Related categories

70 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 70
  1. added 2019-01-04
    Beyond Vision: The Vertical Integration of Sensory Substitution Devices.Ophelia Deroy & Malika Auvray - 2015 - In D. Stokes, M. Matthen & S. Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press.
    What if a blind person could 'see' with her ears? Thanks to Sensory Substitution Devices (SSDs), blind people now have access to out-of-reach objects, a privilege reserved so far for the sighted. In this paper, we show that the philosophical debates have fundamentally been mislead to think that SSDs should be fitted among the existing senses or that they constitute a new sense. Contrary to the existing assumption that they get integrated at the sensory level, we present a new thesis (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. added 2018-10-21
    Replies to Nagel, Pautz, and Railton_2018 Eastern APA.Susanna Siegel - manuscript
    This handout contains my replies to comments on the Rationality of Perception by Jennifer Nagel, Adam Pautz, and Peter Railton from a symposium at the 2018 Eastern APA in Savannah.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2018-09-23
    How to Explain the Rationality of Perception.Harmen Ghijsen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):500-512.
  4. added 2018-09-07
    Colour Layering and Colour Relationalism.Derek H. Brown - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):177-191.
    Colour Relationalism asserts that colours are non-intrinsic or inherently relational properties of objects, properties that depend not only on a target object but in addition on some relation that object bears to other objects. The most powerful argument for Relationalism infers the inherently relational character of colour from cases in which one’s experience of a colour contextually depends on one’s experience of other colours. Experienced colour layering—say looking at grass through a tinted window and experiencing opaque green through transparent grey—demands (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. added 2018-09-07
    Colour Layering and Colour Constancy.Derek H. Brown - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Loosely put, colour constancy for example occurs when you experience a partly shadowed wall to be uniformly coloured, or experience your favourite shirt to be the same colour both with and without sunglasses on. Controversy ensues when one seeks to interpret ‘experience’ in these contexts, for evidence of a constant colour may be indicative a constant colour in the objective world, a judgement that a constant colour would be present were things thus and so, et cetera. My primary aim is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. added 2018-08-31
    Replies to Begby, Ghijsen and Samoilova.Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):523-536.
    I’m grateful to Endre Begby, Harmen Ghijsen, and Katia Samoilova for engaging with The Rationality of Perception and for writing such interesting and productive commentaries. Taken together, the three commentaries cover a diverse range of topics.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2018-05-30
    Can We Perceive Mental States?Eleonore Neufeld - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    In this paper, I defend Non-Inferentialism about mental states, the view that we can perceive some mental states in a direct, non-inferential way. First, I discuss how the question of mental state perception is to be understood in light of recent debates in the philosophy of perception, and reconstruct Non-Inferentialism in a way that makes the question at hand – whether we can perceive mental states or not – scientifically tractable. Next, I motivate Non-Inferentialism by showing that under the assumption (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2018-05-21
    Uvod u filozofiju psihologije.Nenad Miščević - 1990 - Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske.
  9. added 2018-02-16
    Immediate Transfer of Synesthesia to a Novel Inducer.Aleksandra Mroczko, Thomas Metzinger, Wolf Singer & Danko Nikolić - 2009 - Journal of Vision 9 (12):1-8.
  10. added 2018-02-09
    Experiences of Duration and Cognitive Penetrability.Carrie Figdor - forthcoming - In B. Brogaard and D. Gatzia (ed.), The Rational Roles of Perceptual Experience: Beyond Vision. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This paper considers the cognitive penetrability of our experiences of the durations of everyday events. I defend an account of subjective duration based in contemporary psychological and neurobiological research. I show its philosophical adequacy by demonstrating its utility in explain-ing the phenomenology of duration experiences. I then consider whether cognitive penetrability is a problem for these experiences. I argue that, to the contrary, the problem presupposes a relationship between perception and belief that duration perceptions and beliefs do not exhibit. In-stead, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2017-10-20
    On the Perception of Structure.E. J. Green - 2017 - Noûs.
