Consciousness and Neuroscience

Unprecedented advancements in the diagnosis and treatment of patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) have given rise to ethical questions about how to recognize and respect autonomy and a sense of agency of the personhood when those capacities are themselves disordered, as they typically are in patients with DoC. At the intersection of these questions rests the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. Indeed, evaluations of consciousness levels and capacity for recovery have a significant impact on decisions regarding whether to discontinue (...) or prolong life-sustaining therapy for DoC patients. However, in the unconsciousness domain, there is the confusing array of terms that are regularly used interchangeably, making it quite challenging to comprehend what unconsciousness is and how it might be empirically grounded. In this opinion paper, we will provide a brief overview of the state of the field of unconsciousness and show how a rapidly evolving electroencephalogram (EEG) neuroimaging technique may offer empirical, theoretical, and practical tools to approach unconsciousness and to improve our ability to distinguish consciousness from unconsciousness and also nonconsciousness with greater precision, particularly in cases that are borderline (as is typical in patients with DoC). Furthermore, we will provide a clear description of three distant notions of (un)consciousness (unconsciousness, nonconsciousness, and subconsciousness) and discuss how they relate to the experiential selfhood which is essential for comprehending the moral significance of what makes life worth living. (shrink)

For ages there has been a gap between the two cultures of the sciences and religions. According to Roger Sperry, science can now bridge the gap between the cold hard facts of the sciences and humanitarian and religious values. Sperry won the Nobel Prize in 1981 for his work on the differences between the left and right halves of the brain. For the past twenty years he has been campaigning for human consciousness and values to be investigated scientificlly. This book (...) describes Sperry's work and his struggle to guide humanity beyond a world divided. terms such as consciousness, value, love and joy are scientifically meaningful, just like terms referring to brain physiology, such as neural pathways and electrical impulse. The split between mind matter, or religion, and science can be removed, says Sperry, by expanding scientific research. Now, conscious experiences must be taken into account as scientific information about the brain. Our values, beliefs and goals can directly affect our brain states and physiology. (shrink)

Annotation Up-to-date and accessible examination of scientific thinking about the nature of consciousness. Chris Nunn sets out the most exciting theoretical and experimental advances in this fast developing and controversial area.

Nowadays, physicalism is arguably the received view on the nature of mental states. Among the arguments that have been provided in its favour, the inductive one seems to play a pivotal role in the debate. Leveraging the past success of materialistic science, the physicalist argues that a materialistic account of consciousness will eventually be provided, hence that physicalism is true. This article aims at evaluating whether this strategy can provide support for physicalism. According to the standard objection raised against the (...) inductive line of reasoning, the argument would beg the question by assuming some sort of metaphysical uniformity between consciousness and the rest of the natural domain. Here, I concede that there is a way to avoid this criticism. However, I argue that the argument still fails to support physicalism due to a structural problem of justification transmission. (shrink)

Neuroscientists now approach some of the deepest problems of the human condition - from illnesses and disorders such as Alzheimer's disease and schizophrenia, to the search for the nature of consciousness itself - in the belief that their science can say something useful about these processes and how to intervene in them. At the same time, by addressing the biological mechanisms involved in phenomena as varied as street violence, drug addiction and sexual orientation, the new science raises profound ethical, legal, (...) social and medical questions. Over many of these issues there is no clear consensus but rather, intense debate. Is memory a molecular process? Is schizophrenia a genetic disorder? What does the future hold for psychopharmacology? Can consciousness be computed and is artificial intelligence a real prospect? From Brains to Consciousness? brings together fourteen of the world's leading neuroscientists, psychologists, computer modellers and philosophers, in a series of chapters that offer fascinating and up-to-the-minute insight into the debates that are taking place in this exciting area of research. (shrink)

