About this topic
Summary The issue that normally goes by the label "Consciousness and Intentionality" is the question whether consciousness is constitutive of intentionality in the kind of way entailed by Searle's connection principle, according to which all intentional states are potentially conscious.   
Key works Key works include Searle 1992Searle 1993, and Fodor & Lepore 1994.
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1 — 50 / 155
  1. added 2018-09-24
    Immediate and Reflective Senses.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado & Dena Shottenkirk (eds.), Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge.
    This paper argues that there are two distinct kinds of senses, immediate senses and reflective senses. Immediate senses are what we are immediately aware of when we are in an intentional mental state, while reflective senses are what we understand of an intentional mental state's (putative) referent upon reflection. I suggest an account of immediate and reflective senses that is based on the phenomenal intentionality theory, a theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness. My focus is on the immediate (...)
  2. added 2018-09-18
    La coscienza dell'atto come metodo per superare il soggettivismo e l'oggettivismo in Antropologia.Antonio Malo - 2001 - Acta Philosophica 10 (1).
    The subject we are discussing in this article is very complex, because it involves important questions about the method and the subject of Anthropology: what is the status of Anthropology as a philosophical discipline, that is, what is its place within philosophical knowledge, especially metaphysics, theory of knowledge and ethics? What is the most appropriate method for access to the study of the human person?
  3. added 2018-09-13
    Feeling Fine About the Mind.Louise M. Antony - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: A Quarterly Journal 57 (2):381-387.
    The article presents a critique of John Searle's attack on computationalist theories of mind in his recent book, The Rediscovery of the Mind. Searle is guilty of caricaturing his opponents, and of ignoring their arguments. Moreover, his own positive theory of mind, which he claims "takes account of" subjectivity, turns out to offer no discernible advantages over the views he rejects.
  4. added 2018-08-18
    Phenomenality and Intentionality: A Phenomenological Problem.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy, 27.
    In this paper, I compare the debate on phenomenal intentionality in the philosophy of mind with Husserl's phenomenology. I make a survey of various theoretical options within the " phenomenal intentionality research program ", in order to show how these issues are present also in phenomenology. I focus my analysis on the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology, in relation to the issue of the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality and I argue that, in order to address this issue, (...)
  5. added 2018-08-11
    Les demi-réveils proustiens. S'abîmer dans la concrétude de sa propre conscience.Anne Coignard - 2006 - Kairos 27:143-172.
    Cet article vise tout d’abord à manifester la profondeur phénoménologique d’une expérience proustienne, celle des demi-réveils dans l’obscurité, en engageant un dialogue entre l’artiste et le philosophe – Husserl, mais aussi Levinas – autour de la notion de souvenir. Il s’agit de montrer que l’expérience dont il est fait part dans l’œuvre littéraire, inenvisagée par la phénoménologie, vient questionner les descriptions existantes du phénomène de souvenir et exige dès lors de penser le sens de celui-ci à nouveaux frais. Notre propos (...)
  6. added 2018-08-09
    Mental Action and the Conscious Mind.Michael Brent - forthcoming - Routledge.
    Introduction, by Michael Brent -/- -- Part 1: The Nature of Mental Action -- -/- (1) Skepticism about Self-Understanding, by Matthew Boyle. -/- (2) Agent Causation and Inference, by David Hunter. -/- (3) The Most General Mental Act, by Yair Levy. -/- (4) Are Our Practical Decisions Mental Actions?, by Alfred R. Mele. -/- (5) Practical Rationality and the Problem of Agency, by Joshua Shepherd. -/- (6) Reasoning and the Metaphysics of the Active Mind, by Markos Valaris. -/- (7) Attention (...)
  7. added 2018-07-11
    On the Non-Conceptual Content of Affective-Evaluative Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2018 - Synthese:1-25.
    Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding those evaluative properties. I also (...)
  8. added 2018-06-21
    Ambivalence, Emotional Perceptions, and the Concern with Objectivity.Hili Razinsky - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):211-228.
    Hili Razinsky, free downlad at link. ABSTRACT: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character of emotion, impressed by the objectivist character of perceptions, and believe that the perceptual account solves a (...)
  9. added 2018-05-01
    Alterations in the Three Components of Selfhood in Persons with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms: A Pilot qEEG Neuroimaging Study.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - 2018 - Open Neuroimaging Journal 12:42-54.
    Background and Objective: Understanding how trauma impacts the self-structure of individuals suffering from the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms is a complex matter and despite several attempts to explain the relationship between trauma and the “Self”, this issue still lacks clarity. Therefore, adopting a new theoretical perspective may help understand PTSD deeper and to shed light on the underlying psychophysiological mechanisms. Methods: In this study, we employed the “three-dimensional construct model of the experiential selfhood” where three major components of selfhood (...)