    Many of the objects that we perceive have an important characteristic: When they move, they change shape. For instance, when you watch a person walk across a room, her body constantly deforms. I suggest that we exercise a type of perceptual constancy in response to changes of this sort, which I call structure constancy. In this paper I offer an account of structure constancy. I introduce the notion of compositional structure, and propose that structure constancy involves perceptually representing an object (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. added 2017-10-20
    Attentive Visual Reference.E. J. Green - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (1):3-38.
    Many have held that when a person visually attends to an object, her visual system deploys a representation that designates the object. Call the referential link between such representations and the objects they designate attentive visual reference. In this article I offer an account of attentive visual reference. I argue that the object representations deployed in visual attention—which I call attentive visual object representations —refer directly, and are akin to indexicals. Then I turn to the issue of how the reference (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. added 2017-10-14
    Direct Perception and the Predictive Mind.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3145-3164.
    Predictive approaches to the mind claim that perception, cognition, and action can be understood in terms of a single framework: a hierarchy of Bayesian models employing the computational strategy of predictive coding. Proponents of this view disagree, however, over the extent to which perception is direct on the predictive approach. I argue that we can resolve these disagreements by identifying three distinct notions of perceptual directness: psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological. I propose that perception is plausibly construed as psychologically indirect on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2017-09-12
    The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems.James Jerome Gibson - 1966 - Boston, USA: Houghton Mifflin.
    Describes the various senses as sensory systems that are attuned to the environment. Develops the notion of rich sensory information that specifies the distal environment. Includes a discussion of affordances.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. added 2017-09-06
    Don't Worry, This Will Only Hurt a Bit: The Role of Expectation and Attention in Pain Intensity.Nada Gligorov - 2017 - The Monist 100 (4):501-513.
    To cause pain, it is not enough to deliver a dose of noxious stimulation. Pain requires the interaction of sensory processing, emotion, and cognition. In this paper, I focus on the role of cognition in the felt intensity of pain. I provide evidence for the cognitive modulation of pain. In particular, I show that attention and expectation can influence the experience of pain intensity. I also consider the mechanisms that underlie the cognitive effects on pain. I show that all the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. added 2017-08-21
    Gombrich and the Duck-Rabbit.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2018 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-as and Novelty. Routledge. pp. 49-88.
  17. added 2017-06-15
    Perceptual Consciousness, Short-Term Memory, and Overflow: Replies to Beck, Orlandi and Franklin, and Phillips.Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum - 2017 - The Brains Blog.
    A reply to commentators -- Jake Beck, Nico Orlandi and Aaron Franklin, and Ian Phillips -- on our paper "Does perceptual consciousness overflow cognitive access?".
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2017-05-17
    Inference and Consciousness.Anders Nes & Timothy Chan (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
  19. added 2017-05-02
    Modularity and the Predictive Mind.Zoe Drayson - 2017 - T. Metzinger and W. Weise, (Eds), Philosophy and Predictive Processing.
    Modular approaches to the architecture of the mind claim that some mental mechanisms, such as sensory input processes, operate in special-purpose subsystems that are functionally independent from the rest of the mind. This assumption of modularity seems to be in tension with recent claims that the mind has a predictive architecture. Predictive approaches propose that both sensory processing and higher-level processing are part of the same Bayesian information-processing hierarchy, with no clear boundary between perception and cognition. Furthermore, it is not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2016-12-08
    Looking Into Pictures.Heiko Hecht Margaret Atherton & Schwartz Robert (eds.) - 2003 - MIT Press.
    Interdisciplinary explorations of the implications of recent developments in vision theory for our understanding of the nature of pictorial representation and ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. added 2016-12-08
    Austin on Perception.Garrett L. Vander Veer - 1964 - Review of Metaphysics 17 (4):557-567.
  22. added 2016-12-08
    Awareness and Inference: An Approach to Realism.Marten ten Hoor - 1936 - Journal of Philosophy 33 (22):589 - 596.
  23. added 2016-09-13
    Epilogue: Advances and Open Questions.Gary Hatfield & William Epstein - 2012 - In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 232-241.
