About this topic
Summary The issue that normally goes by the label "Consciousness and Intentionality" is the question whether consciousness is constitutive of intentionality in the kind of way entailed by Searle's connection principle, according to which all intentional states are potentially conscious.   
Key works Key works include Searle 1992Searle 1993, and Fodor & Lepore 1994.
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  1. At the Roots of Consciousness: Intentional Presentations.Liliana Albertazzi - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):94-114.
    The Author argues for a non-semantic theory of intentionality, i.e. a theory of intentional reference rooted in the perceptive world. Specifically, the paper concerns two aspects of the original theory of intentionality: the structure of intentional objects as appearance (an unfolding spatio-temporal structure endowed with a direction), and the cognitive processes involved in a psychic act at the primary level of cognition. Examples are given from the experimental psychology of vision, with a particular emphasis on the relation between phenomenal space (...)
  2. Causality-Dependent Consciousness and Consciousness-Dependent Causality.David Leech Anderson - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (5-6):5-6.
    This paper has two main goals. First, it asks whether causality is an adequate foundation for those theories of cognition and consciousness that are built upon it. The externalist revolution has reconceived all three dimensions of cognition -- the semantic, the epistemological, and the mental -- upon a foundation of 'causal connections of the appropriate type'. Yet, these new theories almost completely ignore the long-standing controversies surrounding the very nature of causality, and the very real threat that 'causality' may be (...)
  3. Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality in Practical Realism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - MeQRiMa Rivista Di Analisi Testo Letterario E Figurativo 5:130-135.
    1. Suppose that John and Jane are junior colleagues in an academic department of a university. John, who thinks of Jane as his competitor, has seen her flirt with the head of the department. He tells his other colleagues that Jane is trying to gain an unfair advantage over him. He comes to dislike Jane, and often in conversation with people outside the department, he enjoys saying bad things about Jane.
  4. Consciousness and Intentionality.John Barresi - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.
    My goal is to try to understand the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. My basic methodological assumption is that embodied agents, through their sensory-motor, affective, and cognitive activities directed at objects, engage in intentional relations with these objects. Furthermore, I assume that intentional relations can be viewed from a first- and a third-person perspective. What is called primary consciousness is the first-person perspective of the agent engaged in a current intentional relation. While primary consciousness posits an implicit.
  5. Is There a Conceptual Connection Between Intentionality and Consciousness?Wolfgang Barz - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (3):183-188.
    It is argued that Searle’s argument for the thesis that there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and consciousness suffers from serious ambiguities. Searle’s argument is reconstructed as consisting of three premises that contain the notions of aspectual shape and irreducible subjectivity. Having identified two different readings of ‘aspectual shape’ and ‘irreducibly subjective,’ I conclude that each version of Searle’s argument incorporates at least one false premise.
  6. Consciousness and Intentionality: A Kantian Perspective.Ermanno Bencivenga - 2007 - Epistemologia 30 (2):197-210.
  7. Intentions and Intentionality.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Issues – Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche:43-54.
    Michael Thompson recently advanced a “naïve action theory” as an alternative to the “sophisticated” accounts of action displayed by ordinary folk psychology. In what follows I defend the plausibility of intentional psychology and folk psychological explanations. I do this in two ways. First I question that naïve explanations are more naïve than the ones provided by folk psychology and suggest that the latter are phenomenologically prior to the former. Second, I focus on the role of intentionality in deliberation and action (...)
  8. Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution.L. Bortolotti - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):247 – 248.
    Book Information Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Edited by Fisette Denis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht. 1999. Pp. viii + 361. Hardback, US$140, £88.
  9. The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    One sometimes believes a proposition without grasping it. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this proposition. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the phenomenal theory (...)
  10. Consciousness and Intentionality.David Bourget - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the aboutness of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or "what it'€™s like" aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This article overviews the key views on the relationship (...)
  11. Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
    Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: I argue that they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional states are phenomenal states. I clarify these claims and argue for each of them. I also address objections which touch on a range (...)