نعني بالتكنولوجيا العصبية كافة التقنيات المُطَّورة لفهم الدماغ وتصور عملياته، وكذلك التحكم في وظائفه بهدف توجيهها أو إصلاحها أو تحسينها. وعلى الرغم من أن تخطيط كهربية الدماغ يرجع إلى ما يقرب من قرن من الزمان، إلا أن أول اختراق كبير في هذا المجال قد تحقق في العقود الأخيرة مع بدء فحص الدماغ باستخدام التصوير بالرنين المغناطيسي، حيث سمحت هذه التقنية للباحثين، من بين أمور أخرى، بتحديد مناطق الدماغ التي يتم تنشيطها أو تعطيلها أثناء أداء مهام معينة، ومن ثم تطرقت التكنولوجيا (...) العصبية إلى مجالات أخرى عادة ما تمر دون أن يلاحظها أحد، بدءًا من تطوير الأدوية لعلاج الاضطرابات النفسية مثل الاكتئاب أو الأرق أو اضطراب نقص الانتباه، ومرورًا بالتقنيات المُخصصة لإعادة التأهيل العصبي بعد الحوادث الدماغية الوعائية، ووصولاً إلى استعادة السمع باستخدام غرسات القوقعة الصناعية. (shrink)

Annotation Argues that civilization-threatening crises can be solved only by adopting ethical systems more compatible with science.

Machine generated contents note: Cajal and Consciousness: Introduction. By PEDRO C. MARIJUAN1 -- Part I. Consciousness, One Hundred Years after Textura -- Progress in the Neural Sciences in the Century after Cajal (and the Mysteries -- That Remain). By THOMAS D. ALBRIGHT, THOMAS M. JESSELL, -- ERIC R. KANDEL, AND MICHAEL I. POSNER11 -- Part II. Biological Complexity and the Emergence of Consciousness -- Consciousness, Reduction, and Emergence: Some Remarks. -- By MURRAY GELL-MANN41 -- The Epistemic Paradox of Mind and (...) Matter. By HAROLD J. MOROWITZ50 -- The Conscious Cell. BY LYNN MARGULIS55 -- Complexity and Tinkering. By FRANCOIS JACOB71 -- Consciousness, the Brain, and Spacetime Geometry. By STUART HAMEROFF. 74 -- Consciousness, the Brain, and Spacetime Geometry: An Addendum-Some -- New Developments on the Orch OR Model for Consciousness. -- By ROGER PENROSE105 -- Part III. From Primary to Higher-level Consciousness -- Consciousness: The Remembered Present. By GERALD EDELMAN111 -- Consciousness and the Binding Problem. By WOLF SINGER123 -- Cajal on Neurons, Molecules, and Consciousness. By JEAN-PIERRE CHANGEUX 147 -- A Neuronal Model of a Global Workspace in Effortful Cognitive Tasks. By -- STANISLAS DEHAENE, MICHEL KERSZBERG, AND JEAN-PIERRE -- CHANGEUX152 -- Consciousness and the Brain: The Thalamocortical Dialogue in Health and -- Disease. By RODOLFO LLINAS AND URS RIBARY166 -- The Neuroanatomy of Phenomenal Vision: A Psychological Perspective. -- ByPETRA STOERIG176 -- Co-evolution of Human Consciousness and Language. By MICHAEL A. ARBIB 195 -- From Computing with Numbers to Computing with Words-From -- Manipulation of Measurements to Manipulations of Perceptions. -- By LOTFI A. ZADEH221 -- Part IV. Closing Remarks -- Who Was Cajal? By ALBERTO PORTERA-SANCHEZ253 -- Index of Contributors259 -- Subject Index261. (shrink)

Two universal functional principles of Grossberg’s Adaptive Resonance Theory decipher the brain code of all biological learning and adaptive intelligence. Low-level representations of multisensory stimuli in their immediate environmental context are formed on the basis of bottom-up activation and under the control of top-down matching rules that integrate high-level, long-term traces of contextual configuration. These universal coding principles lead to the establishment of lasting brain signatures of perceptual experience in all living species, from aplysiae to primates. They are re-visited in (...) this concept paper on the basis of examples drawn from the original code and from some of the most recent related empirical findings on contextual modulation in the brain, highlighting the potential of Grossberg’s pioneering insights and groundbreaking theoretical work for intelligent solutions in the domain of developmental and cognitive robotics. (shrink)

Two universal functional principles of Grossberg’s Adaptive Resonance Theory [19] decipher the brain code of all biological learning and adaptive intelligence. Low-level representations of multisensory stimuli in their immediate environmental context are formed on the basis of bottom-up activation and under the control of top-down matching rules that integrate high-level long-term traces of contextual configuration. These universal coding principles lead to the establishment of lasting brain signatures of perceptual experience in all living species, from aplysiae to primates. They are re-visited (...) in this concept paper here on the basis of examples drawn from the original code and from some of the most recent related empirical findings on contextual modulation in the brain, highlighting the potential of Grossberg’s pioneering insights and groundbreaking theoretical work for intelligent solutions in the domain of developmental and cognitive robotics. (shrink)