    The term “perceptual constancy” was used by the Gestalt theorists in the early part of the twentieth century (e.g., Koffka 1935, 34, 90) to refer to the tendency of perception to remain invariant over changes of viewing distance, viewing angle, and conditions of illumination. This tendency toward constancy is remarkable: every change in the viewing distance, position, and illumination is necessarily accompanied by a change in the local proximal (retinal) stimulation, and yet perception remains relatively stable. The tendency toward perceptual (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. added 2016-07-04
    Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology.Stephen Palmer - 1999 - MIT Press.
  25. added 2016-07-02
    Perception Without Representation? On Travis’s Argument Against the Representational View of Perception.Berit Brogaard - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):273-286.
    In this paper I begin by considering Travis’s main argument against a representational view of experience. I argue that the argument succeeds in showing that representation is not essential to experience. However, I argue that it does not succeed in showing that representation is not an essential component of experience enjoyed by creatures like us. I then provide a new argument for thinking that the perceptual experience of earthly creatures is representational. The view that ensues is compatible with a certain (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. added 2016-01-12
    Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge From Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes.Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):358-391.
    Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling's classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics' in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. added 2016-01-12
    Why Do We Need Perceptual Content?Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788.
    Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2015-10-09
    Psychological Experiments and Phenomenal Experience in Size and Shape Constancy.Gary Hatfield - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):940-953.
    Some experiments in perceptual psychology measure perceivers’ phenomenal experiences of objects versus their cognitive assessments of object properties. Analyzing such experiments, this article responds to Pizlo’s claim that much work on shape constancy before 1985 confused problems of shape ambiguity with problems of shape constancy. Pizlo fails to grasp the logic of experimental designs directed toward phenomenal aspects of shape constancy. In the domain of size perception, Granrud’s studies of size constancy in children and adults distinguish phenomenal from cognitive factors.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. added 2015-09-28
    Vision and Abstraction: An Empirical Refutation of Nico Orlandi’s Non-Cognitivism.Christopher Mole & Jiaying Zhao - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):365-373.
    This article argues against the non-cognitivist theory of vision that has been formulated in the work of Nico Orlandi. It shows that, if we understand ‘representation’ in the way Orlandi recommends, then the visual system’s response to abstract regularities must involve the formation of representations. Recent experiments show that those representations must be used by the visual system in the production of visual experiences. Their effects cannot be explained by taking them to be non-visual effects involving attention or memory. This (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. added 2015-08-11
    A Layered View of Shape Perception.E. J. Green - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2).
    This article develops a view of shape representation both in visual experience and in subpersonal visual processing. The view is that, in both cases, shape is represented in a ‘layered’ manner: an object is represented as having multiple shape properties, and these properties have varying degrees of abstraction. I argue that this view is supported both by the facts about visual phenomenology and by a large collection of evidence in perceptual psychology. Such evidence is provided by studies of shape discriminability, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. added 2015-07-06
    Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach.Robert Carry Osborne - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):197-221.
    Debunking arguments typically attempt to show that a set of beliefs or other intensional mental states bear no appropriate explanatory connection to the facts they purport to be about. That is, a debunking argument will attempt to show that beliefs about p are not held because of the facts about p. Such beliefs, if true, would then only be accidentally so. Thus, their causal origins constitute an undermining defeater. Debunking arguments arise in various philosophical domains, targeting beliefs about morality, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  32. added 2015-01-30
    Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science.Robert Briscoe - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):43-81.
    Pictures are 2D surfaces designed to elicit 3D-scene-representing experiences from their viewers. In this essay, I argue that philosophers have tended to underestimate the relevance of research in vision science to understanding the nature of pictorial experience. Both the deeply entrenched methodology of virtual psychophysics as well as empirical studies of pictorial space perception provide compelling support for the view that pictorial experience and seeing face-to-face are experiences of the same psychological, explanatory kind. I also show that an empirically informed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  33. added 2015-01-27
    Bodily Action and Distal Attribution in Sensory Substitution.Robert Briscoe - forthcoming - In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Proceedings of the British Academy.