  12. The Representational Theory of Consciousness.David Bourget - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    A satisfactory solution to the problem of consciousness would take the form of a simple yet fully general model which specifies the precise conditions under which any given state of consciousness occurs. Science has uncovered numerous correlations between consciousness and neural activity, but it has not yet come anywhere close to this. We are still looking for the Newtonian laws of consciousness. -/- One of the main difficulties with consciousness is that we lack a language in which to formulate illuminating (...)
  13. Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Phenomenal intentionality is a kind of intentionality, or aboutness, that is grounded in phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, experiential feature of certain mental states. The phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), is a theory of intentionality according to which there is phenomenal intentionality, and all other kinds of intentionality at least partly derive from it. In recent years, PIT has increasingly been seen as one of the main approaches to intentionality.
  14. Artificial Qualia, Intentional Systems and Machine Consciousness.Robert James M. Boyles - 2012 - In Proceedings of the DLSU Congress 2012. pp. 110a–110c.
    In the field of machine consciousness, it has been argued that in order to build human-like conscious machines, we must first have a computational model of qualia. To this end, some have proposed a framework that supports qualia in machines by implementing a model with three computational areas (i.e., the subconceptual, conceptual, and linguistic areas). These abstract mechanisms purportedly enable the assessment of artificial qualia. However, several critics of the machine consciousness project dispute this possibility. For instance, Searle, in his (...)
  15. Spatial Content and Motoric Significance.Robert Briscoe - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):199-216.
    According to “actionism” (Noë 2010), perception constitutively depends on implicit knowledge of the way sensory stimulations vary as a consequence of the perceiver’s self-movement. My aim in this contribution is to develop an alternative conception of the role of action in perception present in the work of Gareth Evans using resources provided by Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic theory of mental representation.
  16. The Mark of the Mental.Richard Brown - 2007 - Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):117-124.
    [written in 2005/2006 while I was a graduate student at CUNY. This version was awarded The Southwestern Philosophical Society Presidential Prize for an outstanding paper by a graduate student or recent PhD and was subsequently published in Southwest Philosophy Review] The idea that there is something that it is like to have a thought is gaining acceptance in the philosophical community and has been argued for recently by several philosophers. Now, within this camp there is a debate about which component (...)
  17. On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology, Or: What is It Like to Think That One Thinks That P?Richard Brown & Pete Mandik - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):1-12.
    Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental image? In this paper (...)
  18. Consciousness: Creative and Self-Creating.C. R. Bukala - 1991 - Philosophy Today 14 (1):14-25.
  19. Intentionality and Consciousness.Howard George Callaway - 1976 - Dissertation, Temple University
  20. Phenomenality and Intentionality---Which Explains Which?: Reply to Gertler.Siewert Charles - 2004 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 10 (2).
    In Chapter 7 I argue that we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having phenomenal features. According to Gertler, my claim needs, but does not receive from me, a defence against the allegedly rival thesis that phenomenal features are explained by intentional ones. I maintain that this criticism involves a misunderstanding of my view’s implications. In my book I oppose the “rival” thesis only to this extent: where my conception of consciousness conflicts with broad ways of trying to explain (...)
  21. Cognitive Phenomenology.Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - Routledge.
    Phenomenology is about subjective aspects of the mind, such as the conscious states associated with vision and touch, and the conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person ‘feel’ to them, called their phenomenal character. In this respect they are often taken to be radically different from mental states and processes associated with thought. This is the first book to fully question this orthodoxy and explore the prospects of (...)
  22. The Nature of Intuitive Justification.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.
    In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, (...)
  23. Thomas Reid's Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness and Intentionality.Rebecca Copenhaver - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):279-289.
    Thomas Reid’s epistemological ambitions are decisively at the center of his work. However, if we take such ambitions to be the whole story, we are apt to overlook the theory of mind that Reid develops and deploys against the theory of ideas. Reid’s philosophy of mind is sophisticated and strikingly contemporary, and has, until recently, been lost in the shadow of his other philosophical accomplishments. Here I survey some aspects of Reid’s theory of mind that I find most interesting. I (...)
  24. Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental.Tim Crane - 1998 - In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 229-251.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which (...)
  25. Consciousness and the Varieties of Aboutness.Martin Davies - 1995 - In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford University Press. pp. 2.
