About this topic
Summary There are two main questions regarding the relation between consciousness and intentional content: does consciousness play a role in intentionality, and does intentionality play a role in consciousness? Phenomenal intentionality theories hold that consciousness plays a role in intentionality, whereas representational theories of consciousness (which go by the labels "representationalism" and "intentionalism") hold that intentionality plays a role in consciousness. Some views bring together these two positions.  
Key works Key statements of phenomenal intentionality theories include Searle 1992Searle 1993Strawson 1994, Horgan & Tienson 2002 and Pitt 2004. Key statements of representationalism include Harman 1990, Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, Lycan 1996, Byrne 2001, and Chalmers 2004.
Related categories

1375 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 1375
Material to categorize
  1. Précis of The Unity of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):715-720.
  2. “Consciousness and Information Integration”.Berit Brogaard, Bartek Chomanski & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2020 - Synthese 1 (e-print).
    Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory (IIT), Global Workspace Theory (GWT), and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory (AIR). We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize (e.g., information, integration, etc.). We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information (as specified by each of the theories) is neither necessary nor (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness (Part 2).Jun Tani & Jeff White - 2016 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 2 (16):29-41.
    We have been left with a big challenge, to articulate consciousness and also to prove it in an artificial agent against a biological standard. After introducing Boltuc’s h-consciousness in the last paper, we briefly reviewed some salient neurology in order to sketch less of a standard than a series of targets for artificial consciousness, “most-consciousness” and “myth-consciousness.” With these targets on the horizon, we began reviewing the research program pursued by Jun Tani and colleagues in the isolation of the formal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. The Experience Dependent Dynamics of Human Consciousness.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2018 - Open Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):116-143.
    By reviewing most of the neurobiology of consciousness, this article highlights some major reasons why a successful emulation of the dynamics of human consciousness by artificial intelligence is unlikely. The analysis provided leads to conclude that human consciousness is epigenetically determined and experience and context-dependent at the individual level. It is subject to changes in time that are essentially unpredictable. If cracking the code to human consciousness were possible, the result would most likely have to consist of a temporal pattern (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Consciousness: Creative and Self-Creating. Bukala - 1991 - Philosophy Today 35 (1):14-25.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Presence and Transparency: A Reading of Levertov's Sands of the Well.Edward Zlotkowski - 1997 - Renascence 50 (1/2):135-151.
  7. On the Nature and Cognitive Function of Phenomenal Content - Part One.Ivan Fox - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):81-117.
  8. State Consciousness Revisited.Pierre Jacob - 1996 - Acta Analytica 11 (16):29-54.
    I try to reconcile Dretske's representational theory of conscious mental states with Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory of conscious mental states by arguing that Rosenthal's HOT can make room for the notion of a state of consciousness whereby an invidual may be conscious of an object or property without thereby being conscious of being in such a state.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Consciousness, Intentionality and Function. What Is the Right Order of Explanation?Pierre Jacob - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):195-200.
    I examine and criticize John Searle's view of the relationships between consciousness, intentionality and function.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. On the 'Hyperinsulation' and 'Transparency' of Imaginery Situations.Jérome Pelletier - 2007 - In María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    I make a few comments concerning the way Recanati analyses imaginary situations in two realms : : the realm of the fictional and the realm of the ascription of beliefs.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. On the 'Hyperinsulation' and 'Transparency' of Imaginery Situations.Jérome Pelletier - 2007 - In María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    I make a few comments concerning the way Recanati analyses imaginary situations in two realms : : the realm of the fictional and the realm of the ascription of beliefs.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Structure of Phenomenal Domains.John L. Rinn - 1965 - Psychological Review 72 (6):445-466.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):17-35.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  14. The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness.Karen Neander - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):411-434.
  15. God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments.Yujin Nagasawa - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    In God and Phenomenal Consciousness, Yujin Nagasawa bridges debates in two distinct areas of philosophy: the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. First, he introduces some of the most powerful arguments against the existence of God and provides objections to them. He then presents a parallel structure between these arguments and influential arguments offered by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson against the physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness. By appealing to this structure, Nagasawa constructs novel objections to Jackson's and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  16. Content, Consciousness, and Cambridge Change.Matthew Rellihan - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):325-345.
