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  1. The Neuroscience of Psychiatric Disorders and the Metaphysics of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2019 - In Pascual Ángel Gargiulo & Humberto Luis Mesones Arroyo (eds.), Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update: From Translational Research to a Humanistic Approach, Volume III. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 53-64.
    In this chapter, I first review and assess evidence regarding brain damage or neural abnormalities associated with some psychopathologies and cognitive deficits, such as hemispatial neglect, agnosias, amnesia, somatoparaphrenia, and others. It becomes clear just how closely normal mental functioning and consciousness depend upon normal brain functioning as well as how some very specific mental changes occur when, and only when, very specific brain damage occurs. I then explore the metaphysical implications of these results with respect to the nature of (...)
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  2. Quantum Mechanics of 'Conscious Energy'.Syed Ismyl Mahmood Rizvi - 2018 - International Journal of Mind, Brain and Cognition 9 (1-2):132-160.
    This paper is aiming to investigate the physical substrate of conscious process. It will attempt to find out: How does conscious process establish relations between their external stimuli and internal stimuli in order to create reality? How does consciousness devoid of new sensory input result to its new quantum effects? And how does conscious process gain mass in brain? This paper will also try to locate the origins of consciousness at the level of neurons along with the quantum effects of (...)
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  3. The Logic of Consciencism.Richmond Kwesi - 2017 - In Martin Ajei (ed.), Disentangling Consciencism: Essays on Kwame Nkrumah's Philosophy. pp. 185-198.
    According to Kwame Nkrumah, the conscience of the African society is plagued with three strands of influences which have competing and conflicting ideologies: “African society has one segment which comprises our traditional way of life; it has a second segment which is filled by the presence of the Islamic tradition in Africa; it has a final segment which represents the infiltration of the Christian tradition and culture of Western Europe into Africa, using colonialism and neocolonialism as its primary vehicles.” When (...)
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  4. Odpovědi přátelům.Tomas Hribek - 2017 - Filosofie Dnes 9 (2):91-110.
    [Replies to My Friends] This is an answer to the critics of my book WHAT IT'S LIKE, OR WHAT IT'S ABOUT? THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE MATERIAL WORLD (2017). I proceed from the least to the most serious objections. I start with Jakub Mihálik’s defense of Russellian Monism against my claim that it is not a genuine alternative to standard dualism and materialism. In reply, I claim this is a side issue to the central aim of my book, which (...)
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  5. Précis knihy Jaké to je, nebo o čem to je? Místo vědomí v materiálním světě.Tomas Hribek - 2017 - Filosofie Dnes 9 (2):4-22.
    [Précis of What It’s Like, or What It’s About? The Place of Consciousness in the Material World] The paper provides a summary of my recent Czech-language book, WHAT IT'S LIKE, OR WHAT IT'S ABOUT? THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE MATERIAL WORLD (2017). As suggested by the subtitle, the topic of the book is philosophy of consciousness. In the contemporary literature, most participants have in mind the so-called phenomenal characters, and the main issue debated between dualists and materialists is whether (...)
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  6. Could There Be Scattered Subjects of Consciousness?Bartek Chomanski - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    There is a debate between David Barnett and Rory Madden concerning the features that “our naïve conception of conscious subjects” has. While Barnett claims that our conception demands that conscious subjects be simple (that is, not composed of parts), Madden holds that our conception demands that conscious beings be topologically integrated (meaning, roughly, that you can travel from any proper part of the conscious subject to any other without breaking the subject’s boundaries). In this paper, I aim to bring some (...)
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  7. The Meditations of Manuel de la Vega.Cora Cruz - 2018 - New York, NY, USA: Peter Lang.
    The Meditations of Manuel de la Vega addresses the "hard" problem of consciousness in a nonreductive way. Which is to say, the question is posited as to why, no matter how much structural or functional explanation we may devise, this does not quite satisfy attempts to grasp the essence, the "what it is like," of being an embodied consciousness. The book’s method aims to be faithful to its subject by its choice of format. It does not intend to offer fully (...)
