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114 found
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1 — 50 / 114
  1. added 2020-06-03
    Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism.Brian Mclaughlin & David Owens - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (74):93-142.
    In recent years, some philosophers have claimed that we can know a priori that certain external world skeptical hypotheses are false on the basis of a priori knowledge that we are in certain kinds of mental states, and a priori knowledge that those mental states are individuated by contingent environmental factors. Appealing to a distinction between weak and strong a priority, I argue that weakly a priori arguments of this sort would beg the question of whether the skeptical hypothesis under (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-22
    Review of Approaches to Wittgenstein: Collected Papers, by Brian McGuinness and Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, by David Bloor. [REVIEW]Julian Friedland - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):164-168.
  3. added 2019-09-09
    I—How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether or Not You Are Envatted.Ofra Magidor - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):151-181.
    Epistemic externalism offers one of the most prominent responses to the sceptical challenge. Externalism has commonly been interpreted as postulating a crucial asymmetry between the actual-world agent and their brain-in-a-vat counterpart: while the actual agent is in a position to know she is not envatted, her biv counterpart is not in a position to know that she is envatted, or in other words, only the former is in a position to know whether or not she is envatted. In this paper, (...)
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  4. added 2019-06-06
    Internal—External.Crispin Wright - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):501-517.
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  5. added 2019-06-06
    Skepticism, Externalism, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Jochen Briesen - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (1):5-26.
    This paper focuses on a combination of the antiskeptical strategies offered by semantic externalism and the inference to the best explanation. I argue that the most difficult problems of the two strategies can be solved, if the strategies are combined: The strategy offered by semantic externalism is successful against standard skeptical brain-in-a-vat arguments. But the strategy is ineffective, if the skeptical argument is referring to the recent-envatment scenario. However, by focusing on the scenario of recent envatment the most difficult problems (...)
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    Proving Realism Transcendentally: Replies to Rolf George and William Harper: Dialogue.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (4):737-750.
  7. added 2019-06-06
    On Davidson’s Semantic Anti-Sceptical Argument.Byeong D. Lee - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (3):529-535.
  8. added 2019-06-06
    Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism: Replies to Cohen, Geivett, Kvanvig, and Schmitt and Lahroodi.John Greco - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):466-480.
    This paper replies to various concerns raised in a symposium on Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry.
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  9. added 2019-06-06
    Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. [REVIEW]Michael Bergmann - 2001 - International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):484-486.
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  10. added 2019-06-05
    Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (2):96-130.
    In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard’s version of non-epistemicism, hinge commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge commitments. One of the main reasons in favour of NBT (...)
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  11. added 2019-04-26
    Semantic Externalism. [REVIEW]Ricardo Miguel & Diogo Santos - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):131-137.
  12. added 2019-04-18
    Kant, Hegel, and the Transcendental Material Conditions of Possible Experience.Kenneth R. Westphal - 1996 - Hegel Bulletin 17 (1):23-41.
    I argue that Hegel is aware of a crucial problem in Kant’s transcendental account of the conditions of human knowledge. Unless the matter of sensation is sufficiently ordered (and sufficiently varied) we could not make any cognitive judgments. In that case we could not distinguish ourselves from objects we know, and so could not be self-conscious. This is a necessary, formal and transcendental condition of possible human experience. However, it is also (as Kant acknowledged) a material – not a conceptual (...)
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  13. added 2019-03-01
    An Externalist Account of Introspective Knowledge.Sarah Sawyer - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):358-378.
    The Content Skeptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are not, as suggested by the Content Skeptic, defeated by the mere possibility (...)
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  14. added 2018-09-06
    II—‘This Is the Bad Case’: What Brains in Vats Can Know.Aidan McGlynn - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):183-205.
    The orthodox position in epistemology, for both externalists and internalists, is that a subject in a ‘bad case’—a sceptical scenario—is so epistemically badly off that they cannot know how badly off they are. Ofra Magidor contends that externalists should break ranks on this question, and that doing so is liberating when it comes time to confront a number of central issues in epistemology, including scepticism and the new evil demon problem for process reliabilism. In this reply, I will question whether (...)
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  15. added 2018-06-26
    Semantic Pragmatism and a Priori Knowledge: (Or 'Yes We Could All Be Brains in a Vat').Henry Jackman - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):455-480.
