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  1. A Novel Reading of Thomas Nagel’s “Challenge” to Physicalism.Serdal Tümkaya - forthcoming - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu.
    In passing remarks, some commentators have noted that for Nagel, physicalism is true. It has even been argued that Nagel seeks to find the best path to follow to achieve future physicalism. I advance these observations by adding that for Nagel, we should discuss the consciousness problem not in terms of physical and mental issues but in terms of our desire to include consciousness in an objective/scientific account, and we can achieve this only by revising our self-conception, i.e., folk psychology, (...)
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  2. Proximal Experience as an Essential Part of Physics.J. C. W. Edwards - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):76-99.
    Conscious experience has been said to be outside of, or alien to, physics, and unexplained in a physical world. However, it is argued here that experience is entirely expected in a physical world that can only be defined by its power to determine patterns of experience. Something physical is something with the type of causal power that can contribute to determining the content of an experience if a subject is present at the right place and time. Physical powers also interact (...)
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  3. Does Quantum Cognition Imply Quantum Minds?S. Gao - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):100-111.
    Quantum cognition is a new theoretical framework for constructing cognitive models based on the mathematical principles of quantum theory. Due to its increasing empirical success, one wonders what it tells us about the underlying process of cognition. Does it imply that we have quantum minds and there is some sort of quantum structure in the brain? In this paper, I address this important issue by using a new result in the research of quantum foundations. Based on the PBR theorem about (...)
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  4. Does Synchronicity Point Us Towards the Fundamental Nature of Consciousness?: An Exploration of Psychology, Ontology, and Research Prospects.B. Butzer - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):29-54.
    The topic of synchronicity has long intrigued philosophers, scientists, and the general public. However, to date very little empirical research has explored the underlying mechanisms of synchronicity. In other words, why do synchronicities occur? Are synchronicities random, or do they hold clues about the ultimate nature of reality? Drawing on theoretical and empirical research, the current paper explores the idea that synchronicity might be one way that the fundamental (i.e. ontologically primary) nature of consciousness reveals itself to us in everyday (...)
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  5. Andreas Elpidorou and Guy Dove’s Consciousness and Physicalism: A Defense of a Research Program (Routledge, 2018). [REVIEW]Andrew Melnyk - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2018.
    This review mainly expresses skepticism about the book's central thesis that physicalism should be viewed as a research program, rather than as a comprehensive thesis about what the world is like.
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  6. Illusionism About Phenomenal Consciousness: Explaining the Illusion.Daniel Shabasson - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-27.
    According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. The illusion problem is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to judge—erroneously—that we are phenomenally conscious. I propose a theory to solve the illusion problem. I argue that on the basis of three hypotheses about the mind—which I call introspective opacity, the infallibility intuition, and the justification constraint—we can explain our disposition, on introspection, to draw erroneous unconscious inferences about our sensory states. Being subject (...)
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  7. Ethics and the Mind-Body Problem.Jonathan Birch - manuscript
    Phenomenal consciousness has an important role in ethics: it is plausible that it is at least a necessary condition for a distinctive kind of moral status. There is a mismatch between this ethical role and an a posteriori (or “type-B”) materialist solution to the mind-body problem. I argue that, if type-B materialism is correct, then the reference of the concept of phenomenal consciousness is indeterminate between properties that are coextensive in the case of (fully conscious) humans but have radically different (...)
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  8. Monotheism and Human Nature.Andrew M. Bailey - 2021 - Cambridge University Press.
    The main question of this Element is how the existence, supremacy, and uniqueness of an almighty and immaterial God bear on our own nature. It aims to uncover lessons about what we are by thinking about what God might be. A dominant theme is that Abrahamic monotheism is a surprisingly hospitable framework within which to defend and develop the view that we are wholly material beings. But the resulting materialism cannot be of any standard variety. It demands revisions and twists (...)
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  9. Intuition-Driven Navigation of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Krzysztof Sękowski & Wiktor Rorot - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    The discussion of the nature of consciousness seems to have stalled, with the “hard problem of consciousness” in its center, well-defined camps of realists and eliminativists at two opposing poles, and little to none room for agreement between. Recent attempts to move this debate forward by shifting them to a meta-level have heavily relied on the notion of “intuition”, understood in a rather liberal way. Against this backdrop, the goal of this paper is twofold. First, we want to highlight how (...)
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  10. Plant Sentience, Semantics, and the Emergentist Dilemma.D. Brown & B. Key - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):155-183.
