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  1. Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers in Cognition and the Brain : The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement.Lutz Antoine, A. Thompson E., Lutz & D. Cosmelli - manuscript -
  2. Monkeys and Consciousness.D. M. Armstrong - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):147-148.
  3. Consanguinity Trends and Correlates in the Palestinian Territories.Shireen Assaf & Marwan Khawaja - 2009 - Journal of Biosocial Science 41 (1):107.
  4. Open Peer Commentary.Anthony P. Atkinson - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2005):50-116.
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  5. Qualia, Consciousness, and Memory: Dennett , Rosenthal , Ledoux , and Libet.Jay David Atlas - unknown -
    In his recent book "Sweet Dreams: philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness," Dennett renews his attack on a philosophical notion of qualia, the success of which attack is required if his brand of Functionalism is to survive. He also articulates once again what he takes to be essential to his notion of consciousness. I shall argue that his new, central argument against the philosophical concept of qualia fails. In passing I point out a difficulty that David Rosenthal's "higher-order thought" (...)
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  6. Peer Commentary on ‘Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness?’.B. Baars, T. Bayne, W. Freeman & V. Hardcastle - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):29-86.
  7. On 'Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness?'.Bernard Baars - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):29-86.
  8. Subjective Experience is Probably Not Limited to Humans: The Evidence From Neurobiology and Behavior.Bernard J. Baars - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):7-21.
    In humans, conscious perception and cognition depends upon the thalamocortical complex, which supports perception, explicit cognition, memory, language, planning, and strategic control. When parts of the T-C system are damaged or stimulated, corresponding effects are found on conscious contents and state, as assessed by reliable reports. In contrast, large regions like cerebellum and basal ganglia can be damaged without affecting conscious cognition directly. Functional brain recordings also show robust activity differences in cortex between experimentally matched conscious and unconscious events. This (...)
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  9. Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: A Stew of Confusion.Bernard J. Baars - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):29-31.
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  10. The Brain Basis of a "Consciousness Monitor": Scientific and Medical Significance.Bernard J. Baars - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):159-164.
    Surgical patients under anesthesia can wake up unpredictably and be exposed to intense, traumatic pain. Current medical techniques cannot maintain depth of anesthesia at a perfectly stable and safe level; the depth of unconsciousness may change from moment to moment. Without an effective consciousness monitor anesthesiologists may not be able to adjust dosages in time to protect patients from pain. An estimated 40,000 to 200,000 midoperative awakenings may occur in the United States annually. E. R. John and coauthors present the (...)
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  11. How Could Brain Imaging Not Tell Us About Consciousness?Bernard J. Baars - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):24-29.
    Revonsuo argues that current brain imaging methods do not allow us to ‘discover’ consciousness. While all observational methods in science have limitations, consciousness is such a massive and pervasive phenomenon that we cannot fail to observe its effects at every level of brain organization: molecular, cellular, electrical, anatomical, metabolic, and even the ‘higher levels of electrophysiological organization that are crucial for the empirical discovery and theoretical explanation of consciousness’ . Indeed, the first major discovery in that respect was Hans Berger's (...)
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  12. One, Not Two, Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars & Steven Laureys - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):269.
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  13. Consciousness Cannot Be Limited to Sensory Qualities: Some Empirical Counterexamples.Bernard J. Baars & Katharine A. McGovern - 2000 - Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):11-13.
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  14. Nonconscious Perception, Conscious Awareness and Attention.Rajendra Badgaiyan - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):584-586.
    Because it is unclear how a nonconscious stimulus is cognitively processed, there is uncertainty concerning variables that modulate the processing. In this context recent findings of a set of neuroimaging experiments are important. These findings suggest that conscious and nonconscious stimuli activate same areas of the brain during performance of a similar task. Further, different areas are activated when a task is performed with or without awareness of processing. It appears that the neural network involved in cognitive processing depends on (...)
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  15. Problems in the Scientific Pursuit of Consciousness.William P. Banks - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):255-263.
  16. Open Peer Commentary.Frédéric Bassoa & Olivier Oullierb - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32:5.
  17. Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Phenomenal Holism, Internalism, and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Timothy J. Bayne - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):32-37.
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  18. Phenomenal Holism, Internalism and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Comment.Timothy J. Bayne - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):32-37.