    Hillary Putnam has famously argued that we can know that we are not brains in a vat because the hypothesis that we are is self-refuting. While Putnam's argument has generated interest primarily as a novel response to skepticism, his original use of the brain in a vat scenario was meant to illustrate a point about the "mind/world relationship." In particular, he intended it to be part of an argument against the coherence of metaphysical realism, and thus to be part of (...)
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  16. added 2018-03-05
    Scepticism by a Thousand Cuts.Martin Smith - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1):44-52.
    _ Source: _Page Count 9 Global sceptical arguments seek to undermine vast swathes of our putative knowledge by deploying hypotheses that posit massive deception or error. Local sceptical arguments seek to undermine just a small region of putative knowledge, using hypotheses that posit deception or error of a more mundane kind. Those epistemologists who have devised anti-sceptical strategies have tended to have global sceptical arguments firmly in their sights. I argue here that local sceptical arguments, while less dramatic, ultimately pose (...)
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  17. added 2018-02-17
    Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):126-131.
    Lewis concludes that fallibilism is uncomfortable, though preferable to scepticism. However, he believes that contextualism about knowledge allows us to ‘dodge the choice’ between fallibilism and scepticism. For the contextualist semantics for ‘know’ can explain the oddity of fallibilism, without landing us into scepticism.
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  18. added 2018-01-22
    Ignorance and Knowledge: The Viability of Externalist Neo-Mooreanism as a Resonse to Radical Scepticism.John Asquith - 2017 - Dissertation, King's College London
    Here, I shall be examining the viability of a Moorean response to the Argument from Ignorance; i.e., one that tries to rebut the argument by denying its first premise that we cannot have knowledge that we are not BIVs. After first explicating the Argument from Ignorance in detail, I then go on to try and motivate this approach by critically examining two alternative approaches to dealing with radical scepticism: closure-denial, and attributer contextualism. Finding them wanting, I then turn to a (...)
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  19. added 2018-01-05
    Perspectival Externalism Is the Antidote to Radical Skepticism.Lisa Miracchi - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):363-379.
  20. added 2017-08-02
    Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism.David J. Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (12):625-660.
    Cartesian arguments for global skepticism about the external world start from the premise that we cannot know that we are not in a Cartesian scenario such as an evil-demon scenario, and infer that because most of our empirical beliefs are false in such a scenario, these beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Veridicalist responses to global skepticism respond that arguments fail because in Cartesian scenarios, many or most of our empirical beliefs are true. Some veridicalist responses have been motivated using verificationism, (...)
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  21. added 2017-05-03
    McKinsey's Challenge, Warrant Transmission, and Skepticism.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
  22. added 2016-12-08
    Semantic Externalism.Jesper Kallestrup - 2011 - Routledge.
    Semantic externalism is the view that the meanings of referring terms, and the contents of beliefs that are expressed by those terms, are not fully determined by factors internal to the speaker but are instead bound up with the environment. The debate about semantic externalism is one of the most important but difficult topics in philosophy of mind and language, and has consequences for our understanding of the role of social institutions and the physical environment in constituting language and the (...)
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  23. added 2016-12-08
    Radical Skepticism, Closure, and Robust Knowledge.J. Adam Carter - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:115-133.
    The Neo-Moorean response to the radical skeptical challenge boldly maintains that we can know we’re not the victims of radical skeptical hypotheses; accordingly, our everyday knowledge that would otherwise be threatened by our inability to rule out such hypotheses stands unthreatened. Given the leverage such an approach has against the skeptic from the very start, the Neo-Moorean line is an especially popular one; as we shall see, though, it faces several commonly overlooked problems. An initial problem is that this particular (...)
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  24. added 2016-12-08
    Disjunctivism, Contextualism and the Sceptical Aporia.Lars Bo Gundersen - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):387-397.
    We know things that entail things we apparently cannot come to know. This is a problem for those of us who trust that knowledge is closed under entailment. In the paper I discuss the solutions to this problem offered by epistemic disjunctivism and contextualism. The contention is that neither of these theories has the resources to deal satisfactory with the problem.
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  25. added 2016-12-08
    The Cost of Skepticism: Who Pays?Thomas Kelly - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):695-712.
