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1 — 50 / 73
  1. added 2018-09-06
    Theorizing About a Mystical Approach.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - Oxford: Create Space.
    The theme of the work concerns the so-called ‘unity experience’ of these mystics. The unity or oneness or the realization of ‘being oned’ with, can be referred to the beatific vision. In the case of Christian mystics it is unity experience of The Gottheit (or Godhead) of Meister Eckhart, in Sufism it is being united with The Beloved, in Buddhism it could be said to realize The Buddha mind or Cosmic Buddha’s consciousness and in Vedanta, the realization of The One (...)
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  2. added 2018-08-29
    Cognitive Phenomenology and Metacognitive Feelings.Santiago Arango‐Muñoz - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believ- ing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phe- nomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of non- sensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the- tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt (...)
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  3. added 2018-08-08
    Concept of Guna in Indian Philosophical Systems: A Cognitive Science Perspective.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - manuscript
    Indian spiritual and philosophical systems are essentially cognitive scientific in nature. Having origin in the Upanishads all Indian philosophical systems supplemented and complemented one another to develop a comprehensive source book of cognitive science. The nature and form of consciousness, mind and its functions are extensively dealt with and discussed from Upanishads through Buddhism, Jainism, Viseshaka, Nyaya, Yoga, Samkhya, Poorva Meemamsa,and Uttara Meemaams, Sabdabrahma Siddhanta contributing to many concepts which have relevance to cognitive science and language acquisition and communication. In (...)
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  4. added 2018-04-10
    Solving Tye’s ‘Philosophical Problems of Consciousness’ (and Some More).J. H. Van Hateren - manuscript
    A recently developed computational and neurobiological theory of phenomenal consciousness is applied to a series of persistent philosophical problems of consciousness (in recent formulations by Tye, Searle, and Chalmers). Each problem has a clear solution, as is briefly explained here.
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  5. added 2018-03-19
    Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):774-778.
    Papineau in his book provides a detailed defense of physicalism via what has recently been dubbed the “phenomenal concept strategy”. I share his enthusiasm for this approach. But I disagree with his account of how a physicalist should respond to the conceivability arguments. Also I argue that his appeal to teleosemantics in explaining mental quotation is more like a promissory note than an actual theory.
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  6. added 2018-03-12
    Singularidade fenomênica e conteúdo perceptivo.Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (1):67-91.
    The most prominent theories of perceptual content are incapable of accounting for the phenomenal particularity of perceptual experience. This difficulty, or so I argue, springs from the absence of a series of distinctions that end up turning the problem apparently unsolvable. After briefly examining the main shortcomings of representationalism and naïve realism, I advance a proposal of my own that aims to make the trivial fact of perceptually experiencing a particular object as such philosophically unproblematic. Though I am well aware (...)
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  7. added 2018-02-24
    On Experiencing Meaning: Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and Sinewave Speech.John Joseph Dorsch - 2017 - Phenomenology and Mind 12:218-227.
    Upon first hearing sinewaves, all that can be discerned are beeps and whistles. But after hearing the original speech, the beeps and whistles sound like speech. The difference between these two episodes undoubtedly involves an alteration in phenomenal character. O’Callaghan (2011) argues that this alteration is non-sensory, but he leaves open the possibility of attributing it to some other source, e.g. cognition. I discuss whether the alteration in phenomenal character involved in sinewave speech provides evidence for cognitive phenomenology. I defend (...)
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  8. added 2018-02-17
    Humans, Animals, Machines: Blurring Boundaries.Glen Mazis - 2008 - State University of New York Press.
    _Examines the overlap and blurring of boundaries among humans, animals, and machines._.
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  9. added 2018-02-17
    Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2008 - MIT Press.
    We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called "the phenomenal-concept strategy," which holds that we possess a range of special concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences. In Consciousness Revisited, the philosopher Michael Tye, until now a proponent of the the phenomenal-concept strategy, argues that the strategy (...)
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  10. added 2017-09-28
    LIMITS OF HUMAN SENSES, Consciousness and Awareness.Ulrich De Balbian - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    LIMITS OF HUMAN SENSES, Consciousness and Awareness -/- ULRICH DE BALBIAN -/- Meta-Philosophy Research Center My art makes the invisible visible, limits of human awareness -/- 1 Human consciousness and awareness is restricted by stereotypes and notions that cause philosophers and artists to exist in the dark ages as far as their perception and understanding of human inner and outer senses are concerned. Humans perceive 7 colors of rainbows with 16 to 37 or more colors, that are perceived by other (...)