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  8. Jaké to je, nebo o čem to je? Místo vědomí v materiálním světě.Tomas Hribek - 2017 - Praha, Česko: Filosofia.
    [What It’s Like, or What It’s About? The Place of Consciousness in the Material World] Summary: The book is both a survey of the contemporary debate and a defense of a distinctive position. Most philosophers nowadays assume that the focus of the philosophy of consciousness, its shared explanandum, is a certain property of experience variously called “phenomenal character,” “qualitative character,” “qualia” or “phenomenology,” understood in terms of what it is like to undergo the experience in question. Consciousness as defined in (...)
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  9. Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy.Bernardo Kastrup - 2018 - Constructivist Foundations 13 (3):341-361.
    > Context • The alleged dichotomy between mind and matter is pervasive. Therefore, the attempt to explain mat- ter in terms of mind (idealism) is often considered a mirror image of that of explaining mind in terms of mat- ter (mainstream physicalism), in the sense of being structurally equivalent despite being reversely arranged. > Problem • I argue that this is an error arising from language artifacts, for dichotomies must reside in the same level of abstraction. > Method • I (...)
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  10. Powerful Qualities, the Conceivability Argument and the Nature of the Physical.Henry Taylor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1895-1910.
    David Chalmers’ ‘conceivability’ argument against physicalism is perhaps the most widely discussed and controversial argument in contemporary philosophy of mind. Recently, several thinkers have suggested a novel response to this argument, which employs the ‘powerful qualities’ ontology of properties. In this paper, I argue that this response fails because it presupposes an implausible account of the physical/phenomenal distinction. In the course of establishing this, I discuss the so-called ‘ultimate’ argument for the claim that dispositional properties form the subject matter of (...)
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  11. The Problem with the 'Information' in Integrated Information Theory.Garrett Mindt - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (7-8):130-154.
    Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness is becoming an increasingly popular neuroscientific account of phenomenal experience. IIT claims that consciousness is integrated information in a system. I set this theory against the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996, 1995) as the goal for a theory of consciousness to meet. In this essay I look to examine and ultimately critique IIT’s use of the notion of information to base a theory of consciousness. I argue that the notion of information in IIT (...)
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  12. Illusionism's Discontent.Balog Katalin - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):40-51.
    Frankish positions his view, illusionism about qualia (a.k.a. eliminativist physicalism), in opposition to what he calls radical realism (dualism and neutral monism) and conservative realism (a.k.a. non-eliminativist physicalism). Against radical realism, he upholds physicalism. But he goes along with key premises of the Gap Arguments for radical realism, namely, 1) that epistemic/explanatory gaps exist between the physical and the phenomenal, and 2) that every truth should be perspicuously explicable from the fundamental truth about the world; and he concludes that because (...)
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  13. Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):774-778.
    Papineau in his book provides a detailed defense of physicalism via what has recently been dubbed the “phenomenal concept strategy”. I share his enthusiasm for this approach. But I disagree with his account of how a physicalist should respond to the conceivability arguments. Also I argue that his appeal to teleosemantics in explaining mental quotation is more like a promissory note than an actual theory.
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  14. In Defence of Type-A Materialism.Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira - 2016 - Diametros 49:68-83.
    In this paper, I argue against the phenomenal concept strategy and in favor of what Chalmers has called type-A materialism. On her release, Mary makes no cognitive discovery at all; not even a thin non-possibility-eliminating discovery, as Tye has recently claimed. When she is imprisoned, Mary already knows everything that is to be known about the phenomenal character of her experiences. What Mary acquires is a new non-cognitive and nonconceptual representation.
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  15. Panpsychism, Pan-Consciousness and the Non-Human Turn: Rethinking Being as Conscious Matter.Cornel Du Toit - 2016 - Hts Theological Studies 72 (4):1-11.
    It is not surprising that in a time of intensified ecological awareness a new appreciation of nature and the inanimate world arises. Two examples are panpsychism and deep incarnation. Consciousness studies flourish and are related to nature, the animal world and inorganic nature. A metaphysics of consciousness emerges, of which panpsychism is a good example. Panpsychism or panconsciousness or speculative realism endows all matter with a form of consciousness, energy and experience. The consciousness question is increasingly linked to the quantum (...)
