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  1. Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World.Keith Allen - unknown
  2. Ignorance and Knowledge: The Viability of Externalist Neo-Mooreanism as a Resonse to Radical Scepticism.John Asquith - 2017 - Dissertation, King's College London
    Here, I shall be examining the viability of a Moorean response to the Argument from Ignorance; i.e., one that tries to rebut the argument by denying its first premise that we cannot have knowledge that we are not BIVs. After first explicating the Argument from Ignorance in detail, I then go on to try and motivate this approach by critically examining two alternative approaches to dealing with radical scepticism: closure-denial, and attributer contextualism. Finding them wanting, I then turn to a (...)
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  3. Externalism and Skepticism: Recognition, Expression, and Self-Knowledge.Dorit Bar-On - manuscript
    As I am sitting at my desk in front of my computer, a thought crosses my mind: There's water in the glass. The thought has a particular content: that there is water in the glass. And, if all is well, there is water in the glass, so my thought is true. According to external-world skepticism, I still do not know that there is water in the glass, because my way of telling what's in front of me does not allow me (...)
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  4. Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.James K. Beilby (ed.) - 2002 - Cornell University Press.
    In this, the first book to address the ongoing debate, Plantinga presents his influential thesis and responds to critiques by distinguished philosophers from a ...
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  5. Externalist Responses to Skepticism.Michael Bergmann - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 504--32.
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  6. Putting Skeptics in Their Place.Michael Bergmann - 2001 - International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):484-486.
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  7. Externalism and Skepticism.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):159-194.
  8. Knowing the World by Knowing One's Mind.Sven Bernecker - 2000 - Synthese 123 (1):1-34.
    This paper addresses the question whetherintrospection plus externalism about mental contentwarrant an a priori refutation of external-worldskepticism and ontological solipsism. The suggestionis that if thought content is partly determined byaffairs in the environment and if we can havenon-empirical knowledge of our current thoughtcontents, we can, just by reflection, know about theworld around us – we can know that our environment ispopulated with content-determining entities. Afterexamining this type of transcendental argument anddiscussing various objections found in the literature,I argue that the notion (...)
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  9. Antiskeptische Trittbrettfahrer des semantischen Externalismus.Jochen Briesen - 2011 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (4):100-122.
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  10. Skepticism, Externalism, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Jochen Briesen - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (1):5-26.
    This paper focuses on a combination of the antiskeptical strategies offered by semantic externalism and the inference to the best explanation. I argue that the most difficult problems of the two strategies can be solved, if the strategies are combined: The strategy offered by semantic externalism is successful against standard skeptical brain-in-a-vat arguments. But the strategy is ineffective, if the skeptical argument is referring to the recent-envatment scenario. However, by focusing on the scenario of recent envatment the most difficult problems (...)
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  11. Skepticism, Externalism and the Nature of the Mind-World Relation.Gayle Maria Brown - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Florida
    Externalism about thought content is the view that the identity conditions for the contents of propositional attitudes include facts about the external world and one's causal interaction with the world. This view seems to offer a promising new strategy for dealing with the problem of skepticism about the external world. The promise, however, is empty. ;Argumentatively, this dissertation is divided into two main parts. The first part aims to clarify the skeptical challenge and to set down some plausible success conditions (...)
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  12. Anti-Individualism and Knowledge.Jessica Brown - 2004 - MIT Press.
    A persuasive monograph that answers the keyepistemological arguments against anti-individualism in thephilosophy of mind.
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  13. Difficulties in Generating Scepticism About Knowledge of Content.A. Brueckner - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):59-62.
  14. Scepticism and the Causal Theory of Reference.Anthony Brueckner - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):199-201.
  15. Reply to Steinitz.Anthony Brueckner - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):205-206.
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  16. Genova, Davidson and Content-Scepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):228 - 231.
    This paper is a discussion of A C Genova's defense of Davidson's Omniscient Interpreter anti-skeptical argument ("Analysis", 1991.
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  17. Skepticism and Externalism.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (1-2):169-71.
  18. Semantic Answers to Skepticism.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):200-19.
  19. Scepticism About Knowledge of Content.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1990 - Mind 99 (395):447-51.
    Focuses on the arguments that show the externalism of mental content. Discussion on the principle of knowledge identification; Account of basic self-knowledge; Interpretations of sentence content; Skepticism of knowledge content.
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  20. Problems for Semantic Externalism and A Priori Refutations of Skeptical Arguments.Keith Butler - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (1):29-49.
    SummaryA familiar sort of argument for skepticism about the external world appeals to the evidential similarity between what is presumed to be the normal case and the case where one is a brain in a vat . An argument from Putnam has been taken by many to provide an a priori refutation of this sort of skeptical argument. The question I propose to address in this paper is whether Putnam's argument affords us an a priori refutation of skeptical arguments that (...)