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  11. added 2017-09-18
    Where Experiences Are: Dualist, Physicalist, Enactive and Reflexive Accounts of Phenomenal Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):547-563.
    Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind. Enactive and reflexive models of perception try to resolve this impasse with a form of “externalism” that challenges the assumption that experiences must either be nowhere or in the brain. However, they are externalist in very different ways. Insofar as they locate experiences anywhere, enactive models locate conscious (...)
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  12. added 2017-09-11
    Content, Object, and Phenomenal Character.Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves - 2012 - Principia, an International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):417-449.
    The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, (...)
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  13. added 2017-07-21
    Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and the AHA! Experience.John Joseph Dorsch - 2016 - Phenomenology and Mind 10:108-121.
    Elijah Chudnoff’s case for irreducible cognitive phenomenology hinges on seeming to see the truth of a mathematical proposition (Chudnoff 2015). In the following, I develop an augmented version of Chudnoff’s case, not based on seeming to see, or intuition, but based on being in a state with presentational phenomenology of high-level content. In contrast to other cases for cognitive phenomenology, those based on Strawson’s case (Strawson 2011), I argue that the case presented here is able to withstand counterarguments, which attempt (...)
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  14. added 2017-07-07
    Predictive Processing and the Phenomenology of Time Consciousness: A Hierarchical Extension of Rick Grush’s Trajectory Estimation Model.Wanja Wiese - 2017 - Philosophy and Predictive Processing.
    This chapter explores to what extent some core ideas of predictive processing can be applied to the phenomenology of time consciousness. The focus is on the experienced continuity of consciously perceived, temporally extended phenomena (such as enduring processes and successions of events). The main claim is that the hierarchy of representations posited by hierarchical predictive processing models can contribute to a deepened understanding of the continuity of consciousness. Computationally, such models show that sequences of events can be represented as states (...)
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  15. added 2017-05-16
    Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Noûs:1-50.
    I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.
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  16. added 2017-02-04
    Critics of Computationalism and semantic aspects of phenomenal consciousness.Baryshnikov Pavel - 2017 - Philosphical Probllems of IT and Cyberspace 12 (2):14-30.
    This article focuses on the methodological basis for the criticism of the computationalism and “computer metaphor” in the philosophy of cognitive sciences. We suppose that the computational paradigm is the direct consequence of the theoretical confusion of phenomenal and cognitive kinds of experience. Cognitive processes, considered as the forms of computational description, are available for computer modelling. That implies the strong position of the computer metaphor in the neuroscience. In our opinion the key problem is the vague ontological nature of (...)
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  17. added 2016-12-08
    Phenomenal Character Revisited.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):465 - 467.
  18. added 2016-09-08
    The Varieties of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Tom Mcclelland - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):871-874.
    Review of Uriah Kriegel's 'The Varieties of Consciousness'.
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  19. added 2016-09-02
    The Phenomenology of Memory.Fabrice Teroni - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 21-33.
    The most salient aspect of memory is its role in preserving previously acquired information so as to make it available for further activities. Anna realizes that something is amiss in a book on Roman history because she learned and remembers that Caesar was murdered. Max turned up at the party and distinctively remembers where he was seated, so he easily gets his hands on his lost cell phone. The fact that information is not gained anew distinguishes memory from perception. The (...)
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  20. added 2016-07-06
    Meaning Generation for Constraint Satisfaction. An Evolutionary Thread for Biosemiotics.Christophe Menant - 2016 - Dissertation, Prague Charles University. Gatherings in Biosemiotics 2016
    One of the mains challenges of biosemiotics is ‘to attempt to naturalize biological meaning’ [Sharov & all 2015]. That challenge brings to look at a possible evolutionary thread for biosemiotics based on meaning generation for internal constraint satisfaction, starting with a pre-biotic entity emerging from a material universe. Such perspective complements and extends previous works that used a model of meaning generation for internal constraint satisfaction (the Meaning Generator System) [Menant 2003a, b; 2011]. We propose to look at such an (...)
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  21. added 2016-02-18
    Does Linguistic Communication Rest on Inference?François Recanati - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (1-2):105–126.