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  16. Physicalism, Qualia and Mental Concepts.Diana I. Perez - 2002 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 17 (2):359-379.
    In this paper I shall carefully examine some recent arguments for dualism. These arguments presuppose a strong version of physicalism that I consider inappropriate. I shall try to show that, if we reformulate the thesis of physicalism according to Kim's view of physicalism, there is a third option, a version of type physicalism, where physicalism and quaiia could be conciliated. In order to sketch this option, I shall consider the main argument against type physicalism: the explanatory gap argument, and two (...)
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  17. Qualia, Kripkean Arguments, and Subjectivity.Emmett L. Holman - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-429.
    The subjectivity of consciousness is widely regarded as a major stumbling block for materialist theories of mind. In this paper I show how Kripkean arguments against identity theories, and in particular a Kripkean argument against qualia-material property identity developed by Frank Jackson are a way of highlighting this problem. As such, Kripkean arguments are akin to recent discussions of subjectivity by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson. I then consider some recent attempts to refute Kripkean arguments or otherwise show that subjectivity (...)
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  18. Subjectivism and the Mental.Giovanni Merlo - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):311-342.
    This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically privileged vis-à-vis the mental states of others, even if only subjectively so. This is an instance of a more general view called Subjectivism, according to which reality is only subjectively the way it is. After characterizing Subjectivism in analogy to two relatively familiar views in the metaphysics of modality and time, I compare the Subjectivist View of the Mental with Egocentric Presentism, a version of Subjectivism recently advocated by (...)
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  19. Review of Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism by Pereboom, D. [REVIEW]Tom McClelland - unknown
  20. The Modal Argument for the Soul / Body Dualism.Ľuboš Rojka - 2016 - Studia Neoaristotelica 13 (1):45-70.
    The modal argument for the existence of a Cartesian human soul proposed by Richard Swinburne more than thirty years ago, if slightly adjusted and interpreted correctly, becomes a plausible argument for anyone who accepts modal arguments. The difficulty consists in a relatively weak justification of the second premise, of the real possibility of a disembodied existence, as a result of which the argument does not provide a real proof. The argument is best understood in the following terms: Special divine action (...)
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  21. A Brief History of the Soul by Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro.Francis Selman - 2012 - New Blackfriars 93 (1046):499-501.
  22. Knowledge by Experience. Or Why Physicalism Should Not Be Our Default Position in Consciousness Studies.Alfredo Tomasetta - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):37-47.
    : Current philosophical and scientific approaches to consciousness are very often characterised by a strong background presupposition: whatever the precise details of a theory of consciousness may be, a physicalist – or materialist – view of consciousness itself must be correct. I believe, however, that this conviction, pervasive though it may be, is not really justified. In particular, I think that the arguments offered in favour of the materialist presupposition are weak and unconvincing, and that there is a very strong (...)
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  23. Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism, by Robert J. Howell.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):608-611.
  24. On the Appearance and Reality of Mind.Demian Whiting - 2016 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 37 (1):47-70.
    According to what I will call the “appearance-is-reality doctrine of mind,” conscious mental states are identical to how they subjectively appear or present themselves to us in our experience of them. The doctrine has had a number of supporters but to date has not received from its proponents the comprehensive and systematic treatment that might be expected. In this paper I outline the key features of the appearance-is-reality doctrine along with the case for thinking that doctrine to be true. I (...)
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  25. Book Review: The Mind- Body Problem. [REVIEW]G. O. Ozumba - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy and Culture 3 (2):151-176.
    Raymond N. Osei, The Mind-Body Problem in Philosophy: An Analysis of the Core Issues, Hope Publications Ltd.,Ibadan, Nigeria, 2006. Pp. 225. ISBN 978-8080-18-9.
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  26. A Metaphysical Dilemma for Dualism.Jason Megill - 2015 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (4):913-926.