    The target paper by Noë and Thompson is a very welcome addition to the literature on the neural correlates of consciousness. It raises a number of important issues, and the debate it will generate should go some way towards clarifying the conceptual terrain that we’re in. In this commentary I focus on three issues: the link between isomorphism and the matching-content doctrine; the argument against the matching-content doctrine; and the argument against experiential internalism.
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  19. Closing the Gap: Some Questions for Neurophenomenology.Timothy J. Bayne - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):349-64.
    In his 1996 paper Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem, Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela''s call hasn''t gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do it? To (...)
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  20. Peer Commentary on de Quincey.M. Beaton - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):13.
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  21. Neural Correlates of the Perception of Spoiled Food Stimuli.Christoph A. Becker, Tobias Flaisch, Britta Renner & Harald T. Schupp - 2016 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10.
  22. Thinking the Voice: Neural Correlates of Voice Perception.Pascal Belin, Shirley Fecteau & Catherine Bédard - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):129-135.
  23. Phenomenology and Cortical Microstimulation.John Bickle - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 140.
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  24. Causal Interpretations of Correlations Between Neural and Conscious Events.Dieter Birnbacher - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):115-128.
    The contribution argues that causal interpretations of empirical correlations between neural and conscious events are meaningful even if not fully verifiable and that there are reasons in favour of an epiphenomenalist construction of psychophysical causality. It is suggested that an account of causality can be given that makes interactionism, epiphenomenalism and Leibnizian parallelism semantically distinct interpretations of the phenomena. Though neuroscience cannot strictly prove or rule out any one of these interpretations it can be argued that methodological principles favour a (...)
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  25. The Brain and Consciousness.E. Bisiach - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 101--120.
  26. Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  27. The Merely Verbal Problem of Consciousness.Ned Block - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):270.
  28. Tactile Sensation Via Spatial Perception.Ned Block - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (7):285-286.
  29. How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.Ned Block - 2001 - In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 1.
    There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H2O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle’s reasoning about the function of consciousness goes (...)
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  30. The Foundations of Cognitive Science.Ned Block - 2001 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  31. How to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness*: Ned Block.Ned Block - 1996 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:23-34.
    There are two concepts of consciousness that are easy to confuse with one another, access-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. However, just as the concepts of water and H 2 O are different concepts of the same thing, so the two concepts of consciousness may come to the same thing in the brain. The focus of this paper is on the problems that arise when these two concepts of consciousness are conflated. I will argue that John Searle's reasoning about the function of (...)
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  32. Operationalizing Consciousness: Subjective Report and Task Performance.Worth Boone - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1031-1041.
    There are two distinct but related threads in this article. The first is methodological and is aimed at exploring the relative merits and faults of different operational definitions of consciousness. The second is conceptual and is aimed at understanding the prior commitments regarding the nature of conscious content that motivate these positions. I consider two distinct operationalizations: one defines consciousness in terms of dichotomous subjective reports, the other in terms of graded subjective reports. I ultimately argue that both approaches are (...)
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  33. Physiological and Cognitive Processes in the Maintenance and Reduction of Fear.T. D. Borkovec - 1976 - In Gary E. Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Plenum. pp. 261--308.
  34. Neurobiology and Phenomenology: Towards a Three-Tiered Intertheoretic Model of Explanation.Noel Boyle - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):34-58.
    Analytic and continental philosophies of mind are too long divided. In both traditions there is extensive discussion of consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, subjectivity, perception (especially visual) and so on. Between these two discussions there are substantive disagreements, overlapping points of insight, meaningful differences in emphasis, and points of comparison which seems to offer nothing but confusion. In other words, there are the ideal circumstances for doing philosophy. Yet, there has been little discourse. This paper invites expanding discourse between these (...)
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  35. Commentary: “Neural Signatures of Intransitive Preferences”.Nicholas Brown, Clintin P. Davis-Stober & Michel Regenwetter - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  36. Consciousness Doesn't Overflow Cognition.Richard Brown - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5 (1399):10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01399.
    Theories of consciousness can be separated into those that see it as cognitive in nature, or as an aspect of cognitive functioning, and those that see consciousness as importantly distinct from any kind of cognitive functioning. One version of the former kind of theory is the higher-order-thought theory of consciousness. This family of theories posits a fundamental role for cognitive states, higher-order thought-like intentional states, in the explanation of conscious experience. These states are higher-order in that they represent the subject (...)
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  37. What is This Thing Called Subjective Experience? Reflections on the Neuropsychology of Qualia.R. Buck - 1993 - Neuropsychology 7:490-99.