  10. added 2018-04-04
    Consciousness and Emotion.Demian Whiting - 2018 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Routledge.
  11. added 2018-03-19
    Consciousness and Meaning: Selected Essays by Brian Loar.Katalin Balog, Stephanie Beardman & Brian Loar - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    One of the most important problems of modern philosophy concerns the place of subjectivity in a purely physical universe. Brian Loar was a major contributor to the discussion of this problem for over four decades. This volume brings together his most important and influential essays in the philosophy of language and of mind.
  12. added 2018-03-08
    Blur and Perceptual Content.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):254-260.
    Intentionalism about visual experiences is the view according to which the phenomenal character of a visual experience supervenes on the content of this experience. One of the most influential objections to this view is about blur: seeing a fuzzy contour clearly and seeing a sharp contour blurrily have different phenomenal character but the same content. I argue that this objection does not work if we understand perceptual content simply, and not particularly controversially, as partly constituted by the sum total of (...)
  13. added 2018-03-05
    A Defense of Holistic Representationalism.Jacob Berger - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):161-176.
    Representationalism holds that a perceptual experience's qualitative character is identical with certain of its representational properties. To date, most representationalists endorse atomistic theories of perceptual content, according to which an experience's content, and thus character, does not depend on its relations to other experiences. David Rosenthal, by contrast, proposes a view that is naturally construed as a version of representationalism on which experiences’ relations to one another determine their contents and characters. I offer here a new defense of this holistic (...)
  14. added 2018-02-24
    On Experiencing Meaning: Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and Sinewave Speech.John Joseph Dorsch - 2017 - Phenomenology and Mind 12:218-227.
    Upon first hearing sinewaves, all that can be discerned are beeps and whistles. But after hearing the original speech, the beeps and whistles sound like speech. The difference between these two episodes undoubtedly involves an alteration in phenomenal character. O’Callaghan (2011) argues that this alteration is non-sensory, but he leaves open the possibility of attributing it to some other source, e.g. cognition. I discuss whether the alteration in phenomenal character involved in sinewave speech provides evidence for cognitive phenomenology. I defend (...)
  15. added 2018-02-16
    Das Wesen des Erscheinens: Eine Untersuchung über Phänomenales Bewusstsein und die Intentionalität der Erfahrung.Dirk Franken - 2014 - Dissertation, Münster
    Wann immer wir etwas sehen, hören, fühlen oder riechen, erscheint uns etwas. Was aber bedeutet es, dass jemandem etwas erscheint? Was ist der mentale Zustand, in dem sich jemand befindet, wenn ihm etwas erscheint (der Zustand des Erscheinens)? Diese nur scheinbar harmlose Frage steht im Zentrum der vorliegenden Untersuchung. Die Antwort, die verteidigt wird, lautet: Zustände des Erscheinens sind ihrem Wesen nach transparent. D. h. in einem Zustand des Erscheinens sind dem Subjekt dieses Zustandes ausschließlich die Gegenstände dieser Zustände präsent, (...)
  16. added 2018-02-06
    Is Consciousness Reflexively Self‐Aware? A Buddhist Analysis.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):389-401.
    This article examines contemporary Buddhist defences of the idea that consciousness is reflexively aware or self-aware. Call this the Self-Awareness Thesis. A version of this thesis was historically defended by Dignāga but rejected by Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika Buddhists. Prāsaṅgikas historically advanced four main arguments against this thesis. In this paper I consider whether some contemporary defence of the Self-Awareness Thesis can withstand these Prāsaṅgika objections. A problem is that contemporary defenders of the Self-Awareness Thesis have subtly different accounts with different assessment (...)
  17. added 2018-01-13
    The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. -/- Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in principle difficulties with currently (...)
  18. added 2017-12-31
    Representation, Consciousness, and Time.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2018 - Metaphysica 19 (1):137-155.
    I criticize Bourget’s intuitive and empirical arguments for thinking that all possible conscious states are underived if intentional. An underived state is one of which it is not the case that it must be realized, at least in part, by intentional states distinct from itself. The intuitive argument depends upon a thought experiment about a subject who exists for only a split second while undergoing a single conscious experience. This, however, trades on an ambiguity in "split second." Meanwhile, Bourget's empirical (...)
  19. added 2017-09-25
    What Makes Up a Mood Experience.Bartek Chomanski - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (5-6):104-127.
    In this paper I argue that the phenomenal character of a mood experience wholly depends on affective modifications (appropriate for the mood in question) to the phenomenal characters of one's non-mood experiences. I argue that this view accounts for all distinctive aspects of mood phenomenology, in contrast to currently existing accounts of moods, each of which faces trouble accounting for some distinctive aspect of mood experience. I also explain how my view allows for holding both that moods seemingly lack intentional (...)
  20. added 2017-09-25
    Not in the Mood for Intentionalism.Davide Bordini - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):60-81.