    Resumo Os Qualia, ou são “entidades espaciais” – ou seja, estão localizados no espaço como os objectos físicos –, ou não são “entidades espaciais”. Então, o dualismo deve alegar que ou os qualia não-físicos são entidades espaciais, ou que eles não o são. Contudo, qualquer resposta é problemática. Se os qualia não-físicos não são entidades espaciais, então, é difícil de conceber como podem ser atribuídos a cérebros particulares, individualizados uns dos outros, e assim por diante. Mas se os qualia não-físicos (...)
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  27. Why a Naturalist Should Be an Emergentist About the Mind.Elly Vintiadis - 2013 - SATS 14 (1):38-62.
    Naturalism about the mind is typically associated with some kind of physicalism. This paper argues that this association is a mistake and that, gi-ven the naturalist’s commitment to the primacy of empirical evidence, natural-ists should be open to different commitments. It is further argued that natural-ists about the mind should be emergentists because of the epistemological attitude that is at the core of the emergentist position, properly understood.
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  28. Jaegwon Kim,Physicalism or Something Near Enough.Yaron M. Senderowicz - 2008 - Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 16 (1):177-184.
  29. Response to Elizabeth J. Perry.R. E. Karl - 2011 - Télos 2011 (154):192-192.
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  30. How a Materialist Can Deny That the United States is Probably Conscious – Response to Schwitzgebel.François Kammerer - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1047-1057.
    In a recent paper, Eric Schwitzgebel argues that if materialism about consciousness is true, then the United States is likely to have its own stream of phenomenal consciousness, distinct from the streams of conscious experience of the people who compose it. Indeed, most plausible forms of materialism have to grant that a certain degree of functional and behavioral complexity constitutes a sufficient condition for the ascription of phenomenal consciousness – and Schwitzgebel makes a case to show that the United States (...)
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  31. The Modal Argument Against Materialism and Intertheoretic Identities.David Pineda - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):491-515.
    In this paper I discuss, on behalf of the materialist, a consideration against the modal or conceivability argument against materialism which was first voiced in the third lecture of Naming and Necessity. This consideration is based on intertheoretic identities, statements in which both terms flanking the identity sign are theoretical. I argue that the defender of the conceivability argument has trouble to account for the appearance of contingency in those types of necessary identities. In fact, intertheoretic identities pose a formidable (...)
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  32. The Enigma of the Mind: The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Thought.Scott Staton (ed.) - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    Sergio Moravia's The Enigma of the Mind offers a broad and lucid critical and historical survey of one of the fundamental debates in the philosophy of mind - the relationship of mind and body. This problem continues to raise deep questions concerning the nature of man. The book has two central aims. First, Professor Moravia sketches the major recent contributions to the mind/body problem from philosophers of mind. Having established this framework Professor Moravia pursues his second aim - the articulation (...)
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  33. Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism.Richard Fumerton - 2013 - Cambridge University Press.
    The relationship between mind and matter, mental states and physical states, has occupied the attention of philosophers for thousands of years. Richard Fumerton's primary concern is the knowledge argument for dualism - an argument that proceeds from the idea that we can know truths about our existence and our mental states without knowing any truths about the physical world. This view has come under relentless criticism, but here Fumerton makes a powerful case for its rehabilitation, demonstrating clearly the importance of (...)
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  34. Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism. [REVIEW]K. Morris - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):367-369.
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  35. Philosophy and the Mind/Body Problem.Paul F. Snowdon - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:21-37.
    The thesis of the paper is that it is an illusion to think that the mind/body problem is one that philosophy can expect to solve. The basic reason is that the problem is one of determining the real nature of conscious states, and philosophy lacks the tools to work this out. It is argued that anti-materialist arguments in philosophy tend to rely on modal intuitions which lack any support. It is then argued that pro-materialist arguments, such as those of Smart (...)
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  36. The Incipient Mind Argument: The Persistence of Absolutist Thinking in Biological Philosophy of Mind.Javier Y. Álvarez-Vázquez - unknown
    The incipient mind argument is the central argument of Evan Thompson’s solution to the so-called mind-body problem. This paper challenges Evan Thompson’s assumption of a pristine form of subjectivity, as well as of interiority in unicellular life forms. I claim that this assumption makes sense only as a useful strategy for an absolutist account of mind. In this paper, I argue that Thompson’s thesis is erroneous at the object-level, as well as at the meta-level of his argumentation. By paying greater (...)