  38. What Does the Mind Do That the Brain Does Not?Jean E. Burns - 2010 - In R. L. Amoroso (ed.), The Complementarity of Mind and Body: Fulfilling the Dream of Descartes, Einstein and Eccles. Nova Science.
    Two forms of independent action by consciousness have been proposed by various researchers – free will and holistic processing. (Holistic processing contributes to the formation of behavior through the holistic use of brain programs and encoding.) The well-known experiment of Libet et al. (1983) implies that if free will exists, its action must consist of making a selection among alternatives presented by the brain. As discussed herein, this result implies that any physical changes mind can produce in the brain are (...)
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  39. Does Consciousness Perform a Function Independently of the Brain?Jean E. Burns - 1991 - Frontier Perspectives, Center for Frontier Sciences, Temple University 2 (1):19-34.
    Even if all of the content of conscious experience is encoded in the brain, there is a considerable difference between the view that consciousness does independent processing and the view that it does not. If all processing is done by the brain, then conscious experience is unnecessary and irrelevant to behavior. If consciousness performs a function, then its association with particular aspects of brain processing reflect its functional use in determining behavior. However, if consciousness does perform a function, it cannot (...)
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  40. Evolution of the Neural Basis of Consciousness: A Bird-Mammal Comparison.Ann B. Butler, Paul R. Manger, B. I. B. Lindahl & Peter Århem - 2005 - Bioessays 27 (9):923-936.
    The main objective of this essay is to validate some of the principal, currently competing, mammalian consciousness-brain theories by comparing these theories with data on both cognitive abilities and brain organization in birds. Our argument is that, given that multiple complex cognitive functions are correlated with presumed consciousness in mammals, this correlation holds for birds as well. Thus, the neuroanatomical features of the forebrain common to both birds and mammals may be those that are crucial to the generation of both (...)
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  41. Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind.Martin Carrier & Peter Machamer (eds.) - 1997 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Leading scholars in the fields of philosophy and the sciences of the mind have contributed to this newest volume in the prestigious Pittsburgh-Konstanz series. Among the problem areas discussed are folk psychology, meanings as conceptual structures, functional and qualitative properties of colors, the role of conscious mental states, representation and mental content, the impact of connectionism on the philosophy of the mind, and supervenience, emergence, and realization. Most of the essays are followed by commentaries that reflect ongoing debates in the (...)
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  42. Determining the Moment of Consciousness?David J. Chalmers - manuscript -
    It's very interesting to see neurophysiological evidence brought to bear on the puzzling question of conscious experience. Many have observed that information-processing models of cognition seem to leave consciousness untouched; it is natural to hope that turning to neurophysiology might lead us to the Holy Grail. Still, I think there are reasons to be skeptical. There are good reasons to suppose that neurophysiological investigation contributes to cognitive explanation at best in virtue of constraining the information-processing structure of cognition. Of course (...)
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  43. What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?David J. Chalmers - 2000 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 17--39.
    The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include.
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  44. On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1998 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. pp. 2--219.
    *[[This paper appears in _Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates_ (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, and A.Scott, eds), published with MIT Press in 1998. It is a transcript of my talk at the second Tucson conference in April 1996, lightly edited to include the contents of overheads and to exclude some diversions with a consciousness meter. A more in-depth argument for some of the claims in this paper can be found in Chapter 6 of my (...)
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  45. Conference on Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions.Antonio Damasio Churchland, Stephen Engel, Hans Flohr, Nick Franks, Melvyn Goodale, Valerie Hardcastle, Christof Koch, Nikos Logothetis, Thomas Metzinger & Ernst Poppel - 1998 - Consciousness and Cognition 7:108.
  46. Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything About Consciousness?Patricia S. Churchland - 1994 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (4):23-40.
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  47. Reduction and the Neurobiological Basis of Consciousness.Patricia S. Churchland - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
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  48. Chimerical Colors: Some Phenomenological Predictions From Cognitive Neuroscience.Paul M. Churchland - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):527-560.
    The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the (...)
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  49. Consciousness: The Organismic Approach.Philip Clapson - 2001 - Neuro-Psychoanalysis 3 (2):203-220.
  50. Vicissitudes of Consciousness, Varieties of Correlates: Review of The Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions[REVIEW]Austen Clark - forthcoming - American Journal of Psychology.
    and denotes a number of different phenomena. We reason about “consciousness” using some premises that apply to one of the..
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