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  1. Yes, We Have Conscious Will.Mark Sharlow - 2007
    In this paper I examine Daniel M. Wegner's line of argument against the causal efficacy of conscious will, as presented in Wegner's book "The Illusion of Conscious Will" (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002). I argue that most of the evidence adduced in the book can be interpreted in ways that do not threaten the efficacy of conscious will. Also, I argue that Wegner's view of conscious will is not an empirical thesis, and that certain views of consciousness and the (...)
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  2. A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action.Chiara Brozzo - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-15.
    Skilled sportsmen or musicians—more generally, skilled agents—often fill us with awe with the way they perform their actions. One question we may ask ourselves is whether they intended to perform some awe-inspiring aspects of their actions. This question becomes all the more pressing as it often turns out that these agents were not conscious of some of those aspects at the time of performance. As I shall argue, there are reasons for suspecting lack of conscious access to an aspect of (...)
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  3. Agentive Phenomenology.Myrto Mylopoulos & Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter we reflect on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology – that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. Our discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 80s (section 1). As we will see, much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. After discussing empirical (...)
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  4. Philosophy of Action From Suarez to Davidson.Constantine Sandis (ed.) - forthcoming
  5. Disorders of Volition.Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
  6. Forthcoming. The Phenomenology of Efficacy.S. Siegel - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
  7. Eine Rezension von "Philosophie in einem neuen Jahrhundert" (Philosophy in a New Century) von John Searle (2008) (Überprüfung überarbeitet 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Willkommen in der Hölle auf Erden: Babys, Klimawandel, Bitcoin, Kartelle, China, Demokratie, Vielfalt, Dysgenie, Gleichheit, Hacker, Menschenrechte, Islam, Liberalismus, Wohlstand, Internet, Chaos, Hunger, Krankheit, Gewalt, Künstliche Intelligenz, Krieg. Las Vegas, NV, USA: Reality Press. pp. 33-52.
    Bevor ich das Buch kommentiere, möchte ich Kommentare zu Wittgenstein und Searle und der logischen Struktur der Rationalität abgeben. Die Essays hier sind meistens bereits während des letzten Jahrzehnts veröffentlicht (obwohl einige aktualisiert wurden), zusammen mit einem unveröffentlichten Artikel, und nichts hier wird für diejenigen, die mit seiner Arbeit mithalten können, nicht überraschen. Wie W gilt er als der beste Standup-Philosoph seiner Zeit und sein schriftliches Werk ist solide als Fels und bahnbrechender durchweg. SeinVersäumnis, das spätere W so ernst zu (...)
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  8. Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception.Eric Marcus - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1205-1225.
    Is it impossible for a person to do something intentionally without knowing that she is doing it? The phenomenon of self-deceived agency might seem to show otherwise. Here the agent is not lying, yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action. This disavowal might seem expressive of ignorance. However, I show that the self-deceived agent does know what she's doing. I argue that we should understand the factors that explain self-deception as masking rather than negating the practical knowledge characteristic (...)
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  9. Self‐Awareness and Self‐Understanding.B. Scot Rousse - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):162-186.
    In this paper, I argue that self-awareness is intertwined with one's awareness of possibilities for action. I show this by critically examining Dan Zahavi's multidimensional account of the self. I argue that the distinction Zahavi makes among 'pre-reflective minimal', 'interpersonal', and 'normative' dimensions of selfhood needs to be refined in order to accommodate what I call 'pre-reflective self-understanding'. The latter is a normative dimension of selfhood manifest not in reflection and deliberation, but in the habits and style of a person’s (...)
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  10. Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention.Joshua Shepherd - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):286-305.
  11. Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 5th Edition.Michael Starks (ed.) - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    e first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. (...)
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  12. The Logical Structure of Consciousness.Michael Starks (ed.) - 2019 - Las Vegas, NV, USA: Reality Press.
    It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, consciousness, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated (...)
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  13. No Self and the Phenomenology of Agency.Monima Chadha - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):187-205.
    The Buddhists philosophers put forward a revisionary metaphysics which lacks a “self” in order to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world. The first task in the paper is to answer the question: what is the “self” that the Buddhists are denying? To answer this question, I look at the Abhidharma arguments for the No-Self doctrine and then work back to an interpretation of the self that is the target of such a doctrine. I argue that Buddhists (...)
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  14. Consciousness and Freedom: The Inseparability of Thinking and Doing. [REVIEW]Samuel Murray - 2017 - Review of Metaphysics 71 (4).