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  37. Pain, Private Language and the Mind-Body Problem.James Anderson - unknown
  38. A Physicalist Relationist Theory of Color.Eliezer Mintz - unknown
    The nature of color is an open philosophical and scientific question. In this work I develop a physicalist relationist theory of color. So far, attempts to identify color as a physical property of objects have not been convincing because no physical property used by scientists seems to be well correlated with color sensations. I define a new physical property which I call transformance and show that transformance is 100% correlated with color sensations. Intuitively, transformance is a very general abstract physical (...)
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  39. "The Evolution of the Soul" by Richard Swinburne. [REVIEW]John Knox - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (4):738.
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  40. Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims About Phenomenal Structure.Juan Suarez Martine Nida‐rÜmelin - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):346-391.
    We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue and no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green . The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We discuss whether these empirical results cast doubt on the other modal claims (...)
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  41. ARMSTRONG, D. M. And MALCOLM, NORMAN.: "Consciousness and Causality". [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36:341.
    Armstrong and Malcolm have a debate on materialism and the everyday concept of mind that was a bit antiquated even in 1985. I try to isolate the issues driving the debate - on phenomenal properties and the role of theory in our thinking - and I make some guesses about the questions that were still live when the debate was published.
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  42. Perry, Ed., Tr., Aesopica.L. A. Post - 1952 - Classical World: A Quarterly Journal on Antiquity 46:40.
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  43. Jon Barwise and John Perry, Situations and Attitudes. [REVIEW]Philip Hanson - 1985 - Philosophy in Review 5:210-212.
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  44. John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Douglas Patterson - 2002 - Philosophy in Review 22:299-301.
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  45. John Perry, Reference and Reflexivity. [REVIEW]Robert Harnish - 2003 - Philosophy in Review 23:135-138.
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  46. It's Not Like That to Be a Bat.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1982 - Behaviorism 10 (1):55-63.
  47. Explaining Why This Body Gives Rise to Me Qua Subject Instead of Someone Else: An Argument for Classical Substance Dualism: Kenneth Einar Himma.Kenneth Einar Himma - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (4):431-448.
    Since something cannot be conscious without being a conscious subject, a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness must resolve an issue first raised by Thomas Nagel, namely to explain why a particular mass of atoms that comprises my body gives rise to me as conscious subject, rather than someone else. In this essay, I describe a thought-experiment that suggests that physicalism lacks the resources to address Nagel's question and seems to pose a counter-example to any form of non-reductive physicalism relying on (...)
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  48. A Defense of Materialism Against Attacks Based on Qualia.Jeffrey Charles Beall - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Qualia--the "what it's like features" of minds--pose a great challenge to a materialist view of the world. The two strongest and most popular objections to materialism based on qualia are the Zombie Argument and the Knowledge Argument. The current dissertation defends materialism against these two popular arguments. ;I argue that if zombie worlds exist, then qualia cause no physical events--they're epiphenomenal$\sb{\rm p},$ or epiphenomenal with respect to the physical domain of our world. I argue, however, that there is good reason (...)
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  49. An Essay in Favor of Property Dualism.Christopher Page Taggart - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    One of the great challenges for a materialistic metaphysical picture of the world is the challenge of finding a place within it for the mind. I argue that materialism is doomed to failure in that there could be neither a reduction nor an elimination of certain phenomenal features of mental states within any physical theory. ;I begin to paint a property dualistic picture of the mind in Chapters 1 and 2. In Chapter 1, I discuss the nature of perception and (...)
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  50. The Mind-Body Problem and Necessary a Posteriori Identity.Karol Polcyn - 2003 - Dissertation, Temple University
    Materialism or physicalism is commonly understood as the view that certain physical properties, that is, properties from the microphysical level, are the basic constituents of the world. According to this view, all properties are related necessarily to the basic physical properties either by being strictly identical with them or by being dependent on them; in this second sense, the relevant properties are said to supervene on the basic physical properties. ;If materialism is the correct picture of the world, then consciousness (...)
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