Consciousness and Psychology, Misc

In this paper a new model of mind is proposed, to do so, at first it was assumed that our physical world a new structure and the mind defined in this context. In this model, the planets are massive curvature of time-space continuum that has made a trapping physical reality that we are located within. Then the mind is defined as an hourglass structure with half bulb within the physical reality and half out of it. This model with attention to (...) figures perhaps might be able to explain some mental states and disorders. (shrink)

Ich beginne mit einigen berühmten Kommentaren des Philosophen (Psychologen) Ludwig Wittgenstein, weil Pinker mit den meisten Menschen (aufgrund der Standardeinstellungen unserer entwickelten angeborenen Psychologie) bestimmte Vorurteile über das Funktionieren desGeistes teilt und weil Wittgenstein einzigartige und tiefgründige Einblicke in das Wirken von Sprache, Denken und Wirklichkeit bietet (die er als mehr oder weniger koextensiv ansah), die er nirgendwo sonst findet. Diere bezieht sich nur auf Wittgenstein in diesem Band, was sehr bedauerlich ist, wenn man bedenkt, dass er der brillanteste und (...) originellste Analytiker der Sprache war. Im letzten Kapitel fasst er anhand der berühmten Metapher von Platons Höhle das Buch auf wunderbare Weise mit einem Überblick darüber zusammen, wie der Geist (Sprache, Denken, absichtliche Psychologie) – ein Produkt blinden Egoismus, nur geringfügig durch automatisierten Altruismus für nahe Verwandte, die Kopien unserer Gene tragen (Inclusive Fitness)– automatisch arbeitet, aber versucht, mit einer optimistischen Note zu enden, indem er uns Hoffnung gibt, dass wir dennoch seine enormen Fähigkeiten nutzen können, um zusammenzuarbeiten. Pinker ist sich dessen sicherlich bewusst, sagt aber wenig darüber aus, dass weit mehr über unsere Psychologie weggelassen wird als eingeschlossen. Unter den Fenstern in die menschliche Natur, die ausgelassen oder minimale Aufmerksamkeit gegeben werden, sind Mathematik und Geometrie, Musik und Klänge, Bilder, Ereignisse und Kausalität, Ontologie (Klassen von Dingen oder was wir wissen), die meisten der Erkenntnistheorie (wie wir wissen), Dispositionen (glauben, Denken, Richten, Beabsichtigen etc.) und der Rest der absichtlichen Handlungspsychologie, Neurotransmitter und Entheogene, spirituelle Zustände (z.B. Satori und Erleuchtung, Hirnstimulation und -aufzeichnung, Hirnschäden und Verhaltensdefizite und -störungen, Spiele und Sport, Entscheidungstheorie (inkl. Spieltheorie und Verhaltensökonomie), Tierverhalten (sehr wenig Sprache, aber eine Milliarde Jahre geteilte Genetik). Viele Bücher wurden über jeden dieser Bereiche der absichtlichen Psychologie geschrieben. Die Daten in diesem Buch sind Beschreibungen, keine Erklärungen, die zeigen, warum unser Gehirn es auf diese Weise tut oder wie es gemacht wird. Woher wissen wir, die Sätze auf ihre unterschiedliche Weise zu verwenden (d.h. alle ihre Bedeutungen zu kennen)? Dies ist die Evolutionspsychologie, die auf einer grundlegenderen Ebene arbeitet – der Ebene, auf der Wittgenstein am aktivsten ist. Und der Kontext, in dem Worte verwendet werden, ist kaum beachtet = eine Arena, die Wittgenstein als Pionier emittierte. Dennoch, ist dies ein klassisches Werk und mit diesen Vorsichtsmaßnahmen ist immer noch lesenswert. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Die jenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Dieses Buch und die meisten seiner Quellen sind Möchtegern-Psychologie texte, obwohl die meisten Autoren es nicht erkannten. Es geht um menschliches Verhalten und Argumentation, warum wir so denken und handeln, wie wir es tun und wie wir uns in Zukunft verändern könnten. Aber (wie alle diese Diskussionen bis vor kurzem)keine der Erklärungensind wirklich Erklärungen, und so geben sie keinen Einblick in menschliches Verhalten. Niemand diskutiert die damit verbundenen mentalen Mechanismen. Es ist, als würde man beschreiben, wie ein Auto by arbeitet, (...) wenn man dasLenkrad und Metall diskutiert und ohne Kenntnis des Motors, Kraftstoffs oder Antriebsstrangs lackiert. Tatsächlich sind die Texte, wie die meisten älteren "Erklärungen" des Verhaltens,hier und die Kommentsvon Wilber oft interessanter für die Art von Dingen, die sie als Erklärungen akzeptieren (undweglassen!) und die Art der Argumentation, die sie verwenden, als für den eigentlichen Inhalt. (shrink)

