
  39. And Transparency.Ronald W. Langacker - 1999 - In Andreas Blank & Peter Koch (eds.), Historical Semantics and Cognition. Mouton de Gruyter. pp. 13--147.
  40. The Problem of Intentionality in Recent Analytic Philosophy.Thomas Michael Lennon - 1968 - Dissertation, The Ohio State University
  41. The Development of Intentionality and the Role of Consciousness.M. Lewis - 1990 - Psychological Inquiry 1:231-247.
  42. Phenomenal Character and the Myth of the Given.Caleb Liang - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Research 31:21-36.
    In “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” Alston argues against Sellars’s position in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) that there is no nonconceptual cognition. According to him, Sellars ignores phenomenal look-concepts that capture the phenomenal character of experience. I contend that the Sellarsian can agree that the phenomenal aspect of looks should be accommodated, but he is not thereby forced to concede a form of the nonconceptual Given. I examine some of Alston’s arguments, especially the Fineness of (...)
  43. Phenomenal Impressions.Eric Lormand - 2005 - In T.S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 316--353.
  44. The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):17-35.
  45. Naturalizing the Mind By Fred Dretske Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996. Pp. Xiii + 208.Cynthia Macdonald - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-.
  46. Intrinsic Versus Contrived Intentionality.Donald M. MacKay - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):149.
  47. Phenomenal Presence.Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.) - forthcoming
  48. Intentionality and Mental Acts.Ausonio Marras - 1967 - Dissertation, Duke University
  49. The Contingency of Consciousness.Steve Martinot - 1992 - Auslegung 18 (1):39-67.
  50. The Lightness of a Transparent Surface in Metelli’s Model of Phenomenal Transparency.Sergio Cesare Masin - 1987 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (4):263-265.
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