  15. The Experience of Acting and the Structure of Consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (8):422-448.
    I offer an account of the experience of acting that demonstrates how agentive aspects of experience associated with the execution of intentions are richly integrated with perceptual aspects associated with parts of action taking place in the publicly observable world. On the view I elucidate, the experience of acting is often both an engagement with the world and a type of intimate acquaintance with it. In conscious action the agent consciously intervenes in the world and consciously experiences the world she (...)
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  16. La Mettrie's Objection: Humans Act Like Animals.Gary Comstock - 2016 - In Gary Comstock & Mylan Engel Jr (eds.), The Moral Rights of Animals. Lanham, MD: Lexington. pp. 175-198.
    A common view of nonhuman animals is that they lack rights because they lack conscious control over themselves. Two thoughts put pressure on this view. First, we recognize the rights of radically cognitively limited humans even though they lack conscious control over themselves. So it would seem mere prejudice to deny rights to nonhuman mammals on the grounds that animals lack autonomy. Tom Regan has been the most eloquent, powerful, and resolute defender of this thought. Second, evidence is growing that (...)
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  17. On the Self-Organizing Origins of Agency.J. A. Scott Kelso - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (7):490-499.
  18. Precis of The Varieties of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):240-246.
  19. Conscious Action/Zombie Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):419-444.
    I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying . I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, conscious visual experience plays a causal role for action control in some circumstances. Second, I propose a multimodal account of the experience (...)
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  20. Kriegel on the Phenomenology of Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):264-272.
    : I focus on Uriah Kriegel’s account of conative phenomenology. I agree with Kriegel’s argument that some conative phenomenology is primitive in that some conative phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to another kind of property. I disagree, however, with Kriegel’s specific characterization of the properties in question. Kriegel argues that the experience of deciding-and-then-trying is the core of conative phenomenology. I argue, however, that the experiences of trying and acting better occupy this place. Further, I suggest that the attitudinal component (...)
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  21. Dissociation During Trauma: The Ownership-Agency Tradeoff Model.Yochai Ataria - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):1037-1053.
    Dissociation during trauma lacks an adequate definition. Using data obtained from interviews with 36 posttraumatic individuals conducted according to the phenomenological approach, this paper seeks to improve our understanding of this phenomenon. In particular, it suggesting a trade off model depicting the balance between the sense of agency and the sense of ownership : a reciprocal relationship appears to exist between these two, and in order to enable control of the body during trauma the sense of ownership must decrease. When (...)
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  22. Sense of Ownership and Sense of Agency During Trauma.Yochai Ataria - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):199-212.
    This paper seeks to describe and analyze the traumatic experience through an examination of the sense of agency—the sense of controlling one’s body, and sense of ownership—the sense that it is my body that undergoes experiences. It appears that there exist two levels of traumatic experience: on the first level one loses the sense of agency but retains the sense of ownership, whilst on the second one loses both of these, with symptoms becoming progressively more severe. A comparison of the (...)
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  23. Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism?Oisín Deery - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):2-19.
    Many philosophers think not only that we are free to act otherwise than we do, but also that we experience being free in this way. Terry Horgan argues that such experience is compatibilist: it is accurate even if determinism is true. According to Horgan, when people judge their experience as incompatibilist, they misinterpret it. While Horgan's position is attractive, it incurs significant theoretical costs. I sketch an alternative way to be a compatibilist about experiences of free agency that avoids these (...)
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  24. The Feeling of Agency Hypothesis: A Critique.Thor Grünbaum - 2015 - Synthese 192 (10):3313-3337.
    A dominant view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience is that low-level, comparator-based mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive experience often called the feeling of agency . An opposing view is that comparator-based motor control is largely non-conscious and not associated with any particular type of distinctive phenomenology . In this paper, I critically evaluate the nature of the empirical evidence researchers commonly take to support FoA-hypothesis. The aim of this paper is not only to scrutinize the FoA-hypothesis and data supposed (...)
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  25. The Sense of Agency.Patrick Haggard & Baruch Eitam (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press USA.
  26. The Varieties of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Recent work on consciousness has featured a number of debates on the existence and character of controversial types of phenomenal experience. Perhaps the best-known is the debate over the existence of a sui generis, irreducible cognitive phenomenology – a phenomenology proper to thought. Another concerns the existence of a sui generis phenomenology of agency. Such debates bring up a more general question: how many types of sui generis, irreducible, basic, primitive phenomenology do we have to posit to just be able (...)
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  27. Time and the Philosophy of Action.Roman Altshuler Michael J. Sigrist (ed.) - 2015 - Routledge.