    Recent arguments in plant biology that claim to be uncovering the scientific basis for sentience in plants are grounded on assumptions that have not been sufficiently scrutinized. This paper focuses on two assumptions in particular – the semantic assumption that psychological predicates are non-rigid and hence can be extended to plants, and the assumption that Darwinian gradualism is inconsistent with consciousness emerging at a specific place on the phylogenetic tree. We interrogate both assumptions, advocating that a careful semantic analysis of (...)
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  11. The Biomolecular Basis for Plant and Animal Sentience: Senomic and Ephaptic Principles of Cellular Consciousness.F. Baluska & A. S. Reber - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):31-49.
    The defining principle of evolutionary biology is that all species, extant and extinct, evolved from ancient prokaryotic cells. Their initial appearance and adaptive evolution are proposed to have been accompanied by a cellular sentience, by feelings, subjectivity or, in a word, 'consciousness'. Prokaryotic cells, such as archaea and bacteria, have natural unitary, valence-marked 'mental' representations. They process and evaluate sensory information in a context-dependent manner. They learn, establish memories, and communicate using biophysical fields acting on excitable membranes. Symbiotic eukaryotic cells, (...)
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  12. Differentiating Behaviour, Cognition, and Consciousness in Plants.Q. Hiernaux - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):106-135.
    An enquiry into plant consciousness requires, on the one hand, taking into account recent experiments in plant biology and, on the other hand, refining the theoretical framework of behaviour and the various degrees of cognition. The main goal of this contribution is to advance such a framework by comparing classical animal and human cognition approaches with the theories of minimal cognition. This leads us to interpret more carefully the various plant activities and to highlight the limits of classical theories of (...)
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  13. The Indeterminacy of Plant Consciousness.C. Maher - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):136-154.
    Are plants conscious? Most knowledgeable people say they aren't. A small minority say they are. Others say we don't know. Virtually all assume the predicate '– is conscious' is fully determinate; plants are or aren't in its extension. Appealing to Mark Wilson's work on predicates and concepts, I challenge that assumption, proposing that the predicate isn't determinate for plants. I offer the start of an explanation for why this is so. We tacitly rely on many empirical correlations when we correctly (...)
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  14. Information and Integration in Plants: Towards a Quantitative Search for Plant Sentience.P. A. M. Mediano & A. Trewavas - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):80-105.
    Integrated information theory (IIT) is a candidate theory of consciousness that highlights the role of complex interactions between parts of a system as the basis of consciousness – and, due to its general information-theoretic formulation, is capable of making statements about consciousness in neural and non-neural systems alike. Here, we argue that a system radically different to a human brain, host to complex physiological and functional structures capable of integrating information, can be found in the meristems and vascular system of (...)
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  15. Sentience With or Without Consciousness.A. Nani, G. Volpara & A. Faggio - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):60-79.
    The study of plant signaling and behaviour, whose aim is to address the physiological basis for adaptive behaviour in plants, is a growing and thought-provoking field of research. In this review we discuss relevant studies that try to interpret in a neurocognitive fashion cases in which plants seem to behave similarly to animals. By comparing observations and experiments about plants and animals, we propose a framework composed of three axes in which interactions of living organisms with the world can be (...)
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  16. Sentience in Plants: A Green Red Herring?S. Ginsburg & E. Jablonka - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):17-33.
    The attribution of sentience or consciousness to plants is currently a topic of debate among biologists and philosophers. The claim that plants are conscious is based on three arguments: (i) plants, like all living organisms, are sentient (biopsychism); (ii) there is a strong analogy between the phloem transport system of plants and the nervous system of animals; and (iii) plants are the cognitive equals of sentient animals. On the basis of a model of consciousness that spells out criteria for assigning (...)
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  17. Plant Sentience: Theoretical and Empirical Issues: Editorial Introduction.V. Raja & M. Segundo-Ortin - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2):7-16.
  18. The Mind-Body Problem(s) in Descartes’ “Meditations” and Husserl’s “Crisis” (Part2).Andrii Leonov - 2020 - Filosofska Dumka 5:117-128.
    The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Hus- serlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus “Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’ last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). (...)
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  19. Considering Consciousness, Reconsidering Neuroscience.Biplab Karak - 2019 - In Siddique Alam Beg & Sahabuddin Ahmed Jamader (eds.), Knowledge, Mind and Reality. Kolkata, West Bengal, India: pp. 99-108.