    Representationalism is widely thought to grease the skids of ontological reduction. If phenomenal character is just a certain sort of intentional content, representationalists argue, the hard problem of accommodating consciousness within a broadly naturalistic view of the world reduces to the much easier problem of accommodating intentionality. I argue, however, that there’s a fatal flaw in this reasoning, for if phenomenal character really is just a certain sort of intentional content, it’s not anything like the sort of intentional content described (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Intentionality and Mental Acts.Ausonio Marras - 1967 - Dissertation, Duke University
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. The Problem of Intentionality in Recent Analytic Philosophy.Thomas Michael Lennon - 1968 - Dissertation, The Ohio State University
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Consciousness, Intentionality, and Self-Knowledge Replies to Ludwig and Thomasson.Charles Siewert - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.
    Both Ludwig and Thomasson question my claim that many phenomenal features are intentional features. Further, Ludwig raises numerous objections to my claim that higher order mental representation is not essential to phenomenal consciousness. While Thomasson does not share those objections, she wonders how my view permits me to make first-person knowledge of mind depend on phenomenal consciousness. I respond to these challenges, drawing together questions about the forms of mental representation, the phenomenal character of sensory experience, rational agency, and introspection.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Agentive Phenomenal Intentionality and the Limits of Introspection.Terry Horgan - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.
    I explore the prospects for overcoming the prima facie tension in the following four claims, all of which I accept: the phenomenal character of experience is narrow; virtually all aspects of the phenomenal character of experience are intentional; the most fundamental kind of mental intentionality is fully constituted by phenomenal character; and yet introspection does not by itself reliably generate answers to certain philosophically important questions about the phenomenally constituted intentional content of experience. The apparent tension results from the following (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  21. Information and Consciousness.Shaun Perceval-Maxwell - 2003 - Dissertation, Queen's University at Kingston (Canada)
    This thesis includes both critical and constructive components. It presents ontological and epistemic arguments against reductive, physicalist accounts of consciousness and develops a limited form of content-first dual aspect theory as an alternative. Phenomenally conscious states, states that it is like something to have, are hypothesized to be dependent on, but irreducible to, certain sorts of information states. The cost of this position is not the unity of science but the inflation of our ontology. ;The case for inflation is supported (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. An Introspectivist View of the Mental.Brie Gertler - 1997 - Dissertation, Brown University
    My dissertation has three interrelated aims: to defend introspectivism, the view that the deliverances of introspection should be basic data for philosophical theories of the mind, from pivotal objections which inspire the currently prevailing anti-introspectivist approach to mentality; to advance a substantive account of introspection; and to lay the groundwork for a more general theory about the mental. ;I begin by analyzing a host of philosophical problems about the mind; in each, I isolate the source of perplexity in an epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Presence to the Mind: Issues in the Intentional Theory of Consciousness.Benjamin Edward Hellie - 2001 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    Consciousness is often thought to be a counterexample to Brentano's conjecture that intentionality is the mark of the mental. This thought is denied by the thesis of intentionalism, according to which the phenomenal character of an experience is determined by which sort of propositional-attitude state the experience is. This thesis treats two objections to intentionalism: first, that experience is not a propositional-attitude state, but rather a relation of acquaintance or presentation between a subject and an experienced object; and second, that (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Phenomenal Presence.Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    What kinds of features of the world figure consciously in our perceptual experience? Colours and shapes are uncontroversial; but what about volumes, natural kinds, reasons for belief, existences, relations? Eleven new essays investigate different kinds of phenomenal presence.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Transparency and Teaching.G. Allen - 2006 - Theory, Culture and Society 23 (2-3):568-570.
  26. Transparency and the Particular.Zenon Bankowski - 1999 - Cultural Values 3 (4):427-444.
  27. Consciousness, Intentionality and Internalism-a Philosophical Perspective on Velmans and His Critics-Reply.M. Velmans - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):181-182.
  28. Phenomenal Characters of Mental States and Emerging Issues in African Philosophy of Mind.Fasiku Gbenga & Oyelakin Richard Taye - 2011 - Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 3 (1):131-143.
    There is a prevalent assumption that the phenomenal character of a mental experience is an ontological property existing as part of the fabric of the world. This implies that the problem of explaining the phenomenal property of a mental experience is a metaphysical one. Contrary to this assumption, the present paper argues that phenomenal properties of mental experiences are the results of our epistemological perspectives of the world. Consequently, the paper contends that in developing issues for African Philosophy of Mind, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. On the Transparency of Begin: Some Uses of Semantic Theory.Tommy R. Anderson - 1968 - Foundations of Language 4 (4):394-421.