    Thinking is special. There is nothing quite like it. Thinking.
  26. Fixing Reference.Imogen Dickie - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles, the first of which connects aboutness and truth, and the second of which connects truth and justification. These principles (...)
  27. Conceptual Qualia and Communication.Fabian Dorsch & Gianfranco Soldati - 2005 - In Gilian Crampton Smith (ed.), The Foundations of Interaction Design. pp. 1-14.
    The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether propositional consciousness is always articulated, or whether there can be non-articulated propositions. In contrast, the question of whether propositions are conscious has not very often been the focus of attention.
  28. Bedeutung und Phänomenalität: Zwei Beispiele.Eva-Maria Engelen - 2014 - In Vom Leben Zur Bedeutung: Philosophische Studien Zum Verhältnis von Gefühl, Bewusstsein Und Sprache. De Gruyter. pp. 85-128.
    Das Verhältnis von Emotionen, Gefühl, Sprache und Bewusstsein wird aus verschiedenen Perspektiven betrachtet. Zum einen aus zweien, die versuchen, einen repräsentationstheoretischen Ansatz mit Sprache zu verbinden, wobei exemplarisch für einen neurowissenschaftlichen Ansatz Antonio Damasios Theorie betrachtet wird, und für die sprachanalytische Perspektive die von Michael Tye und Fred Dretske. Das Zusammenspiel von Empfindung, Gefühl und Bewusstsein wird dabei aus neurowissenschaftlicher und aus analytischer Sicht jeweils ganz unterschiedlich konzipiert, aber es wird deutlich, dass die Klärung des Zusammenwirkens dieser Aspekte zentral ist (...)
  29. Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution.Denis Fisette (ed.) - 1999 - Springer.
    The volume is divided into four sections, each section being prefaced by a specific introduction.
  30. What is the Connection Principle?Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):837-45.
    The Connection Principle (hereafter, CP) says that there is some kind of internal relation between a state's1 having intentional content ("aspectual shape") and its being (at least potentially) conscious. Searle's argument for the principle is just that potential consciousness is the only thing he can think of that would distinguish original intentionality from ersatz (Searle, 1992, pp. 84, 155 and passim. All Searle references are to 1992). Cognitivists have generally found this argument underwhelming given the empirical successes recently enjoyed by (...)
  31. Das Wesen des Erscheinens: Eine Untersuchung über Phänomenales Bewusstsein und die Intentionalität der Erfahrung.Dirk Franken - 2014 - Dissertation, Münster
    Wann immer wir etwas sehen, hören, fühlen oder riechen, erscheint uns etwas. Was aber bedeutet es, dass jemandem etwas erscheint? Was ist der mentale Zustand, in dem sich jemand befindet, wenn ihm etwas erscheint (der Zustand des Erscheinens)? Diese nur scheinbar harmlose Frage steht im Zentrum der vorliegenden Untersuchung. Die Antwort, die verteidigt wird, lautet: Zustände des Erscheinens sind ihrem Wesen nach transparent. D. h. in einem Zustand des Erscheinens sind dem Subjekt dieses Zustandes ausschließlich die Gegenstände dieser Zustände präsent, (...)
  32. Three Centuries of Category Errors in Studies of the Neural Basis of Consciousness and Intentionality.Walter J. Freeman - 1997 - Neural Networks 10:1175-83.
  33. The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
    This paper argues that there is no such thing as ?phenomenal intentionality?. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to ?what it is like? (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one?s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of ?phenomenal intentionality? fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of (...)
  34. Consciousness and Intentionality.Grant R. Gillett & John McMillan - 2001 - John Benjamins.
    This book considers questions such as these and argues for a conception of consciousness, mental content and intentionality that is anti-Cartesian in its major...
  35. Modalities of Word Usage in Intentionality and Causality.Herbert Gintis - 2010 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 33 (4):336-337.
    Moral judgments often affect scientific judgments in real-world contexts, but Knobe's examples in the target article do not capture this phenomenon.
  36. Comments on the Connection Principle.Vinod Goel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):189.
  37. The Connection Principle and the Classificatory Scheme of Reality.Oscar L. Gonzalez-Castan - 1999 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):85-98.