    Although scholarship in philosophy of action has grown in recent years, there has been little work explicitly dealing with the role of time in agency—a role with great significance for the study of action theory. As the articles in this collection demonstrate, virtually every fundamental issue in the philosophy of action involves considerations of time. The four sections of this volume address the metaphysics of action, diachronic practical rationality, the relation between deliberation and action, and the phenomenology of agency, providing (...)
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  28. The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness. [REVIEW]Kourken Michaelian - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):349-351.
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  29. Agentive Awareness is Not Sensory Awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.
    In this paper, I argue that the conscious awareness one has of oneself as acting, i.e., agentive awareness, is not a type of sensory awareness. After providing some set up in Sect. 1, I move on in Sect. 2 to sketch a profile of sensory agentive experiences as representational states with sensory qualities by which we come to be aware of ourselves as performing actions. In Sect. 3, I critique two leading arguments in favor of positing such sensory experiences: the (...)
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  30. Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness Potentials with Non-Conscious Volition.Alexander Schlegel, Prescott Alexander, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Peter Ulric Tse & Thalia Wheatley - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:196-203.
    The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both volitional movement and (...)
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  31. Conscious Control Over Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (3):320-344.
    The extensive involvement of nonconscious processes in human behaviour has led some to suggest that consciousness is much less important for the control of action than we might think. In this article I push against this trend, developing an understanding of conscious control that is sensitive to our best models of overt action control. Further, I assess the cogency of various zombie challenges—challenges that seek to demote the importance of conscious control for human agency. I argue that though nonconscious contributions (...)
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  32. Conscious Intending as Self-Programming.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):94-113.
    Despite the fact that there is considerable evidence against the causal efficacy of proximal (short-term) conscious intentions, many studies confirm our commonsensical belief in the efficacy of more distal (longer-term) conscious intentions. In this paper, I address two questions: (i) What, if any, is the difference between the role of consciousness in effective and in non-effective conscious intentions? (ii) How do effective conscious distal intentions interact with unconscious processes in producing actions, and how do non-effective proximal intentions fit into this (...)
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  33. Improvisational Artistry in Live Dance Performance as Embodied and Extended Agency.Aili Bresnahan - 2014 - Dance Research Journal 46 (1):84-94.
    This paper provides an account of improvisational artistry in live dance performance that construes the contribution of the dance performer as a kind of agency. Andy Clark’s theory of the embodied and extended mind is used in order to consider how this account is supported by research on how a thinking-while-doing person navigates the world. I claim here that while a dance performer’s improvisational artistry does include embodied and extended features that occur outside of the brain and nervous system that (...)
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  34. Intentional Action and the Post-Coma Patient.Zoe Drayson - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):23-31.
    Detecting conscious awareness in a patient emerging from a coma state is problematic, because our standard attributions of conscious awareness rely on interpreting bodily movement as intentional action. Where there is an absence of intentional bodily action, as in the vegetative state, can we reliably assume that there is an absence of conscious awareness? Recent neuroimaging work suggests that we can attribute conscious awareness to some patients in a vegetative state by interpreting their brain activity as intentional mental action. I (...)
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  35. Review of Consciousness and Moral Responsibility. By Neil Levy. [REVIEW]Lantz Fleming Miller - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (11-12):201-206.
    One purpose for the field of consciousness studies may be to increase general understanding about consciousness and its place in human life, thereby possibly aiding us in living in better harmony within our societies and with our fellow humans. Neil Levy’s new work is a candidate for this latter purpose for the field. Consciousness studies may help us better understand how we function as conscious agents—or what role consciousness plays in our agency—and aid in our more just construction of laws, (...)
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  36. An Experiential Account of Creativity.Bence Nanay - 2014 - In Elliot Paul & Scott Barry Kaufman (eds.), The Philosophy of Creativity. Oxford University Press.
    The aim of the paper is to argue that the difference between creative and non-creative mental processes is not a functional/computational, but an experiential one. In other words, what is distinctive about creative mental processes is not the functional/computational mechanism that leads to the emergence of a creative idea, be it the recombination of old ideas or the transformation of one’s conceptual space, but the way in which this mental process is experienced. The explanatory power of the functional/computational theories and (...)
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  37. The Phenomenology of Agency and Experimental Philosophy.Part Eleven - 2013 - In Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates. Oup Usa. pp. 471.
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  38. The Metaphysics of Awareness in the Philosophy of Laozi.James Giles - 2013 - International Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):435-451.