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  21. Externalism and Skepticism.Keith Butler - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):13-34.
  22. Radical Skepticism, Closure, and Robust Knowledge.J. Adam Carter - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:115-133.
    The Neo-Moorean response to the radical skeptical challenge boldly maintains that we can know we’re not the victims of radical skeptical hypotheses; accordingly, our everyday knowledge that would otherwise be threatened by our inability to rule out such hypotheses stands unthreatened. Given the leverage such an approach has against the skeptic from the very start, the Neo-Moorean line is an especially popular one; as we shall see, though, it faces several commonly overlooked problems. An initial problem is that this particular (...)
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  23. Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism.David Chalmers - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
  24. The Matrix as Metaphysics.David J. Chalmers - 2005 - In Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore the Matrix. Oxford University Press. pp. 132.
    The Matrix presents a version of an old philosophical fable: the brain in a vat. A disembodied brain is floating in a vat, inside a scientist’s laboratory. The scientist has arranged that the brain will be stimulated with the same sort of inputs that a normal embodied brain receives. To do this, the brain is connected to a giant computer simulation of a world. The simulation determines which inputs the brain receives. When the brain produces outputs, these are fed back (...)
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  25. Evaluating Williamson’s Anti-Scepticism.Tony Cheng - 2008 - Sorites 21:06-11.
    Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits has been highly influential since the beginning of this century. It can be read as a systematic response to scepticism. One of the most important notions in this response is the notion of «evidence,» which will be the focus of the present paper. I attempt to show primarily two things. First, the notion of evidence invoked by Williamson does not address the sceptical worry: he stipulates an objective notion of evidence, but this begs the (...)
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  26. Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions.David Christensen - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):301-321.
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  27. Switched-Words Skepticism: A Case Study in Semantical Anti-Skeptical Argument.David Christensen - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (1):33 - 58.
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  28. Opposing Skepticism Disjunctively.Earl Conee - unknown
    Disjunctivists hold that perceiving external objects is fundamentally different from any experiential state that is not a perception. In fact, roughly speaking, disjunctivists say that they have nothing in common. Suppose that it appears to someone as though she perceives something. Disjunctivists say that there are two disparate sorts of facts that could make this true. Either she is genuinely perceiving something, or she is in an experiential state of merely apparent perception. An apparent perception is fundamentally unlike a perception. (...)
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  29. Disjunctivism and Anti-Skepticism.Earl Conee - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):16–36.
  30. Scepticism and the Interpreter.Damian Cox - 2000 - Philosophical Papers 29 (2):61-72.
    Abstract This paper defends an argument from interpretation against the possibility of massive error. The argument shares many important features with Donald Davidson's famous argument, but also key differences. I defend the argument against claims that it begs the question against scepticism and that it leaves the sceptic with an obvious means of escape.
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  31. Neither Mentioning 'Brains in a Vat' nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove That We Are Not Brains in a Vat.Marian David - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):891-896.
    In Reason, Truth, and History Hilary Putnam has presented an anti-skeptical argument purporting to prove that we are not brains in a vat. How exactly the argument goes is somewhat controversial. A number of competing "recon¬structions" have been proposed. They suffer from a defect which they share with what seems to be Putnam's own version of the argument. In this paper, I examine a very simple and rather natural reconstruction of the argument, one that does not employ any premises in (...)
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  32. Williamson on the Evidence for Skepticism.John M. DePoe - 2008 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 30:23-32.
    Timothy Williamson has offered a novel approach to refuting external world skepticism in his influential book, Knowledge and Its Limits. The strategy employed by Williamson is to show that skeptics falsely attribute too much self-knowledge to the epistemic agent when they claim that one’s evidence is the same when in a “good case” as it would be in a similar “bad case.” Williamson argues that one’s evidence is not the same in a good case as it would be in a (...)
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  33. Burgeoning Skepticism.Willem A. deVries - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):141-164.
    This paper shows that the resources mobilized by recent arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind also suffice to construct a good argument against a Humean-style skepticism about our knowledge of extra-mental reality. The argument constructed, however, will not suffice to lay to rest the attacks of a truly global skeptic who rejects the idea that we usually know what our occurrent mental states are.
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  34. McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism.Santiago Echeverri - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386.
    Abstract: In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; 2) it could be (...)
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  35. Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism.Kevin Falvey & Joseph Owens - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):107-37.
    Psychological externalism is the thesis Chat the contents of many of a person's propositional mental states are determined in part by relations he bears to his natural and social environment. This thesis has recently been thrust into prominence in the philosophy of mind by a series of thought experiments due to Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge. Externalism is a metaphysical thesis, but in this work I investigate its implications for the epistemology of the mental. I am primarily concerned with the (...)