    It is often claimed that, because of semantic underdetermination, one can determine the content of an utterance only by appealing to pragmatic considerations concerning what the speaker means, what his intentions are. This supports ‘inferentialism' : the view that, in contrast to perceptual content, communicational content is accessed indirectly, via an inference. As against this view, I argue that primary pragmatic processes (the pragmatic processes that are involved in the determination of truth-conditional content) need not involve an inference from premisses (...)
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  22. added 2015-08-27
    Societies of Brains: Walter Freeman in Conversation with Jean Burns.Walter J. Freeman & J. Burns - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (2):172-180.
    [opening paragraph]: Walter Freeman discusses with Jean Burns some of the issues relating to consciousness in his recent book. Burns: To understand consciousness we need know its relationship to the brain, and to do that we need to know how the brain processes information. A lot of people think of brain processing in terms of individual neurons, and you're saying that brain processing should be understood in terms of dynamical states of populations?
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  23. added 2015-05-26
    Comments on Susanna Siegel's The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - manuscript
  24. added 2014-12-31
    Communication as Navigation: A New Role for Consciousness in Language.Erica Cosentino & Francesco Ferretti - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):263-274.
    Classical cognitive science has been characterized by an association with the computational theory of mind. Although this association has produced highly significant results, it has also limited the scope of scientific psychology. In this paper, we analyse the limits of the specific kind of computational model represented by the Chomskian-Fodorian tradition in the study of mind and language. In our opinion, the adhesion to the principle of formality imposed by this specific computational model has motivated the exclusion of consciousness in (...)
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  25. added 2014-04-28
    Consciousness of Oneself as Object and as Subject. Proposal for an Evolutionary Approach (2014).Christophe Menant - 2014 - Dissertation, TSC 2014 Poster
    We humans experience ourselves as objects and as subjects. The distinction initiated by Kant between consciousness of oneself as object and consciousness of oneself as subject was a strict one. The rigidity of that distinction has been challenged by philosophers from the continental and the analytic traditions [1]. From another perspective, researches about animal self-awareness are widening the horizon of studies relative to the nature of self-consciousness [2]. These various perspectives introduce the interest about addressing consciousness of oneself as object (...)
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  26. added 2014-03-30
    Replies to Noam Chomsky, Pierre Jacob, Michael Smith, and Paul Snowdon. [REVIEW]Galen Strawson - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):461-486.
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  27. added 2014-03-29
    Content and Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 1968 - Routledge.
    This paperback edition contains a preface placing the book in the context of recent work in the area.
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  28. added 2014-03-28
    Phenomena and Representation.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 45 (2):527-47.
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  29. added 2014-03-27
    Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.
    When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, therefore, it seems to come down to a choice between (...)
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  30. added 2014-03-23
    What is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience?Galen J. Strawson - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):279-315.
    This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008) I take 'content' in a natural internalist way to refer to occurrent mental content. I introduce a 'thin' or ‘live’ notion of the subject according to which a subject of experience cannot exist unless there is an experience for it to be the subject of. I then argue, first, that in the case of a particular experience E, (...)
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  31. added 2014-03-23
    States of Consciousness and Symbolic Cognition.Joseph Glicksohn - 1998 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (2):105-118.
    Consciousness6 carries the connotation of a state of consciousness . It is an emergent property of a gestalt phenomenon, namely the psychophysiological state of the organism . In this article, I extend my previous discussion of states of consciousness , embedding this within the wider perspective of both Gestalt psychology and psychoanalytic ego psychology. Gestalt notions, such as Prägnanz and microgenesis, are shown to be highly relevant to this theme. Natsoulas’ recent appraisal of my viewpoint has goaded me into reiterating (...)
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  32. added 2014-03-20
    Nietzsche's Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization.Paul Katsafanas - 2005 - European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1–31.
    I show that Nietzsche's puzzling and seemingly inconsistent claims about consciousness constitute a coherent and philosophically fruitful theory. Drawing on some ideas from Schopenhauer and F.A. Lange, Nietzsche argues that conscious mental states are mental states with conceptually articulated content, whereas unconscious mental states are mental states with non-conceptually articulated content. Nietzsche's views on concepts imply that conceptually articulated mental states will be superficial and in some cases distorting analogues of non-conceptually articulated mental states. Thus, the claim that conscious states (...)
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  33. added 2014-03-13
    Moral Phenomenology and Moral Intentionality.John Drummond - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):35-49.
    This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “ phenomenology ”: a narrow sense and a broader sense. It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the phenomenal and intentional differences belonging (...)
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  34. added 2014-03-12
    Representation and the First-Person Perspective.Nicholas Georgalis - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):281-325.