    According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience. This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.). Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear intentional. Standardly, intentionalists have re-described moods’ undirectedness in terms of directedness towards everything or the whole world (e.g., Crane, 1998; Seager, 1999). This move offers the intentionalist a way out, but is quite (...)
  21. added 2017-09-20
    The World as-Perceived, the World as-Described by Physics, and the Thing-Itself: A Reply to Rentoul and Wetherick.Max Velmans - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):167 – 172.
    This paper summarised the main arguments presented in "Consciousness, brain and the physical world" Philosophical Psychology (1990) to introduce a symposium on that paper. This was the first symposium on Velmans' Reflexive Model of Perception (the departure point for Reflexive Monism). This summary of the 1990 paper was followed by three critiques (by Robert Rentoul, Norman Wetherick, and Grant Gillett) followed by two replies. At the time of this upload (25 years later) many of the points in the 1991 paper (...)
  22. added 2017-09-04
    Cognitive linguistics and philosophy of mind.Pavel Baryshnikov - 2016 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 50 (4):119-134.
    This paper is aimed to analyze some grounds bridging the explanatory gap in philosophy of mind and linguistic sign theory. It's noted that the etymological ties between the notions of “consciousness", “cognition", “sign" are emphasized in the works on cognitive linguistics. This connection rises from the understanding of the symbolic nature of consciousness and the sign of semiosis as the key cognitive process. On the one hand, it is impossible to realize the communication procedures, knowledge, understanding, decisionmaking, orientation and even (...)
  23. added 2017-08-08
    The Unity of Unconsciousness.Tim Crane - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (1):1-21.
    What is the relationship between unconscious and conscious intentionality? Contemporary philosophy of mind treats the contents of conscious 10 intentional mental states as the same kind of thing as the contents of un- conscious mental states. According to the standard view that beliefs and desires are propositional attitudes, for example, the contents of these states are propositions, whether or not the states are conscious or unconscious. I dispute this way of thinking of conscious and unconscious content, and propose an alternative, (...)
  24. added 2017-07-24
    Phenomenology as the Original Science of Life in Heidegger’s Early Freiburg Lectures.Lee Michael Badger - 2017 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 48 (1):28-43.
    The aim of this essay is to introduce an original and radical phenomenology of life into Heidegger’s earliest lectures at Freiburg University. The motivation behind this aim lies in the exclusion of life from the existential analytic despite Heidegger’s preoccupation with the question of life during this very early period. Principally, the essay demonstrates how Husserl’s phenomenological insight into the intentionality of life has the potential to be transformed into a living aporia. Although this demonstration is set within the general (...)
  25. added 2017-06-24
    Introduction to the Issue: Subjectivity and Self-Knowledge.Marzenna Jakubczak - 2011 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1 (1):7-8.
    The leading theme of the first volume of the Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal is Subjectivity and Self-knowledge. Five contributors focused on this theme consider various aspects of the self, referring either to western authors (Włodzimierz Heflik, Roger Melin) or eastern thinkers (Marzenna Jakubczak), or undertaking a comparative perspective and discussing arguments given both by western and Indian philosophers (Arindam Chakrabarti, Sven Sellmer).
  26. added 2017-05-24
    Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the aboutness of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or "what it'€™s like" aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This article overviews the key views on the relationship (...)
  27. added 2017-05-11
    Can Representationism Explain How Attention Affects Appearances?Sebastian Watzl - forthcoming - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Themes from Block. Boston, USA: The MIT Press.
    Recent psychological research shows that attention affects appearances. An “attended item looks bigger, faster, earlier, more saturated, stripier.” (Block 2010, p. 41). What is the significance of these findings? Ned Block has argued that they undermine representationism, roughly the view that the phenomenal character of perception is determined by its representational content. My first goal in this paper is to show that Block’s argument has the structure of a Problem of Arbitrary Phenomenal Variation and that it improves on other instances (...)
  28. added 2017-02-15
    A Simple View of Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--66.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
  29. added 2017-02-15
    Consciousness, Intentionality and Internalism-a Philosophical Perspective on Velmans and His Critics-Reply.M. Velmans - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):181-182.
  30. added 2017-02-13
    Of Intentional Consciousness.Arkadi Nedel - 1995 - Philosophy Today 39 (3):295-310.
  31. added 2017-02-13
    Comments on the Connection Principle.Vinod Goel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):189.
  32. added 2017-02-12
    Intentional Spirit and Phenomenal Consciousness.Heinrich Watzka - 2008 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (2):418-434.
  33. added 2017-02-11
    Conscious Intentionality in Perception, Imagination, and Cognition.Philip Woodward - 2016 - Phenomenology and Mind (10):140-155.