    According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception (Hurley & Noë 2003, Noë 2004, O’Regan 2011), active control of camera movement is necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the way stimulation in the substituting modality varies as a function of self-initiated, bodily action. This chapter, by contrast, approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the subject’s perceptual systems. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2014-09-02
    Perceptual Presence Without Counterfactual Richness.Michael Madary - 2014 - Cognitive Neuroscience 5:131-133.
    In this commentary, I suggest that non-visual perceptual modalities provide counterexamples to Seth’s claim that perceptual presence depends on counterfactual richness. Then I suggest a modification to Seth’s view that is not vulnerable to these counterexamples.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2014-04-19
    Perception and Observation Unladened.Ioannis Votsis - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):563-585.
    Let us call ‘veridicalism’ the view that perceptual beliefs and observational reports are largely truthful. This paper aims to make a case for veridicalism by, among other things, examining in detail and ultimately deflating in import what many consider to be the view’s greatest threat, the so-called ‘theory-ladenness’ of perception and/or observation. In what follows, it is argued that to the extent that theoretical factors influence the formation of perceptual beliefs and observational reports, as theory-ladenness demands, that influence is typically (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. added 2014-03-30
    Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology.Gary Hatfield - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception -- Representation in perception and cognition : task analysis, psychological functions, and rule instantiation -- Perception as unconscious inference -- Representation and constraints : the inverse problem and the structure of visual space -- On perceptual constancy -- Getting objects for free (or not) : the philosophy and psychology of object perception -- Color perception and neural encoding : does metameric matching entail a loss of information? -- Objectivity and subjectivity revisited (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  37. added 2014-03-30
    Seeing and Inferring.Romane L. Clark - 1993 - Philosophical Papers 22 (2):81-96.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2014-03-28
    Synchronous Change and Perception of Object Unity: Evidence From Adults and Infants.P. W. Jusczyk, S. P. Johnson, E. S. Spelke & L. J. Kennedy - 1999 - Cognition 71 (3):257-88.
    Adults and infants display a robust ability to perceive the unity of a center-occluded object when the visible ends of the object undergo common motion (e.g. Kellman, P.J., Spelke, E.S., 1983. Perception of partly occluded objects in infancy. Cognitive Psychology 15, 483±524). Ecologically oriented accounts of this ability focus on the primacy of motion in the perception of segregated objects, but Gestalt theory suggests a broader possibility: observers may perceive object unity by detecting patterns of synchronous change, of which common (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39. added 2014-03-18
    The Status of the Minimum Principle in the Theoretical Analysis of Visual Perception.Gary Hatfield & William Epstein - 1985 - Psychological Bulletin 97 (2):155–186.
    We examine a number of investigations of perceptual economy or, more specifically, of minimum tendencies and minimum principles in the visual perception of form, depth, and motion. A minimum tendency is a psychophysical finding that perception tends toward simplicity, as measured in accordance with a specified metric. A minimum principle is a theoretical construct imputed to the visual system to explain minimum tendencies. After examining a number of studies of perceptual economy, we embark on a systematic analysis of this notion. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  40. added 2014-03-17
    Representation and Content in Some (Actual) Theories of Perception.Gary Hatfield - 1988 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (2):175-214.
    Recent discussions in the philosophy of psychology have examined the use and legitimacy of such notions as “representation”, “content”, “computation”, and “inference” within a scientific psychology. While the resulting assessments have varied widely, ranging from outright rejection of some or all of these notions to full vindication of their use, there has been notable agreement on the considerations deemed relevant for making an assessment. The answer to the question of whether the notion of, say, representational content may be admitted into (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  41. added 2014-03-12
    Defending Realism on the Proper Ground.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):47-77.
    'Epistemological constructivism' holds that vision is mediated by background preconceptions and is theory-laden. Hence, two persons with differing theoretical commitments see the world differently and they could agree on what they see only if they both espoused the same conceptual framework. This, in its turn, undermines the possibility of theory testing and choice on a common theory-neutral empirical basis. In this paper, I claim that the cognitive sciences suggest that a part of vision may be only indirectly penetrated by cognition (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  42. added 2014-03-06
    The Epistemological Status of Vision and its Implications for Design.Dhanraj Vishwanath - 2005 - Axiomathes 15 (3):399-486.