A comparison between Muḥammad and Siddhārtha’s psychological states is made to identify how they had their mystical experiences and how their presuppositions and personalities shaped their interpretation of these experiences. Muḥammad’s mystical experience appeared to be based on an altered state of consciousness. Siddhārtha’s teachings include that one must not have blind faith and remain open to various truths. These teachings may reflect that he was high in openness to experience, which may have fortified him from becoming delusional. While mystical (...) experiences may have pathological overlaps, they could be categorized in a similar way to psychological states. Yet, mindful presuppositions and personality traits, especially from within openness to experience spectrum, are what make perceptions of these experiences diverse. (shrink)

Four experiments supported the hypothesis that ordinary people understand free will as meaning unconstrained choice, not having a soul. People consistently rated free will as being high unless reduced by internal constraints (i.e., things that impaired people’s mental abilities to make choices) or external constraints (i.e., situations that hampered people’s abilities to choose and act as they desired). Scientific paradigms that have been argued to disprove free will were seen as reducing, but usually not eliminating free will, and the reductions (...) were because of constrained conscious choice. We replicated findings that a minority of people think lacking a soul reduces free will. These reductions in perceived free will were fully explained by reductions in people’s perceived abilities to make conscious decisions. Thus, some people do think you need a soul to have free will—but it is because they think you need a soul to make conscious decisions. (shrink)

A key contention of Klein & Barron (2016) is that consciousness does not depend on cortical structures. A critical appraisal suggests they have overestimated the strength of their evidence.

According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...) psychopathological challenge they face. The chapter’s central goal is to present two new approaches to defending subjectivity theories in the face of this challenge. What distinguishes these two approaches is that they go to great lengths to interpret patients’ reports at face value – greater length, at any rate, than more widespread approaches in the extant literature. (shrink)

This paper asks about the ways in which embodimentoriented cognitive science contributes to our understanding of phenomenal consciousness. It is first argued that central work in the field of embodied cognitive science does not solve the hard problem of consciousness head on. It is then argued that an embodied turn toward neurophenomenology makes no distinctive headway on the puzzle of consciousness; for neurophenomenology either concedes dualism in the face of the hard problem or represents only a slight methodological variation on (...) extant cognitive-scientific approaches to the easy problems of consciousness. The paper closes with the positive suggestion that embodied cognitive science supports a different approach to phenomenal consciousness, according to which the mind is massively representational, cognitive science has no use for the personal-level posits that tend to drive philosophical theorizing about consciousness and mind, and the hard problem is illusory. (shrink)

In this article the linguistic processes of consciousness are discussed at the informational and semantic levels. The key question is devoted to the distinction between the information, meaning and sense in the physical, logico-semantic and historic levels of brain and consciousness. The principal point runs that the human linguistic process of sense producing takes the variety and indistinctness in the cultural presupposition. The modern theories of philosophy of mind relying on the theories of Soviet psychological school propose some new solutions (...) in the pragmatic questions of the semantic noncomputability. In this review we will try to justify the dualistic correlation between the cultural base and the communicative semantic process. (shrink)

Subjective reports and theories about memory may have an influence on other beliefs and behaviours. Patients with schizophrenia suffer a wide range of deficits affecting their awareness of daily life, including memory. With the Metamemory Inventory in Adulthood we ascertained patients’ memory knowledge and thoughts about their own cognitive capacities and about several aspects of cognitive functioning: personal capacities, knowledge of processes, use of strategies, perceived change with ageing, anxiety, motivation and mastery. The participants’ ratings were correlated with their intellectual, (...) cognitive and psychiatric data. Patients felt they had a lower capacity and marginally lower mastery over their memory than comparison subjects. They reported less recourse to strategies, and higher levels of memory-related anxiety. However, their knowledge of basic memory processes, motivation to succeed, and perception of ageing effects were similar. So patients with schizophrenia do not suffer a general and non specific impairment of their metacognitive knowledge. (shrink)

Though there are holes in the theory of how children move through stages of numerical competence, the current approach offers the most promising avenue for characterizing changes in competence as children confront new mathematical concepts. Like the science of mathematics, children's discovery of number is rooted in intuitions about sets, and not purely in analytic truths.

This paper is a review of the work that has been carried out on machine consciousness. A clear overview of this diverse field is achieved by breaking machine consciousness down into four different areas, which are used to understand its aims, discuss its relationship with other subjects and outline the work that has been carried out so far. The criticisms that have been made against machine consciousness are also covered, along with its potential benefits, and the work that has been (...) done on analysing systems for signs of consciousness. Some of the social and ethical issues raised by machine consciousness are examined at the end of the paper. (shrink)

Report on the National Seminar on Indian Psychology, Bangalore, December 2007, jointly organized by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research and the Swami Vivekananda Yoga Anusandhana Samsthana.