  30. The Knowledge Argument Can Be Introduced Through a Variety of Differ-Ent Illustrations. Here Are Three.(I) Consider a Complete Physical Theory of the Light Spectrum, Including the Effects Different Wavelengths of Light Have on the Neural Systems of Humans. There Are Also the Phenomenal Properties We Experience When We. [REVIEW]John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 179.
  31. Qualia Realism, Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents.George Graham & Terence Horgan - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 89--107.
  32. Intentionality, Terminology and Experience.Galen Strawson - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. And Transparency.Ronald W. Langacker - 1999 - In Andreas Blank & Peter Koch (eds.), Historical Semantics and Cognition. Mouton de Gruyter. pp. 13--147.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Transparency Tricks.Christina Garsten & Monica Lindh de Montoya - 2009 - In Christina Garsten & Tor Hernes (eds.), Ethical Dilemmas in Management. Routledge.
  35. Postscript: Experience, Thought, and Activity (2002).Adrian Cussins - 2003 - In York H. Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  36. The Content, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Experience.Michelle Montague - 2012 - In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. pp. 47--73.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. The Lightness of a Transparent Surface in Metelli’s Model of Phenomenal Transparency.Sergio Cesare Masin - 1987 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (4):263-265.
  38. Intrinsic Versus Contrived Intentionality.Donald M. MacKay - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):149-150.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  39. Intrinsic Intentionality.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):450-457.
  40. Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus.Tobias Schlicht - 2007 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 10:113-136.
    The dominant position in current debates on the mind-body problem is some version of physicalism, according to which the mind is reducible to the brain and mental phenomena are ultimately explainable in physical terms. But there seems to be an explanatory gap between physicalistic descriptions of neuronal processes and the subjectivity of conscious experience. Some dualists conclude that, therefore, consciousness must be ontologically distinct from any physical properties or entities. This article introduces and argues for a different perspective on these (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41. Intentional Spirit and Phenomenal Consciousness.Heinrich Watzka - 2008 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (2):418-434.
  42. Phenomenal Depth A Common Phenomenological Dimension in Depression and Depersonalization.Michael Gaebler & Jan-Peter Lamke - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (7-8):7-8.
    Describing, understanding, and explaining subjective experience in depression is a great challenge for psychopathology. Attempts to uncover neurobiological mechanisms of those experiences are in need of theoretical concepts that are able to bridge phenomenological descriptions and neurocognitive approaches, which allow us to measure indicators of those experiences in quantitative terms. Based on our own on going work with patients who suffer from depersonalization disorder and describe their experience as flat and detached from self, body, and world, we introduce the idea (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Meaning and Phenomenal Properties in Wittgenstein.Julio Torres Melendez - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):35-49.
  44. Reale intentionalität V.2: Warum impliziert intentionalität bewusstsein?Galen Strawson - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):279-297.
    Intentionalität ist ein essenziell mentales, essenziell ereignishaftes und essenziell auf Erfahrung beruhendes Phänomen. Jeder Versuch, der die Intentionalität charakterisieren will und sie von der bewussten Erfahrung entkoppelt, sieht sich zwei unüberwindbaren Problemen gegenübergestellt. Erstens muss man einräumen, dass beinahe alles Intentionalität besitzt – bis hin zu den subatomaren Partikeln. Zweitens hat dies zur Folge, dass alles, was Intentionalität besitzt, viel zuviel davon besitzt – ja vielleicht sogar unendlich viel davon. Der Schlüssel zu einer zufrieden stellenden und wirklich naturalistischen Theorie der (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Accessed, Accessible, and Inaccessible: Where to Draw the Phenomenal Line.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):521-522.
  46. Can a Top-Down Phenomenology of Intentional Consciousness Be Integrated with a Bottom-Up Phenomenology of Biological Systems?Donn Welton - 2011 - Philosophy Today 55 (Supplement):102-113.
  47. The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities.Nino Cocchiarella - 1977 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 3 (1):219-230.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Intentionality.Richard Double - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 31:481-482.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Intentionality.Michael Wreen - 1987 - International Studies in Philosophy 19 (3):113-114.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Intentionality.Linda Lopez McAlister - 1983 - International Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):71-72.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 1375