    Participants in the cognitive phenomenology debate have proceeded by (a) proposing a bifurcation of theoretical options into inflationary and non-inflationary theories, and then (b) providing arguments for/against one of these theories. I suggest that this method has failed to illuminate the commonalities and differences among conscious intentional states of different types, in the absence of a theory of the structure of these states. I propose such a theory. In perception, phenomenal-intentional properties combine with somatosensory properties to form P-I property clusters (...)
  34. added 2017-02-11
    Token-Identity, Consciousness, and the Connection Principle.Jürgen Schröder - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):615-616.
    Searle's (1990) argument for the seems to rest on a confusion between ontological and epistemological claims. The potential consciousness of a mental state does not yield the same effect as does its actual consciousness, namely, the preservation of aspectual shape. Searle's distinction between the consciousness of an intentional object and that of a mental state, which is meant to counter the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep once they become conscious, fails to do its appointed task.
  35. added 2017-02-08
    Modalities of Word Usage in Intentionality and Causality.Herbert Gintis - 2010 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 33 (4):336-337.
    Moral judgments often affect scientific judgments in real-world contexts, but Knobe's examples in the target article do not capture this phenomenon.
  36. added 2017-01-26
    Intentionality, Consciousness and the System's Perspective.Joëlle Proust - 1999 - In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer. pp. 51--72.
  37. added 2017-01-25
    Consciousness and Intentionality: A Kantian Perspective.Ermanno Bencivenga - 2007 - Epistemologia 30 (2):197-210.
  38. added 2017-01-24
    Connection Principle, Searle, and Unconscious Intentionality.Tomislav Janović & Davor Pećnjak - 2007 - Prolegomena 6 (1):29-43.
  39. added 2017-01-19
    Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality.John R. Searle - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:45-66.
  40. added 2017-01-18
    The Contingency of Consciousness.Steve Martinot - 1992 - Auslegung 18 (1):39-67.
  41. added 2017-01-18
    I Believe That "P"'.Norman Malcolm - 1991 - In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  42. added 2017-01-17
    Consciousness: Creative and Self-Creating. Bukala - 1991 - Philosophy Today 14 (1):14-25.
  43. added 2017-01-17
    The Nature of Consciousness.Eddy M. Zemach - 1973 - Dialectica 27 (1):43-65.
  44. added 2017-01-16
    Phenomenality and Intentionality---Which Explains Which?: Reply to Gertler.Siewert Charles - 2004 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 10 (2).
    In Chapter 7 I argue that we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having phenomenal features. According to Gertler, my claim needs, but does not receive from me, a defence against the allegedly rival thesis that phenomenal features are explained by intentional ones. I maintain that this criticism involves a misunderstanding of my view’s implications. In my book I oppose the “rival” thesis only to this extent: where my conception of consciousness conflicts with broad ways of trying to explain (...)
  45. added 2017-01-16
    Consciousness as Existence, and the End of Intentionality.Ted Honderich - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 48:1-26.
  46. added 2017-01-15
    Consciousness, Unconsciousness, and Intentionality.John R. Searle - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):193-209.
  47. added 2016-12-19
    The Sound of Silence: Merleau‐Ponty on Conscious Thought.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):312-335.
    We take ourselves to have an inner life of thought, and we take ourselves to be capable of linguistically expressing our thoughts to others. But what is the nature of this “inner life” of thought? Is conscious thought necessarily carried out in language? This paper takes up these questions by examining Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression. For Merleau-Ponty, language expresses thought. Thus it would seem that thought must be independent of, and in some sense prior to, the speech that expresses it. (...)
  48. added 2016-09-05
    Consciousness and Intentionality: The Face of the Phenomena.Kristjan Laasik - 2016 - Prolegomena 15 (1):5-19.
    In his book The Significance of Consciousness, Charles Siewert argues that some of our phenomenal features are intentional features, because we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having these phenomenal features. In this paper, I will, first, show that this argument stands in need of disambiguation, and will emerge as problematic on both available readings. Second, I will use Thomas Szanto’s recent ideas to develop a deeper understanding of the difficulties with Siewert’s argument. Szanto emphatically contrasts the Husserlian, constitutive (...)
  49. added 2016-09-04
    Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Phenomenal intentionality is a kind of intentionality, or aboutness, that is grounded in phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, experiential feature of certain mental states. The phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), is a theory of intentionality according to which there is phenomenal intentionality, and all other kinds of intentionality at least partly derive from it. In recent years, PIT has increasingly been seen as one of the main approaches to intentionality.
  50. added 2016-09-02
    The Phenomenology of Memory.Fabrice Teroni - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 21-33.
    The most salient aspect of memory is its role in preserving previously acquired information so as to make it available for further activities. Anna realizes that something is amiss in a book on Roman history because she learned and remembers that Caesar was murdered. Max turned up at the party and distinctively remembers where he was seated, so he easily gets his hands on his lost cell phone. The fact that information is not gained anew distinguishes memory from perception. The (...)
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