    This paper explores the problematic issue of the theoretical dominance of neuroscience in the discipline of consciousness studies and tries to explain why such a dominance must not be encouraged through the philosophical and logical divulgement of the methodological shortcomings of neuroscience in explaining consciousness. Besides this, the paper also reminds us of the utmost and exclusive importance of 'consciousness' in consciousness studies and rivets our attention to the immense importance of adopting a multidisciplinary ecumenic approach towards understanding consciousness.
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  20. Near-Death Experiences: To the Edge of the Universe.J. M. Fischer - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (11-12):166-191.
    Most discussions of near-death experiences (NDEs) in both the academic and popular literature contend that they establish ('prove') supernaturalism (about NDEs): they show that the mind is not the brain (and can continue after the brain stops functioning), and they bring us into contact with non-physical realms. I believe that the evidence provided by NDEs for supernaturalism is not persuasive, but I offer an alternative, naturalistic interpretation of these phenomena. On this interpretation, NDEs are 'real' in both senses of the (...)
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  21. An Introduction to Dualism: The Mental to the Fore?Filippo Pelucchi - manuscript
    The contemporary debate around consciousness presents us (and often leads us to embrace) a specific current of thought: physicalism, which states that everything in our reality is physical1. In this paper I want to introduce the main points of the opposite view, dualism, according to which there are two different realms of reality: the mental and the physical one. In the introduction I give the main idea and sketch the general intuition behind dualism. In Section 1 I present substance dualism (...)
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  22. The Structure of Unpleasantness.Abraham Sapién - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):805-830.
    A fair amount of the philosophical discussion about pain and unpleasantness has focused on providing a constitutive account of unpleasantness. These theories provide a more fundamental description of what unpleasantness is by appealing to other well-established notions in the architecture of the mind. In contrast, I address the nature of unpleasantness from a structural account. I will argue for how unpleasantness is built, rather than what unpleasantness is made of, as it were. I focus on the heterogeneity of experience, which (...)
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  23. Hylomorphism and the Construct of Consciousness.William Jaworski - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1125-1139.
    The hard problem of consciousness has held center stage in the philosophy of mind for the past two decades. It claims that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences—what it’s like to be in them—cannot be explained by appeal to the operation of physiological subsystems. The hard problem arises, however, only given the assumption that hylomorphism is false. Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. A human is not a random collection of physical materials, but an individual (...)
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  24. Review of Kim (2005): Physicalism or Something Near Enough. [REVIEW]Yaron M. Senderowicz - 2008 - Pragmatics and Cognition 16 (1):177-184.
  25. The Living Mirror Theory of Consciousness.J. E. Cooke - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):127-147.
    An explanatory gap exists between physics and experience, raising the hard problem of consciousness: why are certain physical systems associated with an experience of an external world from an internal perspective? The living mirror theory holds that consciousness can be understood as arising from the computational interaction between a living system and its environment that is required for the organism's existence and survival. Maintaining a boundary that protects the system against destructive forces requires an interaction between the organism and its (...)
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  26. Naturalizing Religion, Spiritualizing Science: The Role of Consciousness Research.H. Walach - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):165-194.
    This paper reviews and discusses empirical evidence from consciousness research, especially research into anomalies, and asks the question what, if taken seriously, would those data mean for our concepts of consciousness, science, and religion. It shows that the process of naturalization, i.e. finding scientific explanations for as yet badly understood phenomena, is not finished yet and could have a profound impact both on science and religion: traditional religious concepts would have to be reconsidered, and the scientistic materialist worldview that is (...)
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  27. Appearance, Reality, and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Giovanni Merlo - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):120-130.
    Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. The first consists in clarifying how the concept of consciousness precludes the possibility of any distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'. The second consists in spelling out our reasons for recognizing the existence of something that satisfies that concept.
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  28. The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):131-142.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal powers view and my main arguments for it and—drawing in part on a similar view developed by (...)
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  29. First-Person Interventions and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.C. Klein & A. B. Barron - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):82-90.
    Chalmers' (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground between otherwise incompatible positions. We argue that the materialist should welcome discussion of the meta-problem. We suggest that the core of the metaproblem is the seeming arbitrariness of subjective experience. This has an unexpected resolution when one moves to an interventionist account of scientific explanation: the same interventions that resolve the hard problem should also resolve the meta-problem.
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  30. Attending to the Illusion of Consciousness.J. Dewhurst & K. Dolega - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):54-61.