    Those who favor externalist accounts of knowledge and justification often accuse their internalist opponents of playing into the hands of skeptic. According to this line of thought, internalists characteristically set overly demanding requirements for knowledge and justification, requirements which ordinary believers infrequently satisfy: the internalist is thus committed by his or her own theory to a massive and implausible revisionism about the extent of what we know and justifiably believe. For reasons that I explore, the version of internalist foundationalism developed (...)
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  26. added 2016-12-08
    Difficulties in Generating Scepticism About Knowledge of Content.A. Brueckner - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):59-62.
  27. added 2016-12-05
    Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know (...)
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  28. added 2016-01-14
    What's It Like to Be a BIV? A Dialogue.Michael Veber - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):734--756.
    Several subjects are fully convinced that they are brains in vats whose experiences are hallucinatory. They confront a ‘skeptic’ who raises the possibility that they are not brains in vats who lack and hallucinate hands but ‘brains in skulls’ who have hands and see them. Familiar responses to skepticism are offered in support of the claim that the subjects know they do not have hands. The philosophical significance of this looking-glass approach to skepticism is also discussed. It is suggested that (...)
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  29. added 2015-08-27
    Intérprete Omnisciente, Caridad Y Externalismo.Pablo Melogno - 2011 - Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 31 (1):55-67.
    Se discute el argumento del intérprete omnisciente formulado por DonaldDavidson, en relación con otros dos aspectos de la filosofía davidsoniana:el principio de caridad y la concepción externalista del significado. Se busca mostrar que el argumento ha funcionado antes como una consecuenciade la caracterización davidsoniana de la interpretación radical que como unelemento de fortalecimiento de la misma, o bien presupone la metodologíadavidsoniana de interpretación basada en el principio de caridad, cuyos problemas trataba de solucionar, o bien presupone la concepción externalista delsignificado, (...)
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  30. added 2015-08-26
    Epistemic Justification and the Skeptical Challenge.Hamid Vahid - 2005 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This book explores the concept of epistemic justification and our understanding of the problem of skepticism. Providing critical examination of key responses to the skeptical challenge, Hamid Vahid presents a theory which is shown to work alongside the internalism/externalism issue and the thesis of semantic externalism, with a deontological conception of justification at its core.
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  31. added 2015-08-26
    Skepticism, 'Externalism,' and the Goal of Inquiry.Barry Stroud - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.
  32. added 2015-08-25
    McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism?Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3):202-217.
    In a series of recent articles, Duncan Pritchard argues for a ‘neo-Moorean’ interpretation of John McDowell’s anti-sceptical strategy. Pritchard introduces a distinction between ‘favouring’ and ‘discriminating’ epistemic grounds in order to show that within the radical sceptical context an absence of ‘discriminating’ epistemic grounds allowing one to distinguish brain-in-a-vat from non-brain-in-a-vat scenarios does not preclude possessing knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses. I argue that Pritchard’s reading is mistaken for three reasons. First, the distinction between ‘favouring’ and ‘discriminating’ epistemic (...)
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  33. added 2015-08-25
    Anthony Brueckner , Essays on Skepticism . Reviewed By.Stephen Leach - 2012 - Philosophy in Review 32 (3):161-163.
  34. added 2015-08-25
    Skepticism and Transcendental Arguments From Semantic Externalism.Esben Nedenskov Petersen - 2007 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 42:111-122.
  35. added 2015-08-25
    Conative Transcendental Arguments and the Question Whether There Can Be External Reasons.Adrian Moore - 1999 - In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford University Press. pp. 271--292.
  36. added 2015-08-25
    Response to Crispin Wright.John McDowell - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), On Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 47--62.
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  37. added 2015-08-24
    A Defense of McDowell’s Response to the Sceptic.Harold Langsam - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):43-59.
    Crispin Wright argues that John McDowell’s use of disjunctivism to respond to the sceptic misses the point of the sceptic’s argument, for disjunctivism is a thesis about the differing metaphysical natures of veridical and nonveridical experiences, whereas the sceptic’s point is that our beliefs are unjustified because veridical and nonveridical experiences can be phenomenally indistinguishable. In this paper, I argue that McDowell is responsive to the sceptic’s focus on phenomenology, for the point of McDowell’s response is that it is the (...)
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  38. added 2015-08-24
    The Epistemology Externalized Vs The Sceptical Question.Mahmoud Khatami - 2004 - Anthropology and Philosophy 5 (1).