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  36. Bohlin, Henrik. Groundless Knowledge: A Humean Solution to the Problem of Skepticism.Peter S. Fosl - 1999 - Review of Metaphysics 53 (1):144-145.
  37. Putnam, Brains in Vats, and Arguments for Scepticism.A. N. Gallois - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):273-286.
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  38. Externalism and Scepticism.André Gallois & John O'Leary-Hawthorne - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (1):1 - 26.
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  39. John McDowell on Experience: Open to the Sceptic?Simon Glendinning & Max De Gaynesford - 1998 - Metaphilosophy 29 (1-2):20-34.
  40. Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (1):53-78.
    Given anti-individualism, a subject might have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking that p, have complete and exhaustive explicational knowledge of all of the concepts composing the content that p, and yet still need empirical information (e.g. regarding her embedding conditions and history) prior to being in a position to apply her exhaustive conceptual knowledge in a knowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed by anti-individualists: it squares with everything that compatibilist-minded anti-individualists have (...)
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  41. Externalism and Skepticism.John Greco - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 53.
    Part 1 argues that, despite rhetorical appearances, McDowell accepts a standard version of epistemic externalism. Moreover, epistemic externalism plays an important role in McDowell’s response to skepticism. Part 2 argues that, contra McDowell, epistemic externalism is necessary for rejecting skepticism, and content externalism is not sufficient for rejecting skepticism.
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  42. Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism: Replies to Cohen, Geivett, Kvanvig, and Schmitt and Lahroodi. [REVIEW]John Greco - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):466–480.
    This paper replies to various concerns raised in a symposium on Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry.
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  43. Disjunctivism, Contextualism and the Sceptical Aporia.Lars Gundersen - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):387-397.
    We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.
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  44. A Gricean Approach to the Gettier Problem.Allan Hazlett - manuscript
    David Lewis maintained that epistemological contextualism (on which the truth-conditions for utterances of “S knows p” change in different contexts depending on the salient “alternative possibilities”) could solve the problem of skepticism as well as the Gettier problem. Contextualist approaches to skepticism have become commonplace, if not orthodox, in epistemology. But not so for contextualist approaches to the Gettier problem: the standard approach to this has been to add an “anti-luck” condition to the analysis of knowledge.
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  45. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. By Barry Stroud.R. J. Henle - 1987 - Modern Schoolman 64 (2):148-150.
  46. Contextualism and the Meaning-Intention Problem.Thomas Hofweber - unknown
    The relevant alternatives approach in epistemology1 arose some years ago partly out of the hope to be able to reconcile our ordinary claims of knowledge with our inability to answer the skeptic. It was supposed to give rise to an account of knowledge according to which our ordinary claims of knowledge are true, even though the claims about our lack of knowledge that the skeptics make in one of their more persuasive moments are also true. To know, according to such (...)
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  47. Pritchard's Angst.Robert G. Hudson - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (3):85-92.
    In this paper, I raise some questions about Pritchard ’s internalist argument for scepticism. I argue that his internalism begs the question in support of scepticism. Correlatively I advance what I take to be a better internalist argument for scepticism, one that leaves open the possibility of empirically adjudicating sceptical hypotheses. I close by discussing what it means to be an internalist.
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  48. A Defense of Moderate Invariantism.Leo W. Iacono - unknown
    This dissertation is a defense of moderate invariantism, the traditional epistemological position combining the following three theses: invariantism, according to which the word ‘know’ expresses the same content in every context of use; intellectualism, according to which whether one knows a certain proposition does not depend on one’s practical interests; and antiskepticism, according to which we really do know much of what we ordinarily take ourselves to know. Moderate invariantism needs defending because of seemingly powerful arguments for contextualism, the view (...)
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  49. Semantic Pragmatism and a Priori Knowledge: (Or 'Yes We Could All Be Brains in a Vat').Henry Jackman - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):455-480.
    Hillary Putnam has famously argued that we can know that we are not brains in a vat because the hypothesis that we are is self-refuting. While Putnam's argument has generated interest primarily as a novel response to skepticism, his original use of the brain in a vat scenario was meant to illustrate a point about the "mind/world relationship." In particular, he intended it to be part of an argument against the coherence of metaphysical realism, and thus to be part of (...)
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  50. Contextualism and Global Doubts About the World.Stephen Jacobson - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):381-404.
    Several recent contextualist theorists have proposed contextualizing the skeptic. Their claim is that oneshould view satisfactory answers to global doubts regarding such subjects as theexternal world, other minds, and induction as requirements for justification incertain philosophical contexts, but not in everyday and scientific contexts. Incontrast, the skeptic claims that a satisfactory answer to a global doubt in eachof these areas is a context-invariant requirement for justified belief. In this paper,I consider and reject the arguments Michael Williams develops in his bookUnnatural (...)
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