Walling and Hicks make a direct assault on the "Everest" of scientific mysteries. The authors trace the first glimmerings of consciousness in evolution and during emergence from anesthesia. There are no formulae or equations; all the difficult concepts have been presented as allegories and pictures. Unlike many philosophical books about consciousness, they have evidence to back up their ideas. This book is also an attempt to bridge the chasm between science and religion which the authors believe to be largely unnecessary.

Continuing the debate over whether consciousness causes behaviour or plays no functional role in it, leading scholars discuss the question in terms of neuroscience, philosophy, law, and public policy.

We should be suspicious of the idea that experiencing pain could enable animals to trade off different motivations in a common currency. It is not even clear that humans have a common motivational currency reflected in evaluative experience. Instead, pain may capture attention, inhibiting attention to competing motivations and needs, thereby making genuine trade-offs harder. Our criteria for pain in invertebrates should be part of a more subtle theory of the relationship between pain and decision-making.

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system—prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We (...) argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system—quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system. (shrink)

Reflection on the relationship between free will and consciousness has mainly revolved around Libet-style experiments, for example by criticizing the claim that conscious intentions never cause what we do. Less attention has been paid to whether this response captures the sense in which consciousness is relevant for free will, however. In this paper I argue that scholars seem to accept two assumptions they should reject: (1) that the relationship between free will and consciousness is best characterized in terms of conscious (...) states and/or processes being part of the causal chain leading up to the action, and (2) that the third-person perspective is a suitable means to capturing the relationship between free will and consciousness. I provide an alternative proposal of how free will and consciousness may be related, in which an agent’s self-understanding of what she is doing and why, while acting, takes center stage. In order to capture the relationship between the two, I argue, the first-person perspective should be investigated instead of explained away. (shrink)

This paper pursues two lines of inquiry. First, drawing on evidence from clinical literature on borderline states of consciousness, I propose a new categorical framework for liminal states of consciousness associated with certain forms of meditative attainment; second, I argue for dissociating phenomenal character from phenomenal content in accounting for the etiology of nonconceptual states of awareness. My central argument is that while the idea of nonconceptual awareness remains problematic for Buddhist philosophy of mind, our linguistic and categorizing practices cannot (...) be adequately explained without considering the ways in which the first-person phenomenology grounds a more basic level of cognitive and affective sensing. (shrink)

Laura Specker Sullivan (2022) makes a fairly compelling case for the value of the perspectives of Buddhist practitioners in neuroethics. In this study, Tibetan Buddhist monks have been asked, among other things, whether consciousness, in brain-injured patients in a minimally conscious state, entails a duty to preserve life. In our view, some of the participants’ responses could be used to inform the bioethical debate on death determination.

Est-il aujourd’hui possible d’expliquer le mental à partir du cerveau? Où est le problème, diront les uns, puisque la mécanique neuronale est celle qui le crée? Comment seulement espérer, rétorqueront les autres, que la complexité de l’esprit puisse être fondée sur le seul fonctionnement cérébral? S’appuyant sur des siècles d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences, et surtout sur un examen des données expérimentales récentes, Pierre Buser établit ici une sorte de bilan, dégageant plusieurs problématiques distinctes et bien actuelles : comment (...) définir la conscience, ce site supposé abriter notre vécu subjectif, à nouveau reconnu comme instance fondamentale de l’esprit chez l’homme et aussi chez l’animal? Que sait-on aujourd’hui de l’inconscient, ce domaine où se trouvent amassés tant d’acquis de notre intellect, de notre vie cognitive et affective? Et que nous apprennent, par exemple, l’hypnose ou la méditation sur le fonctionnement de notre esprit? Pierre Buser est professeur émérite de neurosciences de l’université Pierre-et-Marie-Curie de Paris. Il est membre de l’Académie des sciences. Il a notamment publié Cerveau de soi, cerveau de l’autre, L’Inconscient aux mille visages et Le Temps, instant et durée (en collaboration avec Claude Debru). (shrink)