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  39. added 2015-07-25
    John McDowell on Experience: Open to the Sceptic?Simon Glendinning & Max De Gaynesford - 1998 - Metaphilosophy 29 (1-2):20-34.
  40. added 2015-06-15
    McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism.Santiago Echeverri - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386.
    Abstract: In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; 2) it could be (...)
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  41. added 2015-06-08
    Skepticism, Externalism and the Nature of the Mind-World Relation.Gayle Maria Brown - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Florida
    Externalism about thought content is the view that the identity conditions for the contents of propositional attitudes include facts about the external world and one's causal interaction with the world. This view seems to offer a promising new strategy for dealing with the problem of skepticism about the external world. The promise, however, is empty. ;Argumentatively, this dissertation is divided into two main parts. The first part aims to clarify the skeptical challenge and to set down some plausible success conditions (...)
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  42. added 2015-03-23
    Skepticism, Sensitivity, and Closure, or Why the Closure Principle is Irrelevant to External World Skepticism.Adam Leite - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):335-350.
    Is there a plausible argument for external world skepticism? Robert Nozick’s well-known discussion focuses upon arguments which utilize the Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle. Nozick claims, correctly, that no such argument succeeds. But he gets almost all the details wrong. The Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle are compatible; the Sensitivity Requirement is incorrect; and even if true, the Closure Principle is structurally incapable of generating a plausible and valid global skeptical argument. It is therefore a mistake to take (...)
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  43. added 2015-02-05
    Evaluating Williamson’s Anti-Scepticism.Tony Cheng - 2008 - Sorites 21:06-11.
    Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits has been highly influential since the beginning of this century. It can be read as a systematic response to scepticism. One of the most important notions in this response is the notion of «evidence,» which will be the focus of the present paper. I attempt to show primarily two things. First, the notion of evidence invoked by Williamson does not address the sceptical worry: he stipulates an objective notion of evidence, but this begs the (...)
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  44. added 2014-04-02
    Knowing the World and Knowing Our Minds.Ted A. Warfield - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):525-545.
    In Reason, Truth and History Hilary Putnam offered an argument purporting to show that Brain-in-a-Vat skepticism can be refuted on the assumption that central features of the causal theory of reference are correct. Many philosophers have discussed Putnam’s proposal, defending both the pro and con sides of the debate. The debate continues in the current literature with Putnamians such as Tymoczko and Dell’Utri offering ever more intricate defenses of the anti-skeptical position and critics such as David and Brueckner rebutting these (...)
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  45. added 2014-04-02
    The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. By Barry Stroud.R. J. Henle - 1987 - Modern Schoolman 64 (2):148-150.
  46. added 2014-03-31
    Self-Knowledge and Scepticism.Jeff Malpas - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (2):165-184.
    Donald Davidson has argued that 'most of our beliefs must be true' and that global scepticism is therefore false. Davidson's arguments to this conclusion often seem to depend on externalist considerations. Davidson's position has been criticised, however, on the grounds that he does not defeat the sceptic, but rather already assumes the falsity of scepticism through his appeal to externalism. Indeed, it has been claimed that far from defeating the sceptic Davidson introduces an even more extreme version of scepticism according (...)
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  47. added 2014-03-30
    Switched-Words Skepticism: A Case Study in Semantical Anti-Skeptical Argument.David Christensen - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (1):33 - 58.
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  48. added 2014-03-27
    Externalism and Skepticism.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):159-194.
    Internalists and externalists in epistemology continue to disagree about how best to understand epistemic concepts such as justification or warrant or knowledge. But there has been some movement towards agreement. Two of the most prominent rationales for the internalist position have been subjected to severe criticism by externalists: the idea that justification should be understood deontologically and the thought that justification consists in having a reason in the form of another belief. It would not be accurate to say that all (...)
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  49. added 2014-03-26
    Problems for Semantic Externalism and A Priori Refutations of Skeptical Arguments.Keith Butler - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (1):29-49.
    SummaryA familiar sort of argument for skepticism about the external world appeals to the evidential similarity between what is presumed to be the normal case and the case where one is a brain in a vat . An argument from Putnam has been taken by many to provide an a priori refutation of this sort of skeptical argument. The question I propose to address in this paper is whether Putnam's argument affords us an a priori refutation of skeptical arguments that (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-26
    Externalism and Scepticism.André Gallois & John O'Leary-Hawthorne - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (1):1 - 26.
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