    Chalmers (2018) raises three challenges for Michael Graziano's attention schema theory. Our aim in this paper is to bolster Graziano's attention schema theory with some tools and insights from the predictive processing framework, in order to respond to the challenges raised by Chalmers and more generally strengthen the theory. We will first introduce the attention schema theory and the three challenges raised by Chalmers, before outlining our application of predictive processing to the theory and how it can resolve these challenges, (...)
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  31. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.E. Diaz-Leon - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):62-73.
    The hard problem of consciousness is about how we could explain in physicalist terms why we are conscious. The meta-problem of consciousness is about how we could explain why we have a hard problem of consciousness. In this note I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy can in principle provide a satisfactory solution to the meta-problem.
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  32. Two Caveats to the Meta-Problem Challenge.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):74-81.
    I present two caveats to the meta-problem challenge to theories of consciousness. Chalmers suggests that a theory of consciousness that solves the hard problem should also inform us about the meta-problem, and vice versa. The first caveat is the view that mechanism M, the mechanism through which content becomes conscious, may be neutral with respect to the content it renders conscious. This means that there can be no systematic connection between M and conscious content. The second caveat concerns how we (...)
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  33. How Colour Qualia Became a Problem.Z. Adams & J. Browning - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):14-25.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have problem intuitions about consciousness, why we intuitively think that conscious experience cannot be scientifically explained. In his discussion of this problem, David Chalmers briefly considers the possibility of giving a 'genealogical' solution, according to which problem intuitions are 'accidents of cultural history' (2018, p. 33). Chalmers' response to this solution is largely dismissive. In this paper, we defend the viability of a genealogical solution. Our strategy is to focus (...)
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  34. Soft-Wired Illusionism vs. the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.A. Balmer - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):26-37.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is framed as a route into investigating why there are problems in understanding consciousness by describing the mechanisms underpinning our tendency to describe consciousness as problematic, and the evolutionary origins of these mechanisms. This is framed as a means of uniting illusionists and realists toward a common goal, but this supposes that the only viable form of illusionism is what I call 'hard-wired' illusionism, under which phenomenal judgments are a direct product of natural selection. I argue (...)
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  35. Editorial Introduction: More Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.F. Kammerer - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):8-13.
  36. Recurrent Reincarnation.Joel Fry - manuscript
    This article has to do with the idea that reincarnation can be compatible with physicalism because the basic awareness of a person will exist in and as another person in a future life. It contends that the underlying process of awareness can cease in one life then begin in another, even if the two processes are not the same. I refer to this process as "recurrence." It distinguishes process from objects and points out that processes can cease to exist then (...)
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  37. Zeno's Paradox as a Derivative for the Ontological Proof of Panpsychism.Eamon Macdougall - manuscript
    This article attempts to elucidate the phenomenon of time and its relationship to consciousness. It defends the idea that time exists both as a psychological or illusory experience, and as an ontological property of spacetime that actually exists independently of human experience.
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  38. The Many-Worlds Theory of Consciousness.Christian List - 2021
    This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ (...)
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  39. Quantum Uncertainty Reduction (QUR) Theory of Access and Phenomenal Consciousness.A. Nichvoloda - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (1-2):120-148.
    Consciousness is widely perceived as a phenomenon that poses a special explanatory problem for science. The problem arises from the apparent rift between immediate first-person acquaintance with consciousness and our inability to provide an objective/scientific third-person characterization of consciousness. In this paper, I outline a theory of perceptual consciousness called the 'Quantum Uncertainty Reduction (QUR)1 Theory of Access and Phenomenal Consciousness'. The theory offers a functional solution to the hard problem of consciousness in terms of quantum information processing in a (...)
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  40. Distributed Nervous System, Disunified Consciousness?: A Sensorimotor Integrationist Account of Octopus Consciousness.B. van Woerkum - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (1-2):149-172.
    What is it like to be an octopus, one of those eight-armed, infinitely flexible sea creatures with a nervous system distributed over head, eyes and arms? One interesting approach is to argue that octopuses, because of their distributed nervous systems, are likely to possess disunified consciousness (Carls-Diamante 2017). However, this supposed isomorphism between a “unified” nervous system and “unified” consciousness is problematic, since the term “unity” is taken as a “given” even though it is far from clear what it means. (...)
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  41. Consciousness and Information Integration.Berit Brogaard, Bartek Chomanski & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory, Global Workspace Theory, and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory. We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize. We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both (...)