A breathtaking look at the new science that can track consciousness deep in the brain How does our brain generate a conscious thought? And why does so much of our knowledge remain unconscious? Thanks to clever psychological and brain-imaging experiments, scientists are closer to cracking this mystery than ever before. In this lively book, Stanislas Dehaene describes the pioneering work his lab and the labs of other cognitive neuroscientists worldwide have accomplished in defining, testing, and explaining the brain events behind (...) a conscious state. We can now pin down the neurons that fire when a person reports becoming aware of a piece of information and understand the crucial role unconscious computations play in how we make decisions. The emerging theory enables a test of consciousness in animals, babies, and those with severe brain injuries. A joyous exploration of the mind and its thrilling complexities, Consciousness and the Brain will excite anyone interested in cutting-edge science and technology and the vast philosophical, personal, and ethical implications of finally quantifying consciousness. (shrink)

Assembling the pieces : the neuroscience disciplines essential for the study of language and brain -- Building the basis : linguistic contributions to a theory of language and their relevance to the study of language and brain -- Neuroscience applications to the study of multilingualism -- Exploring the boundaries of cognitive linguistics and neurolinguistics : reimagining cross-cultural contributions -- Imaging technologies in the study of multilingualism : focus on BOLD fMRI -- Reassembling the pieces : languages and brains.

The human brain is the first computer to which all others are compared. Yet we know painfully little about how a brain accomplishes its peculiar computations. In particular, consciousness is at once familiar and mysterious, and needs to be understood both for science and for medicine. Boldly, but gently this book introduces a reader to the neural circuitry that achieves consciousness. This amazing interconnection enables consciousness to flow like a stream, intimately relevant to the outside world; and for this to (...) happen, fundamental cues emerge from mental images to bring forth associated recalls. Alas cues can be inconsistent, causing memory failure; fortunately a subliminal cue editor encourages remembering forgotten items. Furthermore, cues generally address several memories, forcing the brain to make a selection. This necessitates another special circuit whose purpose is subliminal editing. The simplified explanations provided in this book make it clear that neurons do far more than ordinary devices, since a single neuron is capable of remarkably dense combinational and sequential logic. Beginning with their interesting and unexpected logical behavior, the reader will genuinely enjoy Dr. Burger's synthesis of a system for biological consciousness, a system that may someday result in credible artificial consciousness. (shrink)

Contrasting conditions with and without conscious experience has served consciousness research well. However, research based on this simple contrast has led to controversies about the neural basis of conscious experience. One key reason for these ongoing debates seems to be that the simple contrast between conditions with and without consciousness is not specific for unraveling the neural basis of conscious experience, but rather also leads to other processes that precede or follow it. Acknowledging this methodological problem implies that some of (...) the previous research findings about the neural underpinnings of conscious experience are actually reflecting the prerequisites and consequences rather than the direct correlates of conscious perception. Thus, it is required to re-evaluate the previous results to find out which of them are telling us anything about the neural basis of consciousness. But first and foremost, to overcome this methodological problem we need new experimental paradigms that go beyond the simple contrastive analysis or find the ways how some older but well forgotten paradigms may foster a new look at this emerging problem. Accordingly, this research topic is looking for empirical and theoretical contributions that: 1) envision new and suitable experimental approaches to study consciousness that are free from the limitations of the simple contrastive analysis; 2) provide empirical data that help to separate the neural correlates of conscious experience from the prerequisites and consequences of it; 3) help to re-assess previous research findings about the neural correlates of conscious perception in the light of the methodological problems with the traditional contrastive analysis. We hope that the theoretical insights and experimental approaches collected within this Research Topic help us to gain a more refined understanding of the neural basis of conscious experience. (shrink)

Introduction to mind and brain -- The science and philosophy of mind -- A brief look into brain structure and function -- States of mind -- Signatures of consciousness -- Rhythms of the brain -- Brain synchrony, coherence, and resonance -- Networks of the brain -- Introduction to the hard problem -- Multiscale speculations on the hard problem -- Glossary.