    The orthodox view in the study of representation is that a strictly third-person objective methodology must be employed. The acceptance of this methodology is shown to be a fundamental and debilitating error. Toward this end I defend what I call.
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  35. added 2014-02-27
    Commentary on Contentless Consciousness.Peter Binns - 1995 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (1):61-63.
  36. added 2014-02-20
    Contentless Consciousness and Information-Processing Theories of Mind.Philip R. Sullivan - 1995 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (1):51-59.
  37. added 2014-02-10
    The Phenomenal Character of Experience.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2).
    These lectures have been organized around the question of whether there is any good sense in which our introspective access to our own mental states is a kind of perception, something that can appropriately be called "inner sense." In my first lecture I distinguished two versions of the perception model of introspection, based on two different stereotypes of sense- perception. One of these, based primarily on the case of vision, is what I called the object-perceptual model -- it takes perception (...)
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  38. added 2013-12-15
    The Profundity of Absence.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - manuscript
    The significance and use of absence of a thing is highlighted as its presence. The role of absence in various disciplines of mathematics, physics, semi-conductor electronics, computing and cognitive sciences for ease in conceptualizing is discussed. The use of null set, null vector and null matrix are also presented.
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  39. added 2013-09-05
    Time in Experience: Reply to Gallagher.Barry F. Dainton - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In "Stream of Consciousness" I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Husserl (...)
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  40. added 2013-06-20
    Information, meaning and sense Iin the linguistic process of consciousness.Pavel Baryshnikov - 2012 - RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA DEL LINGUAGGIO.
    In this article the linguistic processes of consciousness are discussed at the informational and semantic levels. The key question is devoted to the distinction between the information, meaning and sense in the physical, logico-semantic and historic levels of brain and consciousness. The principal point runs that the human linguistic process of sense producing takes the variety and indistinctness in the cultural presupposition. The modern theories of philosophy of mind relying on the theories of Soviet psychological school propose some new solutions (...)
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  41. added 2013-02-18
    Against Division: Consciousness, Information and the Visual Streams.Wayne Wu - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (4):383-406.
    Milner and Goodale's influential account of the primate cortical visual streams involves a division of consciousness between them, for it is the ventral stream that has the responsibility for visual consciousness. Hence, the dorsal visual stream is a ‘zombie’ stream. In this article, I argue that certain information carried by the dorsal stream likely plays a central role in the egocentric spatial content of experience, especially the experience of visual spatial constancy. Thus, the dorsal stream contributes to a pervasive feature (...)
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  42. added 2012-10-12
    On the Phenomenology of Thought.Joseph Levine - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 103.
  43. added 2011-12-04
    Behavior and Conscious Experience.Kendon Rasey Smith - 1969 - Athens, Ohio University Press.
  44. added 2011-01-25
    Prevedere Il Comportamento. Atteggiamenti Proposizionali E Pragmatica.Leonardo Caffo - 2010 - Scienza E Filosofia (4):98 - 109.
    L'articolo ha come obiettivo quello di dimostrare come il paradigma russelliano risulti più proficuo non soltanto per rendere coerente una teoria semantica per gli atteggiamenti proposizionali ma anche per predire il comportamento di un agente razionale cosa, del tutto innovativa, viste le continue ciritiche nella letteratura contemporanea. Sul finire dell'articolo viene abbozzata una proposta inedita volta alla costruzione di un modello - inquadrato nelle scienze cognitive - coerente per prevedere il comportamento di un agente razionale sulla base di una teoria (...)
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  45. added 2010-08-30
    The Philosophy of Consciousness Without an Object.Franklin Merrell-Wolff - 1973 - New York: Julian Press.
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  46. added 2010-06-22
    Gurwitsch's Relevancy for Cognitive Science.Lester Embree (ed.) - 2004 - Springer.
    He died before cognitive science came together in the 1970s, but his positions on many issues - the self, the other, practical action in situations, the lived ...
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  47. added 2010-06-22
    Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium.Marek And Reicher (ed.) - 2004 - The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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  48. added 2010-06-22
    Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity.James G. Hart - 1998 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  49. added 2009-08-31
    Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
    The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ’No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ’Yes’. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can (...)
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  50. added 2009-08-31
    Intentionality, Consciousness and Intentional Relations: From Constitutive Phenomenology to Cognitive Science.John Barresi - 2004 - In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 79--93.
    In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the (...)
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