  38. Consciousness and Intentionality.George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 468--484.
  39. HOT: Keeping Up Appearances?David Miguel Gray - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):155-163.
    David Rosenthal and Josh Weisberg have recently provided a counter argument to Ned Block’s argument that a Higher Order Thought theory of consciousness cannot accommodate the existence of hallucinatory conscious states . Their counter argument invokes the idea of mental appearances: a non-existent intentional object which is to aid in an account of subjective conscious awareness. I argue that if mental appearances are to do the work they are supposed to, we cannot draw a mental appearance/reality distinction. I provide an (...)
  40. Consciousness and Intentionality: Robots with and Without the Right Stuff.Keith Gunderson - 1990 - In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Language, Logic, and Mind. CSLI Publications.
  41. XI—Writing on the Page of Consciousness.Christoph Hoerl - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):187-209.
    I identify one particular strand of thought in Thomas Nagel's ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’, which I think has helped shape a certain conception of perceptual consciousness that is still prevalent in the literature. On this conception, perceptual consciousness is to be explained in terms of a special class of properties perceptual experiences themselves exhibit. I also argue that this conception is in fact in conflict with one of the key ideas that supposedly animates Nagel's argument in (...)
  42. Consciousness as Existence and the End of Intentionality.Ted Honderich - 2001 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Philosophy at the New Millennium. Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-26.
  43. Consciousness as Existence, and the End of Intentionality.Ted Honderich - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 48:1-26.
  44. Searle's Intentional Mistake.Donovan Hulse & Cynthia Read - manuscript
  45. Consciousness, Intentionality, and Function: What is the Right Order of Explanation?Pierre Jacob - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):195-200.
    I examine and criticize John Searle's view of the relationships between consciousness, intentionality and function.
  46. Introduction to the Issue: Subjectivity and Self-Knowledge.Marzenna Jakubczak - 2011 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 1 (1):7-8.
    The leading theme of the first volume of the Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal is Subjectivity and Self-knowledge. Five contributors focused on this theme consider various aspects of the self, referring either to western authors (Włodzimierz Heflik, Roger Melin) or eastern thinkers (Marzenna Jakubczak), or undertaking a comparative perspective and discussing arguments given both by western and Indian philosophers (Arindam Chakrabarti, Sven Sellmer).
  47. Connection Principle, Searle, and Unconscious Intentionality.Tomislav Janović & Davor Pećnjak - 2007 - Prolegomena 6 (1):29-43.
  48. Représentationnalisme et langage privé : une défense wittgensteinienne du caractère non-représentationnel de la phénoménalité.François Kammerer - 2015 - Philosophie 126 (3):62.
    Dans « Représentationnalisme et langage privé », François Kammerer s’attache à la thèse dite du représentationnalisme qui, au regard de la conscience phénoménale, pose que les propriétés qualitatives d’une expérience consciente sont entièrement déterminées par ses propriétés représentationnelles ; de nombreux arguments ont été proposés en faveur de cette thèse, qui est devenue l’orthodoxie en philosophie de l’esprit contemporaine. L’auteur entend réfuter les arguments les plus significatifs, en se fondant sur des considérations de Wittgenstein sur l’impossibilité d’un « langage privé (...)
  49. On Gilbert Harman's The Intrisic Quality of Experience.Tim Klaassen - manuscript
    I propose that there are two kind's of qualia realism, and that Harman's observations about the transparency of experience pose a threat to only one of these.
  50. Lost Feeling of Ownership of One’s Mental States: The Importance of Situating Patient R.B.'s Pathology in the Context of Contemporary Theory and Empiricism.Stan Klein - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):490-493.
    In her re-analysis of the evidence presented in Klein and Nichols (2012) to support their argument that patient R.B. temporarily lost possessory custody of consciously apprehended objects (in this case, objects that normally would be non-inferentially taken as episodic memory), Professor Roache concludes Klein and Nichols's claims are untenable. I argue that Professor Roache is incorrect in her re-interpretation, and that this is due, in part, to lack of sufficient familiarity with psychological theory on memory as well as clinical literature (...)
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