    This paper shows that a careful reading of Laozi’s The Way and Its Power enables one to come up with a metaphysics of awareness. This is done by rejecting those accounts that paint Laozi as a mystic or cosmologist and by arguing for the human-centeredness of his approach. It is shown that three central ideas in Laozi’s work can all be understood as referring to properties of awareness. These three ideas are the Way , return , and non-action . The (...)
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  39. Did I Do That? Brain–Computer Interfacing and the Sense of Agency.Pim Haselager - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (3):405-418.
    Brain–computer interfacing (BCI) aims at directly capturing brain activity in order to enable a user to drive an application such as a wheelchair without using peripheral neural or motor systems. Low signal to noise ratio’s, low processing speed, and huge intra- and inter-subject variability currently call for the addition of intelligence to the applications, in order to compensate for errors in the production and/or the decoding of brain signals. However, the combination of minds and machines through BCI’s and intelligent devices (...)
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  40. Understanding Conative Phenomenology: Lessons From Ricœur.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):537-557.
    I discuss Ricoeur's intriguing account of the phenomenology of the will, which focuses on deciding rather than desiring as the experientially paradigmatic exercise of the will.
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  41. Embodied Demonstratives: A Reply to Wu.Christopher Mole - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):231-239.
    Although Wayne Wu correctly identifies a flaw in the way in which my 2009 article frames the debate about ‘zombie action’, he fails in his attempts to strengthen the case for thinking that our actions are under less conscious control than we usually imagine. His argument, like the arguments that my earlier paper addressed, can be blocked by allowing that an embodied demonstrative concept can contribute contents to a visual experience.
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  42. The Apparent Illusion of Conscious Deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.
    Recent work in cognitive science suggests that conscious thought plays a much less central role in the production of human behavior than most think. Partially on the basis of this work, Peter Carruthers has advanced the claim that humans never consciously decide to act. This claim is of independent interest for action theory, and its potential truth poses a problem for theories of free will and autonomy, which often take our capacity to consciously decide to be of central importance. In (...)
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  43. The Semantic Role of Agentive Control in Hungarian Placement Events.Attila Andics - 2012 - In Anetta Kopecka & Bhuvana Narasimhan (eds.), Events of "Putting" and "Taking": A Crosslinguistic Perspective. John Benjamins. pp. 100--183.
  44. What Is Self-Consciousness?Bruya Brian - 2012 - In Labirinti della mente: Visioni del mondo. Siena, Italy: Società bibliografica toscana. pp. 223-233.
    In this article, I delineate seven aspects of the process of self-consciousness in order to demonstrate that when any of the aspects is compromised, self-consciousness goes away while consciousness persists. I then suggest that the psychological phenomenon of flow is characterized by a loss of self-consciousness. The seven aspects are: 1) implicit awareness that the person and the self are identical; 2) awareness of an event or circumstance in the world internal or external to the person; 3) awareness that this (...)
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  45. Mental Action. Edited by Lucy O'Brien and Matthew Soteriou. (Oxford UP, 2009. Pp. X + 286. Price £50.00).Andrei A. Buckareff - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):401-403.
  46. Agency and the Other: The Role of Agency for the Importance of Belief in Buddhist and Christian Traditions.Julia Cassaniti - 2012 - Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 40 (3):297-316.
  47. Mental Actions, by Lucy O'Brien and Matthew Soteriou (Eds).E. Mayr - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):1110-1115.
  48. Age and Agency.Veli Mitova - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (3):335-369.
    Abstract I defend the following three-part hypothesis: (1) the sense that one is running out of time diminishes one's capacity to reauthor oneself; (2) this capacity is constitutive of agency par excellence; so, (3) the sense of running out of time attenuates agency. (2) is shown to enjoy both intuitive and abductive plausibility. (1) and (3) are confirmed by existing reflections on old age, as well as by empirical research.
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  49. Evaluating the Case for the Low-Level Approach to Agentive Awareness.Myrto Mylopoulos - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):103-127.
    Agentive awareness is the awareness one has of oneself as acting, or as performing a particular action. Theorists distinguish between high-level , low-level , and integrative approaches to explaining this brand of subjective awareness. In this paper, I evaluate the commitment of both low-level and integrative approaches to the claim that the representations involved in sensorimotor control, specifically as described by the comparator model , contribute in some significant way to agentive awareness. I examine the main empirical data offered in (...)
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  50. Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2012 - In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge University Press. pp. 92--111.
    In recent years, the integration of philosophical with scientific theorizing has started to yield new insights. This chapter surveys some recent philosophical and empirical work on the nature and structure of action, on conscious agency, and on our knowledge of actions.
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