How consciousness appeared much earlier in evolutionary history than is commonly assumed, and why all vertebrates and perhaps even some invertebrates are conscious. How is consciousness created? When did it first appear on Earth, and how did it evolve? What constitutes consciousness, and which animals can be said to be sentient? In this book, Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt draw on recent scientific findings to answer these questions—and to tackle the most fundamental question about the nature of consciousness: how does (...) the material brain create subjective experience? After assembling a list of the biological and neurobiological features that seem responsible for consciousness, and considering the fossil record of evolution, Feinberg and Mallatt argue that consciousness appeared much earlier in evolutionary history than is commonly assumed. About 520 to 560 million years ago, they explain, the great “Cambrian explosion” of animal diversity produced the first complex brains, which were accompanied by the first appearance of consciousness; simple reflexive behaviors evolved into a unified inner world of subjective experiences. From this they deduce that all vertebrates are and have always been conscious—not just humans and other mammals, but also every fish, reptile, amphibian, and bird. Considering invertebrates, they find that arthropods (including insects and probably crustaceans) and cephalopods (including the octopus) meet many of the criteria for consciousness. The obvious and conventional wisdom–shattering implication is that consciousness evolved simultaneously but independently in the first vertebrates and possibly arthropods more than half a billion years ago. Combining evolutionary, neurobiological, and philosophical approaches allows Feinberg and Mallatt to offer an original solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness. (shrink)

Introduction -- Mind controls : how the brain regulates the body, and usually makes a mess of things -- Memories are made of this (some assembly required) : the human memory system, and its strange features -- We have nothing to fear but fear itself, and clowns : the many ways in which the brain makes us constantly scared -- Think you're clever, do you? : the baffling and complex science of intelligence -- You see this chapter coming? : the (...) haphazard properties of the brain's observational systems -- You say you have a 'great personality', but how can you be sure? : the complex and confusing properties of personality -- Group hug! : how the brain is influenced by other people -- When the brain breaks down ... mental health problems, and how they come about -- Afterword. (shrink)

The problem of how the brain produces consciousness, subjectivity and "something it is like to be" remains one of the greatest challenges to a complete science of the natural world. While various scientists and philosophers approach the problem from their own unique perspectives and in the terms of their own respective fields, Biophysics of Consciousness: A Foundational Approach attempts a consilience across disparate disciplines to explain how it is possible that an objective brain produces subjective experience. This volume unites the (...) cr me de la cr me of physicists, neuroscientists, and psychiatrists in the attempt to understand consciousness through a foundational approach encompassing ontological, evolutionary, neurobiological, and Freudian interpretations with the focus on conscious phenomena occurring in the brain. By integrating the perspectives of these diverse disciplines with the latest research and theories on the biophysics of the brain, the book tries to explain how what John Searle calls a "conscious field" can be an adaptive and causal element in the natural world. (shrink)

Jeremy Sherman distills Terrence Deacon's breakthrough natural science hypothesis for the emergence of agents and agency, selves and aims in an otherwise aimless universe. The theory cuts a new path through the dualistic spirit vs. mechanism debate, unifying the hard and soft sciences and suggesting new solutions to philosophical mysteries.

This unique book clearly explains genetic and neuroimaging research on intelligence and how neuroscience findings may lead to enhancing it.

Aims to show that the brain is not responsible for consciousness, and uses this assertion to explore profound love and human connection.

When celebrated neuropsychologist Paul Broks's wife died of cancer, it sparked a journey of grief and reflection that traced a lifelong attempt to understand how the brain gives rise to the soul. The result of that journey is a gorgeous, evocative meditation on fate, death, consciousness, and what it means to be human. The Darker the Night, The Brighter the Stars weaves a scientist's understanding of the mind - its logic, its nuance, how we think about what makes a person (...) - with a poet's approach to humanity, that crucial and ever-elusive why. It's a story that unfolds through the centuries, along the path of humankind's constant quest to discover what makes us human, and the answers that consistently slip out of our grasp. It's modern medicine and psychology and ancient tales; history and myth combined; fiction and the stranger truth. But, most importantly, it's Broks' story, grounded in his own most fascinating cases as a clinician--patients with brain injuries that revealed something fundamental about the link between the raw stuff of our bodies and brains and the ineffable selves we take for who we are.Tracing a loose arc of loss, acceptance, and renewal, he unfolds striking, imaginative stories of everything from Schopenhauer to the Greek philosophers to jazz guitarist Pat Martino in order to sketch a multifaceted view of humanness that is as heartbreaking at it is affirming. (shrink)