This invaluable resource presents a state-of-the-art account of the psychology of pain from leading researchers. It features contributions from clinical, social, and biopsychological perspectives, the latest theories of pain, as well as basic processes and applied issues. The book opens with an introduction to the history of pain theory and the epidemiology of pain. It then explores theoretical work, including the gate control theory/neuromatrix model, as well as biopsychosocial, cognitive/behavioral, and psychodynamic perspectives. Issues, such as the link between psychophysiological processes (...) and consciousness and the communication of pain are examined. Pain over the life span, ethno-cultural, and individual differences are the focus of the next three chapters. Pain: Psychological Perspectives addresses current clinical issues: * pain assessment and acute and chronic pain interventions; * the unavailability of psychological interventions for chronic pain in a number of settings, the use of self-report, and issues related to the implementation of certain biomedical interventions; and * the latest ethical standards and the theories. Intended for practitioners, researchers, and students involved with the study of pain in fields such as clinical and health psychology, this book will also appeal to physicians, nurses, and physiotherapists. Pain is ideal for advanced courses on the psychology of pain, pain management, and related courses that address this topic. (shrink)

Includes established theories and cutting-edge developments. Presents the work of an international group of experts. Presents the nature, origin, implications, and future course of major unresolved issues in the area.

The book does not address speculations about the neurophysiological/brain bases of consciousness, arguing that these are premature, and it is highly critical of ...

The author explores the fragmented and often fragile human psyche, revealing common, everyday forms of dementia that plague millions of people, discusses the ...

The International Handbook of Psychology is an authoritative resource covering all the main areas of psychological science and written by an outstanding set of authors from around the world. The 31 chapters cover not only scientific but also applied cross-disciplinary aspects. Supervised by an International Editorial Advisory Board (IEAB) of 13 eminent psychologists and edited by Professors Kurt Pawlik and Mark R Rosenzweig, it is being published under the auspices of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS) by SAGE Publications (...) Ltd in London. The International Handbook of Psychology will be invaluable to advanced undergraduates, graduate students and academics in psychology,. (shrink)

This overview of Consciousness Studies examines the conditions that one has to satisfy to establish a scientific investigation of phenomenal consciousness. Written from the perspective experimental psychology, it follows a two-pronged approach in which traditional third-person methods for investigating the brain and physical world are complementary to first-person methods for investigating subjective experience allowing the possibility of finding “bridging laws” that relate such first- and third-person data to each other. Mindful of the relative sophistication of third-person methods the chapter focuses (...) on the problems of developing similarly sophisticated first-person methods. The problems are of three kinds: (1) Epistemological problems: How can one obtain public, objective knowledge about private, subjective experiences? (2) Methodological problems: Given that one cannot attach measuring instruments directly up to experiences, what psychological “instruments” and procedures are appropriate to their study? (3) The relation of the observer to the observed: The more closely coupled an observer is with an observed, the greater the potential influence of the act of observation on the nature of the observed (“observer effects”). Given this, how can one develop introspective and phenomenological methods where the observer is the observed? The chapter argues that the epistemological problems are more apparent than real, although this requires one to construe what is private versus public, and what is subjective or intersubjective versus what is objective in a slightly different way—with some enabling consequences for a science of consciousness. Methodological problems are real, but not fundamentally different to the problems traditionally faced in experimental psychological investigations of mental phenomena. The close-coupling of observer with the observed in first-person investigations can also be a problem, producing “observer effects” that are more acute than in most third-person investigations. The chapter suggests that one can either try to minimise such effects or to harness them, depending on the purpose of the investigation. (shrink)

How can one investigate phenomenal consciousness? As in other areas of science, the investigation of consciousness aims for a more precise knowledge of its phenomena, and the discovery of general truths about their nature. This requires the development of appropriate first-person, second-person and third-person methods. This book introduces some of the creative ways in which these methods can be applied to different purposes, e.g. to understanding the relation of consciousness to brain, to examining or changing consciousness as such, and to (...) understanding the way consciousness is influenced by social, clinical and therapeutic contexts. To clarify the strengths and weaknesses of different methods and to demonstrate the interplay of methodology and epistemology, the book also suggests a number of “maps” of the consciousness studies terrain that place different approaches to the study of consciousness into a broader, interdisciplinary context. (shrink)

Two experiments examine the effects of unreportable hints on anagram solving performance and on solvers' subjective experience of insight. In Experiment 1, after seeing a hint presented too briefly to identify, participants solved anagrams preceded by the solution fastest and solved anagrams preceded by unrelated hints slowest. Participants' “warmth” ratings for solution hints were more insight-like than those for unrelated hints. In Experiment 2 a hint, or no hint, was presented at one of three different exposure durations . Participants benefited (...) from solution-relevant hints that were either unreportable or reportable, but showed a cost only for unrelated hints that were reportable. Participants' ratings of their insight experiences showed that unreportable solution and semantically related hints produced more insight-like experiences than did unrelated hints. The results suggest that unreportable processing of solution-related information is important for the insight experience. (shrink)

This volume takes the first step toward building the necessary local bridges.

I start with a review of 20 years of proposals on the functions of consciousness. I then present a minimal number of functions that consciouness subserves, as well as as some remaining puzzles about its psychology. In the process I stress a psychologist's functional approach, asking what consciousness is for. The result is an attempt to place conscious processes within the usual flow of human information processing.

The third edition of a work that defines the field of cognitive neuroscience, with extensive new material including new chapters and new contributors.