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  42. From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness (Part 2).Jun Tani & Jeff White - 2016 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 2 (16):29-41.
    We have been left with a big challenge, to articulate consciousness and also to prove it in an artificial agent against a biological standard. After introducing Boltuc’s h-consciousness in the last paper, we briefly reviewed some salient neurology in order to sketch less of a standard than a series of targets for artificial consciousness, “most-consciousness” and “myth-consciousness.” With these targets on the horizon, we began reviewing the research program pursued by Jun Tani and colleagues in the isolation of the formal (...)
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  43. From Biological to Synthetic Neurorobotics Approaches to Understanding the Structure Essential to Consciousness, Part 1.Jeffrey White - 2016 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 1 (16):13-23.
    Direct neurological and especially imaging-driven investigations into the structures essential to naturally occurring cognitive systems in their development and operation have motivated broadening interest in the potential for artificial consciousness modeled on these systems. This first paper in a series of three begins with a brief review of Boltuc’s (2009) “brain-based” thesis on the prospect of artificial consciousness, focusing on his formulation of h-consciousness. We then explore some of the implications of brain research on the structure of consciousness, finding limitations (...)
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  44. Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?François Kammerer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667.
    Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of the most common strategies to do so consists in interpreting the alleged “explanatory gap” between phenomenal states and physical states as resulting from a fallacy, or a cognitive illusion. In this paper, I argue that the explanatory gap does not rest on a fallacy or a cognitive illusion. This does not imply the falsity of physicalism, but it has consequences (...)
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  45. Locating Consciousness: Why Experience Can't Be Objectified.T. W. Clark - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (11-12):60-85.
    The world appears to conscious creatures in terms of experienced sensory qualities, but science doesn't find sensory experience in that world, only physical objects and properties. I argue that the failure to locate consciousness in the world is a function of our necessarily representational relation to reality as knowers: we won't discover the terms in which reality is represented by us in the world as it appears in those terms. Qualia -- arguably a type of representational content -- will therefore (...)
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  46. William James and the Embodied Mind.Lana Kühle - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (1):51-75.
    The hard problem of consciousness lies in explaining what constitutes the subjectivity of consciousness. I argue that significant headway can be made on the problem from an embodied mind view, and particularly if we turn to William James’ theory of emotions. The challenge is one of explaining how bodily subjectivity arises from biological processes. I argue that the solution to this problem lies in our sense of interoception, and James’ theory which suggests emotional feelings are the cascade of changing bodily (...)
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  47. The Subjectivity of Experiential Consciousness: It’s Real and It’s Bodily.Lana Kuhle - 2017 - Mind and Matter 1 (15):91-109.
    Experiential consciousness is characterized by subjectivity: There is something it is like to be a subject of experience – a first-personal perspective, a what-it-is-like-for-me. In this paper I defend two proposals. First, I contend that to understand the subjectivity of consciousness we must turn to the subject: we are embodied sub- jects of experience. Thus, I argue, the subjectivity of experiential consciousness should be understood as a bodily subjectivity. Sec- ond, if we take this approach, I propose that we can (...)
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  48. Underestimating the Physical.G. Strawson - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):228-240.
    Many hold that (1) consciousness poses a uniquely hard problem. Why is this so? Chalmers considers 12 main answers in 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'. This paper focuses on number 11, and is principally addressed to those who endorse (1) because they think that (2) consciousness can't possibly be physical. It argues that to hold (2) is to make the mistake of underestimating the physical, and that almost all who make this mistake do so because they think they know more about (...)
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  49. No Problem: Evidence that the Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness is Not Widespread.J. Sytsma & E. Ozdemir - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):241-256.
    The meta-problem is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness' (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). This presupposes that we think there is a problem in the first place. We challenge the breadth of this 'we', arguing that there is already sufficient empirical evidence to cast doubt on the claim. We then add to this body of evidence, presenting the results of a new cross-cultural study extending the work of Sytsma and Machery (2010).
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  50. Idealization and Problem Intuitions: Why No Possible Agent is Indisputably Ideal.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):270-279.
    This paper explores one way in which the meta-problem may shed light on existing debates about the hard problem (though not directly on the hard problem itself). I'll argue that the possibility of a suitable agent without problem intuitions would undercut the dialectical force of arguments against physicalism. Standard antiphysicalist arguments begin from intuitions about what's ideally conceivable, and argue from there to the falsity of physicalism. For these arguments to be dialectically effective, there must be a shared conception of (...)
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