    Computational theories of vision typically rely on the analysis of two aspects of human visual function: (1) object and shape recognition (2) co-calibration of sensory measurements. Both these approaches are usually based on an inverse-optics model, where visual perception is viewed as a process of inference from a 2D retinal projection to a 3D percept within a Euclidean space schema. This paradigm has had great success in certain areas of vision science, but has been relatively less successful in understanding perceptual (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  43. added 2014-03-03
    Phenomenal and Cognitive Factors in Spatial Perception.Gary Hatfield - 2012 - In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 35.
    This chapter provides an overview of the phenomenology of size perception and the use of instructions to tease apart phenomenal and cognitive aspects. It develops his own recent proposals concerning the geometry of visual space. The chapter proposes that visual space is contracted along the lines of sight. This contraction would explain the apparent convergence of railway tracks, but without invoking a “proximal mode” experience. Parallel railway tracks receding into the distance project converging lines onto the retinas. A true proximal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44. added 2014-02-10
    Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content.Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):556-573.
    A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is problematic in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  45. added 2014-02-10
    Realization and Unconscious Inference.John Williamson - 1966 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (September):11-26.
  46. added 2013-02-19
    Critical Notice of 'Expression and the Inner' by David H. Finkelstein. [REVIEW]María G. Navarro - 2012 - Polis: Revista Latinoamericana 32.
    La obra del filósofo estadounidense David H. Finkelstein, Expression and the Inner, publicada originariamente en 2003 por Harvard University Press (2ª ed. 2008) puede ahora leerse en la versión española de Lino San Juan, editada por la ovetense KRK Ediciones con el título: La expresión y lo interno. Finkelstein propone en La expresión y lo interno un análisis expresivista del autoconocimiento. Podría parecer cuando menos sorprendente y aún más admirable que con tan sólo dos capítulos (“Detectivismo y constitutivismo” y “Expresión”) (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2011-07-01
    Intrinsic Multiperspectivity: Conceptual Forms and the Functional Architecture of the Perceptual System.Rainer Mausfeld - 2011 - In Welsch Wolfgang, Singer Wolf & Wunder Andre (eds.), Interdisciplinary Anthropology. Springer. pp. 19--54.
    It is a characteristic feature of our mental make-up that the same perceptual input situation can simultaneously elicit conflicting mental perspectives. This ability pervades our perceptual and cognitive domains. Striking examples are the dual character of pictures in picture perception, pretend play, or the ability to employ metaphors and allegories. I argue that traditional approaches, beyond being inadequate on principle grounds, are theoretically ill equipped to deal with these achievements. I then outline a theoretical perspective that has emerged from a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. added 2011-04-09
    Review of Sleights of Mind: What the Neuroscience of Magic Reveals About Our Brains[REVIEW]Neil Van Leeuwen - 2011 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 16 (5):473-478.
    The book I review, _Sleights of Mind_, aims to illuminate properties of perceptual systems by discussing human susceptibility to magical illusions. I describe how the authors use psychological principles to explain two tricks, spoon bending and the Miser's Dream. I also argue that the book is congenial to the following view of illusions: susceptibility to illusion is the result of evolutionary trade-offs; perceptual systems must make assumptions in order to function at all, but susceptibility to illusion is the byproduct of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. added 2010-12-25
    Infants' Sensitivity to Effects of Gravity on Visible Object Motion.In Kyeong Kim & Elizabeth S. Spelke - unknown
    A preference method probed infants` perception of object motion on an inclined plane. Infants viewed videotaped events in which a ball rolled downward (or upward) while speeding up (or slowing down). Then infants were tested with events in which the ball moved in the opposite direction with appropriate or inappropriate acceleration. Infants aged 7 months, but not 5 months, looked longer at the test event with inappropriate acceleration, suggesting emerging sensitivity to gravity. A further study tested whether infants appreciate that (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  50. added 2010-09-23
    Perception Beyond Inference. The Information Content of Visual Processes.Albertazzi Liliana, Tonder Gervant & Vishwanath Dhanraj (eds.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
1 — 50 / 70